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Part i
Introduction and overview of EU legal 
instruments in the fight against terrorism

Introduction
Francesca Galli and Anne Weyembergh
1.	 The	background	to	the	publication
In recent times, evaluations have become increasingly important when it comes 
to EU policy related to cooperation in penal matters. This has been recognised by the 
EU institutions, and especially by the European Commission  1 and by the Justice 
and Home Affairs Council  2. It can also be read in planning texts adopted by the 
European Council, such as the The Hague Programme of 5 November 2005  3 and the 
Stockholm Programme of December 2009  4 and political texts such as the Lisbon 
Treaty  5. There are a number of reasons for this trend. One is the increasing number 
and importance of EU instruments in the field. Faced with this development, one 
of the main current challenges is to ensure that existing EU penal law is fully and 
correctly implemented. In this regard, an evaluation of the implementation of existing 
criminal policy texts is essential. An evaluation of the existing EU texts and of their 
implementation is also required before further developing policies in the penal sector. 
Each new intervention by the EU legislator should be preceded by a demonstration of 
the added value of the draft instrument. Part of this should be about identifying and 
measuring the effects of the existing law. Finally, evaluation is also a key part of efforts 
to boost levels of mutual trust within the EU criminal justice area. Proper evaluation 
1 See especially the Commission’s Communications “on evaluation of EU policies on 
freedom, security and justice”, COM (2006) 332 final, 28 June 2006 and “on the creation of a 
forum for discussing EU justice policies and practice”, COM (2008) 38 final, 4 February 2008. 
See also COM (2005) 195 final, 19 May 2005, p. 8 and f. 
2 See JHA conclusions of 24 January 2005.
3 OJ, no. C 53, 3 March 2005, p. 1.
4 OJ, no. C 115, 4 May 2010, p. 1.
5 Article 70 TFEU.
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can help drive up the quality and efficiency of national systems and improves mutual 
knowledge and understanding of each others’ systems. 
This collective book presents and discusses the latest counter-terrorism policies 
at the EU level, and particularly the approximating instruments in the field, namely 
the Framework Decisions 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism and 2008/919/JHA 
amending the previous one. The objective is, in particular, to evaluate the impact of 
introducing an EU definition of terrorism and the three new offences of provocation, 
training and recruiting for terrorism purposes on the development of selected EU 
Member States’ substantive criminal law and case law. 
It is a follow-up to the studies by ECLAN on the evaluation of EU policies 
in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which aims to develop a 
methodology to assess the implementation and impact of European criminal law  6. 
It applies the methodology developed by these ECLAN studies. The choice of which 
EU instruments to assess was determined by the ECLAN contact points on the basis of 
their importance, sensitivity and representativeness but also on the basis of the period 
of implementation. A sufficient period of time had to go by to allow for an assessment 
of their transposition and of the instruments’ practical implementation  7. The chosen 
topic is, moreover, in line with the research project entitled ‘The prevention of 
terrorism within the European Union: impact on criminal law and the redefinition of 
the relationship between European criminal law and national criminal justice systems’ 
conducted by the Institut d’Etudes Européennes of the ULB  8.
6 Particularly noteworthy are the two following publications: A. weyembergh and S. de 
biolley (eds.), Comment évaluer le droit pénal européen?, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université 
de Bruxelles, 2006, 242 p. and A. weyembergh and V. santamaria (eds.), The evaluation of 
European criminal law – The example of the Framework Decision on combating trafficking in 
human beings, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009.  See also other projects 
and publications such as the project led by the University of Maastricht on “Evaluation and 
Monitoring European Cooperation in Criminal Matters” and N.M. dane and A. KliP (eds.), An 
additional evaluation mechanism in the field of EU judicial cooperation mechanisms in the field 
of EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters to strengthen mutual trust, Celsus Juridische 
Uitgeverij, 2009.
7 By virtue of Article 11 of the 2002 FD, Member States had to adopt the necessary 
measures to implement the instrument by 31 December 2002 and by virtue of Article 3 of the 
2008 FD, Member States had to adopt the necessary measures to implement the instrument by 
9 December 2010.
8 This is led with the financial support of the Belgian Fond National pour la Recherche 
Scientifique (FNRS). 






1. History and scope
The need to put in place a common and robust EU policy against terrorism was 
discussed for years before any action was taken. Finally, a proposal for a Framework 
Decision on the fight against terrorism was presented by the Commission on 19 
September 2001  10, a few days after the attacks of 11 September 2001. The proposal 
was negotiated during the Belgian Presidency of the EU Council. Thanks to the 
favorable timing for any negotiation in this field, it was formally adopted on 13 June 
2002  11. 
9 On the Framework Decision see A. Weyembergh and V. Santamaria, “Lutte contre le 
terrorisme et droits fondamentaux dans le cadre du troisième pilier. La Décision-cadre du 13 juin 
2002 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et le principe de la légalité”, in J. Rideau (ed.), Les 
droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne. Dans le sillage de la Constitution européenne, 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2009, p. 197 and f.; M.A. Beernaert, “La décision-cadre du 13 juin 2002 
relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme”, Revue internationale de droit pénal, 2006, p. 277 and 
f.; S. Peers, “EU Responses to Terrorism”, ICLQ, no. 52, 2003, p. 227; B. Saul, “International 
Terrorism as a European Crime: The Policy Rationale for Criminalization”, European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 11(4), 2003, p. 323-349; E. Dimitriu, “The EU’s 
Definition of Terrorism: The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism”, German 
Law Journal, 5(5), 2004, p. 585-602. On the EU counter-terrorism policy more broadly, see 
A. Adam, La lutte contre le terrorisme: étude comparative Union européenne – Etats-Unis, 
Paris, L’Harmattan, 2005; J. Argomaniz, The EU and counter-terrorism: politics, polity and 
policies after 9/11, New York, Routledge, 2011; J. auvret-fincK (ed.), L’Union européenne 
et la lutte contre le terrorisme : état des lieux et perspectives, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2010; D. 
Brown, The European Union, counter terrorism and police co-operation, 1992-2007: unsteady 
foundations?, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010; O. Bures, “EU Counterterrorism 
Policy: A Paper Tiger?”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(1), 2006, p. 57; F. Eder and 
M. Senn (eds.), Europe and transnational terrorism: assessing threats and countermeasures, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009; M. Jimeno-bulnes, “After September 11th: the fight against 
terrorism in national and European law. Substantive and procedural rules: some examples”, 
European law journal, 10, 2004, p. 235; D. Keohane, The EU and counter-terrorism, London, 
Centre For European Reform, 2005; D. MahncKe and J. Monar (eds.), International Terrorism. 
A European Response to a Global Threat?, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2006; J. Monar, “Common 
Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its 
Problems”, Government and Opposition, 42(3), 2007, p. 292; J. Monar, “The EU’s Approach 
post-September 11: Global Terrorism as a Multidimensional Law Enforcement Challenge”, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20(2), 2007, p. 267; A. Weyembergh, “La 
coopération pénale européenne face au terrorisme: rupture ou continuité ?”, in K. Bannelier et 
al. (eds.), Le Droit international face au terrorisme après le 11 septembre 2001, Paris, Pedone, 
2002.
10 COM (2001) 521final, 19 September 2001. 
11 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ, no. L 164, 
22 June 2002, p. 3-7. 
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This Framework Decision is meant to put into practice Article 31(e) TUE, which 
explicitly refers to terrorism as one of the priorities for the approximation of Member 
States’ legislation, i.e. the adoption of measures establishing minimum standards on 
offences and sanctions. With the exception of some specificities, the instrument is 
modeled on other framework decisions aiming at approximating substantive criminal 
law in the European Union. The most important provisions in the Framework Decision 
focus on the approximation of offences (Articles 1 to 4) but others concern sanctions 
(Article 5), the acknowledgment of particular mitigating circumstances (Article 6), the 
liability of legal persons (Article 7) and the relevant penalties (Article 8), jurisdiction 
and prosecutions (Article 9), the protection and the assistance to victims (Article 10) 
and the coming into force of the instrument (Articles 11-13). 
By virtue of Article 1, Member States must take all necessary measures to 
incorporate into national legislation terrorist offences as defined on the basis of three 
elements: 
− Material acts, listed in para. 1(a) to 1(i), as being criminalised in national legislation 
(e.g. attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death, attacks on the physical 
integrity of a person and kidnapping or hostage-taking or threatening to commit 
any of the acts listed);
− The seriousness of the danger resulting from the material acts listed: acts 
that, “because of their nature or context, could seriously harm a country or an 
international organisation”;
− The moral element or terrorist intent of the author: acts must have been 
committed intentionally “with the aim of seriously intimidating a population 
or unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or 
abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country 
or an international organisation”. 
By virtue of Article 2, States must also punish offences related to a terrorist 
group. Two kinds of acts are identified: directing a terrorist group and participation in 
a terrorist group, including providing information or material means via any kind of 
financing of these activities with the knowledge that this participation will contribute 
to the criminal activities of the group. 
A terrorist group is defined as: “a structured group of more than two persons, 
established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences”. 
“Structured group” is defined as “a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate 
commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its 
members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure”. 
Article 3 requires States to take measures to criminalise, as terrorist offences, 
aggravated theft, extortion and drawing up false administrative documents with a 
view to committing a terrorist offence. 
By virtue of Article 4, States are required to sanction incitement and conspiracy 
to commit a terrorist offence, to direct or participate in a terrorist group and to be 
involved in terrorist activities. The attempt to commit a terrorist offence or an offence 
linked with terrorist activities must also be punished. 
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2. Models for a European definition of terrorism 
The definitions of the offences cited above have been mainly influenced by three 
different sources: international law  12, the law of the European Union and domestic 
legislation. 
At the international level, there have been some unsuccessful attempts to agree on 
a general definition of terrorism  13. More generally, the United Nations have avoided 
defining terrorism as such for a long time. The international approach has long been 
a sectoral one  14, with the focus being on material acts. In order to reinforce judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, material acts were depoliticised, with their specific 
intent being left aside. The Council of Europe has adopted a similar approach  15. 
12 With regards to the criminalisation of terrorism in international law, see international 
bar association, Terrorism and International Law: accountability, remedies and reform, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011; Y. Ronen, “Incitement to terrorist acts and international law”, 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 23(3), 2010, p. 645-674; M. Letho, The criminalisation 
of terrorism financing, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff , 2010; M.J. Glennon, Terrorism et droit 
international/Terrorism and international law, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008; B. Saul, 
Defining terrorism in international law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; A. Cassese, 
“The multifaced criminal notion of terrorism in international law”, Journal of International 
criminal Justice, 4, 2006, p. 933-958; J. Friedrichs, “Defining the International Public Enemy: 
The Political Struggle behind the Legal Debate on International Terrorism”, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 19, 2006, p. 69-91; J.C. Martin, Les règles internationales relatives à la 
lutte contre le terrorisme, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2006; H. Duffy, The “war on terror” and the 
framework of international law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005; G. Guillaume, 
“Terrorism and international law”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 53(3), 
2004, p. 537-548; international bar association, International terrorism: legal challenges 
and responses, New York, Transnational publishers, 2003; K. Bannelier et al. (eds.), op. cit.; 
E. Hugues, “La notion de terrorisme en droit international: en quête d’une définition juridique”, 
JDI, 3, 2002, p. 761 and f.; A. Cassese, “Terrorism is also disrupting some crucial legal 
categories of international law”, European Journal of International law,  12(5), 2001, p. 993-
1001; M. Flory and R. Higgins (eds.), Terrorism and international law, London, Routledge, 
1997; G. Guillaume, “Terrorisme et droit international », RCADI, III, T. 215, 1989, p. 287 and 
f.; H. Labayle, “Droit international et lutte contre le terrorisme”, AFDI, 1986, p. 106 and f.  
13 See for instance the Convention of 16 November 1937 for the prevention and punishment 
of terrorism (formally adopted but never come into force), in S. Glaser, Droit international 
pénal conventionnel, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1970, p. 233 and f.
14 See for instance the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On 
Board Aircraft (1963), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons (1973), International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979), Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980). For a complete list see http://www.
un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml.
15 See the Council of Europe Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism of 27 January 
1977, STE 90; the Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
of 15 May 2003, STE 190; the Council of Europe Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism of 
16 May 2005, STE 196. For a comment on the approach of the Council of Europe, see council 
of euroPe (ed.), Les Droits de l’Homme et la Lutte contre le Terrorisme. Les Lignes Directrices 
du Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, 2005. 
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By identifying a legal and general category as ‘terrorist offences’, where intent 
constitutes the key element, the Framework Decision breaks with the traditional 
treatment of terrorist offences as described above. However, the Framework Decision 
was certainly influenced by the global approach, which has recently evolved. Since the 
1990s the UN has sought to adopt a Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism which 
would define terrorism as such  16. This new approach was launched by the two last 
UN conventions adopted before the drafting of the Framework Decision 2002, namely 
the Convention for the suppression of terrorist bombing of 15 December 1997 and the 
Convention for the suppression of terrorism financing of 9 December 1999. Although 
they remain ad hoc instruments, adopting a sectoral approach, they both employ terms 
such as ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’. In addition, the Convention on terrorism financing 
of 1999 does come up with a definition of terrorism. For this purpose, it refers to all 
UN ad hoc instruments listed in the annex but also to “any other act intended to cause 
death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active 
part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by 
its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act”  17.
Remarkably, during the Framework Decision negotiations, numerous delegations 
insisted on using the UN definition within the EU instrument. The final version of the 
Framework Decision has certainly been influenced by this  18. 
EU law, especially the definition of ‘criminal organisation’ in Article 1 of the 
Joint Action of 21 December 1998 on the criminalisation of participation in a criminal 
organisation in the Member States  19 has also clearly inspired the definition of a 
terrorist organisation. 
National legislation has also been a point of reference for the Framework Decision. 
This is particularly true for Member States where, as a result of domestic threats 
experienced in the 1960s to the 1980s, terrorist offences were already enshrined in 
16 See M. Hmoud, “Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism. Major Bones of Contention”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4(5), 2006, 
p. 1031-1043; S.P. Subedi, “The war on terror and UN attempt to adopt a comprehensive 
convention on international terrorism”, in P. Eden and T. o’donnel (eds.), September 11, 
2001: a turning point in international and domestic law, New York, Transnational publishers, 
2005, p. 207-225; P. d’argent, “Examen du projet de convention générale sur le terrorisme 
international”, in K. Bannelier et al., op. cit., p. 121 and f., and J.C. Martin, op. cit., p. 69. 
See also ‘Renewed effort towards completion of Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism 
applauded in Legal Committee’ (8 October 2008), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 2008/
gal3340.doc.htm.
17 Article 2(1)(b) UNGA International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism (1999). 
18 See the position of the Netherlands as supported by Denmark, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom (Council of the European Union, doc 12647/1/01 rev 10). See also Council of the 
European Union, doc 12647/2/01 rev 2. With regards to the value of this reference to UN 
conventions, see E.J. Husabo, “The implementation of new rules on terrorism through the 
pillars of the European Union”, in E.J. Husabo and A. StrandbaKKen (eds.), Harmonisation of 
criminal law in Europe, Antwerpen/Oxford, Intersentia, 2005, p. 58 and f. 
19 OJ, no. L 351, 29 December 1998, p. 1 and f. 
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national criminal codes: the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany. 
Despite the differences in national legislations, the definition of terrorist offences 
results from a combination of existing offences and the perpetrator’s terrorist intent. 
3. Negotiations
The definition of offences has been at the centre of the negotiations, thus markedly 
influencing the initial proposal. 
The proposal only contained two articles on offences: Article 3 on terrorist 
offences and Article 4 on incitement, aiding and abetting, conspiracy and attempt. 
It did not explicitly distinguish between offences related to a terrorist group or to 
terrorism activities. These offences were, however, covered by the category of 
‘terrorist offences’. This category also covered directing and participating in a terrorist 
organisation, aggravated theft and extortion. 
Changes introduced in the course of the negotiations mainly aimed at tightening 
up the wording of the definition of terrorism. Such a trend was evident from the 
very beginning of the discussions  20. First, as a result of the negotiations, many 
of the material acts listed in Article 1 were more strictly defined than in the initial 
proposal. Second, whereas the requirement of seriousness of the danger was quite 
discrete or almost non-existent in the initial proposal, it was generally worded and 
even several times repeated concerning various material acts. Third, if on the one 
hand, the terrorist intent has been enlarged to encompass serious attacks against 
international organisations too, it has been more narrowly defined from various points 
of view  21.
4. Evaluation
This section will provide a few elements of the overall assessment as a fuller 
assessment is the focus of the following contribution by Sabine Gless. 
The Framework Decision was severely criticised in particular for not being 
sufficiently democratic. As with other third pillar instruments, the European Parliament 
was only consulted and its opinion had only a relatively minor impact on the final 
version of the text. Such a democratic deficit has affected all framework decisions but 
it was even more the case for this Framework Decision, which obliged some Member 
States to insert an offence that did not exist into their national law and not simply to 
redefine preexisting offences in their internal legislation.
As mentioned above, efforts have been made during the negotiations to define 
the offences more narrowly and to find a better balance between the need to combat 
terrorism effectively and to protect suspects’ and defendants’ rights  22. However, 
20 See Doc. 12647/01. For a deeper comparison between the initial proposal and the final 
text, see A. Weyembergh and V. Santamaria, op. cit., p. 197 and f.
21 See F. Dias and P. Caeiro, “A Lei de Combate ao terrorismo”, Revista de legislaçao  e 
de jurisprudencia, 3935, 2005, p. 70 and f. 
22 A. Weyembergh, “L’impact du 11 septembre sur l’équilibre sécurité/liberté dans 
l’espace pénal européen”, in E. Bribosia et A. Weyembergh (eds.), op. cit., p. 153-195; M. den 
boer, “The EU and Counter-terrorism: Human Rights in the Balance?”, in The law on Terror: 
Terrorism and Human Rights, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2003, p. 29-45; R. Goldstone, 
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the Framework Decision has been the subject of considerable criticism and one 
may indeed wonder whether it has succeeded in its attempt to overcome the usual 
difficulties met in the pursuit of a general definition of terrorism  23. 
Many authors have denounced the definition as being imprecise and general 
and thus not in compliance with the principle of legality  24. Such criticisms were 
addressed to each of the constituent elements of the terrorist offences. First, some 
material acts listed, such as the “threatening to commit” a terrorist act, are defined 
very broadly. Second, the criterion of dangerousness and the notion of intent, which 
are meant to lend specificity to terrorist offences, are extremely imprecise. The EU 
network of independent experts in human rights has concluded that these elements are 
not sufficient to define a terrorist offence precisely enough  25. 
A number of formal safeguards have been raised during the negotiations and a 
special provision has been introduced in the text: “This Framework Decision shall not 
have the effect of altering the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental 
legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union”  26. Such 
safeguards can be seen as reassuring because they give information on the meaning to 
give to the terms used and on the intentions of the authors of the text. However, they 
may also be analysed as a symptom of the negotiators’ uneasiness, as an admission 
by them of the risks of abuses which arise from the chosen definition. In addition, 
the declaration annexed by the Council to the Framework Decision  27, which raises 
“The Tension between Combating Terrorism and Protecting Civil Liberties”, in R. Ashby 
wilson, Human Rights in the “War on Terror”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 
p. 157-168. 
23 With regards to such difficulties see J.F. Gayraud, “Définir le terrorisme : est-ce possible, 
est-ce souhaitable ?”, RICPT, 2, 1988, p. 185 and f.; K. Koufa KallioPi, Terrorism and Human 
rights, Progress Report, UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31, 27 juin 2007, para. 25, p. 8. 
24 See M.L. Cesoni, “Terrorisme et involutions démocratiques”, Rev. dr. pén., 2002, p. 141 
and f.; I. Thomas, “La mise en œuvre en droit européen des dispositions internationales de lutte 
contre le terrorisme”, RGDIP, 2, 2004, p. 475. 
25 See eu networK of indePendent exPerts in fundamental rights, The balance between 
freedom and security in the response by the European Union and its Member States to the 
terrorist threats (2004), p. 11, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/obs_
thematique_fr.pdf
26 Article 1(2) FD 2002. 
27 According to this annex : “The Council states that the Framework Decision on the fight 
against terrorism covers acts which are considered by all Member States of the European Union 
as serious infringements of their criminal laws committed by individuals whose objectives 
constitute a threat to their democratic societies respecting the rule of law and the civilisation 
upon which these societies are founded. It has to be understood in this sense and cannot be 
construed so as to argue that the conduct of those who have acted in the interest of preserving 
or restoring these democratic values, as was notably the case in some Member States during the 
Second World War, could now be considered as “terrorist” acts. Nor can it be construed so as 
to incriminate on terrorist grounds persons exercising their fundamental right to manifest their 
opinions, even if in the course of the exercise of such right they commit offences” (Council, 
doc. 14845/1/01, REV 1, 7 Dec. 2001). 
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the problem of the legitimacy of the struggle of freedom fighters  28, reinforces the 
subjective interpretation of the definition of terrorism and makes things even more 
confused.  Critical views have been expressed and dangers of abuse have been 
underlined because the aim of the criminalisation of terrorism at the EU level is not 
to prevent specific acts from going unpunished  29 but rather to improve police and 
judicial criminal cooperation and apply exceptional measures (harsher penalties  30 
and exceptional procedural rules including particular means of investigations  31). 
Reacting to these criticisms, the supporters of the Framework Decision underlined 
that the implementation measures at the national level as well as the margin of 
appreciation left to the judiciary would lead to a restrictive interpretation and application 
of the instrument and the definition of terrorism. However, it is uncertain whether 
the national authorities have effectively implemented the definitions provided by the 
Framework Decision in a stricter way and it is unclear how they might implement 
them in a stricter way without betraying the substance of the Framework Decision and 
thus risk being accused of failing to transpose the instrument. Besides, given the nature 
of the instrument, the margin of manoeuvre left to national legislators is very limited. 
In addition, although criminal law must be strictly interpreted  32, practice shows that 
not all judges tend to apply a strict interpretation of criminal provisions  33. 
B.	 Council	Framework	Decision	2008/919/JHA	of	28	November	2008
The EU Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA amends the 2002 Framework 
Decision in its Article 3 and introduces the offences of ‘public provocation to 
commit a terrorist offence’, ‘training for terrorism’ and ‘recruitment for terrorism’, as 
demanded by the earlier Council of Europe Convention of 2005 on the Prevention of 
Terrorism  34, from which the Framework Decision draws inspiration. 
28 On terrorism and freedom fighters see J. Hubrecht, “Comment distinguer un ‘combattant 
de la liberté’ d’un terroriste?”, Esprit, 1, 2002, p. 5 and f.; T. garton ash, “Is There a Good 
Terrorist?”, NY Review of books, 29 November 2001. 
29 Terrorist offences were not criminalised as such in most Member States. However, 
specific criminal acts were prosecuted under different labels. In this regard see for instance the 
contribution within this book on the Belgian legislation and case-law.
30 Article 5(2) FD 2002. 
31 See M.-L. Cesoni (ed.), Nouvelles méthodes de lutte contre la criminalité: la normalisa- 
tion de l’exception. Etude de droit comparé (France, EU, France, Pays-Bas), Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, 2007. 
32 On the principle of strict interpretation of criminal law see for instance F. TulKens and 
M. van de Kerchove, Introduction au droit pénal. Aspects juridiques et criminologiques, 
Bruxelles, Kluwer, 1993, p. 284 and f.; J. Messinne, “Tendances récentes en droit pénal et en 
procédure pénale”, Mélanges offerts à Robert Legros, Bruxelles, Editions. de l’Université de 
Bruxelles, 1985, p. 459. 
33 See F. TulKens and M. van de Kerchove, op. cit., p. 284-286. See for instance the 
contribution within this book on the Belgian legislation and case-law. 
34 See A. Hunt, “The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism”, 
European Public Law, 4, 2006, p. 603; council of euroPe (ed.), “Apologie du terrorisme” and 
incitement to terrorism, Strasbourg, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, 2007. 
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Proposed by the Commission on 6 November 2007, this amendment is the 
result of a change in the terrorist threat, which sees an increase in the use of the 
internet in the self-training and self-radicalisation of potential terrorists with the 
consequent development of the ‘lone wolves’ phenomenon. In addition, more and 
more young Europeans are being recruited to carry out terrorism training in Pakistan 
or Afghanistan.
By virtue of the Framework Decision, “public provocation to commit a terrorist 
offence” means the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the 
public, with the intent to incite the commission of [a terrorist offence] where such 
conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that 
one or more such offences may be committed. “Recruitment for terrorism” means to 
solicit another person to commit a terrorist offence or an offence related to a terrorist 
group. “Training for terrorism” means to provide instruction in the making or use 
of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or in 
other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence 
knowing that the skills provided are intended to be used for this purpose. 
The three new offences are crimes of intent and it is not enough to be reckless for 
one of them to have been deemed to have been committed. The Framework Decision 
explicitly incriminates these offences when committed via the internet too.
This second Framework Decision suffers from the same democratic deficit as the 
first one. Despite the urgency of the amendment given developments in the terrorist 
threat, it would have been preferable, for the purpose of the principle of legality, to 
wait until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which would have resulted in 
the involvement of the European Parliament as co-legislator and would have reduced 
the abovementioned democratic deficit.
The insertion of the three new offences has also raised another concern. On the one 
hand, the offence of provocation is likely to affect the right to freedom of expression 
ex Article 10 ECHR  35. This right may be legitimately restricted under limited 
conditions identified in Article 10(2), i.e. only when interferences are prescribed by 
law, pursue a legitimate aim, and are “necessary in a democratic society”. On the 
other hand, extending criminal liability beyond the traditional notion of attempt, the 
offences of recruitment and training are at risk of curtailing freedom of association 
and assembly ex Article 11 ECHR, which may only be restrained under the previously 
mentioned conditions of legality, necessity and proportionality  36. 
35 I. Hare and J. Weistein (eds.), Extreme Speech and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2009. 
36 eu networK of indePendent exPerts in fundamental rights, The requirements of 
fundamental rights in the framework of the measures of prevention of violent radicalisation 
and recruitment of potential terrorists, 2005; OSCE/ODIHR, Human Rights Considerations 
in Combating Incitement to Terrorism and Related Offences, 2006, at http://www.osce.org/
odihr/22052.
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3.	 The	structure	of	the	publication
Following this introduction and a general critical assessment by Sabine Gless 
of Framework Decisions 2002/475/JHA and 2008/919/JHA, the book contains three 
main parts. 
The first part will be devoted to the interplay between these two EU instruments 
and national provisions, including a study of the relevant domestic case law. Nine 
Member States have been selected in order to ensure a balanced representation based 
on where they are located in geographical terms, the nature of their judicial systems, 
having some “old” and some “new” Member States but also and particularly the 
division between two groups of States: a first group gathering few jurisdictions which 
have experienced serious and long-lasting periods of political violence and terrorism, 
developed specific terrorist offences and have been influential in providing a model 
for shaping a common European counter-terrorism strategy and a second group 
encompassing States which have defined terrorist offences as autonomous ones in 
their penal codes only as required by the Framework Decision of 2002 on combating 
terrorism. These nine Member States are France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Hungary. This study, which focuses on the 
legislation and case law of the selected jurisdictions, will follow a common grid of 
analysis entitled ‘Guide for the contributions on national counter-terrorism legislation 
and case law’, which is annexed to this introduction. 
A second and briefer part looks at the influence of the two relevant EU framework 
decisions harmonizing the terrorist offences on European cooperation. 
A third and last part is entirely dedicated to the issue of the shift towards 
prevention in the fight against terrorism and gathers several crosscutting reports for 
this purpose. 
The book ends with a conclusion by Pedro Caeiro.




 1.1. Indicate whether and to what extent terrorism constitutes a major threat in your country 
– and whether it is a threat of an international or national kind.
2.	 Identify	 the	 legislation	 adopted	 to	 implement	 the	 Framework	 Decisions	 2002	 and	
2008,	highlighting	in	particular:	
 2.1 Whether your country has implemented both Framework Decisions of 2002 and 
2008; 
 2.2 Whether the deadline for the implementation of the instrument was met; 
 2.3 If/why one or both instruments have not been implemented (e.g. pre-existing measures 
satisfying the requirements of the new instruments);  
 2.4 Whether the implementation of the Framework Decisions required the repeal of pre-
existing provisions; 
 2.4 Whether the implementation of the new instruments introduced symbolic or significant 
legislative changes. 
3.	 The	legislation	in	detail:	
 3.1 Definition of the offences, penalties, liability of legal persons; 
 3.2 Rules of competence and prosecution;  
 3.3 Identify and explain eventual lacunas in the implementation of specific provisions 
(e.g. conflict with pre-existing national provisions, ambiguities in the definition of the 
framework decisions’ provisions). 
4.	 National	case	law	
 4.1 If available, please provide detailed information on the number of prosecutions and the 
number of convictions on the basis of a terrorism charge since 2001; 
 4.2 Example of concrete cases (Do judges interpret the law in accordance with the 
legislators’ approach? Is their interpretation strict or broad? etc.);  
 4.3 Identify practical obstacles to the application of the law to concrete cases (contradictions 
within the framework decisions, the national provisions, lack of clarity, etc).  
5.	 Perception	of	the	instrument	at	the	national	level	
 5.1 The practitioners’ assessment of the framework decisions and the legislation 
implementing them at the national level;
 5.2 Do practitioners have an in-depth knowledge of the framework decisions’ provisions 
and of the national legislation implementing them? 
 5.3 Do politicians, the media and civil society manifest a particular position towards the 
framework decisions and the relevant legislation at the national level? 
 5.4 Doctrinal perspective on the topic (bibliography attached).
6.	 Conclusion
 6.1 Direct and indirect impact of the framework decisions and the relevant national 
legislation on the protection of fundamental rights (legality principle, presumption of 
innocence, burden of proof, etc.);
 6.2. Impact of the framework decisions and the relevant national legislation on the legal 
framework as a whole and on domestic criminal policies; 
37 This document is inspired by the Modèle standard d’évaluation académique. See A. 
Weyembergh and V. Santamaria (eds.), The evaluation of European criminal law – The example 
of the Framework Decision on combating trafficking in human beings, Bruxelles, Editions de 
l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009, p. 9-40.
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6.3 Do you consider that the shift towards prevention and the development of special 




THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Union, and in particular Article 29, 
Article 31(e) and Article 34(2)(b) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2),
Whereas:
(1) The European Union is founded on the universal values of human dignity, liberty, equality 
and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is based on the principle 
of democracy and the principle of the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member 
States.
(2) Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious violations of those principles. The La Gomera 
Declaration adopted at the informal Council meeting on 14 October 1995 affirmed that terrorism 
constitutes a threat to democracy, to the free exercise of human rights and to economic and 
social development.
(3) All or some Member States are party to a number of conventions relating to terrorism. The 
Council of Europe Convention of 27 January 1977 on the Suppression of Terrorism does not 
regard terrorist offences as political offences or as offences connected with political offences 
or as offences inspired by political motives. The United Nations has adopted the Convention 
for the suppression of terrorist bombings of 15 December 1997 and the Convention for the 
suppression of financing terrorism of 9 December 1999. A draft global Convention against 
terrorism is currently being negotiated within the United Nations.
(4) At European Union level, on 3 December 1998 the Council adopted the Action Plan of 
the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice (3). Account should also be taken of the 
Council Conclusions of 20 September 2001 and of the Extraordinary European Council plan of 
action to combat terrorism of 21 September 2001. Terrorism was referred to in the conclusions 
of the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999, and of the Santa María da 
Feira European Council of 19 and 20 June 2000. It was also mentioned in the Commission 
communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the biannual update of the 
scoreboard to review progress on the creation of an area of “freedom, security and justice” in 
the European Union (second half of 2000). Furthermore, on 5 September 2001 the European 
Parliament adopted a recommendation on the role of the European Union in combating 
terrorism. It should, moreover, be recalled that on 30 July 1996 twenty-five measures to fight 
against terrorism were advocated by the leading industrialised countries (G7) and Russia 
meeting in Paris.
(5) The European Union has adopted numerous specific measures having an impact on terrorism 
and organised crime, such as the Council Decision of 3 December 1998 instructing Europol 
to deal with crimes committed or likely to be committed in the course of terrorist activities 
against life, limb, personal freedom or property (4); Council Joint Action 96/610/JHA of 15 
October 1996 concerning the creation and maintenance of a Directory of specialised counter-
terrorist competences, skills and expertise to facilitate counter-terrorism cooperation between 
the Member States of the European Union (5); Council Joint Action 98/428/JHA of 29 June 1998 
on the creation of a European Judicial Network (6), with responsibilities in terrorist offences, 
in particular Article 2; Council Joint Action 98/733/JHA of 21 December 1998 on making it a 
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criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European 
Union (7); and the Council Recommendation of 9 December 1999 on cooperation in combating 
the financing of terrorist groups (8).
(6) The definition of terrorist offences should be approximated in all Member States, including 
those offences relating to terrorist groups. Furthermore, penalties and sanctions should be 
provided for natural and legal persons having committed or being liable for such offences, 
which reflect the seriousness of such offences.
(7) Jurisdictional rules should be established to ensure that the terrorist offence may be 
effectively prosecuted.
(8) Victims of terrorist offences are vulnerable, and therefore specific measures are necessary 
with regard to them.
(9) Given that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States unilaterally, and can therefore, because of the need for reciprocity, be better 
achieved at the level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, this Framework 
Decision does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(10) This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they emerge 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States as principles of Community law. 
The Union observes the principles recognised by Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union 
and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably Chapter VI 
thereof. Nothing in this Framework Decision may be interpreted as being intended to reduce 
or restrict fundamental rights or freedoms such as the right to strike, freedom of assembly, of 
association or of expression, including the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions 
with others for the protection of his or her interests and the related right to demonstrate.
(11) Actions by armed forces during periods of armed conflict, which are governed by 
international humanitarian law within the meaning of these terms under that law, and, inasmuch 
as they are governed by other rules of international law, actions by the armed forces of a State in 
the exercise of their official duties are not governed by this Framework Decision,
HAS ADOPTED THIS FRAMEWORK DECISION:
Article 1
Terrorist offences and fundamental rights and principles
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts 
referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defined as offences under national law, which, given 
their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where 
committed with the aim of:
– seriously intimidating a population, or
– unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from 
performing any act, or
– seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or 
social structures of a country or an international organisation,
shall be deemed to be terrorist offences:
(a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death;
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an 
infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the 
continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in 
major economic loss;
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
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(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or 
of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, 
biological and chemical weapons;
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is 
to endanger human life;
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural 
resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;
(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).
2. This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of altering the obligation to respect 
fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union.
Article 2
Offences relating to a terrorist group
1. For the purposes of this Framework Decision, “terrorist group” shall mean: a structured 
group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to 
commit terrorist offences. “Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed 
for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined 
roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following intentional 
acts are punishable:
(a) directing a terrorist group;
(b) participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or 
material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such 
participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group.
Article 3
Offences linked to terrorist activities
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that terrorist-linked offences 
include the following acts:
(a) aggravated theft with a view to committing one of the acts listed in Article 1(1);
(b) extortion with a view to the perpetration of one of the acts listed in Article 1(1);
(c) drawing up false administrative documents with a view to committing one of the acts listed 
in Article 1(1)(a) to (h) and Article 2(2)(b).
Article 4
Inciting, aiding or abetting, and attempting
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that inciting or aiding or 
abetting an offence referred to in Article 1(1), Articles 2 or 3 is made punishable.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that attempting to commit an 
offence referred to in Article 1(1) and Article 3, with the exception of possession as provided for 
in Article 1(1)(f) and the offence referred to in Article 1(1)(i), is made punishable.
Article 5
Penalties
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred to 
in Articles 1 to 4 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, 
which may entail extradition.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the terrorist offences 
referred to in Article 1(1) and offences referred to in Article 4, inasmuch as they relate to 
terrorist offences, are punishable by custodial sentences heavier than those imposable under 
national law for such offences in the absence of the special intent required pursuant to Article 
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1(1), save where the sentences imposable are already the maximum possible sentences under 
national law.
3. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that offences listed in Article 
2 are punishable by custodial sentences, with a maximum sentence of not less than fifteen 
years for the offence referred to in Article 2(2)(a), and for the offences listed in Article 2(2)(b) 
a maximum sentence of not less than eight years. In so far as the offence referred to in Article 




Each Member State may take the necessary measures to ensure that the penalties referred to in 
Article 5 may be reduced if the offender:
(a) renounces terrorist activity, and
(b) provides the administrative or judicial authorities with information which they would not 
otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them to:
(i) prevent or mitigate the effects of the offence;
(ii) identify or bring to justice the other offenders;
(iii) find evidence; or
(iv) prevent further offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4.
Article 7
Liability of legal persons
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be held 
liable for any of the offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4 committed for their benefit by any 
person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading 
position within the legal person, based on one of the following:
(a) a power of representation of the legal person;
(b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person;
(c) an authority to exercise control within the legal person.
2. Apart from the cases provided for in paragraph 1, each Member State shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure that legal persons can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control 
by a person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of any of the offences 
referred to in Articles 1 to 4 for the benefit of that legal person by a person under its authority.
3. Liability of legal persons under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal proceedings 
against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators or accessories in any of the offences 
referred to in Articles 1 to 4.
Article 8
Penalties for legal persons
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person held liable 
pursuant to Article 7 is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which 
shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other penalties, such as:
(a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid;
(b) temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities;
(c) placing under judicial supervision;
(d) a judicial winding-up order;
(e) temporary or permanent closure of establishments which have been used for committing 
the offence.
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Article 9
Jurisdiction and prosecution
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4 where:
(a) the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory. Each Member State may extend 
its jurisdiction if the offence is committed in the territory of a Member State;
(b) the offence is committed on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft registered there;
(c) the offender is one of its nationals or residents;
(d) the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in its territory;
(e) the offence is committed against the institutions or people of the Member State in question 
or against an institution of the European Union or a body set up in accordance with the Treaty 
establishing the European Community or the Treaty on European Union and based in that 
Member State.
2. When an offence falls within the jurisdiction of more than one Member State and when 
any of the States concerned can validly prosecute on the basis of the same facts, the Member 
States concerned shall cooperate in order to decide which of them will prosecute the offenders 
with the aim, if possible, of centralising proceedings in a single Member State. To this end, the 
Member States may have recourse to any body or mechanism established within the European 
Union in order to facilitate cooperation between their judicial authorities and the coordination 
of their action. Sequential account shall be taken of the following factors:
– the Member State shall be that in the territory of which the acts were committed,
– the Member State shall be that of which the perpetrator is a national or resident,
– the Member State shall be the Member State of origin of the victims,
– the Member State shall be that in the territory of which the perpetrator was found.
3. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures also to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences referred to in Articles 1 to 4 in cases where it refuses to hand over or extradite a person 
suspected or convicted of such an offence to another Member State or to a third country.
4. Each Member State shall ensure that its jurisdiction covers cases in which any of the offences 
referred to in Articles 2 and 4 has been committed in whole or in part within its territory, 
wherever the terrorist group is based or pursues its criminal activities.
5. This Article shall not exclude the exercise of jurisdiction in criminal matters as laid down by 
a Member State in accordance with its national legislation.
Article 10
Protection of, and assistance to, victims
1. Member States shall ensure that investigations into, or prosecution of, offences covered 
by this Framework Decision are not dependent on a report or accusation made by a person 
subjected to the offence, at least if the acts were committed on the territory of the Member 
State.
2. In addition to the measures laid down in the Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 
15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (9), each Member State shall, 
if necessary, take all measures possible to ensure appropriate assistance for victims’ families.
Article 11
Implementation and reports
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with this Framework Decision 
by 31 December 2002.
2. By 31 December 2002, Member States shall forward to the General Secretariat of the 
Council and to the Commission the text of the provisions transposing into their national law the 
obligations imposed on them under this Framework Decision. On the basis of a report drawn 
up from that information and a report from the Commission, the Council shall assess, by 31 
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December 2003, whether Member States have taken the necessary measures to comply with 
this Framework Decision.
3. The Commission report shall specify, in particular, transposition into the criminal law of the 
Member States of the obligation referred to in Article 5(2).
Article 12
Territorial application
This Framework Decision shall apply to Gibraltar.
Article 13
Entry into force
This Framework Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official 
Journal.
(1) OJ, no. C 332 E, 27.11.2001, p. 300.
(2) Opinion delivered on 6 February 2002 (not yet published in the Official Journal).
(3) OJ, no. C 19, 23.1.1999, p. 1.
(4) OJ, no. C 26, 30.1.1999, p. 22.
(5) OJ, no. L 273, 25.10.1996, p. 1.
(6) OJ, no. L 191, 7.7.1998, p. 4.
(7) OJ, no. L 351, 29.12.1998, p. 1.
(8) OJ, no. C 373, 23.12.1999, p. 1.




THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29, Article 31(1)(e) 
and Article 34(2)(b) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (1),
Whereas:
(1) Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious violations of the universal values of human 
dignity, liberty, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
on which the European Union is founded. It also represents one of the most serious attacks 
on democracy and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States and on 
which the European Union is based.
(2) Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2) 
is the basis of the counter-terrorist policy of the European Union. The achievement of a legal 
framework common to all Member States, and in particular, of a harmonised definition of 
terrorist offences, has allowed the counter-terrorism policy of the European Union to develop 
and expand, subject to the respect of fundamental rights and the rule of law.
(3) The terrorist threat has grown and rapidly evolved in recent years, with changes in the 
modus operandi of terrorist activists and supporters including the replacement of structured and 
hierarchical groups by semi-autonomous cells loosely tied to each other. Such cells inter-link 
international networks and increasingly rely on the use of new technologies, in particular the 
Internet.
(4) The Internet is used to inspire and mobilise local terrorist networks and individuals in Europe 
and also serves as a source of information on terrorist means and methods, thus functioning 
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as a “virtual training camp”. Activities of public provocation to commit terrorist offences, 
recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism have multiplied at very low cost and risk.
(5) The Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European 
Union, adopted by the European Council on 5 November 2004, underlines that effective 
prevention and combating of terrorism in full compliance with fundamental rights requires 
Member States not to confine their activities to maintaining their own security, but to focus also 
on the security of the Union as a whole.
(6) The Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on 
strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union (3), recalls that a global 
response is required to address terrorism and that the expectations that citizens have of the Union 
cannot be ignored, nor can the Union fail to respond to them. In addition, it states that attention 
must focus on different aspects of prevention, preparedness and response to further enhance, 
and where necessary complement, Member States’ capabilities to fight terrorism, concentrating 
particularly on recruitment, financing, risk analysis, protection of critical infrastructures and 
consequence management.
(7) This Framework Decision provides for the criminalisation of offences linked to terrorist 
activities in order to contribute to the more general policy objective of preventing terrorism 
through reducing the dissemination of those materials which might incite persons to commit 
terrorist attacks.
(8) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) calls upon States to take measures 
that are necessary and appropriate, and in accordance with their obligations under international 
law, to prohibit by law incitement to commit terrorist act or acts and to prevent such conduct. 
The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations “Uniting against terrorism: 
recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy” of 27 April 2006, interprets the 
above-mentioned Resolution as providing for a basis for the criminalisation of incitement 
to terrorist acts and recruitment, including through the Internet. The United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 8 September 2006 mentions that the Member States of the UN 
resolve to explore ways and means to coordinate efforts at the international and regional level 
to counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on the Internet.
(9) The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism establishes the obligations 
of States parties thereto to criminalise public provocation to commit a terrorist offence and 
recruitment and training for terrorism, when committed unlawfully and intentionally.
(10) The definition of terrorist offences, including offences linked to terrorist activities, should 
be further approximated in all Member States, so that it covers public provocation to commit 
a terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism, when committed 
intentionally.
(11) Penalties should be provided for natural persons having intentionally committed or 
legal persons held liable for public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for 
terrorism and training for terrorism. These forms of behaviour should be equally punishable in 
all Member States irrespective of whether they are committed through the Internet or not.
(12) Given that the objectives of this Framework Decision cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States unilaterally, and can therefore, because of the need for European-wide 
harmonised rules, be better achieved at the level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures, 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the EC Treaty and 
referred to in Article 2 of the EU Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, 
as set out in Article 5 of the EC Treaty, this Framework Decision does not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(13) The Union observes the principles recognised by Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty and 
reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably Chapters II 
and VI thereof. Nothing in this Framework Decision may be interpreted as being intended to 
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reduce or restrict fundamental rights or freedoms such as freedom of expression, assembly, or 
of association, the right to respect for private and family life, including the right to respect of 
the confidentiality of correspondence.
(14) Public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism and training 
for terrorism are intentional crimes. Therefore, nothing in this Framework Decision may be 
interpreted as being intended to reduce or restrict the dissemination of information for scientific, 
academic or reporting purposes. The expression of radical, polemic or controversial views in 
the public debate on sensitive political questions, including terrorism, falls outside the scope of 
this Framework Decision and, in particular, of the definition of public provocation to commit 
terrorist offences.
(15) The implementation of the criminalisation under this Framework Decision should be 
proportional to the nature and circumstances of the offence, with respect to the legitimate 
aims pursued and to their necessity in a democratic society, and should exclude any form of 
arbitrariness or discrimination,
HAS ADOPTED THIS FRAMEWORK DECISION:
Article 1
Amendments
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA shall be amended as follows:
1. Article 3 shall be replaced by the following:
“Article 3
Offences linked to terrorist activities
1. For the purposes of this Framework Decision:
(a) “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence” shall mean the distribution, or otherwise 
making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of one of the 
offences listed in Article 1(1)(a) to (h), where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating 
terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed;
(b) “recruitment for terrorism” shall mean soliciting another person to commit one of the 
offences listed in Article 1(1)(a) to (h), or in Article 2(2);
(c) “training for terrorism” shall mean providing instruction in the making or use of explosives, 
firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or in other specific methods or 
techniques, for the purpose of committing one of the offences listed in Article 1(1)(a) to (h), 
knowing that the skills provided are intended to be used for this purpose.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that offences linked to 
terrorist activities include the following intentional acts:
(a) public provocation to commit a terrorist offence;
(b) recruitment for terrorism;
(c) training for terrorism;
(d) aggravated theft with a view to committing one of the offences listed in Article 1(1);
(e) extortion with a view to the perpetration of one of the offences listed in Article 1(1);
(f) drawing up false administrative documents with a view to committing one of the offences 
listed in Article 1(1)(a) to (h) and Article 2(2)(b).
3. For an act as set out in paragraph 2 to be punishable, it shall not be necessary that a terrorist 
offence be actually committed”.
2. Article 4 shall be replaced by the following:
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“Article 4
Aiding or abetting, inciting and attempting
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that aiding or abetting an 
offence referred to in Article 1(1), Articles 2 or 3 is made punishable.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that inciting an offence 
referred to in Article 1(1), Article 2 or Article 3(2)(d) to (f) is made punishable.
3. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that attempting to commit 
an offence referred to in Article 1(1) and Article 3(2)(d) to (f), with the exception of possession 
as provided for in Article 1(1)(f) and the offence referred to in Article 1(1)(i), is made 
punishable.
4. Each Member State may decide to take the necessary measures to ensure that attempting to 
commit an offence referred to in Article 3(2)(b) and (c) is made punishable”.
Article 2
Fundamental principles relating to freedom of expression
This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of requiring Member States to take 
measures in contradiction of fundamental principles relating to freedom of expression, in 
particular freedom of the press and the freedom of expression in other media as they result 
from constitutional traditions or rules governing the rights and responsibilities of, and the 
procedural guarantees for, the press or other media where these rules relate to the determination 
or limitation of liability.
Article 3
Implementation and report
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with this Framework Decision 
by 9 December 2010. In the implementation of this Framework Decision, Member States shall 
ensure that the criminalisation shall be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and necessary 
in a democratic society and shall exclude any form of arbitrariness and discrimination.
2. By 9 December 2010, Member States shall forward to the General Secretariat of the Council 
and to the Commission the text of the provisions transposing into their national law the 
obligations imposed on them under this Framework Decision. On the basis of a report drawn 
up from that information and a report from the Commission, the Council shall assess, by 9 




This Framework Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official 
Journal of the European Union.
(1) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
(2) OJ, no. L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3.
(3) OJ, no. C 198, 12.8.2005, p. 1.

The two Framework Decisions 
A critical approach  1
Sabine Gless
1.	 Introduction
Terrorism is a very serious challenge in many ways, not only for people, but also 
for the fundamental principles of democracies bound to the rule of law. When for 
instance, in spring 2011 special US agents finally tracked down Osama Bin Laden 
and killed him, the execution set off a heated debate among lawyers: was this a legal 
execution, a justified action of killing a combat in a war against terrorists? Or are 
terrorists vested with all the rights of a criminal suspect  2, and thus certainly must be 
captured, out on trial and not killed? 
Seven years before, Klaus Tolksdorf, the current president of the German 
Bundesgerichtshof declared: “The fight against terrorism cannot be a wild, unjust 
war” and ordered a retrial of Mounir el-Motassadeq, the only person successfully 
prosecuted for involvement in the September 11 attacks  3. These attacks, as it is well 
known, have dramatically altered the context of discussions about fighting terrorism, 
1 Parts of this contribution have been inspired by Cyrille Fijnaut’s work; see s. gless, 
“Fighting Terrorism in a “Rechtsstaat”, in T. SaPens, M. GroenhuiJsen and T. KooiJmanns 
(eds.), Antwerpen/Cambridge, Intersentia, 2011, p. 929-940. I wish to thank Dario Stagno and 
Claudine Abt, who have provided valuable help researching facts and editing the text. 
2 K. ambos, “Terrorists Have Rights Too – What International Law Says about the 
Killing of Bin Laden”, Spiegel Online, 2011, at http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/0,1518,762417,00.html; see also e. guild, “The Uses and Abuses of Counter-Terrorism 
Policies in Europe: The Case of the ‘Terrorist Lists’”, JCMS, 2008, p. 173-193, at p. 184-188.
3 New York Times, 5 March 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/05/world/german-
judges-order-a-retrial-for-a-9-11-figure.html.
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in the US as well as in Europe  4. According to Amnesty International the goal of 
suppressing terrorism has been used as a justification “for laws and practices designed 
simply to stifle dissent and opposition”  5. Tolksdorf thus is not alone with this view, 
but shares his opinion with many of his European colleagues  6. His position as the 
presiding judge in the appeal against Mr Motassadeq’s conviction provided him with 
a world-wide audience for the claim that even in a terrorist trial all evidence must 
be made available, including exonerating evidence. Some weeks before, the German 
Bundesgerichtshof had already acquitted Abdelghani Mzoudi, the second suspect to 
be tried for involvement in the 9/11 attacks, of accessory to murder and membership 
in Al Qaeda, namely because, as one of the judges put it, the evidence was not enough 
to convict him  7.
In Europe, the prevailing view is that a justice system cannot bend to accommodate 
security concerns, not even those of international efforts to fight terrorism: “We cannot 
abandon the rule of law. That would be the beginning of a fatal development and 
ultimately a victory for terrorists”  8. The reality of criminal justice systems, however, 
changed after 9/11  9. Most countries introduced special laws against terrorists  10. 
Traditional international cooperation was modified and new transnational frameworks 
were established  11 – all sharing a common goal: the fight against terrorism.
My assignment for this publication is a critical evaluation of the changes brought 
by two relevant EU Framework Decisions:
– FD from 2002 on combating terrorism  12;
4 r. bossong, “The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism”, JCMS, 2008, p. 27-48, at p. 30, 
34 and 42; c. fiJnaut, “The attacks on 11 September 2001, and the Immediate Response of the 
European Union and the United States”, in J. Wouters and F. Naert (eds.), Legal instruments in 
the fight against international terrorism. A transatlantic dialogue, Leiden/Boston, Nijhoff, 2004, 
p. 15-36, at p. 22-26; e. guild, op. cit., at p. 178-182; v. mitsilegas, “Transatlantic Counter-
Terrorism Cooperation after Lisbon”, Eucrim, 2010, p. 111-117, at p. 111-113; J. wouters and 
f. naert, “Of Arrest Warrants, Terrorist Offences and Extradition Deals”, Common Market 
Law Review, 2004, p. 909-935, at p. 909-911.
5 rePort of amnesty international, “Human Rights Dissolving at the Borders? Counter-
Terrorism and EU Criminal Law”, Amnesty International EU Office, IOR 61/013/2005, p. 1-44, 
at p. 2, at http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/AIreport.pdf. 
6 See e.g. s. gless discussing c. fiJnaut.
7 New York Times, 6 February 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/06/world/
faulting-us-germany-frees-a-9-11-suspect.html?ref=abdelghanimzoudi; for a more detailed 
discussion of the relevant German legal framework, see c. safferling, “Terror and Law – Is the 
German Legal System able to deal with terrorism?”, German Law Journal, 2004, p. 515-524. 
8 New York Times, 5 March 2004.
9 r. bossong, op. cit.; c. fiJnaut, “The attacks on 11 September 2001”.
10 See Martin Böse’s and Robert Kert’s country reports within this same publication.
11 m. den boer, c. hillebrand and a. nölKe, “Legitimacy under Pressure: The European 
Web of Counter-Terrorism Networks”, JCMS, 2008, p. 101-124, at p. 109-115; J. wouters and 
f. naert, op. cit., p. 910-913.
12 Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ, no. L 164, 22 June 
2002, p. 3.
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– FD from 2008 amending 2002 FD on combating terrorism  13.
Drafted and adopted in Brussels, published in the EU Official Journal some years 
ago, the two legal acts, hardly appear as documents of a wild unjust war.
But in the legal profession critics are not so easily appeased, and thus I keep with 
my assignment for this publication and take a critical approach. I will discuss four 
objections against the Framework Decisions:
– their definition of terrorism,
– the duty to punish (on the ground of imprecise EU parameters),
– the obligation to expand Member States’ jurisdiction,
– and the possible infringements on human rights.
2.	 EU-Framework	in	general
To combat terrorism is high on the EU agenda today  14. Even before the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001 the Commission had launched work on European 
legislation targeting terrorist crimes  15. After the outrages in the US the initiatives 
for Framework Decisions defined terrorism and gave punishment parameters to the 
Member States as well as they established a more efficient cooperation, among other 
things, by introducing the European arrest warrant, which by now basically replaces 
traditional extradition procedures between the Member States. Several other legal 
acts followed  16. The listing of terrorists, the freezing of their property without 
legal remedies or fair trial guarantees led to well-known and interesting case law 
establishing principles of due process  17. Today legal instruments giving access to 
data exchange basis when pursuing terrorists are of high priority in practice  18. 
13 Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA amending Framework Decision on combating 
terrorism, OJ, no. L 330, 9 December 2008, p. 21.
14 See for instance v.v. ramraJ, m. hor and K. roach (eds.), Global Anti-Terrorism Law 
and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 444-447.
15 E.J. husabø and i. bruce, Fighting Terrorism through Multilevel Criminal Legislation, 
Security council Resolution 1337, the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism and 
their Implementation in Nordic, Dutch and German Criminal Law, Leiden/Boston, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 55-56.
16 J. wouters and f. naert, op. cit., p. 911-915; v. mitsilegas, “The Third Wave of Third 
Pillar Law”, European Law Review, 2009, p. 523-560, at p. 538-542. 
17 See e.g. ECJ, 3 September 2008, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Commission 
and Council v. Kadi; CFI, 11 June 2009, T-318/01, Commission and Council v. Omar; ECJ, 29 
June 2010, Judgment C-550/09, E. and F.; see g. de búrca, “The European Court of Justice 
and the International Legal Order After Kadi”, Harvard International Law Journal, 2010, p. 1-
50; s. gless and d. schaffner, “Judicial review of freezing orders due to a UN listing by 
European Courts”, in S. Braum and A. Weyembergh (eds.), Le contrôle juridictionnel dans 
l’espace pénal européen/The judicial control in EU cooperation in criminal matters, Bruxelles, 
2009, p. 163-193; e. guild, “The Uses and Abuses of Counter-Terrorism Policies in Europe: 
The Case of the ‘Terrorist Lists’”, op. cit., p. 173-193. 
18 v. mitsilegas, “Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation”, op. cit. ; K.l. schePPele, 
“Other People’s PATRIOT Acts: Europe’s Response to September 11”, Loyola Law Review, 
2004, p. 89-148, at p. 89.
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The Framework Decisions are predominantly vehicles for the harmonization of 
substantive criminal law as, in addition to defining terrorism, and guiding criminal 
procedure and the law of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, they also oblige 
Member States to criminalize certain behaviour as terrorist acts and extend their 
jurisdiction in order to enable them to prosecute these acts (or extradite the individuals 
concerned to another State for prosecution)  19. The Framework Decisions are quite 
detailed in many respects. Despite, or rather because of the regulations, two basic 
questions however remain: (1) Which acts are actually punishable as acts of terrorism? 
(2) How should EU Member States react to terrorism – given their commitment to 
“Rechtsstaatlichkeit”, human rights, and the principle of proportionality  20?
3.	 Definition	of	terrorism	–	a	critical	approach
A.	 Terrorism	according	to	EU-law
One core issue in the legal fight against terrorism is settling on a valid definition 
of terrorism itself, since a common definition is a prerequisite for harmonization as 
well as for the effective cooperation between States to combat the various aspects of 
terrorism. 
1. The context 
The EU definition of terrorism is established in Art. 1(1) of the 2002 FD, and is 
basically three-fold: consisting of the aim of the action, the intention of the actor and 
the specific act being committed. 
The 2002 FD defines aim, or rather context and intent, matter-of-factly as being: 
“to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic 
or social structures of a country or an international organisation”. There is (1) neither 
reference to the promotion of core values, like democracy, liberty, equality ruling that 
system nor (2) to the cross-border or international element. Both aspects can cause 
trouble to the Member States national criminal justice systems, which may in fact 
wish to react to certain political movements – like animal rights activists – not with 
the range of instruments provided by terrorist legislation. The question thus arose: 
Is it conceivable that EU legislation sets the national agenda, for instance asking for 
incrimination of social movements? Or does it lack the democratic legitimation to do 
so in principle  21?
In response to the Member States’ concern that the broad definition of terrorism 
would eventually infringe on the right to legitimate protest, a declaration was attached 
to the Draft 2002 FD, asserting that EU law should not criminalise persons who 
exercise their legitimate right to manifest their opinions, for instance defending 
democratic values, even if they commit criminal offences  22.
19 a. KliP, European Criminal Law: an Integrative Approach, Antwerp/Oxford/Portland, 
Intersentia, 2009, p. 200; v. mitsilegas, “The Third Wave”, p. 524-527; J. monar, “Anti-
Terrorism law and policy: the case of the European Union”, in V.V. ramraJ, m. hor, K. roach 
(eds.), op. cit., p. 425-452, at p. 433. 
20 m. den boer, c. hillebrand and a. nölKe, op. cit., p. 103-105.
21 e. guild, op. cit., p. 175.
22 See during the preparatory process Council Document 14845/01 of 6 December 2001.
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The declaration however is not part of the 2002 FD and thus has no clear-cut legal 
impact, the latter being questionable anyway due to the vagueness of the phrasing. 
For the EU Member States in any case the principle question remains, whether the 
EU has a mandate or rather a democratic legitimation for such legislation  23. 
This demur appears at first sight to be a rather technical aspect: according to EU 
law, namely.
According to Art. 83 TFEU, the EU is only competent to “establish minimum rules 
concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particular 
serious crime with a cross-border dimension...”  24. But the establishment of an EU 
parameter for terrorism, which will hereafter encompass all forms of alleged terrorist 
activities, might go beyond the scope of Art. 83 TFEU, because it obliges all EU 
Member States to fight internal national activism according to the EU standards, and 
thus impinges of a State’s sovereign right to solve internal conflict issues according 
to its own agenda. The importance of this aspect becomes clear when looking at the 
first mentioned gap in the definition of terrorism, i.e. the lack of a reference to the 
long term intentions of an actor: Is it the same in the eyes of the law whether a liberal 
democracy shall be destabilized or a dictatorship? Must all violent acts be labelled 
terrorism? 
2. Achievement of a politically neutral definition
What appears as a shortcoming at first glance might, however, turns out to be a 
big achievement. There has been a lively debate since the 1950s, especially within the 
United Nations, as to whether national liberation movements should be excluded from 
the definition of terrorism  25. In 1977 the Council of Europe agreed on a common 
European definition of terrorism, which did not take into account the long-term 
projects violent actors might have. This was because distinguishing a terrorist from 
a freedom fighter is very difficult, as the often quoted phrase “One man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter” demonstrates. 
It has thus often been deemed unwise to put a criminal court, responsible for 
handing down a verdict of personal guilt in a certain case, in the position of having to 
pass judgment on a political situation at the same time.
Unostentatious definitions of terrorism may eventually jeopardize the important 
boundary between terrorism and other politically motivated violent acts, which might 
be considered legitimate freedom-fighting or activism for a good political cause, 
albeit aggressive. From a criminal lawyer’s point of view, the blurring of distinction 
between these two areas might become a problem, especially when, as is the case in 
EU Member States, States have an obligation to incriminate membership in a terrorist 
group or glorifying a terrorist group, etc.
23 For further discussion on standards of democratic, legal and social legitimacy see m. den 
boer, c. hillebrand and a. nölKe, op. cit., p. 103-109.
24 Consolidated version of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, OJ, no. 
C 83, 30 March 2010, p. 47.
25 c. greenwood, “War, Terrorism and International Law”, in C. Greenwood (ed.), Essays 
on War in International Law, London, 2006, p. 409-432, at p. 409-410.
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In practice there have been cases in which prosecutions on terrorist charges were 
received by the public with disbelief or rather discontent.
In Austria law enforcement authorities brought charges against animal activists for 
being part of a criminal conspiracy, arguing that both mainstream and militant groups 
were part of a criminal conspiracy – not because of their actions, but because of their 
beliefs in support of animal rights– and that they should therefore be held responsible 
for a wide range of crimes committed in the name of animal rights. Although the 
activists were acquitted eventually, doubts about the feasibility and adequacy of 
such legislation prevail – and were recently fuelled after law enforcement authorities 
prosecuted a member of an association of fathers fighting for changes in family law.
This blurring distinction between terrorists and activists has also been the subject 
of discussion in Great Britain, where courts were faced with the question of whether 
planning terrorism against undemocratic and tyrannical regimes can be excused as a 
noble cause. In R v. F, a Libyan national, whose family was allegedly murdered by 
or on behalf of Gaddafi’s regime, was granted asylum in the UK in 2003. In 2006, he 
was arrested and charged under the UK Terrorism Act (2000) for being in possession 
of two documents that could be used to further terrorist activities. He denied ever 
having seen one of the documents but said that the other one was given to him by 
the leader of a resistance movement in Libya opposed to Gaddafi. His argument was 
that he was a freedom fighter against a tyrannical government and he therefore had 
a ‘reasonable excuse’ as set out in Section 58(3) of the Terrorism Act (2000). The 
judges held that being a ‘freedom fighter’ is not a defense stating, “… the terrorist 
legislation applies to countries which are governed by tyrants and dictators. There is 
no exemption from criminal liability for terrorist activities which are motivated or said 
to be morally justified by the alleged nobility of the terrorist cause”  26. The recent 
wave of revolutions in the Arab world has led to the fall of tyrant regimes, paving 
the way for these countries to enjoy the freedoms enjoyed by others in democratic 
regimes such as that of the UK. Therefore, one cannot help by wonder if the courts in 
Great Britain will still uphold this judgment in light of the Arab spring. 
A definition detached from any reference to values (like democracy or Rechtsstaat) 
or reasons for committing the terrorist act (like freedom fighting) leads to problems 
if a State wishes – maybe for good reasons – not to condemn certain violent acts as 
terrorist acts. This problem gets worse as a trigger mechanism for a duty to criminalize 
“terrorism” is set by superior law, like in the EU. This means that States cannot react 
individually to the particular challenges that they as individual States may face, such 
as the existence of a national political movement which has members who may resort 
to violence in an attempt to achieve their ends. 
Some examples, drawn from the list of Nobel peace laureates, illustrate the 
problem of individuals perceived by some States to be pursuing an illegal cause, and 
who could even be defined as “terrorists”. They include i.e. Menachem Begin (head 
of Irgun Tzwai Le’umi, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978); Yassir Arafat (for 
belonging to the PLO, and a Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1994); Nelson Mandela (for 
belonging to the ANC, equally a Nobel Peace Prize winner).
26 [2007] 2 All ER 193, [2007] EWCA Crim 243, [2007] 3 WLR 164.
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Today however, the discussion about drawing the line between legitimate freedom 
fighters and terrorists is replaced by the functional approach of looking at the actions 
as such  27.
3. Terrorist acts
In Article 1(1) of the 2002 FD, specified acts which are criminal are defined first. 
These include attacks upon persons’ lives or their physical integrity, kidnapping or 
hostage taking, or interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any 
other fundamental resource the effect of which is to endanger human life, etc.
Whereas the 2002 FD only obliged Member States to punish a rather limited 
number of acts linked to terrorist activities in its Art. 3, such as aggravated theft 
committed with a view to facilitate terrorist acts, extortion committed with a view 
to the perpetration of terrorist acts, the drawing up of false administrative documents 
with a view to committing terrorist acts the 2008 FD broadened the obligation to 
include several more acts linked to terrorist activities or rather to prepare, organise or 
supporting terrorism, such as: 
a. “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence” – meaning distributing, or 
otherwise making available, a message to the public, with the intent to incite the 
commission of a terrorist act;
b. “recruitment for terrorism” – meaning to solicit another person to commit a 
terrorist act;
c.  “training for terrorism” – meaning to provide instruction in the making or use 
of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or 
instructing individuals in other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of 
committing a terrorist act.
Since the crime of terrorism itself is not defined in the EU framework, the 2008 
FD effectively bases broadly phrased subsidiary offences for which terrorism remain 
inchoate  28. During the legislative procedure several members of the European 
Parliament as well as members of national parliaments of EU Member States criticised 
the vagueness of the elements of the new offences  29.
The amendment of the former Framework Decision was made, especially to 
include incitement to terrorism on the Internet  30. The World Wide Web however 
brings together people (and jurisdictions) with quite diverging concepts of “public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence” or “incitement to terrorism”. Thus, a legal 
obligation to prosecute such behaviour must be well reflected in terms of legitimate 
jurisdiction. A possible solution would be the supply of specific definitions of the 
27 s. Kirsch and a. oehmichen, “Judges gone astray: The fabrication of terrorism as an 
international crime by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, Durham Law Review Online, 2011, 
p. 1-20, at p. 11-13.
28 rePort of amnesty international, op. cit., p. 2.
29 l. mellinger, “Illusion of Security: Why the Amended EU Framework Decision 
Criminalizing ‘Incitement to Terrorism’ on the Internet Fails to Defend Europe from Terrorism”, 
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, 2010, p. 339-368, at p. 354.
30 Ibid., p. 340-341. 
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outlawed behaviour. Otherwise the burden of defining the concepts will be on the 
national criminal courts and balancing the need for criminal prosecution with the right 
of free speech and other democratic freedoms  31.
Moreover, the obligation to prosecute exists even if a terrorist offence was never 
actually committed in the end. This is provided for in Art. 3(3) of the 2008 FD. Art. 4 
obliges Member States to punish the aiding or abetting, inciting or the attempt to 
commit terrorist acts. 
Thus Member States’ obligation to punish is quite broad and rather vague, and 
it appears unclear how national legislators will implement the EU parameters into 
national law.
B.	 Terrorism	in	(customary)	international	law	–	and	the	“just	war”	argument
Did the EU lawmaker fall short in his duty to provide a comprehensive definition 
– or is the task of defining punishable terrorism (as opposed to justified freedom 
fighting) an unanswerable dilemma? 
The definition of terrorism has been in law journal’s headlines recently  32 following 
the decision handed down by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon which – among other 
things – defined terrorism as a crime according to customary international law  33, 
and thus in principle binding for all States, including EU Member States  34.
According to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon rules of international law define 
terrorism as follows: the commission of a criminal act causing harm to life, limb 
and property, including a concrete threat or an attempt  35 to commit such an act, 
as the only objective element of the offence  36. Many academics still hold the 
view that currently no universal definition of terrorism exists  37. This position is 
31 Ibid., p. 360-363.
32 K. ambos, “Judicial creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is There a Crime of 
Terrorism under International Law?”, Leiden Journal of International Law, 2011, p. 655-675, 
at p. 655; s. Kirsch and a. oehmichen, op. cit., p. 1.
33 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, 
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis, 16 February 2011 (‘Decision’), 
nos. 85 and 102.
34 Whether the tribunal’s judges were right to press ahead with a definition in the case 
before them, may be left open here. For a critique see K. ambos, op. cit., p. 665-666; s. Kirsch 
and a. oehmichen, op. cit., p. 6-7.
35 Art. 2(2) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, A/
RES/52/164 of 15 Dec. 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S 256; Art. 2(3) International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, A/Res/54/109 of 9 Dec. 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270; 
Art. 1(a) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 Dec. 1970, 860 
U.N.T.S. 106; Art. 2(1)(d) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, 14 Dec. 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 168; all conventions can be 
found at [www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml].
36 Interlocutory Decision, no. 188.
37 E.g. K. ambos, op. cit., p. 666; e. stubbins bates et al., Terrorism and International 
Law: Accountability, Remedies, and Reform: a Report of the IBA Task Force on Terrorism, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 1; m. ch. bassiouni, “Terrorism: the Persistent 
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exemplified by Schmid and Jongman  38 who have analysed 109 different definitions 
of terrorism and isolated 22 different elements characterising terrorism. Later, in a 
report, Schmid suggested a definition of terrorism, which has latterly become famous 
due to its simplicity: acts of terrorism are defined as ‘peacetime equivalents of war 
crimes’  39. This definition blurs again however the legal parameters of such crimes, 
some of which are to be prosecuted as crimes in a national criminal justice systems 
and some of which, the more serious ones, which shall be taken care of by the nascent 
international criminal justice systems, or even outside of the criminal justice system 
altogether by triggering a reaction based on international humanitarian law.
Part of the dilemma terrorism poses to legal systems is that of drawing lines 
between criminal law measures and responses that may be labeled either as military or 
humanitarian interventions. Both of these forms of intervention lie beyond the scope 
of national criminal justice systems, and carry the risk of being viewed as acts of 
terrorism themselves. 
The 2002 FD on combating terrorism deals with this paradox also, albeit only 
marginally: Recital 11 of the preamble asserts, that “Actions by armed forces during 
periods of armed conflicts, which are governed by international humanitarian law 
within the meaning of these terms under that law … cannot be viewed as terrorism”. 
Ultimately, this exemption clause is based on a “just war” argument, too. The law 
makes the assumption that certain circumstances may exempt violence from the legal 
range of terrorism. Violence which could under different circumstances be considered 
to be an act of terrorism is defined into a certain act of freedom fighting  40.
References to the “just war” argument have dominated political discussions 
mainly regarding the fight against terrorism, especially in the US, with regard to 
Al-Qaeda  41. A reference to the “just war” argument in legal documents governing 
the States’ reactions to terrorism provoke however a series of questions, including: 
May such a principle be applied to (politically motivated) violence at all? If this 
is answered in the affirmative, certain justifications could be invoked to transform 
violence from an evil to a non-evil-action. Not only States themselves are provided 
with some protections in this way insofar as State intervention is exempted from any 
terrorism charge without further question, but also other groups or individuals as well. 
Dilemma of Legitimacy”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 2004, p. 299-
306, at p. 305; s. Kirsch and a. oehmichen, op. cit., p. 7-8.
38 a.P. schmid and a.J. Jongman, Political Terrorism – a New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature, Amsterdam/New Brunswick, 2nd ed., 1988, 
p. 5-8.
39 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Definitions of Terrorism, at http://web.
archive.org/web/20070527145632/http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html, 
last visited on 27 April 2011. 
40 s. Peers, “EU Responses to Terrorism”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 
2003, p. 227-243, at p. 236-238.
41 See also a. oehmichen, Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legislation: The Terrorised 
Legislator? A Comparison of Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Its Implications on Human 
Rights in the Legal Systems of the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and France, Antwerp, 
Intersentia, 2009, p. 389 and f.
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How these exemption clauses can be accommodated within the wider fight against 
terrorism and whether they simply open a Pandora’s box of difficulties remain moot 
questions. 
4.	 Fighting	terrorism	by	means	of	criminal	law
It would nevertheless be unfair to judge efforts designed to fight terrorism by 
means of the criminal law, like those foreseen in the EU-Framework Decisions, solely 
on the fact that they do not solve the historically difficult distinction between terrorism 
and freedom fighting. Criticism should rather focus on the special use of criminal 
law in a certain system, like that established by the Framework Decisions or in the 
national criminal justice systems of the Member States  42.
The EU act basically does two things: (a) compel Member States to punish 
certain acts, and (b) force Member States to claim wide jurisdiction in order to ensure 
prosecution. These obligations correspond in general with the demands of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, which deduced from rules of international law two obligations 
on States and non-State actors: (1) the obligation to refrain from engaging in acts of 
terrorism, and (2) the obligation to prevent and repress terrorism, and in particular to 
prosecute and try alleged perpetrators  43.
A.	 Obligation	to	punish	
The Framework Decisions – as explained above – oblige Member States to punish 
certain behaviour as terrorist acts. This fact can be interpreted quite differently: It 
could be viewed as progress towards a united fight against terrorism or as an EU 
infringement on State sovereignty and a violation of a democratically legitimized 
law. 
The duty to criminalize, established by the Framework Decisions, is quite broad 
– as illustrated previously – especially if one bends the rather imprecise language 
to encompass all its possible meanings, for instance when criminalizing acts of 
preparation and/or conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism  44. 
The EU obligation is thus problematic, taking into account the basic question 
of a European competence to define criminal terrorist acts in the first place and the 
Framework Decision’s failure to frame punishable terrorist activities in a precise 
language  45. Nonetheless, in attempting to come up with definitions it is important 
to keep in mind – as the German Bundesverfassungsgericht phrased it in its 2009 
Lisbon Judgement – that: “decisions on substantive and formal criminal law are 
42 For a comparative overview see: A. oehmichen, Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legislation, 
op. cit.; e.J. husabø/i.bruce, op. cit., p. 171-192. 
43 Interlocutory Decision, no. 102.
44 For critical views see e.g. s. melander, “The Use of Criminal Law in Combating 
Terrorism – a Nordic Perspective”, in K. Ligeti (ed.), Homage to Imre A. Wiener, Toulouse, 
Eres, 2010, p. 119-135, p. 121-123.
45 a. KliP, op. cit., p. 200; S. Peers, op. cit., p. 230-232.
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particularly important to the ability of a constitutional State to democratically shape 
its laws”  46.
However, seven years earlier, the 2002 FD set out to compel Member States to 
punish certain acts of “terrorism” on the grounds of EU parameters laid out in the 
Framework Decision. And, this Framework Decision does not meet in all aspects 
the requirements of precise language and coherent concepts that govern most of the 
different Member States’ criminal justice systems. 
One must furthermore always keep in mind the fact that, in practice, the importance 
of anti-terrorist legislation is often not the elements of crime that it defines, but the 
special investigative methods or other measure provided to deal with it  47. Neither of 
these aspects are however laid down in the EU-Framework Decisions.
B.	 Expansion	of	jurisdiction
The EU-Framework Decisions also oblige the Member States to expand their 
criminal jurisdiction. According to Art. 9 of the 2002 FD on combating terrorism, 
each Member State shall take the necessary measures to establish 
– territorial jurisdiction (extending the concept to vessels flying its flag and aircraft 
registered there), 
– jurisdiction based on a broad concept of the active personality principle (including 
acts committed by “residents” and legal persons as well as citizens) and 
– jurisdiction based on a broad concept of the protective principle, where acts are 
committed “against the institutions or people” of that Member State or an EU 
institution or body based there. 
Given that EU-Member states have not yet settled on a legal act which allocates 
clear-cut jurisdiction to one EU-state in cases of a positive competence conflict, the 
obligation to expand jurisdiction and potentially intensify the problem of multiple 
jurisdictions is striking  48.
C.	 Infringements	of	human	rights?
In addition, anti-terrorist legislation always raises concerns about the adequate 
protection of human rights and civil liberties  49; this is especially true in an atmosphere 
of “war against terrorism”  50.
46 BVerfG, 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 
1259/08, 2 BvR 182/09, no. 252 at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/
es20090630_2bve000208en.html. 
47 a. oehmichen, “Incommunicado Detention in Germany: An Example of Reactive Anti-
terror Legislation and Long-term Consequences”, German Law Journal, 2008, p. 855-887; 
s. Peers, op. cit., p. 237-243.
48 See e.J. husabø/i.bruce, op. cit., p. 315-357.
49 a. oehmichen, Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legislation, op. cit., p. 343 and f.; e. guild, 
op. cit., p. 174-175.
50 See e.g. f.d. ní aoláin, “Looking Ahead: Strategic Priorities and Challenges for the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights”, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 
2004, p. 469-491, at p. 487-491. 
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The European authorities have however realised by now that respect for human 
rights adds to the legitimacy of the fight against terrorism, and thus strive for 
compliance with human rights as well as spreading respect of human rights in order to 
ensure that there is a sound basis for cooperation with third countries.
On the face of it, such concern seems unnecessary anyway, since Art. 2 of the 
2008 FD explicitly declares that: “[The] Framework Decision shall not have the 
effect of requiring Member States to take measures in contradiction of fundamental 
principles relating to freedom of expression, in particular freedom of the press and the 
freedom of expression in other media as they result from constitutional traditions or 
rules governing the rights and responsibilities of, and the procedural guarantees for, 
the press or other media where these rules relate to the determination or limitation of 
liability.”
The legal effect and impact of Art. 2 of the 2008 FD in a particular case remains 
nonetheless somewhat unclear. Could a defendant raise an objection based on an 
infringement of Art. 2 of the 2008 FD? Or could a Member State raise, for instance, a 
reservation of national freedom of expression if its national criminal laws were to be 
screened before the ECJ because the penal statutes against terrorism were judged too 
lenient from a Brussels point of view?
Before the 2008 amendment, the 2002 FD on combating terrorism only stated in 
its preamble that the Union is “based on the principle of democracy and the principle 
of the rule of law” and that the Framework Decision “respects fundamental rights” 
as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Member 
States” constitutions and observes the principle recognised by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, agreed in December 2000  51. 
The European Court of Human Rights (Eur. Court HR) has however rejected the 
invoking of human rights protections to justify violent political acts committed in the 
territory of signatory States to the European Convention on Human Rights in general: 
Given that all of them are considered to be democratic countries, and have made a 
commitment to human rights protection, political violence may be treated like any 
other serious criminal offence  52. However in recent judgements the European Court 
of Human Rights has been firm in Human Rights protection as regards of certain 
consequences like preventive detention as well as deportation or expulsion of terrorist 
suspects, if they cannot be convicted in a criminal trial  53. Thus the FD’s parameters 
for substantive criminal law should only raise concern with regard to the incrimination 
of non-violent actions, such as alleged recruitment for terrorism in certain situations, 
which touch upon the freedom of association, the freedom of speech and expression 
51 The preamble further asserts that the Framework Decision could not be interpreted 
to “reduce or restrict fundamental rights or freedom such as the right to strike, freedom of 
assembly, of association and of expression, including the right of everyone to form and join 
trade unions… and the related right to demonstrate”.
52 See furthermore Eur. Court HR, 18 January 1978, Ireland v. UK, no. 5310/71; Eur. 
Court HR, 27 September 1995, McCann and Others v. UK, no. 18984/91.
53 See e.g. Eur. Court HR, 19 February 2009, A. and Others v. UK , no. 3455/05; or Eur. 
Court HR, 28 February 2008, Saadi v. Italy, no. 37201/06; or Eur. Court HR, 24 March 2009, 
Ben Salah v. Italy, no. 38128/06.
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as well as on the principle of legal certainty  54. But there is still little relevant case 
law up to now.
Counter terrorism legislation often collides with the right to freedom of speech 
because it often seeks to suppress certain politically motivated acts  55. Furthermore, 
terrorism, or rather the fear of terrorism, is also often used to justify the use of special 
police and prosecution powers that reduce the usual protection of fair trial guarantees 
relating to investigations, detention, and criminal proceedings  56. Both are highly 
problematic from a human rights perspective. 
European countries basically have abstained from the “war on terrorism”-
terminology. The common understanding is that societies have to balance the need 
for criminal prosecution and democratic entitlements, especially the right of free 
speech  57. These privileges are legally grounded in the Art. 10 ECHR as well as in 
Art. 19 ICCPR and Art. 20 ICCPR (International Convenant on Civil and Political 
Rights). Both grant the right of freedom of thought and expression, giving the 
individual the right to have an opinion and voice it without government intrusion  58. 
The exercise of these rights, however, may be subject to such limitations as are lawful 
in a democratic society in order to protect national society and public safety.
5.	 Conclusion
The EU-Framework Decisions provide the grounds on which Member States 
have, at least partly, built their national criminal sanctions against terrorism. In doing 
so, legislators – at the European and the State level – have had to create systems which 
allow them to fight violent attacks effectively, avoiding unwanted consequences on 
other levels. 
Basically the criminal justice systems face two problems: (a) Criminal prosecution 
and warfare instruments must be kept separately, i.e. as long as terrorism is regarded 
a crime, all alleged terrorists must be treated like alleged criminals and have the basic 
rights of criminal suspects; (b) criminal justice systems must draw an adequate line 
between those groups advancing legitimate political goals with controversial means 
54 Eur. Court HR, 26 April 1979, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, no. 6538/74; Eur. Court 
HR, 30 January 1998, United Communist Party v. Turkey, 133/1996/752/951; Eur. Court HR, 
13 February 2003, Welfare Party v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98.
55 See e.g. f.d. ní aoláin, op. cit, p. 489-491; s. douglas-scott, “The Rule of Law in the 
European Union – putting the security into the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, 
European Law Review, 2004, p. 219-242, at p. 221-224.
56 See judgments regarding infiltration of undercover agents in terrorist organisation – 
Eur. Court HR, 5 February 2008, Ramanauskas v. Lithuania, no. 74420/01; or Eur. Court HR, 
10 March 2009, Bykov v. Russia, no. 4378/02 – which are only legitimate if there is an adequate 
legal base and a guarantee of supervision of independent authority as well as a clear distinction 
between identifying perpetrators and inciting an innocent person; regarding collection and 
automatic procession of data (data mining), see Eur. Court HR, 4 May 2000, Rotaru v. Romania, 
no. 28341/95; and Eur. Court HR, 4 December 2008, S. and Marper v. UK (DNA storage), nos. 
30562/04, 30566/04.
57 l. mellinger, op. cit., at p. 360-365.
58 c. brants and s. franKen, “The protection of fundamental human rights in criminal 
process General report”, Utrecht Law Review, 2009, p. 7-65, at p. 28-29.
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and those which have crossed the line, not only propagating illegitimate political 
goals, but using punishable means. 
Addressing the problem, the European legislator has different possibilities:
To solve the first problem, requirements for phrasing the statutes incriminating 
terrorism could be modified in a way that “freedom activists” could be exempted, for 
instance by way of a negative definition entered. § 278(c)(3) of the Austrian Criminal 
Code provides an example for such exemption: According to that statute a violent act 
is not judged as terrorist act, if the aim is to establish or reconstitute democratic or 
constitutional power or to protect human rights  59.
Another way out of a terrorist verdict could be the acknowledgement of “good 
cause” as an exceptional justification or excuse. The result is very similar as if the 
statute would itself carry an exemption clause. For reasons of criminal doctrine 
however it is different, whether there is no “legal wrong” (“Unrecht”) committed or if 
a “legal wrong” is by way of exception justified or excused.
A third potential way to avoid unwanted terrorist charges could be a mechanism 
to drop charges if the prosecuting authorities or the courts realize that terrorist laws 
are applied in a case of legitimate freedom fighting or political activism of the “good 
sort”.
The need for an outlet is obvious in the 2002 FD itself, namely in the exemption 
clause based on a “just war” argument: The assumption that certain circumstances 
may in fact transform violence from what may otherwise be considered to be an act of 
terrorism into an act of freedom fighting  60. References to the “just war”-argument 
have dominated political discussions, especially in the US, with regard to Al-Qaeda. 
But Europe hopefully will not follow the example and construe criminal prosecution 
as warfare.
59 § 278(c)(3) StGB: “(3) Die Tat gilt nicht als terroristische Straftat, wenn sie auf die 
Herstellung oder Wiederherstellung demokratischer und rechtsstaatlicher Verhältnisse oder die 
Ausübung oder Wahrung von Menschenrechten ausgerichtet ist” at http://www.internet4jurists.
at/gesetze/bg_stgb01.htm#%C2%A7_170.
60 s. Peers, op. cit., p. 236.
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Les infractions terroristes  
en droit pénal français
Quel impact des décisions-cadres de 2002 et 2008 ?
Henri Labayle
1.	 Introduction	
Apprécier la conformité d’une législation nationale à une décision-cadre devrait 
être chose simple, normalement. Tel n’est pas nécessairement le cas lorsque l’on 
se penche sur la décision-cadre 2002/475 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme. 
Son caractère essentiellement réactif, au lendemain des évènements dramatiques 
du 11 septembre, la présence d’un arsenal juridique international particulièrement 
impressionnant en la matière, la variété des manifestations terroristes visées rendent 
en effet à son propos l’exercice de l’évaluation délicat. 
Un premier point de vue, technocratique, consiste à lister méthodiquement dans 
un tableau de correspondance les dispositions respectives du droit interne et de la 
décision-cadre. Indispensable, cette démarche n’est cependant pas suffisante car elle 
ne permet pas de rendre compte exactement de l’effet utile de la règle de l’Union. 
Une mise en perspective plus politique de la situation nationale est en effet 
indispensable pour comprendre à quel point l’impact de cette règle conditionne 
ou pas la réponse pénale nationale. A cet égard, la situation du droit français est 
particulièrement significative tant cet effet est relatif. 
2.	 Le	contexte	de	la	lutte	anti-terroriste	en	France
La position de la France au regard de la lutte contre le terrorisme est assez 
simple à analyser du point de vue juridique comme politique. Très tôt, la France a été 
confrontée aux attentats terroristes sur son territoire ou à travers ses ressortissants et 
ses biens. Elle a donc adapté son comportement à ce type de menace et développé une 
législation et une politique répressive spécifique à ce type de criminalité.
D’un point de vue politique, il est bon de rappeler que la France a eu à affronter 
différentes vagues de terrorisme d’origine et de signification diverses, de façon grave 
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et ancienne. Du terrorisme interne à base séparatiste comme en Corse ou au Pays 
basque jusqu’au terrorisme interne radical comme Action directe en passant par le 
terrorisme lié à sa politique étrangère au Proche-Orient  1 ou en Algérie  2, la France 
a eu à subir toutes les formes de violence liées au terrorisme : enlèvements et prises 
d’otages, assassinats de hauts fonctionnaires ou de dirigeants, détournements d’avion, 
attentats à l’explosif sur son territoire et à l’étranger jalonnent l’histoire des trente 
dernières années de manière grave et importante. Cette actualité ne se dément pas 
puisque s’achève en ce moment à Paris le procès de l’assassinat en Corse du préfet 
Erignac tandis qu’un certain nombre de ressortissants français sont encore aujourd’hui 
pris en otage à l’étranger. 
Tout en développant sa propre réponse interne, la République française s’est 
donc associée immédiatement aux premiers procédés de collaboration européenne 
en  matière de lutte contre le terrorisme, tels ceux entamés dans le cadre des groupes 
Trevi notamment. Cette attitude explique également qu’à partir des années quatre-
vingt, sa politique extraditionnelle ait contribué systématiquement à la répression 
du terrorisme, en particulier dans ses relations avec les autres Etats européens dans 
leur lutte contre le terrorisme. Le virage de cette politique dans sa relation bilatérale 
avec l’Espagne a été déterminant de ce point de vue, à compter du moment où les 
juridictions françaises ont refusé de considérer que le terrorisme pouvait bénéficier de 
la règle de non-extradition en matière politique en raison de sa gravité. 
Du point de vue juridique, le positionnement de la France est tout aussi clair, 
notamment en ce qui concerne sa participation aux différents instruments internationaux 
de lutte contre le terrorisme et aux différentes enceintes où ce droit s’élabore. La 
France est donc de ce fait partie aujourd’hui à la quasi-totalité des grandes conventions 
internationales en la matière  3.
1 Avec une série d’attentats dans les rues de Paris, de fin 1985 à l’automne 1986, en liaison 
avec des tensions avec l’Iran.
2 De juillet à octobre 1995 avec des attentats à Paris liés à des mouvements islamistes 
algériens. 
3 Par exemple, voir : convention relative aux infractions et à certains actes survenus à bord 
des aéronefs, adoptée à Tokyo le 14 septembre 1963 ; convention pour la répression de la capture 
illicite d’aéronefs, signée à La Haye le 16 décembre 1970 ; convention pour la répression d’actes 
illicites dirigés contre la sécurité de l’aviation civile, adoptée à Montréal le 23 septembre 1971 ; 
convention internationale contre la prise d’otages, adoptée par l’AG des NU le 17 décembre 
1979 ; convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires, adoptée à Vienne le 
3 mars 1980 ; protocole pour la répression des actes illicites de violence dans les aéroports 
servant à l’aviation civile internationale, complémentaire à la convention pour la répression 
des actes illicites dirigés contre la sécurité de l’aviation civile, adopté à Montréal le 24 février 
1988 ; convention pour la répression des actes illicites dirigés contre la sécurité de la navigation 
maritime, adoptée à Rome le 10 mars 1988 ; protocole pour la répression d’actes illicites contre 
la sécurité des plates-formes fixes situées sur le plateau continental, adopté à Rome le 10 mars 
1988 ; convention sur le marquage des explosifs plastiques aux fins de détection, adoptée à 
Montréal le 1er mars 1991 ; convention pour la répression des attentats terroristes à l’explosif, 
adoptée par l’AG des NU le 15 décembre 1997 ; convention internationale pour la répression 
du financement du terrorisme, adoptée par l’AG des NU le 9 décembre 1999. Pour le texte le 
plus récent, voir la loi 2007-1474 du 17 octobre 2007 autorisant la ratification du protocole 
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Historiquement comme techniquement, la période charnière du droit français en 
matière de lutte contre le terrorisme se situe au milieu des années quatre-vingt, à 
la suite et en réaction à la campagne d’attentats précités à Paris. La loi 86-1020 du 
9 septembre 1986, plus de quinze ans avant la décision-cadre 2002/475 du 13 juin 
2002 fixe l’état du droit français. Les choix de politique criminelle effectués à l’époque 
constituent effectivement une « étape essentielle dans la prise en compte du terrorisme 
par le droit français »  4. Ils n’ont pas été infirmés depuis, bien au contraire.
Les options de la législation française sont donc relativement simples à résumer. 
Le droit français fait tout d’abord le choix de privilégier un régime juridique spécifique 
applicable au terrorisme, celui de l’aggravation de la criminalité ordinaire et celui 
d’un régime procédural particulier. Au plan technique, il mise sur la centralisation et 
la spécialisation des acteurs de la répression, y compris judiciaires, avec pour option 
de mettre la règle de droit au service d’une démarche collective d’anticipation et de 
prévention de l’infraction terroriste.
3.	 La	législation	anti-terroriste	française	
La législation française est composée à titre principal de deux grands textes, la loi 
86-1020 du 9 septembre 1986 précitée et la loi 2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006 relative 
à la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions diverses relatives à la sécurité et 
aux contrôles frontaliers, adoptée au lendemain des attentats de Londres.
A diverses reprises, le législateur est également intervenu en matière anti-terroriste, 
hors de ces deux grandes lois, souvent d’ailleurs en liaison avec l’actualité criminelle. 
Il s’agit de la loi du 22 juillet 1996 adoptée à la suite des attentats terroristes commis 
sur le sol français pendant l’été 1995, de la loi 2001-1062 du 15 novembre 2001 
relative à la sécurité quotidienne, de la loi 2003-329 du 18 mars 2003 pour la sécurité 
intérieure, de la loi 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant adaptation de la justice aux 
évolutions de la criminalité, de la loi 2008-1245 et, plus récemment, de la loi 2011-
267 du 14 mars 2011 d’orientation et de programmation pour la performance de la 
sécurité intérieure dite LOPSI 2. Cette inflation législative complète les dispositifs 
en vigueur, principalement à des fins de prévention et de surveillance. On notera que, 
comme son homologue européen, cette législation est essentiellement « réactive », 
c’est-à-dire adoptée en faisant suite à des agressions terroristes préalables.
De ce catalogue particulièrement fourni, se dégage donc un constat paradoxal : il 
n’existe pas formellement de texte de transposition de la décision-cadre 2002/475 en 
droit pénal français alors que l’inflation législative de ce droit applicable au terrorisme 
(près d’une dizaine de textes législatifs) couvre largement la matière (et au-delà) et 
aurait permis, au moins, une référence au droit de l’Union, référence que l’on est 
bien en peine de trouver. Quoi qu’il en soit, le caractère particulièrement fourni de 
la législation française rendait inutile une telle transposition dès 2004, époque du 
premier rapport d’évaluation de la Commission  5. La Commission l’avait d’ailleurs 
portant amendement à la convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme du Conseil 
de l’Europe. 
4 M.E. Cartier, « Le terrorisme dans le nouveau code pénal français », RSC, 1995 
p. 225.
5 COM (2004) 409 du 8 juin 2004.
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noté, la France étant avec l’Espagne les deux seuls Etats à ne pas avoir adopté une 
législation spécifique à cet égard  6.
Enfin, il n’est pas inintéressant de noter que la législation pénale française, faite 
de deux textes centraux et d’apports successifs ou de prorogations dans le temps de 
dispositions temporaires, est accompagnée d’un mécanisme de suivi parlementaire. 
Classique quand il est le fait du gouvernement, lequel respecte d’ailleurs rarement 
l’obligation législative de remettre annuellement un rapport sur l’application de 
la loi  7, ce mécanisme est plus intéressant quand il est le fait du législateur lui-
même. La Commission des Lois de l’Assemblée nationale a ainsi adopté un rapport 
d’évaluation et de suivi des textes, en 2008, faisant le bilan de l’application de la 
législation anti-terroriste  8. Il n’est pas indifférent de voir le législateur noter que bon 
nombre de dispositions exceptionnelles qu’il a votées n’ont, en fait, jamais fait l’objet 
d’une application concrète, relativisant ainsi l’intérêt de tels dispositifs d’exception. 
Là encore, et ces schémas ne sont pas nouveaux, le droit de la lutte anti-terroriste se 
distingue par la volonté politique d’associer un discours sécuritaire fort, au besoin 
déconnecté des besoins réels, à la nécessité technique d’une réponse pénale. 
4.	 Contenu	de	la	législation	française
Le Code pénal français répond en tous points à la volonté exprimée par le droit 
de l’Union européenne. Il procède ainsi à une individualisation claire de la criminalité 
terroriste en droit pénal. 
Pour ce faire, son livre quatrième, intitulé Des crimes et délits contre la Nation, 
l’Etat et la paix publique, contient un titre II intitulé Du terrorisme, décomposé en 
deux chapitres distincts relatifs aux « actes de terrorisme » (chapitre 1, articles 421-1 
à 421-6) et à des « dispositions particulières » (chapitre 2, articles 422-1 à 422-7).
A.	 L’infraction	terroriste
Vérifier la compatibilité du droit pénal français avec les prescriptions de la 
décision-cadre 2002/475 n’est guère compliqué. Le Code pénal français utilise deux 
techniques pour incriminer l’infraction terroriste  9, qui se révèlent en conformité 
avec les articles 1 et 2 de la décision-cadre. Dans un premier temps, il s’appuie sur 
des infractions de droit commun dont la finalité « terroriste » justifie un traitement 
particulier. Dans un second temps, il érige certaines infractions terroristes en 
infractions « autonomes ».
A la première catégorie correspond l’alinéa 1 de l’article 421-1 du Code pénal 
qui incrimine le terrorisme par sa finalité puisqu’un certain nombre d’infractions 
« constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu’elles sont intentionnellement en relation 
avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement 
l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur ».
Une énumération de sept catégories d’infractions est ensuite listée, c’est-à-dire :
6 SEC (2004) 288, p. 3.
7 Voir l’article 32 de la loi du 23 janvier 2006.
8 Assemblée nationale, Rapport E. Diard et J. Dray, 5 février 2008, n° 683.
9 Sur le thème, voir J. Alix, Terrorisme et droit pénal, étude critique des incriminations 
terroristes, Paris, Dalloz, 2010. 
les infractions terroristes en droit Pénal français     53
« 1° Les atteintes volontaires à la vie, les atteintes volontaires à l’intégrité de la 
personne, l’enlèvement et la séquestration ainsi que le détournement d’aéronef, 
de navire ou de tout autre moyen de transport, définis par le livre II du présent 
code ;
2° Les vols, les extorsions, les destructions, dégradations et détériorations, ainsi que 
les infractions en matière informatique définis par le livre III du présent code ;
3° Les infractions en matière de groupes de combat et de mouvements dissous 
définies par les articles 431-13 à 431-17 et les infractions définies par les articles 
434-6 et 441-2 à 441-5 ;
4° Les infractions en matière d’armes, de produits explosifs ou de matières nucléaires 
définies par le I de l’article L. 1333-9, les articles L. 1333-11 et L. 1333-13-2, le 
II des articles L. 1333-13-3 et L. 1333-13-4, les articles L. 1333-13-6, L. 2339-
2, L. 2339-5, L. 2339-8 et L. 2339-9 à l’exception des armes de la 6e catégorie, 
L. 2339-14, L. 2339-16, L. 2341-1, L. 2341-4, L. 2341-5, L. 2342-57 à L. 2342-
62, L. 2353-4, le 1° de l’article L. 2353-5 et l’ article L. 2353-13 du Code de la 
défense ;
5° Le recel du produit de l’une des infractions prévues aux 1° à 4° ci-dessus ;
6° Les infractions de blanchiment prévues au chapitre IV du titre II du livre III du 
présent code ;
7° Les délits d’initié prévus à l’article L. 465-1 du Code monétaire et financier ».
Ce dispositif appelle plusieurs remarques. En premier lieu, la notion « d’entreprise 
terroriste » pose évidemment problème, au même titre que « l’association structurée » 
visée par la décision-cadre avait nourri les interrogations. En droit interne, ce concept 
a fait l’objet de nombre de critiques auxquelles le Conseil constitutionnel a mis fin 
dans sa décision n° 86-213 DC du 3 septembre 1986 en estimant qu’elle satisfaisait 
aux conditions de précision et de clarté exigées de la loi pénale. Elle correspond à une 
variété de « l’association de malfaiteurs » connue du droit pénal et visée par l’article 2 
de la décision-cadre et, quoi que l’on en dise, son indétermination ajoutée à celle de la 
notion de « terrorisme » en fait une notion particulièrement élastique.
En second lieu, la technique législative de l’énumération retenue par le droit 
français pose effectivement des questions de principe. Le législateur peut évidemment 
être tenté d’allonger indéfiniment les éléments de cette liste, déjà passablement large 
puisqu’elle renvoie à des infractions de droit commun basiques telles par exemple que 
le vol ou le délit d’initié. La loi de 1994 établissant le nouveau Code pénal n’ayant 
pas été déférée au juge constitutionnel, ce procédé n’a pu être validé par ce dernier. 
En 1996, le Conseil constitutionnel a cependant censuré une disposition législative 
classant le délit d’aide à l’entrée ou au séjour irrégulier des étrangers parmi les 
infractions susceptibles d’être qualifiées d’acte de terrorisme  10. Le Conseil a jugé 
que le législateur avait « entaché son appréciation d’une disproportion manifeste », 
dans la mesure où les agissements visés n’étaient pas des actes matériels directement 
attentatoires à la sécurité des biens ou des personnes mais constituaient un simple 
comportement d’aide à des personnes en situation irrégulière, n’étant pas en relation 
immédiate avec la commission de l’acte terroriste. Il a d’ailleurs souligné qu’au cas où 
un lien avec une entreprise terroriste apparaîtrait, les faits pourraient être poursuivis 
10 Décision n° 96-377 DC du 16 juillet 1996.
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sous d’autres qualifications, comme le recel de criminel ou la participation à une 
association de malfaiteurs.
A la seconde technique d’incrimination du terrorisme correspond l’individua-
lisation de certains actes autonomes par le Code pénal dans ses articles 421-2, 421-
2-1, 421-2-2, 421-2-3. Il s’agit en premier lieu, depuis 2004, d’un terrorisme que l’on 
pourrait qualifier « d’écologique » puisque, sur la base de l’article 421-2, le législateur 
va au delà des dispositions de l’article 1 h) de la décision-cadre : 
« Constitue également un acte de terrorisme, lorsqu’il est intentionnellement en relation 
avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement 
l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur, le fait d’introduire dans l’atmosphère, 
sur le sol, dans le sous-sol, dans les aliments ou les composants alimentaires ou dans 
les eaux, y compris celles de la mer territoriale, une substance de nature à mettre en 
péril la santé de l’homme ou des animaux ou le milieu naturel ».
En second lieu, conformément à l’article 2 de la décision-cadre 2002/475, l’article 
421-2-1 incrimine :
« le fait de participer à un groupement formé ou à une entente établie en vue de 
la préparation, caractérisée par un ou plusieurs faits matériels, d’un des actes de 
terrorisme mentionnés aux articles précédents ».
En troisième lieu, l’article 421-2-2 incrimine en tant qu’acte de terrorisme :
« le fait de financer une entreprise terroriste en fournissant, en réunissant ou en gérant 
des fonds, des valeurs ou des biens quelconques ou en donnant des conseils à cette 
fin, dans l’intention de voir ces fonds, valeurs ou biens utilisés ou en sachant qu’ils 
sont destinés à être utilisés, en tout ou partie, en vue de commettre l’un quelconque 
des actes de terrorisme prévus au présent chapitre, indépendamment de la survenance 
éventuelle d’un tel acte ».
Enfin, dans la logique de la répression de certains faits criminels tels que le trafic 
de stupéfiants ou le proxénétisme, le législateur punit dans l’article 421-2-3 :
« Le fait de ne pouvoir justifier de ressources correspondant à son train de vie, 
tout en étant en relations habituelles avec une ou plusieurs personnes se livrant à 
l’un ou plusieurs des actes visés aux articles 421-1 à 421-2-2, est puni de sept ans 
d’emprisonnement et de 100 000 euros d’amende ».
En l’état, se pose alors la question de la compatibilité du droit français avec les 
prescriptions de la décision-cadre modifiée en 2008. Est en cause principalement 
l’article 3 de la décision-cadre et plus particulièrement la question de la « provocation 
publique » et dans une moindre mesure celle de l’entraînement et du recrutement de 
terroristes, les autorités françaises semblant penser que les dispositions concernant 
l’association de malfaiteurs suffiraient à y répondre  11. Pour ce qui est de la 
« provocation », la loi française de 1881 sur la liberté de la presse semblerait y 
répondre également, sous réserve qu’elle soit « directe »  12 et publique quand bien 
même on serait en droit de douter de la lisibilité de ce renvoi à un texte vieux de plus 
11 En ce sens, voir les réponses apportées par la France lors de l’examen thématique de 
mise en œuvre des conventions du Conseil de l’Europe, octobre 2006.
12 Ce que ne précise pas la décision-cadre.
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d’un siècle, en droit comme en fait. Elle est punie de cinq ans d’emprisonnement 
et de 45 000 € d’amende mais connaît un contentieux extrêmement limité. Au vu 
des modalités contemporaines de la provocation en question, sur Internet ou certains 
réseaux sociaux, on peut néanmoins douter raisonnablement qu’un texte adopté pour 
de tout autres raisons puisse être adapté…
B.	 Les	sanctions	des	infractions	terroristes
Sur la base de l’article 5 de la décision-cadre 2002/475, les Etats membres prennent 
les mesures « nécessaires » pour punir les infractions terroristes de sanctions pénales 
effectives, proportionnées et dissuasives obéissant à un certain nombre de seuils liés 
à la gravité de l’infraction. A l’évidence, le droit pénal français s’y conforme en les 
dépassant largement. Il effectue une distinction selon que les infractions terroristes 
sont autonomes ou pas.
La condition fixée par l’article 5 de la décision-cadre 2002/475 relative à 
une sévérité accrue en raison de « l’intention spéciale » animant son auteur est 
manifestement satisfaite.
Pour ce qui est des infractions ordinaires qui sont qualifiées de terroristes par la 
finalité animant leur auteur, la peine de droit commun est ici aggravée du fait de cette 
finalité. 
L’article 421-3 du Code pénal dispose ainsi que :
« Le maximum de la peine privative de liberté encourue pour les infractions 
mentionnées à l’article 421-1 est relevé ainsi qu’il suit lorsque ces infractions 
constituent des actes de terrorisme :
1° Il est porté à la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité lorsque l’infraction est punie de 
trente ans de réclusion criminelle ;
2° Il est porté à trente ans de réclusion criminelle lorsque l’infraction est punie de 
vingt ans de réclusion criminelle ;
3° Il est porté à vingt ans de réclusion criminelle lorsque l’infraction est punie de 
quinze ans de réclusion criminelle ;
4° Il est porté à quinze ans de réclusion criminelle lorsque l’infraction est punie de 
dix ans d’emprisonnement ;
5° Il est porté à dix ans d’emprisonnement lorsque l’infraction est punie de sept ans 
d’emprisonnement ;
6° Il est porté à sept ans d’emprisonnement lorsque l’infraction est punie de cinq ans 
d’emprisonnement ;
7° Il est porté au double lorsque l’infraction est punie d’un emprisonnement de trois 
ans au plus ».
A cela, le même article ajoute que les dispositions du Code relatives à la période de 
sûreté  13 sont applicables aux crimes et aux délits punis de dix ans d’emprisonnement 
prévus par le présent article.
Un constat est facile à tirer de l’observation de ce régime : lorsque l’infraction 
est punie de trois ans au plus, la sanction est doublée. Au delà, l’aggravation de la 
peine retenue est d’un degré (de 5 à 7, de 7 à 10, de 10 à 15, de 15 à 20, de 20 à 30, 
de 30 à la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité). D’où le passage de certaines infractions 
13 Article 132-23.
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du régime délictuel au régime criminel, de l’alinéa 5 à 4 de l’article 421-1, du fait de 
leur mobile terroriste  14.
Pour ce qui est des actes de terrorisme « autonomes », le Code pénal manifeste la 
même sévérité. 
L’article 421-4 relatif au terrorisme « écologique » dispose ainsi que :
« L’acte de terrorisme défini à l’article 421-2 est puni de vingt ans de réclusion 
criminelle et de 350 000 euros d’amende.
Lorsque cet acte a entraîné la mort d’une ou plusieurs personnes, il est puni de la 
réclusion criminelle à perpétuité et de 750 000 euros d’amende.
Les deux premiers alinéas de l’article 132-23 relatif à la période de sûreté sont 
applicables au crime prévu par le présent article ».
L’article 421-5 relatif au financement du terrorisme prévoit que :
« Les actes de terrorisme définis aux articles 421-2-1 et 421-2-2 sont punis de dix ans 
d’emprisonnement et de 225 000 euros d’amende.
Le fait de diriger ou d’organiser le groupement ou l’entente défini à l’article 421-2-1 
est puni de vingt ans de réclusion criminelle et de 500 000 euros d’amende.
La tentative du délit défini à l’article 421-2-2 est punie des mêmes peines.
Le régime des peines de sûreté est également applicable ». 
L’article 421-6 aggrave les peines encourues lorsque l’entreprise terroriste est 
susceptible d’entraîner mort d’homme :
« Les peines sont portées à vingt ans de réclusion criminelle et 350 000 euros 
d’amende lorsque le groupement ou l’entente définie à l’article 421-2-1 a pour objet 
la préparation :
1° Soit d’un ou plusieurs crimes d’atteintes aux personnes visés au 1° de l’article 
421-1 ;
2° Soit d’une ou plusieurs destructions par substances explosives ou incendiaires 
visées au 2° de l’article 421-1 et devant être réalisées dans des circonstances de 
temps ou de lieu susceptibles d’entraîner la mort d’une ou plusieurs personnes ;
3° Soit de l’acte de terrorisme défini à l’article 421-2 lorsqu’il est susceptible 
d’entraîner la mort d’une ou plusieurs personnes.
Le fait de diriger ou d’organiser un tel groupement ou une telle entente est puni de 
trente ans de réclusion criminelle et 500 000 euros d’amende ».
Le régime des périodes de sûreté est applicable en la matière.
A cet ensemble, le Code pénal, dans un chapitre deuxième, ouvre la possibilité de 
prononcer des peines dites « complémentaires », généralement plus importantes que 
dans le droit commun.
L’article 422-3 dispose ainsi que : 
« Les personnes physiques coupables de l’une des infractions prévues par le présent 
titre encourent également les peines complémentaires suivantes :
14 On peut citer à cet égard l’article 322-6 du Code pénal visant « la destruction, la 
dégradation ou la détérioration d’un bien appartenant à autrui par l’effet d’une substance 
explosive, d’un incendie ou de tout autre moyen de nature à créer un danger pour les personnes » 
qui sont sanctionnées d’une peine de dix ans et de 150 000 euros. Qualifiée de terroriste, elle est 
sanctionnée d’une peine de quinze ans de réclusion criminelle.
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1° L’interdiction des droits civiques, civils et de famille, suivant les modalités 
prévues par l’article 131-26. Toutefois, le maximum de la durée de l’interdiction 
est porté à quinze ans en cas de crime et à dix ans en cas de délit ;
2° L’interdiction, suivant les modalités prévues par l’article 131-27, soit d’exercer 
une fonction publique ou d’exercer l’activité professionnelle ou sociale dans 
l’exercice ou à l’occasion de l’exercice de laquelle l’infraction a été commise, 
le maximum de la durée de l’interdiction temporaire étant porté à dix ans, 
soit, pour les crimes prévus par les 1° à 4° de l’article 421-3, l’article 421-4, le 
deuxième alinéa de l’article 421-5 et l’article 421-6, d’exercer une profession 
commerciale ou industrielle, de diriger, d’administrer, de gérer ou de contrôler 
à un titre quelconque, directement ou indirectement, pour son propre compte 
ou pour le compte d’autrui, une entreprise commerciale ou industrielle ou une 
société commerciale. Ces interdictions d’exercice peuvent être prononcées 
cumulativement ;
3° L’interdiction de séjour, suivant les modalités prévues par l’article 131-31. 
Toutefois, le maximum de la durée de l’interdiction est porté à quinze ans en cas 
de crime et à dix ans en cas de délit ».
L’article 422-4 précise que :
« L’interdiction du territoire français peut être prononcée dans les conditions prévues 
par l’article 131-30, soit à titre définitif, soit pour une durée de dix ans au plus, à 
l’encontre de tout étranger coupable de l’une des infractions définies au présent 
titre ».
L’article 422-6 ajoute que : 
« Les personnes physiques ou morales reconnues coupables d’actes de terrorisme 
encourent également la peine complémentaire de confiscation de tout ou partie de 
leurs biens quelle qu’en soit la nature, meubles ou immeubles, divis ou indivis ».
Enfin, le même chapitre deuxième apporte un certain nombre de précisions qui 
sont de nature à satisfaire aux prescriptions de la décision-cadre 2002/475.
Il en va ainsi de la responsabilité des personnes morales mentionnée aux articles 
7 et 8 de la décision-cadre.
L’article 422-5 indique ainsi que le droit commun s’applique ici en disposant 
que :
« Les personnes morales déclarées responsables pénalement, dans les conditions 
prévues par l’article 121-2, des infractions définies au présent titre encourent, outre 
l’amende suivant les modalités prévues par l’article 131-38, les peines prévues par 
l’article 131-39.
L’interdiction mentionnée au 2° de l’article 131-39 porte sur l’activité dans l’exercice 
ou à l’occasion de l’exercice de laquelle l’infraction a été commise ».
Par ailleurs, les « circonstances particulières » de l’article 6 de la décision-cadre 
sont prises en compte par le Code pénal français. 
L’article 422-1 prévoit que : 
« Toute personne qui a tenté de commettre un acte de terrorisme est exempte de 
peine si, ayant averti l’autorité administrative ou judiciaire, elle a permis d’éviter la 
réalisation de l’infraction et d’identifier, le cas échéant, les autres coupables ».
L’article 422-2 précise que : 
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« La peine privative de liberté encourue par l’auteur ou le complice d’un acte de 
terrorisme est réduite de moitié si, ayant averti les autorités administratives ou 
judiciaires, il a permis de faire cesser les agissements incriminés ou d’éviter que 
l’infraction n’entraîne mort d’homme ou infirmité permanente et d’identifier, le cas 
échéant, les autres coupables. Lorsque la peine encourue est la réclusion criminelle à 
perpétuité, celle-ci est ramenée à vingt ans de réclusion criminelle ».
Enfin, la situation des victimes mentionnée par l’article 10 est réglée par l’article 
422-7 qui dispose que :
« Le produit des sanctions financières ou patrimoniales prononcées à l’encontre des 
personnes reconnues coupables d’actes de terrorisme est affecté au fonds de garantie 
des victimes des actes de terrorisme et d’autres infractions ».
C.	 Compétences	et	poursuites
La Commission le note elle-même dans son rapport d’évaluation de 2004, la 
question n’est guère problématique. Outre sa compétence territoriale, la loi française 
établit la compétence des juridictions françaises pour une série d’infractions commises 
à l’étranger, sur la base des articles 689 et suivants du Code de procédure pénale.
L’article 689 dispose ainsi que :
« Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République 
peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, 
conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du Code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, 
la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris 
en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence 
aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction ».
Il est précisé par l’article 689-1 que :
« En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut 
être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, 
toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une 
des infractions énumérées par ces articles. Les dispositions du présent article sont 
applicables à la tentative de ces infractions, chaque fois que celle-ci est punissable ».
A cela, une série d’articles du CPP établis à la suite de la ratification d’un ensemble 
de conventions internationales réprimant le terrorisme établissent la compétence des 
juridictions françaises. Il s’agit de l’article 689-3 pour la convention européenne de 
1977  15, l’article 689-4 pour la convention sur la protection physique des matières 
15 « Pour l’application de la convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme, 
signée à Strasbourg le 27 janvier 1977, et de l’accord entre les Etats membres des Communautés 
européennes concernant l’application de la convention européenne pour la répression du 
terrorisme, fait à Dublin le 4 décembre 1979, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions 
prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Atteinte 
volontaire à la vie, tortures et actes de barbarie, violences ayant entraîné la mort, une mutilation 
ou une infirmité permanente ou, si la victime est mineure, une incapacité totale de travail 
supérieure à huit jours, enlèvement et séquestration réprimés par le livre II du Code pénal ainsi 
que les menaces définies aux articles 222-17, alinéa 2, et 222-18 de ce code, lorsque l’infraction 
est commise contre une personne ayant droit à une protection internationale, y compris les 
agents diplomatiques ; 2° Atteintes à la liberté d’aller et venir définies à l’article 421-1 du Code 
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nucléaires de 1980  16, l’article 689-5 pour la convention pour la répression d’actes 
illicites contre la sécurité de la navigation maritime et pour l’application du protocole 
pour la répression d’actes illicites contre la sécurité des plates-formes fixes situées 
sur le plateau continental, faits à Rome le 10 mars 1988  17, l’article 689-6 pour la 
convention sur la répression de la capture illicite d’aéronefs, signée à La Haye le 
16 décembre 1970, et la convention pour la répression d’actes illicites dirigés contre la 
sécurité de l’aviation civile, signée à Montréal le 23 septembre 1971  18, l’article 689-
7 pour le protocole pour la répression des actes illicites de violence dans les aéroports 
pénal ou tout autre crime ou délit comportant l’utilisation de bombes, de grenades, de fusées, 
d’armes à feu automatiques, de lettres ou de colis piégés, dans la mesure où cette utilisation 
présente un danger pour les personnes, lorsque ce crime ou délit est en relation avec une 
entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par 
l’intimidation ou la terreur ».
16 « Pour l’application de la convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires, 
ouverte à la signature à Vienne et New York le 3 mars 1980, peut être poursuivie et jugée 
dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de l’une des infractions 
suivantes : 1° Délit prévu à l’article L1333-11 du Code de la défense ; 2° Délit d’appropriation 
indue prévue par l’article L1333-9 du code précité, atteinte volontaire à la vie ou à l’intégrité 
de la personne, vol, extorsion, chantage, escroquerie, abus de confiance, recel, destruction, 
dégradation ou détérioration ou menace d’une atteinte aux personnes ou aux biens définis par 
les livres II et III du Code pénal, dès lors que l’infraction a été commise au moyen des matières 
nucléaires entrant dans le champ d’application des articles 1er et 2 de la convention ou qu’elle 
a porté sur ces dernières ».
17 « Pour l’application de la convention pour la répression d’actes illicites contre la sécurité 
de la navigation maritime et pour l’application du protocole pour la répression d’actes illicites 
contre la sécurité des plates-formes fixes situées sur le plateau continental, faits à Rome le 
10 mars 1988, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute 
personne coupable de l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Crime défini aux articles 224-6 et 
224-7 du Code pénal ; 2° Atteinte volontaire à la vie ou à l’intégrité physique, destruction, 
dégradation ou détérioration, menace d’une atteinte aux personnes ou aux biens réprimées 
par les livres II et III du Code pénal ou délits définis par l’article 224-8 de ce code et par 
l’article L. 331-2 du Code des ports maritimes, si l’infraction compromet ou est de nature à 
compromettre la sécurité de la navigation maritime ou d’une plate-forme fixe située sur le 
plateau continental ; 3° Atteinte volontaire à la vie, tortures et actes de barbarie ou violences 
réprimés par le livre II du Code pénal, si l’infraction est connexe soit à l’infraction définie au 
1°, soit à une ou plusieurs infractions de nature à compromettre la sécurité de la navigation 
maritime ou d’une plate-forme visées au 2° ». 
18 « Pour l’application de la convention sur la répression de la capture illicite d’aéronefs, 
signée à La Haye le 16 décembre 1970, et de la convention pour la répression d’actes illicites 
dirigés contre la sécurité de l’aviation civile, signée à Montréal le 23 septembre 1971, peut 
être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable 
de l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Détournement d’un aéronef non immatriculé en France 
et tout autre acte de violence dirigé contre les passagers ou l’équipage et commis par l’auteur 
présumé du détournement, en relation directe avec cette infraction ; 2° Toute infraction 
concernant un aéronef non immatriculé en France et figurant parmi celles énumérées aux a, b 
et c du 1° de l’article 1er de la convention pour la répression d’actes illicites dirigés contre la 
sécurité de l’aviation civile précitée ».
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servant à l’aviation civile internationale de Montréal du 24 février 1988  19, et 
l’article 689-9 pour la convention internationale pour la répression du terrorisme de 
1998  20 ainsi que l’article 689-10 pour la convention de New York sur la répression 
du financement du terrorisme  21.
D.	 Jugement	
Le régime procédural applicable au terrorisme est caractérisé en France par un 
système largement dérogatoire au droit commun, tant sur le plan de la centralisation 
des poursuites et de l’instruction que sur celui de la spécialisation des juridictions 
chargées d’en connaître. En traiter ne relève pas du présent rapport mais constitue un 
révélateur de la logique qui préside depuis les années quatre-vingt au droit français de 
la lutte contre le terrorisme. 
Dès la loi du 9 septembre 1986, le principe de la centralisation des affaires de 
terrorisme à Paris a été posé. En vertu de l’article 706-17 du Code de procédure pénale, 
le procureur de la République, le juge d’instruction et les juridictions de jugement de 
19 « Pour l’application du protocole pour la répression des actes illicites de violence 
dans les aéroports servant à l’aviation civile internationale, fait à Montréal le 24 février 1988, 
complémentaire à la convention pour la répression d’actes illicites dirigés contre la sécurité 
de l’aviation civile, faite à Montréal le 23 septembre 1971, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans 
les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable, à l’aide d’un 
dispositif matériel, d’une substance ou d’une arme : 1° De l’une des infractions suivantes si 
cette infraction porte atteinte ou est de nature à porter atteinte à la sécurité dans un aérodrome 
affecté à l’aviation civile internationale : a) Atteintes volontaires à la vie, tortures et actes de 
barbarie, violences ayant entraîné la mort, une mutilation ou une infirmité permanente ou, si 
la victime est mineure, une incapacité totale de travail pendant plus de huit jours, réprimés 
par le livre II du Code pénal, lorsque l’infraction a été commise dans un aérodrome affecté à 
l’aviation civile internationale ; b) Destructions, dégradations et détériorations réprimées par le 
livre III du Code pénal, lorsque l’infraction a été commise à l’encontre des installations d’un 
aérodrome affecté à l’aviation civile internationale ou d’un aéronef stationné dans l’aérodrome 
et qui n’est pas en service ; c) Délit prévu au quatrième alinéa (3°) de l’article L. 282-1 du 
Code de l’aviation civile, lorsque l’infraction a été commise à l’encontre des installations d’un 
aérodrome affecté à l’aviation civile internationale ou d’un aéronef dans l’aérodrome et qui 
n’est pas en service ; 2° De l’infraction définie au sixième alinéa (5°) de l’article L. 282-1 du 
Code de l’aviation civile, lorsqu’elle a été commise à l’encontre des services d’un aérodrome 
affecté à l’aviation civile internationale ».
20 « Pour l’application de la convention internationale pour la répression des attentats 
terroristes, ouverte à la signature à New York le 12 janvier 1998, peut être poursuivie et 
jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable d’un crime ou 
d’un délit d’acte de terrorisme défini par les articles 421-1 et 421-2 du Code pénal ou du délit 
d’association terroriste prévu par l’article 421-2-1 du même code lorsque l’infraction a été 
commise en employant un engin explosif ou un autre engin meurtrier défini à l’article 1er de 
ladite convention ».
21 « Pour l’application de la convention internationale pour la répression du financement 
du terrorisme, ouverte à la signature à New York le 10 janvier 2000, peut être poursuivie et 
jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable d’un crime ou d’un 
délit défini par les articles 421-1 à 421-2-2 du Code pénal lorsque cette infraction constitue un 
financement d’actes de terrorisme au sens de l’article 2 de ladite convention ».
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Paris disposent d’une compétence concurrente de celle résultant des règles de droit 
commun. En cas d’infraction terroriste, le procureur de la République d’un tribunal 
autre que celui de Paris invitera le juge d’instruction à le dessaisir au profit du juge 
parisien. Après avoir avisé les parties et les avoir invitées à fournir leurs observations, 
le juge d’instruction prendra sa décision dans un délai compris entre huit jours et un 
mois  22. Cette centralisation vaut également pour l’application des peines.
De même, le principe de spécialisation s’applique à la poursuite et au jugement 
des infractions terroristes. Les magistrats du parquet comme ceux de l’instruction 
sont spécialisés dans des contentieux particuliers (terrorisme basque, corse, islamique 
radical), le service central de la lutte anti-terroriste s’avérant être la « 14e section du 
parquet ». Une Cour d’assises composée uniquement de magistrats professionnels (un 
président et six assesseurs ou, en appel, huit assesseurs) en connaît, aucun citoyen 
ordinaire n’y siège. Le Conseil constitutionnel a estimé à ce propos dans sa décision 
86-213 DC du 3 septembre 1986, que ce procédé était admissible « pourvu que ces 
différences ne procèdent pas de discriminations injustifiées et que soient assurées 
aux justiciables des garanties égales, notamment quant au respect du principe des 
droits de la défense ». Il a ajouté qu’une telle différence de traitement tendait, « selon 
l’intention du législateur, à déjouer l’effet des pressions ou des menaces pouvant 
altérer la sérénité de la juridiction de jugement  23 ; que cette différence de traitement 
ne procède donc pas d’une discrimination injustifiée ; qu’en outre, par sa composition, 
la Cour d’assises instituée par l’article 698-6 du Code de procédure pénale présente les 
garanties requises d’indépendance et d’impartialité ; que devant cette juridiction les 
droits de la défense sont sauvegardés », d’où le respect du principe d’égalité devant 
la justice.
Cette spécialisation est généralement présentée comme un gage de succès, 
permettant à ses acteurs judiciaires d’acquérir une technicité particulière et une 
connaissance approfondie de la criminalité terroriste, y compris en relation avec les 
autres systèmes répressifs européens. Elle est également présentée comme une garantie 
de la connaissance et de la confiance mutuelle avec les autres secteurs spécialisés en 
charge de la lutte contre le terrorisme.
Au plan procédural, enfin, des règles dérogatoires au droit commun, notamment 
en matière de garde à vue  24, de perquisition  25 et de prescription  26, posent 
évidemment problème au regard des droits fondamentaux.
22 L’ordonnance par laquelle un juge d’instruction statue sur son dessaisissement peut faire 
l’objet d’un recours dans un délai de cinq jours devant la Cour de cassation. Dans les huit jours 
suivant la réception du dossier, celle-ci désignera le juge d’instruction chargé de poursuivre 
l’information (article 706-22 du Code de procédure pénale). Les actes et formalités accomplis 
avant le dessaisissement demeurent valables.
23 Ce qui fut le cas lors du procès d’Action directe en décembre 1986, antérieurement à 
l’applicabilité de la loi de septembre 1986.
24 Près de six jours, en vertu de l’article 706-88 du CPP.
25 Articles 706-89 et suivants du Code de procédure pénale.
26 L’article 706-25-1 du Code de procédure pénale fixe un délai de trente ans pour les 
crimes mentionnés à l’article 706-16 du Code de procédure pénale et de vingt ans pour les délits 
mentionnés à l’article 706-16 du Code de procédure pénale.
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De ce point de vue et sous cet angle, les critiques adressées au dispositif du droit 
français ne sauraient être sous-estimées  27, quand bien même l’essentiel aurait été 
soumis au contrôle du juge constitutionnel.
5.	 L’impact	de	la	décision-cadre	2002/475
Si le droit français de la lutte anti-terroriste s’avère en phase avec la décision-
cadre 2002/475, paradoxalement, il l’ignore largement. On ne trouve trace de celle-ci 
ni dans le Code pénal, ni dans le Code de procédure pénale et l’on serait bien en peine 
d’en trouver un écho dans la jurisprudence interne rendue en matière de terrorisme qui 
s’appuie logiquement et systématiquement sur les seules dispositions de droit interne. 
Plusieurs explications peuvent être trouvées à ce phénomène. 
Une raison chronologique l’explique largement d’abord, dans la mesure où 
le texte central du droit français de la lutte contre le terrorisme précède de près de 
quinze années le texte européen. Autrement dit, la quasi-totalité des dispositions de la 
décision-cadre faisaient déjà partie du droit positif français bien avant leur adoption et 
elles n’ont de ce fait apporté aucune valeur ajoutée au droit interne, si ce n’est ici ou 
là à titre de précision complémentaire.
Une raison politique s’y ajoute ensuite. Là où le droit de l’Union est un instrument 
de rapprochement des législations pénales en soi, l’inspiration qui anime la législation 
française est tout autre. Plus que tout autre pays européen sans doute, la France a 
mis en place une réponse pénale flexible, qu’elle veut adaptée aux caractères de la 
lutte contre le terrorisme. L’approche préventive associant l’ensemble des acteurs 
de la répression pénale, et en particulier le juge, domine cette construction. Le juge 
comme la règle de droit sont mis ici au service d’une stratégie d’anticipation visant 
avant toute autre chose à prévenir la commission de l’infraction et le démantèlement 
des réseaux, en coordination avec les services de police chargés du renseignement, 
eux aussi spécialisés. Cette coopération entre services de police et appareil judiciaire 
est apparemment de grande qualité, l’utilisation du renseignement pour l’enquête 
judiciaire étant facilitée par la confiance des acteurs en présence. Dans ce schéma, 
la phase répressive ne tient pas une fonction prioritaire, quand bien même elle serait 
particulièrement rigoureuse. En d’autres termes, la mobilisation dérogatoire de 
l’ensemble de l’arsenal répressif est mise au service d’une politique précise : éviter 
la commission de l’infraction. En atteste sans aucun doute l’article 421-2-1 du Code 
pénal précité qui prévoit que constitue également un acte terroriste le fait de participer 
à une entente établie ou un groupement formé en vue de préparer des actes terroristes, 
disposition adoptée dès la loi du 22 juillet 1996 et reprise par la décision-cadre 
2002/475.
D’où la volonté de systématiser cet objectif préventif par une utilisation des règles 
de procédure pénale telles que la garde à vue et par une action forte de surveillance des 
milieux à risque tant du point de vue des moyens de communication et des données de 
connexion, de la vidéosurveillance.
27 Voir par exemple Human rights watch, La justice court-circuitée, Les lois et procédures 
anti-terroristes en France, 2008.
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Cette originalité de la réponse française est souvent présentée par ses acteurs 
comme un exemple au regard d’autres expériences nationales et elle structure 
l’ensemble de la lutte anti-terroriste. D’où les ajustements incessants de la législation 
française afin d’accroître l’efficacité de la police administrative et de la surveillance. 
D’où le sentiment revendiqué ouvertement par les autorités françaises de ne pas avoir 
besoin de passer (comme ailleurs) par des dispositifs d’exception ou des mesures 
extrajudiciaires, comme en témoigne l’unanimité des parlementaires sur ce point.
A cet égard, la notion « d’association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise 
terroriste », introduite en droit interne depuis 1996, joue un rôle déterminant comme 
l’a bien compris le législateur européen qui en reprend la logique dans l’article 2 
de la décision-cadre. Elle permet par son indétermination et son adaptabilité à des 
situations très différentes d’attirer dans son orbite des cas de figures extrêmement 
variés et de les placer sous l’emprise de contraintes juridiques particulièrement sévères 
comme on l’a vu plus haut  28. Le caractère très lâche de ses éléments constitutifs 
est un élément décisif dans le démantèlement de réseaux plus ou moins structurés, 
permettant des arrestations de masse avec plus ou moins de crédibilité comme l’affaire 
des Moudjahidines iraniens l’a récemment démontré en France après des années de 
procédures vaines. Associé à la garde à vue et à un régime de détention provisoire 
rigoureux, cet usage du droit par le juge explique l’efficacité de l’action anti-terroriste, 
du point de vue des pouvoirs publics.
Le bilan chiffré d’Europol pour l’année 2010 continue à attester de cette 
efficacité  29, quand bien même on pourrait discuter de ses modalités d’établissement. 
De manière très significative, le taux d’acquittement en matière de poursuites témoigne 
lui aussi de l’efficacité judiciaire de cette stratégie : il est égal en France à 0%
Est-on bien certain, si la sécurité publique y trouve son compte, que ce soit aussi 
le cas des principes d’une Communauté de droit et notamment de celui d’un procès 
équitable ?
28 L’affaire récente des sabotages de lignes TGV illustre bien la puissance de cette 
attraction.
29 La France compte à elle seule près du tiers (219) des arrestations effectuées en matière 
de terrorisme dans l’Union européenne (611), principalement pour un terrorisme qualifié de 
« séparatiste » (123).

The impact of the Framework Decisions  
on combating terrorism on counterterrorism 
legislation and case law in Germany
Martin Böse
1.	 Introduction
The origins of German counterterrorism legislation date back to the 19th century. 
That was a period when the government used criminal law as an instrument to deal 
with political movements that emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution and 
as a consequence of the industrial revolution (e.g. liberal and socialist movements)  1. 
The German Penal Code of 1871 made it a criminal offence to take part in a secret / 
anti-State association  2, as the Prussian Penal Code had done before in 1851. After 
1945, these provisions were amended several times so that it became a criminal 
offence to take part in a criminal organisation  3. In the 1970s, a series of terrorist 
attacks by the Marxist-Leninist Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion or RAF 
for short) sparked a new wave of counterterrorism legislation. In particular, a new 
offence of participating in a terrorist organisation was adopted  4. After the RAF was 
broken up in 1998 and, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, terrorism has mainly been 
regarded as being an international threat posed by radical Islamic movements and 
organisations. The debate about legislative action in the last decade or so has therefore 
been particularly shaped by the bombings in Madrid and London and by similar bomb 
plots in Germany. Fortunately, the terrorist attacks in Germany failed or the terrorists 
1 For details of the history of German counterterrorism legislation, see m. nehring, 
Kriminelle und terroristische Vereinigungen im Ausland, Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2007, 
p. 32 and f.
2 Sections 128 and 129 Penal Code of 1871.
3 Section 129 Penal Code.
4 Section 129a Penal Code. Act of 18 August 1976 (“Anti-Terror-Gesetz”), 
Bundesgesetzblatt, part I, p. 2181.
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were arrested before they could carry out their plans  5. In April and September 2011, 
the police arrested the members of two terrorist groups in Düsseldorf and Berlin for 
planning a terrorist attack. The ringleader of one group had allegedly attended an Al-
Qaeda terror camp in Pakistan before  6. According to the German Federal Criminal 
Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt), there are more than 100 potential terrorists 
(Gefährder) in Germany who have attended a terrorist camp abroad  7.
2.	 National	legislation
Since 2001, substantive German criminal law on terrorism has been subject to 
several amendments in 2002/2003 and 2009. In the first phase, the German legislator 
explicitly adopted amendments to the Penal Code in order to implement the Joint 
Action of 1998  8 and the Framework Decision of 2002 (FD 2002)  9. By contrast, 
legislative action was not considered necessary with regard to the Framework 
Decision of 2008 (FD 2008)  10 because, at that time, government and parliament 
had already initiated the legislative process to introduce new criminal law provisions 
on combating terrorism. The draft German laws were influenced by the European 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005  11 and were thus deemed to 
comply with the corresponding requirements of the FD 2008.
A.	 Offences	and	sanctions
1. Terrorist offences
Article 1(1) FD 2002 defines what kind of offences “shall be deemed as terrorist 
offences”. Since the crimes listed in Art. 1(1)(a) to (i) FD 2002 are covered by the 
corresponding offences under German criminal law, the legislator did not see any 
need for implementation in that regard (e.g. by making terrorist offences crimes via a 
5 In 2006, two suitcases filled with bombs were placed in regional trains, but, due to faulty 
construction, the bombs did not go off. In 2007, a group of three men (the so-called “Sauerland-
group”), which had been trained in a terrorist camp in Pakistan, were arrested when preparing 
to carry out car bombings on a US airbase and other public locations, see M. A. zöller, 
“Willkommen in Absurdistan – Neue Straftatbestände zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus”, 
Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht, 2010, p. 607, at p. 608-609.
6 Spiegel online, 1 May 2011 at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ 
0,1518,759943,00.html (last visit: 18 May 2012); Tagesspiegel, 8 September 2011 at http://
www.tagesspiegel. de/berlin/schlag-gegen-mutmassliche-terror-zelle-in-berlin/4587766.html 
(last visit: 18 May 2012).
7 Welt am Sonntag, 8 May 2011 at http://www.welt.de/print/wams/politik/article 13359110/
Alle-Sensoren-sind-aktiv.html (last visit: 18 May 2012). 
8 Joint Action 98/733/JHA of 21 December 1998 on making it a criminal offence to 
participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European Union, OJ, no. 
L 351, 29 December 1998, p. 1.
9 Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ, 
no. L 164, 22 June 2002, p. 3.
10 Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ, no. L 330, 9 December 2008, p. 1.
11 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 16 May 2005 (ETS no. 
196); see the German ratification Act of 15 March 2011, Bundesgesetzblatt, part II, p. 300.
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separate category of crimes)  12. The Commission considered the absence of specific 
provisions on terrorist offences as not being in line with the requirements of the FD 
2002  13. German scholars have rejected this criticism, arguing that the FD 2002 
does not oblige the Member States to create a separate category of crimes, but to 
make these offences subject to certain legal consequences with regard to sentencing, 
jurisdiction etc.  14   15.
2. Participation in a terrorist group
One of the core elements of the FD 2002 is the offence of participating in a terrorist 
group. In this regard, the Joint Action of 1998 already provided for a similar obligation. 
As has been mentioned before  16, the corresponding provision in the German Penal 
Code was enacted in 1976  17. Since the offence was only applicable to domestic 
organisations  18, the German legislator had to extend the scope of application to 
terrorist organisations abroad  19 when implementing the Joint Action of 1998  20. 
The new provision even goes beyond the requirements of EU law because it is not 
limited to organisations in the Member States, but also applies to organisations outside 
the European Union. However, in this case, specific jurisdictional requirements have 
to be met (“genuine link”, e.g. German nationality of the perpetrator or the (potential) 
victim) and an authorisation from the Federal Ministry of Justice is required  21.
Unlike the Joint Action of 1998, Art. 2 FD 2002 specifies a detailed concept of 
participating in a terrorist group. The German legislator did not transpose this concept 
into national law, but maintained the traditional offence of participating in a terrorist 
organisation  22 and adopted several amendments to the (existing) provision  23   24.
12 See the explanatory report, Bundestags-Drucksache, no. 15/813, pp. 5-6.
13 See the Commission’s reports on the implementation of the FD of 2002, COM (2004) 
409 final, 8 June 2004, p. 6; COM (2007) 681 final, 6 November 2007, p. 7.
14 See infra 2 “Participation in a terrorist group”, 3 “Offences linked to terrorist activities” 
and E “Jurisdiction”.
15 C. Kress and N. gazeas, “§ 19 Terrorismus”, in U. sieber, f.-h. brüner, h. satzger 
and B. von heintschel-heinegg (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011, 
paras. 16 and 20.
16 See supra 1 “Introduction”.
17 Section 129a Penal Code.
18 See, in this regard, German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), judgment of 
5 January 1982, Case StB 53/81, official Court reports in criminal matters (BGHSt) vol. 30, 
p. 328, at p. 329-330.
19 Section 129b Penal Code.
20 Act of 22 August 2002 (“34. Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz”), Bundesgesetzblatt, part I, 
p. 3390.
21 Section 129b(2) Penal Code.
22 See infra 3 “Offences linked to terrorist activities”.
23 Section 129a Penal Code.
24 Act on the implementation of FD 2002/475/JHA (“Gesetz zur Umsetzung des 
Rahmenbeschlusses des Rates vom 13. Juni 2002 zur Terrorismusbekämpfung und zur Änderung 
anderer Gesetze”) of 22 December 2003, Bundesgesetzblatt, part I, p. 2836.
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Since the catalogue of terrorist offences  25 did not cover the crimes mentioned in 
Art. 1(1)(b), (d), (f) and (g) FD 2002, the legislator inserted the missing offences (and 
the other elements of the notion of terrorist offence) in Section 129a(2) Penal Code. 
Accordingly, the scope of the offence has been extended to include even threatening 
to commit one of the listed offences  26. However, German law distinguishes 
between two kinds of terrorist offences: Whereas in Section 129a(2), the additional 
requirements of Art. 1(1) (seriously intimidating the population etc.) must be met, in 
Section 129a(1) the legislator does not refer to these criteria, thereby going beyond its 
obligations under EU law.
Having regard to Art. 5(3) and Art. 2(2)(b) FD 2002, the legislator changed the 
maximum sentence for (mere) participation in the organisation from five to ten years 
imprisonment (Section 129a(1) and (2) Penal Code). If the aims or activities of the 
organisation are limited to threatening to commit a terrorist offence, the maximum 
sentence will be ten years for the leader of the organisation and five years imprisonment 
for mere participation  27. 
Summing up, Germany can be said to have properly implemented Art. 2 FD 2002 
into national law  28.
3. Offences linked to terrorist activities
By contrast, the German legislator did not adopt any legislation as far as offences 
linked to terrorist activities (Art. 3(2)(d) to (f) FD 2002) and specific terrorist intent 
as an aggravating factor (Art. 5(2) FD 2002) are concerned because the general 
provisions on sentencing were considered to be a sufficient basis for taking the 
relevant circumstances in due consideration  29. Although the Commission criticised 
the German legislation for not complying with EU law  30, some authors have raised 
doubts about whether the FD 2002 obliges Member States to provide for specific 
sentencing rules for terrorist offences  31.
25 Section 129a(1) Penal Code.
26 Section 129a(3) Penal Code; see Art. 1(1)(i) FD 2002. See the explanatory report, op. 
cit., p. 6-7.
27 Section 129a(3), (4) Penal Code; see Art. 5(3) FD 2002.
28 B. hecKer, Europäisches Strafrecht, 3rd ed. Berlin, Springer, 2010, p. 378; C. Kress and 
N. gazeas, op. cit., paras. 27-28 and 46; see also the reports on the implementation of the FD of 
2002, COM (2004) 409 final, p. 6; COM (2007) 681 final, p. 7; see however, with regard to the 
different concepts of terrorist group and terrorist organisation, infra 3 “Case law”.
29 Section 46(2) Penal Code; see also with regard to Art. 3 FD 2002: Section 243(1), 
253(4), 267(3) Penal Code. See the explanatory report, op. cit., p. 6. For instance, the killing 
of a person with terrorist intent qualifies as murder because the specific intent is considered to 
be a base (i.e. particularly worthy of condemnation) motive (Section 211(2)(4) Penal Code), 
see Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 24 June 2004, Case 5 StR 306/03, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift, 2004, p. 3051 (3054); Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 2007, p. 230, at p. 233; M. 
A. zöller, Terrorismusstrafrecht, Heidelberg, C.F. Müller, 2009, p. 483 and f.
30 See the Commission’s reports on the implementation of the FD of 2002, COM (2004) 
409 final, 8 June 2004, p. 6; COM (2007) 681 final, 6 November 2007, p. 7.
31 C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., paras. 20 and 47.
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4. Public provocation, recruitment and training for terrorism
The FD of 2008 has not been implemented stricto sensu in Art. 3(1)(a) to (c), 
(2)(a) to (c) FD 2008. Instead, national legislation  32 has its origins in a mainly 
autonomous national debate on legislative measures to combat terrorism. As a result 
of this debate, parliament has adopted three new offences:
– Preparation of a serious violent offence endangering the State  33. Preparatory 
acts are defined by an exhaustive catalogue that covers instructing another 
person or receiving instruction in special facilities necessary for committing a 
terrorist offence, producing or storing weapons or explosives and collecting not 
insubstantial assets for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence.
– Establishing contacts for the purpose of committing a serious violent offence 
endangering the State  34. Through this provision, the legislator criminalises the 
mere establishment of or maintaining contacts with a terrorist organisation with 
the intention of receiving instruction for the purpose of committing a terrorist 
offence.
– Encouraging the commission of a serious violent offence endangering the State  35. 
The provision is not limited to encouraging the commission of a terrorist offence 
by supplying or displaying instructions but covers the very fact of obtaining these 
instructions as well.
Although these offences are quite different from the definitions of public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence (Art. 3(1)(a) FD 2008), recruitment for 
terrorism (Art. 3(1)(b) FD 2008) and training for terrorism (Art. 3(1)(c) FD 2008), the 
concept of the German law goes far beyond the requirements of EU law. Accordingly, 
the legislator considered the new provisions compatible with Art. 3 FD 2008 and the 
corresponding provisions in Arts. 5 to 7 of the European Convention on the prevention 
of terrorism  36. Nonetheless, the notion of terrorist offence  37 is different from the 
definition of a serious violent offence endangering the State  38. As the wording of 
the provision and its position in the third title of the first chapter of the “Special 
Part” of the Penal Code (offences endangering the democratic State under the rule 
of law)  39 suggest, the German concept focuses on terrorist attacks against the State 
and its institutions rather than on attacks on the population. A serious violent offence 
endangering the State therefore means an offence which, under the circumstances, 
32 Act on prosecution of the preparation of serious violent offences endangering the State 
(“Gesetz zur Verfolgung der Vorbereitung von schweren staatsgefährdenden Gewalttaten”) of 
30 July 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt, part I, p. 2437.
33 Section 89a Penal Code.
34 Section 89b Penal Code.
35 Section 91 Penal Code.
36 See the explanatory report, Bundestags-Drucksache, no. 16/12428, p. 12-13; see 
the explanatory memorandum to the European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 
Bundestags-Drucksache, no. 17/3801, p. 30-31.
37 Art. 1(1) FD 2002; see also Section 129a Penal Code.
38 Section 89a(1)(1) Penal Code.
39 Strafgesetzbuch – Besonderer Teil, Erster Abschnitt, Dritter Titel (Gefährdung des 
demokratischen Rechtsstaates).
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is intended to impair and is capable of impairing the existence or security of a State 
or of an international organisation, or to abolish, rob of legal effect or undermine 
constitutional principles of the Federal Republic of Germany  40. However, the term 
“impairing the security of a State” is considered to be very broad and to cover terrorist 
acts intimidating the population too  41. Thus, another restriction of the German 
concept seems to be more important. In contrast to Art. 1 FD 2002, the definition of 
a serious violent offence  42 requires an offence against life  43 or personal freedom, 
i.e. taking hostages  44.
Similar differences reveal themselves in the criminal conduct because the 
offences were not drafted on the basis of the European concept of public provocation, 
recruitment and training for terrorism. Nevertheless, the correspondent acts are 
punishable under German law.
Public provocation (Art. 3(1)(a) FD 2008) will be mainly covered by Section 
91 Penal Code  45. However, this provision only applies to serious violent offences 
endangering the State (see supra). Furthermore, although Section 91 Penal Code does 
not even require a public statement, its scope is limited to the dissemination of written 
material (instructions)  46. The same restriction applies to Section 130a Penal Code 
(instruction to commit offences) and Section 130(2) Penal Code (agitation). There 
is, however, a general provision on public incitement to crime. This offence even 
applies if the crime has not been committed  47. In this case, the maximum sentence 
is imprisonment of five years. Nevertheless, the notion of ‘incitement’ means that the 
perpetrator must call on another person to commit a crime  48. So, Section 111 Penal 
Code does not cover the “provocateur” who is merely disseminating information on 
how to commit a terrorist offence  49.
40 Section 89a(1)(2) Penal Code
41 See the explanatory report, op. cit., p. 12; for a more restrictive approach  N. gazeas, 
t. grosse-wilde and A. Kiessling, “Die neuen Tatbestände im Staatsschutzstrafrecht – Versuch 
einer ersten Auslegung der §§ 89a, 89b und 91 StGB”, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 2009, 
p. 593, at p. 594-595.
42 Section 89a(1)(2) Penal Code
43 Sections 211 and 212 Penal Code
44 Sections 239a and 239b Penal Code
45 See the explanatory memorandum to the European Convention, op. cit., at p. 30 (with 
regard to Art. 5 of the Convention).
46 C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 34.
47 Cf. Art. 3(3) FD 2008; see Section 111(2) Penal Code; see also Section 130(1) Penal 
Code See also with regard to felonies (minimum sentence of one year imprisonment, Section 
12(1) Penal Code) the general provision on attempted incitement (Section 30(1) Penal Code); 
if the crime has been committed, the general provisions on participation (Sections 26 and 27 
Penal Code) will apply, see the explanatory memorandum to the European Convention, op. cit., 
at p. 30 (with regard to Art. 5 of the Convention).
48 Higher Regional Court Berlin (Kammergericht), judgment of 29 June 2001, Case (3) 1 
Ss 410/00 (35/01), Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht – Rechtsprechungsreport, 2002, p. 10.
49 See also the objections to an interpretation in conformity with the FD 2008: C. Kress 
and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 34.
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Recruitment for terrorism, i.e. soliciting another person to commit a terrorist 
offence (Art. 3(1)(b) FD 2008), will be mainly covered by the general provision 
on conspiracy, the attempt to induce another person to commit a crime in particular 
(Section 30(1) Penal Code)  50. The recruiting person will be punished according to the 
applicable offence (murder, assault etc.), but the sentence has to be mitigated (Section 
30(1)(1) Penal Code). Admittedly, this provision does not apply to all offences listed 
in Art. 1(1) FD 2002 (Section 129a(1) to (3) Penal Code), but only to felonies  51. 
Nevertheless, Section 129a(5) Penal Code criminalises the recruitment of members 
or supporters of a terrorist organisation  52. The sentence is imprisonment from six 
months to five years. In summary, German law does not cover the recruitment of 
persons for committing a terrorist offence if the offence to be committed does not 
qualify as a felony (e.g. Sections 316b and 317 Penal Code) and the perpetrator does 
not end up participating in a terrorist organisation. Taking the minor gravity of the 
relevant offences into consideration, imposing a criminal sentence might result in a 
breach of the principle of proportionality  53.
Section 89a(2)(1) Penal Code expressly criminalises training for terrorism 
purposes (receiving instruction in the production or the use of firearms, explosives, 
explosive or incendiary devices, nuclear fission material or other radioactive substances, 
substances that contain or can generate poison, other substances detrimental to health, 
special facilities necessary for committing a terrorist offence). The dissemination of 
written instructions is covered as well by Section 91 and Section 130a Penal Code. 
Furthermore, the general provision on incitement, aiding and abetting will apply to 
the “trainer”  54. Training for terrorism has therefore been criminalised under German 
law  55.
B.	 Participation	and	attempt
Criminal liability for incitement, aiding and abetting (Art. 4(1), (2) FD 2008) 
follows from the general rules  56. According to the relevant criminal offences  57, 
attempt is punishable under German law  58. However, the German legislator 
50 See the explanatory memorandum to the European Convention, op. cit., p. 31 (with 
regard to Art. 6 of the Convention); C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 36.
51 Minimum sentence of one year imprisonment, see Section 12(1) Penal Code. C. Kress 
and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 36.
52 See the explanatory memorandum to the European Convention, op. cit., p. 31 (with 
regard to Art. 6 of the Convention); C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 36.
53 Cf. Art. 3(1)(2) FD 2008; see infra 4 “Perception in legal practice and doctrine”. 
C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 36.
54 Sections 26, 27, 30 Penal Code.
55 See the explanatory memorandum to the European Convention, op. cit., p. 31 (with 
regard to Art. 7 of the Convention); C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 39.
56 Sections 26 and 27 Penal Code. See the explanatory memorandum to the European 
Convention, op. cit., p. 31 (with regard to Art. 9 of the Convention); C. Kress and N. gazeas, 
op. cit., paras. 42-43.
57 Art. 1(1) and Art. 3(2)(d) to (f) FD 2008.
58 Cf. Art. 4(3) FD 2008. C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 44.
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refrained from criminalising the attempt to recruit and train for terrorism  59, probably 
because this would result in criminalising the attempt to carry out merely preparatory 
acts  60.
C.	 Mitigation
With regard to the mitigation of a sentence (Art. 6 FD 2002), German law allows 
for a minimum sentence to be reduced or even for dispensing with punishment if 
the perpetrator contributes to the discovery or prevention of a terrorist offence  61. 
The same applies if the degree of guilt is minor  62. Since Art. 6 FD 2002 does not 
provide for an exemption from punishment, the German provisions are considered 
to be incompatible with EU law  63. In order to avoid a breach with EU law, a 
suggestion has been made to interpret the German provisions in line with Art. 6 FD 
2002, thereby restricting the national judge’s margin of appreciation. However, such 
an interpretation would contradict the wording of the provisions and thus appear to be 
contra legem  64.
D.	 Criminal	liability	of	legal	persons
German law provides for sanctions against legal persons	(Arts. 7 and 8 FD 2002). 
Thus, by imposing an (administrative) fine (Section 30 Regulatory Offences Act – 
Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz), forfeiture or confiscation  65, legal persons can be held 
liable for committing the offences mentioned above  66.
E.	 Jurisdiction
Matters of jurisdiction are regulated in the general part of the Penal Code. 
German criminal law applies to terrorist offences on the basis of the territoriality 
principle  67, the flag principle  68, active personality  69 and passive personality  70 
and the aut dedere aut iudicare principle  71. Though jurisdiction based upon active 
or passive personality and the principle aut dedere aut iudicare is subject to the 
59 See Art. 4(4) FD 2008.
60 Sections 89a, 89b and 91 Penal Code; see also Sections 111, 130a Penal Code.
61 Sections 129a(7), 129(6) Penal Code; Section 89a(7) Penal Code.
62 Sections 89b(5), 91(3), 129a(6) Penal Code.
63 C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 48. This might apply as well to other grounds of 
impunity of a person cooperating with law enforcement agencies (e.g. necessity – Section 34 
Penal Code: Federal Court of Justice, decision of 16 September 2010, Case AK 12/10, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Strafrecht – Rechtsprechungsreport, 2010, p. 369).
64 C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 48.
65 Sections 73 and f. Penal Code.
66 See the explanatory memorandum to the European Convention, op. cit., p. 31 (with 
regard to Art. 10 of the Convention).
67 Sections 3 and 9 Penal Code; see Art. 9(1)(a) FD 2002.
68 Section 4 Penal Code; see Art. 9(1)(b) FD 2002.
69 Section 7(2)(1) Penal Code (German nationality of the perpetrator); see Art. 9(1)(c) FD 
2002.
70 Section 7(1) Penal Code (German nationality of the victim); see Art. 9(1)(e) FD 2002.
71 Sections 6(9) and 7(2)(2) Penal Code; see Art. 9(3) FD 2002.
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double criminality requirement  72, the general rules seem to comply with EU law 
because the corresponding provision of the European Convention on the prevention 
of terrorism does not prevent the States Parties from applying the double criminality 
requirement  73.
With regard to particular terrorist offences, the legislator has adopted specific 
provisions on jurisdictional matters. According to Section 89a(3)(1) Penal Code, this 
Section applies to offences committed abroad. However, Section 89a(3)(2) Penal Code 
states that, if the offence is committed outside the European Union, jurisdiction has to 
be based upon the principle of active personality, passive personality or the protective 
principle (the serious violent offence is meant to be committed domestically)  74. 
Furthermore, the exercise of jurisdiction requires an authorisation of the Federal 
Ministry of Justice (Section 89a(4) Penal Code). Similar rules are laid down in Section 
89b(3), (4) and Section 129b(1) Penal Code  75. Furthermore, German criminal law 
applies to terrorist organisations abroad  76. 
Nevertheless, German law does not fully comply with the jurisdictional rules in 
Art. 9 FD 2002. There is no general provision based upon the domicile principle  77, 
the active personality principle relating to legal persons  78 and the protective 
principle, especially with regard to the institutions of the European Union (Art. 9(1)(e) 
FD 2002)  79.
3.	 Case	law	
A.	 Participation	in	a	terrorist	group/organisation
As has been mentioned above, the German legislator did not implement the 
definition of a terrorist group (Art. 2(1) 1 FD 2002). The traditional concept of a 
terrorist organisation (Section 129a Penal Code) requires a developed structure of 
the organisation and a common objective of its members who thereby submit to the 
decisions that have been taken by the organisation  80. According to this concept, it 
is the structure of the organisation and the influence on its members that creates the 
72 Section 7(1), (2) Penal Code.
73 See the explanatory memorandum to the European Convention, op. cit., p. 32-33 (with 
regard to Art. 14 of the Convention), referring to para. 161 of the explanatory report to the 
Convention; C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., para. 55, raise doubts with regard to Art. 9(3) 
(aut dedere aut iudicare); however, jurisdiction can be based upon Section 6(9) Penal Code (see 
C. Kress and N. gazeas, ibid., with further references).
74 See in this regard the explanatory report, Bundestags-Drucksache, no. 16/12428, p. 15-
16.
75 See infra 3 “Case law”.
76 Section 129b Penal Code; see Art. 9(4) FD 2002.
77 Art. 9(1)(c) FD 2002.
78 Art. 9(1)(d) FD 2002.
79 See also C. Kress and N. gazeas, op. cit., paras. 53-54.
80 See Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 7 November 1956, Case 6 StR 137/55, official 
Court reports in criminal matters (BGHSt), vol. 10, p. 16, at p. 17; judgment of 11 October 
1978, Case 3 StR 105/78, official Court reports in criminal matters (BGHSt), vol. 28, p. 147, 
at p. 148-149; judgment of 30 March 2001, Case StB 4/01, official Court reports in criminal 
matters, vol. 46, p. 349, at p. 354; M. A. zöller, op. cit., p. 518 and f. with further references.
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specific risk of a terrorist offence being committed and that must be considered to 
be an indispensable condition for criminalising mere participation in such a terrorist 
group.
Obviously, this understanding does not comply with the definition in Art. 2(1) 
FD 2002. As a consequence, it has been suggested that Section 129a Penal Code 
must be interpreted in line with the FD 2002 according to the ECJ’s ruling in the 
Pupino case  81  82. In a recent judgment on participation in a criminal organisation, 
the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) rejected this approach and adhered 
to the traditional concept although it realised that this is not compatible with the EU 
law (in casu the FD on combating organised crime  83). In the eyes of the Federal 
Court of Justice, the offence does not allow for an interpretation in line with the 
FD because this would give the concept of criminal (and terrorist) organisation the 
same meaning as the notion of a criminal group (or gang) that is used in a number of 
offences relating to organised crime. Whereas participation in a criminal organisation 
has been criminalised per se, acting as a member in a gang is merely an aggravating 
factor that can only be applied if a crime has been committed. Thus, the concept of 
membership of a terrorist group is not compatible with the German system, which 
distinguishes between the organisation and the group. According to the Federal Court 
of Justice, it is up to the legislator to assimilate these two notions  84. In 2010, the 
Federal Court of Justice explicitly refused to interpret Section 129a Penal Code in 
line with Art. 2 FD 2002 and, thereby, to overcome the legislator’s failure to fulfil its 
obligations under EU law  85. Some scholars, however, have criticised the approach 
of the Federal Court of Justice, arguing that an interpretation in line with EU law will 
not totally eliminate the differences between group and organisation  86.
81 ECJ, 16 June 2005, judgment C-105/03, Maria Pupino, para. 43.
82 C. Kress, “Das Strafrecht in der Europäischen Union vor der Herausforderung durch 
organisierte Kriminalität und Terrorismus”, Juristische Ausbildung, 2005, p. 220, at p. 224; M. 
Krauss, in H.W. Laufhütte, R. rissing-van saan and K. Tiedemann (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch 
– Leipziger Kommentar, vol. 5, 12th edition, Berlin, de Gruyter, 2009, Section 129a Penal Code, 
para. 26.
83 Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on combating organised crime, 
OJ, no. L 300, 11 November 2008, p. 42.
84 Judgment of 3 December 2009, Case 3 StR 277/09, official Court reports in criminal 
matters (BGHSt), vol. 54, p. 216, at p. 223.
85 Judgment of 28 October 2010, Case 3 StR 179/10, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 
2011, p. 542, at p. 544; see also judgment of 14 August 2009, Case 3 StR 552/08, official Court 
reports in criminal matters (BGHSt), vol. 54, p. 69, at p. 110; judgment of 14 April 2010, Case 
StB 5/10, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 2010, p. 3042, at p. 3043.
86 C. Kress and N. gazeas, “Europäisierung des Vereinigungsbegriffs in den §§ 129 ff. 
StGB? Einige Gedanken zur neueren Rechtsprechung des BGH”, in H.U. Paeffgen, m. böse, u. 
Kindhäuser, s. stübinger, t. verrel and R. ZaczyK (eds.), Strafrechtswissenschaft als Analyse 
und Konstruktion – Festschrift für Ingeborg Puppe zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin, Duncker & 
Humblot, 2011, p. 1487, p. 1499-1500, referring to Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) 
Düsseldorf, judgment of 5 December 2007, Case III-VI 10/05, p. 350; M. A. zöller, Juristen-
Zeitung, 2010, p. 908, at p. 911-912.
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B.	 Jurisdictional	matters
In another judgment, the Federal Court of Justice referred to the FD 2002 when 
interpreting the rules on jurisdictional matters in Sections 89a and 129b Penal Code. 
The Federal Court of Justice held that the limitations set out in specific jurisdictional 
rules in Section 129b Penal Code may not be circumvented by applying the provisions 
of the general part (e.g. Section 7 Penal Code). As a consequence, the corresponding 
provision in Section 89a Penal Code has to be interpreted accordingly because 
the FD’s provisions on jurisdiction apply to all kind of terrorist offences without 
distinction  87. 
4.	 Perception	in	legal	practice	and	doctrine
Up to now, precious few cases have been investigated on the basis of the new 
legislation  88. Nevertheless, the new provisions have been welcomed by practitioners 
of judicial and law enforcement authorities because the legislation that existed 
beforehand did not allow for effective measures against terrorist networks and lone 
operators  89. On this basis, constitutional concerns were rejected  90. By contrast, 
defence counsels criticised the new offences for being superfluous and in breach of 
constitutional principles  91. 
In legal doctrine, the new law on terrorism has been subject to a considerable 
amount of criticism. In summary, the following objections have been raised.
The new provisions criminalise conduct in the preparatory stage. Preparatory 
acts do not put the protected interest (life, personal freedom, public security) at risk 
but require further action by the (single) perpetrator whereas a member of a terrorist 
group is permanently exposed to group pressure and encouragement and thus more 
87 Judgment of 15 December 2009, Case StB 52/09, official Court reports in criminal 
matters (BGHSt), vol. 54, p. 264, at p. 268.
88 According to the government (March 2011), 35 cases concerning Section 89a Penal 
Code, 10 cases concerning Section 89b Penal Code and no case concerning Section 91 Penal 
Code have been reported, see Bundestags-Drucksache, no. 17/4988, p. 2, 7 and 11.
89 E.g. the Frankfurt airport shooting in March 2001: two American soldiers were killed 
by a 21-year-old Kosovo-Albanian who was radicalised by jihadist propaganda videos, see 
Welt online, 3 March 2011, at http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article 12685755/Das-
Doppelleben-des-Attentaeters-Arid-U.html (last visit: 18 May 2012).
90 See the opinions of  the practitioners J.P. graf (Federal Court of Justice), R. griesbaum 
(Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice – Generalbundesanwaltschaft), K.M. 
rogner (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution – Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) 
and J. ziercKe (President of the Federal Criminal Police Office – Bundeskriminalamt) in 
the hearing before the legal committee of the Parliament (Rechtsausschuss des Deutschen 
Bundestages), available at http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1251
&id=1134; see also M. bader, “Das Gesetz zur Verfolgung der Vorbereitung von schweren 
staatsgefährdenden Gewalttaten”, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 2009, p. 2853, at p. 2854-
2856 (last visit: 18 May 2012).
91 See the opinion of the Federal Bar Association (Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer) in 
the hearing before the legal committee of the Parliament (Rechtsausschuss des Deutschen 
Bundestages), available at http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad 
=1251&id=1134 (last visit: 18 May 2012).
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likely to commit a terrorist offence  92. ‘Neutral’ or socially acceptable conduct (e.g. 
flight or language courses, military service) is criminalised by referring only to the 
criminal attitude of the (potential) perpetrator  93. This applies in particular to the 
“preparation of the preparation”  94. The provisions do not criminalise dangerous acts 
– insofar as they are superfluous because specific offences will apply (e.g. on the 
handling of weapons and explosives)  95 – but do criminalise a person considered 
to be a (potential) terrorist  96. This is held to be incompatible with the principle of 
proportionality and the principle of personal guilt (nulla poena sine culpa).
Constitutional concerns arise as well as far as the scales of the penalties are 
concerned. Imprisonment from six months to ten years for the mere preparation of 
a terrorist offence (training) does not reflect the gravity of personal guilt  97. By 
creating a kind of preventive detention, the new offences are in breach of the principle 
of personal guilt (nulla poena sine culpa)  98. Some scholars therefore argue that the 
new offences have the sole and illegitimate purpose of extending the investigative 
powers of the law enforcement authorities  99.
Further objections have been based upon the legality principle (nulla poena, 
nullum crimen sine lege certa). For instance, the instruction in “other skills that can 
be of use” or “collecting not insubstantial assets” for the commission of a serious 
violent offence (Section 89a(2)(1), (4) Penal Code) or the definition of serious violent 
92 O. bacKes, “Der Kampf des Strafrechts gegen nicht organisierte Terroristen”, 
Strafverteidiger, 2008, p. 654, at p. 655 and  659; R. decKers and J. heusel, “Strafbarkeit 
terroristischer Vorbereitungshandlungen – rechtsstaatlich nicht tragbar”, Zeitschrift für 
Rechtspolitik, 2008, p. 169, at p. 171; K. gierhaKe, “Zur geplanten Einführung neuer 
Straftatbestände wegen der Vorbereitung terroristischer Straftaten”, Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Strafrechtsdogmatik, 2008, p. 397, at p. 402; M.A. zöller, op. cit., at p. 617-618 and 619.
93 O. bacKes, op. cit., p. 659; R. decKers and J. heusel, op. cit., p. 171; N. gazeas, t. 
grosse-wilde and A. Kiessling, op. cit., p. 597; H. radtKe and M. steinsieK, “Bekämpfung 
des internationalen Terrorismus durch Kriminalisierung von Vorbereitungshandlungen 
– Zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verfolgung der Vorbereitung von schweren Gewalttaten 
(Referentenentwurf des BMJ vom 21.4.2008)”, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, 
2008, p. 383, at p. 389-390; U. sieber, “Legitimation und Grenzen von Gefährdungsdelikten im 
Vorfeld terroristischer Gewalt”, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 2009, p. 353, at p. 360 and 362; 
M.A. zöller, op. cit., p. 616.
94 Sections 89b, 91(1)(2) Penal Code. O. bacKes, op. cit., p. 658; N. gazeas, t. grosse-
wilde and A. Kiessling, op. cit., p. 601; M. A. zöller, op. cit., p. 616.
95 O. bacKes, op. cit., p. 657-658.
96 b. heinrich, “Die Grenzen des Strafrechts bei der Gefahrprävention”, Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, vol. 121 (2009), p. 94, at p. 120 and 122; H. radtKe and 
M. steinsieK, op. cit., p. 393-394; see also with regard to obtaining instructions for committing a 
terrorist offence (Section 91(1)(2) Penal Code): N. gazeas, t. grosse-wilde and A. Kiessling, 
op. cit., p. 602.
97 O. bacKes, op. cit., p. 656-657; H. radtKe and M. steinsieK, op. cit., p. 391-392.
98 H.-U. Paeffgen, in U. Kindhäuser, u. neumann and H.-U. Paeffgen (ed.), Nomos 
Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, vol. 1, 3rd ed., Baden-Baden 2010, § 89a.
99 O. bacKes, op. cit., p. 660; H. RadtKe and M. SteinsieK, op. cit., p. 394; M.A. zöller, 
op. cit., p. 620.
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offence endangering the State (Section 89a(1)(2) Penal Code) are rather vague and 
thus cannot be regarded as a proper legal basis for criminal sentencing  100.
Finally, the provisions on extraterritorial jurisdiction have raised concerns in 
terms of their compatibility with international law (principle of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of another State)  101. Furthermore, the new offences not only 
protect the Federal Republic of Germany, the Union and the other Member States but 
any State, irrespective of whether it complies with international standards on human 
rights or democracy  102.
5.	 Conclusion
The FDs have had a rather limited impact on German counterterrorism legislation. 
Recent changes in criminal law have been made after a domestic debate and an 
autonomous legislative process at the national level. As a consequence, German law 
does not fully comply with the requirements of the FDs. Major shortcomings relate 
to the traditional concept of terrorist organisation and the notion of serious violent 
offence, which do not comply with the European concepts of terrorist group and terrorist 
offence. On the other hand, by criminalising preparatory acts in general, the German 
approach goes far beyond the requirements of the FD 2008. Despite these differences, 
both approaches raise similar constitutional concerns relating to the principle of 
proportionality, the principle of personal guilt and the legality principle  103. The 
current situation is – at least in part – driven by the argument that criminal law and 
criminal proceedings provide for legal guarantees and procedural safeguards that are 
not considered to be available in the context of police action  104. On the other hand, 
a criminal justice system cannot tolerate preventive measures being taken as a form 
of criminal punishment  105. Sentencing a person to several years of imprisonment 
for “training for terrorism” will be tantamount to preventive detention because the 
“trainee” is not detained for crimes he has already committed but rather for crimes he 
is expected to commit in the future  106. Whether preventive detention is a legitimate 
instrument in the fight against terrorism or not has to be left open and requires further 
discussion. In any case, the legislator will have to provide for adequate guarantees 
and procedural safeguards  107. However, a clear-cut distinction between prosecution 
and prevention and the different functions of criminal justice and police action should 
100 O. bacKes, op. cit., p. 657-659; N. gazeas, t. grosse-wilde and A. Kiessling, op. cit., 
p. 597 and 599; H. radtKe and M. steinsieK, op. cit., p. 388.
101 R. decKers and J. heusel, op. cit., p. 172; N. gazeas, t. grosse-wilde and A. Kiessling, 
op. cit., p. 600.
102 N. gazeas, t. grosse-wilde and A. Kiessling, op. cit., p. 595.
103 See with regard to the FD 2008: P. asP and al., “A Manifesto to European Criminal 
Policy”, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, 2009, p. 707, at p. 710-711 and 
712.
104 B. weisser, “Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus – Prävention durch Strafrecht?”, 
Juristenzeitung, 2008, p. 388, at p. 394; M.A. zöller, op. cit., p. 617.
105 U. sieber, op. cit., p. 357.
106 M. PawliK, Der Terrorist und sein Recht, München, C.H. Beck, 2008, p. 35-36.
107 See in this regard M. PawliK, op. cit., p. 42 and f.; for the contrary view see H. radtKe 
and M. steinsieK, op. cit., p. 388; U. sieber, op. cit., p. 355.
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be regarded as an indispensable basis for an in-depth discussion of the instruments 
available for combating terrorism  108. Building the security architecture for Europe, 
the Union and the Member States should keep in mind one of the basic architectural 
rules: “form follows function”  109.
108 b. heinrich, op. cit., p. 127-128.
109 “It is the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things physical and 
metaphysical, of all things human and all things super-human, of all true manifestations of the 
head, of the heart, of the soul, that the life is recognisable in its expression that form ever follows 
function. This is the law” (l. sullivan, The Tall Building Artistically Considered, 1896).
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Annex	–	Sections	89a,	89b,	91,	129,	129a	and	129b	of	the	German	Penal	Code		110
Section 89a
Preparation of a serious violent offence endangering the State
(1) Whosoever prepares a serious offence endangering the State shall be liable to imprisonment 
from six months to ten years. A serious violent offence endangering the State shall mean an 
offence against life under Sections 211 or 212 or against personal freedom under Sections 
239a or 239b, which under the circumstances is intended to impair and capable of impairing 
the existence or security of a State or of an international organisation, or to abolish, rob of 
legal effect or undermine constitutional principles of the Federal Republic of Germany.
(2) Subsection (1) above shall only be applicable if the offender prepares a serious violent 
offence endangering the State by
1. instructing another person or receiving instruction in the production or the use of 
firearms, explosives, explosive or incendiary devices, nuclear fission material or 
other radioactive substances, substances that contain or can generate poison, other 
substances detrimental to health, special facilities necessary for the commission of 
the offence or other skills that can be of use for the commission of an offence under 
Subsection (1) above,
2. producing, obtaining for himself or another, storing or supplying to another weapons, 
substances or devices and facilities mentioned under no. 1 above,
3. obtaining or storing objects or substances essential for the production of weapons, 
substances or devices and facilities mentioned under no. 1 above, or
4. collecting, accepting or providing not unsubstantial assets for the purpose of its 
commission.
(3) Subsection (1) above shall also apply if the preparation occurs abroad. If the preparation 
occurs outside the territory of the Member States of the European Union, the aforesaid 
shall apply only if the preparation is performed by a German citizen or a foreign citizen 
whose existence is based within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany or if the 
serious violent offence endangering the State so prepared is meant to be committed within 
the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany or against a German citizen.
(4) In the cases of Subsection (3) 2nd sentence above the prosecution shall require the 
authorisation by the Federal Ministry of Justice. If the preparation occurred on the 
territory of another Member State of the European Union, the prosecution shall require the 
authorisation by the Federal Ministry of Justice if the preparation was neither performed 
by a German citizen nor the serious violent offence endangering the State so prepared to 
be committed within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany or by or against a 
German citizen.
(5) In less serious cases the penalty shall be imprisonment from three months to five years.
(6) The court may make an order for supervision (Section 68(1)); Section 73 shall apply.
(7) The court in its discretion may mitigate the sentence (Section 49(2)) or order a discharge for 
the offence under this provision, if the offender voluntarily gives up the further preparation 
of the serious violent offence endangering the State, or averts or substantially reduces 
a danger caused and recognised by him that others will further prepare or commit the 
offence, or if he voluntarily prevents the completion of the offence. If the danger is averted 
or substantially reduced regardless of the contribution of the offender or the completion 
of the serious violent offence endangering the State prevented, his voluntary and earnest 
efforts to achieve that object shall suffice. 
110 English translation provided by Michael Bohlander (http://www.gesetze-im-internet.
de/englisch_stgb/index.html#Section90) (last visit: 18 May 2012). 
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Section 89b
Establishing contacts for the purpose of committing a serious violent offence  
endangering the State
(1) Whosoever, with the intention of receiving instruction for the purpose of the commission 
of a serious violent offence endangering the State under Section 89a(2) no. 1, establishes 
or maintains contacts to an organisation within the meaning of Section 129a, also in 
conjunction with Section 129b, shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years 
or a fine.
(2) Subsection (1) above shall not apply if the act exclusively serves the fulfilment of lawful 
professional or official duties.
(3) Subsection (1) above shall also apply if the act of establishing or maintaining contact 
occurs abroad. Outside the territory of the Member States of the European Union this shall 
apply only if the act of establishing or maintaining contact is committed by a German 
citizen or a foreign citizen whose existence is based within the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany.
(4) The prosecution shall require the authorisation by the Federal Ministry of Justice
1. in the cases of Subsection (3) 2nd sentence above or
2. if the act of establishing or maintaining contacts occurs on the territory of another 
Member State of the European Union.
(5) If the degree of guilt is of a minor nature, the court may order a discharge for the offence 
under this provision.
Section 91
Encouraging the commission of a serious violent offence endangering the State
(1) Whosoever
1. displays or supplies to another written material (Section 11(3)) which by its content 
is capable of serving as an instruction to the commission of a serious violent offence 
endangering the State (Section 89a(1)), if the circumstances of its dissemination 
are conducive to awakening or encouraging the preparedness of others to commit a 
serious violent offence endangering the State,
2. obtains written material within the meaning of no. 1 above for the purpose of 
committing a serious violent offence endangering the State
shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.
(2) Subsection (1) no. 1 above shall not apply if
1. the act serves the purpose of citizenship education, the defence against anti-
constitutional movements, arts and sciences, research or teaching, reporting about 
current or historical events or similar purposes or
2. if the act exclusively serves the fulfilment of lawful professional or official duties.




(1) Whosoever forms an organisation the aims or activities of which are directed at the 
commission of offences or whosoever participates in such an organisation as a member, 
recruits members or supporters for it or supports it, shall be liable to imprisonment of not 
more than five years or a fine.
(2) Subsection (1) above shall not apply
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1. if the organisation is a political party which the Federal Constitutional Court has not 
declared to be unconstitutional;
2. if the commission of offences is of merely minor significance for the objectives or 
activities or
3. to the extent that the objectives or activities of the organisation relate to offences 
under Sections 84 to 87.
(3) The attempt to form an organisation as indicated in Subsection (1) above shall be 
punishable.
(4) If the offender is one of the ringleaders or hintermen or the case is otherwise especially 
serious the penalty shall be imprisonment from six months to five years; the penalty shall 
be imprisonment from six months to ten years if the aim or the activity of the criminal 
organisation is directed at the commission of an offence set out in Section 100c (2) no. 1 
(a), (c), (d), (e), and (g) with the exception of offences pursuant to Section 239a or Section 
239b, (h) to (m) nos. 2 to 5 and 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(5) The court may order a discharge under Subsections (1) and (3) above in the case 
of accomplices whose guilt is of a minor nature or whose contribution is of minor 
significance.
(6) The court may in its discretion mitigate the sentence (Section 49 (2)) or order a discharge 
under these provisions if the offender
1. voluntarily and earnestly makes efforts to prevent the continued existence of the 
organisation or the commission of an offence consistent with its aims; or
2. voluntarily discloses his knowledge to a government authority in time so that offences 
the planning of which he is aware of may be prevented;
if the offender succeeds in preventing the continued existence of the organisation or if this is 
achieved without his efforts he shall not incur criminal liability.
Section 129a
Forming terrorist organisations
(1) Whosoever forms an organisation whose aims or activities are directed at the commission 
of
1. murder under specific aggravating circumstances (Section 211), murder (Section 212) 
or genocide (Section 6 of the Code of International Criminal Law) or a crime against 
humanity (Section 7 of the Code of International Criminal Law) or a war crime 
(Section 8, Section 9, Section 10, Section 11 or Section 12 of the Code of International 
Criminal Law); or
2. crimes against personal liberty under Section 239a or Section 239b,
3. (repealed)
or whosoever participates in such a group as a member shall be liable to imprisonment 
from one to ten years.
(2) The same penalty shall be incurred by any person who forms an organisation whose aims 
or activities are directed at
1. causing serious physical or mental harm to another person, namely within the ambit 
of Section 226,
2. committing offences under Section 303b, Section 305, Section 305a or offences 
endangering the general public under sections 306 to 306c or Section 307(1) to (3), 
Section 308(1) to (4), Section 309(1) to (5), Section 313, Section 314 or Section 
315(1), (3) or (4), Section 316b(1) or (3) or Section 316c(1) to (3) or Section 317(1),
3. committing offences against the environment under Section 330a(1) to (3),
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4. committing offences under the following provisions of the Weapons of War (Control) 
Act: Section 19(1) to (3), Section 20(1) or (2), Section 20a(1) to (3), Section 19(2) 
no. 2 or (3) no. 2, Section 20(1) or (2), or Section 20a(1) to (3), in each case also in 
conjunction with Section 21, or under Section 22a(1) to (3) or
5. committing offences under Section 51(1) to (3) of the Weapons Act;
or by any person who participates in such a group as a member, if one of the offences stipulated 
in nos. 1 to 5 is intended to seriously intimidate the population, to unlawfully coerce a public 
authority or an international organisation through the use of force or the threat of the use of 
force, or to significantly impair or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic 
or social structures of a State or an international organisation, and which, given the nature or 
consequences of such offences, may seriously damage a State or an international organisation.
(3) If the aims or activities of the group are directed at threatening the commission of one of 
the offences listed in Subsections (1) or (2) above, the penalty shall be imprisonment from 
six months to five years.
(4) If the offender is one of the ringleaders or hintermen the penalty shall be imprisonment of 
not less than three years in cases under Subsections (1) and (2) above, and imprisonment 
from one to ten years in cases under Subsection (3) above.
(5) Whosoever supports a group as described in Subsections (1), (2) or (3) above shall be 
liable to imprisonment from six months to ten years in cases under Subsections (1) and (2), 
and to imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine in cases under Subsection (3). 
Whosoever recruits members or supporters for a group as described in Subsection (1) or 
Subsection (2) above shall be liable to imprisonment from six months to five years.
(6) In the cases of accomplices whose guilt is of a minor nature and whose contribution is of 
minor significance, the court may, in cases under Subsections (1), (2), (3) and (5) above, 
mitigate the sentence in its discretion (Section 49(2)).
(7) Section 129(6) shall apply mutatis mutandis.
(8) In addition to a sentence of imprisonment of not less than six months, the court may order 
the loss of the ability to hold public office, to vote and be elected in public elections 
(Section 45(2) and (5)).
(9) In cases under Subsections (1), (2) and (4) above the court may make a supervision order 
(Section 68(1)).
Section 129b
Criminal and terrorist organisations abroad; extended confiscation and deprivation
(1) Section 129 and Section 129a shall apply to organisations abroad. If the offence relates to an 
organisation outside the Member States of the European Union, this shall not apply unless 
the offence was committed by way of an activity exercised within the Federal Republic of 
Germany or if the offender or the victim is a German or is found within Germany. In cases 
which fall under the 2nd sentence above the offence shall only be prosecuted on authorisation 
by the Federal Ministry of Justice. Authorisation may be granted for an individual case or 
in general for the prosecution of future offences relating to a specific organisation. When 
deciding whether to give authorisation, the Federal Ministry of Justice shall take into 
account whether the aims of the organisation are directed against the fundamental values of 
a State order which respects human dignity or against the peaceful coexistence of nations 
and which appear reprehensible when weighing all the circumstances of the case.
(2) Section 73d and Section 74a shall apply to cases under Section 129 and Section 129a, in 
each case also in conjunction with Subsection (1) above.
Italian counter-terrorism legislation  
The development of a parallel track (“doppio binario”)
Francesca galli  1
1.	 Introduction	
Many provisions first introduced in Italy before 11 September 2011 to cope with 
the threat of domestic terrorism were then re-introduced at a later stage in an attempt 
to deal with international terrorism. 
Italian legal writers have used the expression “doppio binario” (parallel track) 
to describe the development since the early 1990s of special procedures to deal with 
organised crime offences. 
In fact, in Italy the normalisation process results from the reciprocal influence 
of anti-terrorism and anti-organised crime legislation passed in the last thirty years 
and the subsequent re-enactment of provisions that had been repealed following a 
new outbreak of terrorism or organised crime. Since 1975 (Law 152/1975)  2, special 
measures adopted to deal with the threat of domestic terrorism have been gradually 
introduced as derogations to the ordinary principles of criminal law  3. With the 
enactment of the new Codice di Procedura Penale (CPP) in 1988, Italian criminal 
procedure was redesigned in a more accusatorial fashion with an emphasis on the 
rights of the defence, cross-examination and on gathering evidence during the trial 
1 I would like to express my appreciation to the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique 
(FNRS) for its generous financial support over the years of my post-doctoral research at the 
Institut d’Etudes Européennes (ULB), focusing on  “L’Union européenne et la prévention du 
terrorisme : impact sur le droit pénal et redéfinition de la relation entre le droit pénal européen 
et les droits pénaux nationaux”.
2 Law 152/1975 (Disposizioni a tutela dell’ordine pubblico, detta Legge Reale). 
3 G. Illuminati, “Reati ‘speciali’ e procedure ‘speciali’ nella legislazione d’emergenza”, 
Giustizia Penale, 1981, p. 106. 
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rather than beforehand during the investigation phase. The new code was also meant 
to redress the balance in terms of the numerous derogations set out in emergency 
legislation in the previous decade. 
However, as soon as the level of the threat from organised crime increased again in 
the early 1990s, the tools provided by the 1988 CPP began to seem inadequate and the 
legislator had to resort to old methods once again despite their inquisitorial flavour  4. 
Major changes in the law were made via the introduction of layer upon layer of new 
principles, rules and exceptions and not as a coherent legislative design  5. 
With the enactment of Law 438/2001 and Law 155/2005, the scope of many of 
these provisions has been extended to cope with the emergence of an international 
terrorist threat  6. Thus, temporary measures adopted in the 1970s to investigate and 
bring to trial acts of domestic terrorism – although temporarily repealed by the 1988 
CPP – are still part of the counter-terrorism framework and have since been applied 
to a broader range of offences. 
2.	 Political	and	criminological	context	
A.	 From	a	domestic	to	an	international	terrorist	threat	
Between the 1960s and 1980s, Italy’s democracy was threatened by right-wing 
and left-wing extremism and to a lesser extent by minor separatist movements  7. 
Right-wing terrorism dominated a period (1969-75)  8 of apparently mindless, 
gratuitous and indiscriminate bombings in public places  9. In Italy, it is widely 
believed that the secret services, and possibly even the government, were indirectly 
involved in these attacks  10, which were part of a wider strategy, the so-called 
4 P.L. Vigna, “Il processo accusatorio nell’impatto con le esigenze di lotta alla criminalità 
organizzata”, Giustizia Penale, 1991, p.  462. 
5 These include: special investigative judges, prosecutors and police (Direzioni Distrettuali 
Antimafia and Direzione Investigativa Antimafia), relaxed requirements for the interception of 
communications (and the development of preventive interceptions) and searches, a potential 
extension of pre-trial detention and preliminary investigations, etc. In addition, Law 203/1991 
(Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 13 maggio 1991, n. 152, recante 
provvedimenti urgenti in tema di lotta alla criminalità organizzata e di trasparenza e buon 
andamento dell’attività amministrativa) re-introduced the mandatory use of pre-trial detention 
with regard to a large number of offences, a measure that the new Codice di Procedura Penale 
(1988) had conceived as an extrema ratio.
6 Interestingly some provisions (such as derogations on cross-examination requirements 
ex Article 190bis CPP) had already been applied to sexual offences and paedophilia by Law 
268/1998.
7 See D. della Porta, Terrorismi in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984.
8 Judicial investigations and historical studies both attribute these events to right-wing 
terrorism groups. 
9 Milano, Piazza Fontana (12 December 1969); Brescia, Piazza della Loggia (28 May 
1974); Bologna, treno Italicus (18 December 1986). 
10 Auditions of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry. One of the major problems 
in the state response to domestic terrorism was the fact that political elites never engaged 
in a common reflection over the phenomenon and its roots. The establishment of a Joint 
Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on terrorism in Italy (1988) allowed the in-depth analysis 
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“strategy of tension”  11. This political instrumentalisation of violent “opposed 
extremisms” was meant to induce public demand for “law and order” and to contain 
any possible expansion of communism on the peninsula. The so-called “theory of 
opposed extremisms” accused Christian Democrat (DC) governments of exploiting 
political violence to deny the Communist Party (PCI) the right to legitimately 
participate in the democratic debate. This alleged strategy was carried out together 
with attempted coups d’Etat, linked to the existence of Gladio, the Italian branch of 
the NATO Stay Behind network  12. 
 Left-wing terrorism, by contrast, developed as a reaction to the complete stasis 
of the political system, in the name of a wider anti-imperialist coalition. It shared 
ideological roots, historical background and references with the Communist Party. 
However, the latter – though not part of the government – was regarded as having 
betrayed its revolutionary responsibilities (and the anti-fascist resistance movement) 
and as having sold its soul by making unacceptable compromises against the 
interests of the working class that it claimed to represent. The development of these 
underground groups was the natural result of widespread discontent and disaffection 
as conveyed by Marxist terminology. Their aim was a wider revolutionary armed 
struggle with the eventual support of the masses against what they considered a 
corrupted government  13.
In parallel with this, during the 1960s, the Alto Adige German-speaking 
separatists launched terrorist campaigns aiming at reuniting Alto Adige with Austria 
or at achieving Alto Adige’s independence within Italy. In 1972, the Senate gave 
effect to constitutional provisions according a special status of self-government to 
five regions where large linguistic and ethnic minorities existed. This prevented any 
further political violence there and also in Sicily. On the island of Sicily, terrorism was 
closely connected with other forms of organised crime and a major rebellion had been 
militarily repressed after the war  14. 
of a large quantity of judicial documents and intelligence material as well as the auditioning of 
political leaders. 
11 See the film “Il Divo” (2008) by P. Sorrentino; N. Tranfaglia, “La strategia della 
tensione”, in C. Venturoli (ed.), Come studiare il terrorismo e le stragi, Venezia, Marsilio, 
2002. 
12 During the Cold War, “Stay behind” was a secret military unit training local (right-wing) 
resistance movements in Western European countries against a possible uprising of domestic 
communist parties supported by the USSR. Its existence is known from the accounts given to 
Parliamentary committees by domestic political figures. 
13 On left wing terrorism and its ideology, see C. Marletti, “Immagini Pubbliche e 
ideologia del terrorismo”, in L. Bonanate, Dimensioni del terrorismo politico, Milano, Franco 
Angeli, 1979.  
14 The bandit Giuliano, member of the separatist movement for the independence of 
Sicily after the Second World War, is held responsible for the Strage di Portella della Ginestra 
(1 May 1947), when he fired with his gang on leftist workers, who were demonstrating against 
the existence of large estates and for agrarian reform. Although the truth is still unknown, 
reactionary local elites and the Mafia are suspected of being instigators. Others attribute the 
responsibility to neo-fascist movements and to the CIA, concerned by the spread of communism 
in the peninsula.
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During the late 1980s and early 1990s no significant terrorist activity was recorded. 
The situation changed abruptly at the end of the 1990s. Right-wing radical groups 
engaged in expressions of racism and anti-immigration demonstrations and represented 
a threat to public order on several occasions because of their association with football 
hooligans. As for left wing terrorism, the murder of two labour consultants  15 made 
Italy aware of the possible re-emergence of revolutionary left-wing groups. As things 
stand, domestic terrorism does not seem to present any imminent danger. 
Intelligence and investigative agencies’ reports have explicitly referred to possible 
terrorist attacks from Islamic groups  16. Organised on an ethnic basis since the late 
1980s and early 1990s, Islamic terrorists active in Italy are mainly Maghrebi  17 
and Egyptian nationals  18. With regards to Jihadist activities, Italy has historically 
been used as a logistical base in order to acquire false documents, obtain weapons 
and military hardware, raise funds and convert people to Islam.	They specialise in 
counterfeiting identity cards and passports; importing weapons and military hardware; 
and money laundering. 
A number of complex investigations over the past 20 years have uncovered 
Jihadist networks throughout the peninsula and extensive links with networks in other 
European countries and the Middle East. However there seemed to be no indications of 
networks planning serious attacks in Italy or from Italy against other countries  19.
B.	 The	development	of	home	grown	terrorism	
The latest investigations have shown some changes to previous patterns of Jihadist 
activities and revealed the emergence of the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism  20. 
15 Professors Massimo D’Antona (1999) and Marco Biagi (2002).
16 Among the events that occurred in the last few years: the kidnapping of the imam Abu 
Omar and the various incidents connected with the Italian involvement in the war in Iraq.  
17 Originally most terrorists were Algerians. In the last few years they have been mostly 
Tunisians, opponents of the regime of Ben Ali. They are well rooted and strong in Milan, where 
they are active as ‘Gruppo salafita per la predicazione ed il combattimento’.
18 Among the events that occurred in the last few years: the kidnapping of the imam Abu 
Omar and the various incidents connected with Italy’s involvement in the war in Iraq.  
19 A. SPataro (ed.), “Dati sulle sentenze di condanna”, La Magistratura, 2, 2008.
20 The recent rise of this phenomenon seems to be caused by a mixture of violent ideological 
influences (radical propaganda shared via the internet), group dynamics and more structural 
problems in Western societies. Its most important characteristics are a deep religious faith, often 
newly discovered, hatred of the West and a sense of alienation from their societies. Homegrown 
terrorists are part loosely knit and fluid networks (sometimes simply individuals) with varying, 
or no, international links. They are primarily young Muslim men, second or third generation 
immigrants who have met by hazard within the community and share a common grief. See 
K.L. ThachuK et al., Homegrown Terrorism. The threat within, Center for Technology and 
National Security Policy. National Defense University, May 2008, available at http://www.
ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP%2048%20Home%20Grown%20Terrorism.pdf (last visit: 
30 May 2012); T. Precht, Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe. From 
conversion to terrorism, Danish Ministry of Justice, December 2007, available at http://www.
justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Home_grown_
terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__
2_.pdf. (last visit: 30 May 2012).
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Militants, the so-called “lone wolves”, are now based and operating within the country. 
By providing access to broad and constant terrorist-related propaganda, the internet 
has a major role in facilitating violent radicalisation  21. An interesting example of this 
process is the attempted attack by a legal immigrant from Libya, Mohammad Game, 
on 12 October 2009 in Milan  22. The subsequent investigations revealed that Game 
and his accomplices, an Egyptian and a Libyan, had not acted under the direction 
of, or even in remote cooperation with, any organised group. Self-recruited and self-
trained via the internet, their sudden radicalisation and unsophisticated techniques 
resemble those of similar homegrown terrorist networks in other European countries 
such as the United Kingdom and Spain. 
3.	 The	legislation	in	detail
Italy is one of those jurisdictions that have experienced serious and lengthy periods 
of political violence and terrorism, and thus developed specific terrorist legislation 
well before the drafting of the Framework Decisions of 2002 and 2008. In fact, as a 
result of the threat represented by domestic political violence, a series of laws were 
enacted from 1974 onwards. 
These laws gradually modified specific provisions of the Codice Penale (CP, 1930) 
and the Codice di Procedura Penale (CPP, 1930). The new provisions were scattered 
about in the codes and never grouped together in a specific section devoted to terrorist 
offences and related applicable procedures. Adopted with wide parliamentary support 
to respond to the most urgent problems, they eroded the improvements in individual 
rights introduced by late 1960s and early 1970s legislation, which was considered 
the period of maximum development of individual safeguards in the Italian criminal 
justice system. Although controversial, these repressive measures were never declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Most of the legislation was adopted via 
law-decree, a quicker procedure, dictated by urgency  23. The emergency situation 
made long and comprehensive debates impossible and reduced parliamentary scrutiny. 
The Interior Ministry obtained more freedom of manœuvre and thus adopted policies 
oriented towards “law and order”. 
21 P. Brunst, “Terrorism and the Internet: new threats posed by cyber-terrorism and terrorist 
use of the internet”,  in M. Wade and A. MalJevic (eds.), A War on Terror? The European 
Stance on a new threat, changing laws and human rights, New York, Springer, 2009, p. 51. 
22 Game detonated an explosive device hidden on his person at the gates of the Santa 
Barbara military base in Milan, injuring himself and a carabiniere who tried to stop him. 
Game and his accomplices used to attend Milan’s Islamic Cultural Institute (the Mosque of 
Viale Jenner), well-known by law enforcement authorities, having been the focus of terrorism 
investigations for almost 20 years.  At trial, Game stressed that the attack was his religious duty 
as a Muslim and was meant as a protest against Italy’s involvement in Afghanistan. The Libyan 
terrorist was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment with a charge of making and possessing 
explosives for terrorist purposes. 
23 Under Article 77 of the Constitution, the government can adopt a law-decree in 
emergency situations. Parliament must convert (totally or partially) the decree in law in the 
sixty days following its enactment. Governments have over time abused this extraordinary 
power to overcome parliamentary scrutiny. 
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Of particular interest for the purpose of this contribution is Law-decree 625/1979 
(which later became Law 15/1980)  24, which established the ‘association with the 
aims of terrorism and subversion of democratic order’ (Article 270 bis CP) and the 
offence of ‘attack with terrorist or subversive aims’ (Article 280 CP). The aggravating 
circumstances of these new offences provided for: an increase in the sentence of up to 
50%; exclusion from mitigating circumstances and parole; and an extension of up to 
a third of the maximum time of pre-trial detention (reaching – in some circumstances 
– more than ten years). Pre-trial detention could sometimes last longer than the 
maximum penalty provided for the offence. Once again, public opinion favoured the 
adoption of harsh anti-terrorist measures. The referendum held in 1981 for the repeal 
of Law 15/1980 had a negative outcome (only 14.5% voted in favour of abrogation).
Many of the anti-terrorism provisions previously enacted had been repealed by 
the coming into force of the new Codice di Procedura Penale in 1989. However, 
after the attacks of 11 September 2001, new anti-terrorism legislation was considered 
necessary.  In addition, there was allegedly a need to fill gaps and address weaknesses 
in the existing legislation because of the changing nature of the phenomenon from a 
domestic to an international threat. 
The first and most relevant piece of new legislation was Law 438/2001  25, which 
amended Article 270 bis CP and introduced the new charge of ‘international terrorism’ 
and the newly defined category of ‘association for the purpose of international 
terrorism’ (through the amendment of Article 270bis CP). This law then inspired the 
guidelines of criminal policy adopted by Law 155/2005  26, which most importantly 
introduced in the code Article 270sexies, attempting to define for the first time a 
“terrorism act” and a “terrorist intent”. Although they touch upon very complex and 
delicate issues, both laws were adopted with unusual speed due to the need to address 
the terrorist emergency.
A.	 The	definition	of	terrorism
No legislation has been specifically adopted to implement the two Framework 
Decisions, although, as we shall see, the FD of 2002 has certainly had an impact in the 
shaping of the definition of terrorism introduced in the criminal code in 2005. 
Since the late 1970s, the domestic definition has progressively evolved: first in 
response to the reality of the threat; then to the emotional reaction caused by the 
attacks; and finally to conform with European and wider international requirements, 
such as the Framework Decision of 2002.
At the international level, the thirteen successive UN ad hoc conventions for 
the suppression of terrorism (1963-2005) identify a number of specific terrorist acts, 
including certain types of bombing as well as aircraft and maritime hijacking. They 
24 Law 15/1980 (Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 15 dicembre 
1979, n. 625, concernente misure urgenti per la tutela dell’ordine democratico e della sicurezza 
pubblica). 
25 Law 438/2001 (Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 18 ottobre 
2001, n. 374, recante disposizioni urgenti per contrastare il terrorismo internazionale).
26 Law 155/2005 (Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 27 luglio 
2005, n. 144, recante misure urgenti per il contrasto del terrorismo internazionale). 
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also require state parties to establish as criminal offences under domestic law the 
behaviours set forth in the conventions and to make them punishable with severe 
penalties. 
Moreover, there have been attempts at the international level to define terrorism 
as such. However, these are normally said to be insufficient. First, since the late 
1980s, the United Nations has been unsuccessfully trying to draft a ‘Comprehensive 
Convention for the Prevention and Repression of Terrorism’ that would encompass an 
international definition of the offence of terrorism  27. But such a legal definition is 
still controversial, not least because of divergent perceptions of political phenomena 
such as national liberation movements ― ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter!’ ― and state terrorism. The UN Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism (1999) lays down some common characteristics of terrorist 
offences and thereby marks a step forward towards a consensus: 
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, 
intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do 
or to abstain from doing any act”  28. 
Not only has the UN 1999 Convention proved a useful point of reference for 
judges hearing terrorism cases, but EU Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA has also 
had a major impact on courts’ decisions, legislators’ choices and on the academic 
debate. 
EU Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA  29 on combating terrorism identifies a 
number of acts that must be qualified as terrorism where committed with a specific 
purpose. EU Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA  30 amends the latter and introduces 
the offences of ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist offence’, ‘training for 
terrorism’ and ‘recruitment for terrorism’, as demanded by the earlier Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005)  31.
The importance of the EU definition is the enumeration of acts (such as physical 
attacks, kidnapping, seizure of aircraft, manufacture or possession of weapons or 
explosives, etc.) that should be qualified as terrorism where they are committed 
with the aim of seriously intimidating a population; of compelling a government 
or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or of 
seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country or international organisation. 
27 “Renewed effort towards completion of the Comprehensive Convention against 
Terrorism applauded in Legal Committee” (8 October 2008), http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2008/gal3340.doc.htm (last visit: 30 May 2012).	
28 Article 2(1)(b) UNGA International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism (1999). 
29 Council Framework Decision (EC) 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. 
30 Council Framework Decision (EC) 2008/919/JHA amending Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. 
31 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005). 
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The first appearance of “terrorism” in Italian law dates back to the late 1970s. 
There, it arose in connection with domestic terrorist actions  32. At this stage, the 
term “terrorism” was never defined. Nor was a definition provided when, under Law 
438/2001, the notion of “international terrorism” was introduced in the wording of 
Article 270 bis CP   33 (‘association for terrorist purposes’). 
Prosecutors and judges were left to decide on a case by case basis whether an act 
fell within the offence of ‘association for terrorist purposes’, relying on principles of 
national and international law to define the notion of “terrorist offence” and “terrorist 
act”. As a consequence, the interpretation of the concept of terrorism gave rise to a 
controversial body of case law and heated academic debate. 
Terrorism was formally defined in the Italian Codice Penale (CP) only in 2005. 
The aim of the definition of terrorism was to prompt the use of special procedural 
measures. In addition, Article 15 Law 155/2005 sought to clarify the meaning of 
Article 270 bis CP (‘association for terrorist purposes’) and thus added to the Codice 
Penale Article 270 sexies, which reads as follows:  
“Are considered offences with a terrorist intent, those activities that, in view 
of their nature or context, might cause serious harm to a country or international 
organisation and are intended to intimidate the population or constrain state powers or 
an international organisation to carry out or to refrain from carrying out any activity, 
or to destabilise or to destroy fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country or of an international organisation; as well as all the activities 
defined as terrorist or as pursuing a terrorist intent by international convention and 
instruments binding on Italy”.
Article 270 sexies CP is divided into two parts: a general definition and a blanket 
provision. 
First, the article defines the specific mens rea required for an ordinary offence 
to be qualified as terrorist. The act must have been one intended to render serious 
damage to a state or international organisation  34. The judge has to assess whether the 
circumstances of the case make such damage more or less likely. Possible difficulties 
include identifying what was likely to have occurred (if the action had been carried 
through) and whether the potential damage would have been sufficiently serious for 
the act to be deemed as terrorist. By contrast to the definition contained in Article 1 of 
the FD 2002, the provision does not list offences or types of behaviour  which are to 
be considered as terrorist acts under specific circumstances.
Article 270 sexies CP also contains a “blanket provision” that brings within the 
general definition any action deemed as terrorist either under international law or 
32 E.g. Law 191/1978 (Conversione in Legge, con modificazioni, del Decreto-Legge 
21 marzo 1978, n. 59, concernente norme penali e processuali per la prevenzione e la 
repressione di gravi reati), Law 15/1980, Law 304/1982 (Misure per la difesa dell’ordinamento 
costituzionale). 
33 See A. Valsecchi, “Il problema della definizione di terrorismo”, Riv. It. Dir. Proc. Pen., 
4, 2004, p. 1127.
34 L. Pistorelli, “Punito anche il solo arruolamento”, Guida Dir., 33, 2005, p. 55.
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under conventions binding on Italy  35. This cross-reference is open and imprecise as 
it does not specify which international instruments have to be taken into account. A 
precise definition of the offence is avoided in order not to exclude by mistake other 
acts that are recognisably terrorist  36.
B.	 The	development	of	inchoate	offences	and	the	criminalisation	of	preparatory	
activities	
1. Association for terrorism purposes
In Italy, the shift of criminal liability upstream from the commission of any harm 
has been firstly achieved by the application of ‘association for terrorist purposes’ 
offences which have played a central role in the repression of terrorism since the 
1980-90s. 
The history of the matter is as follows. From the late 1970s onwards, various 
far-reaching provisions were introduced which penalised not only participation in 
terrorism-related activities but also indirect involvement in terrorist groups, irrespective 
of the actual commission of violent acts. However, the progressive change in the 
nature of the offences and in the operating modes of terrorist organisations made the 
existing scheme partially inadequate. 
Article 270 bis CP criminalises the promotion, establishment, organisation and 
direction of terrorist groups  37. As originally drafted in 1980, Article 270 bis CP 
only applied to terrorist groups that were planning operations within Italy  38. Law 
438/2001 amended Article 270 bis and thus extended the offence to cover terrorism 
directed against foreign states and international organisations  39. In addition, the 
sentence provided for individuals who participate in associations with terrorist 
purposes was increased to imprisonment from five to ten years. 
Finally, in order to implement the UN Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (1999), Article 270 bis has been further amended in 2001 so 
that it now also punishes terrorism financing with the same sentence as promoting, 
constituting, organising or directing an association for terrorist purposes.
35 For a precise list of the international law sources to which this article supposedly refers 
see A. Valsecchi, “Brevi osservazioni di diritto penale sostanziale”, Dir. Pen. Pr., 10, 2005, 
p. 1224, at p. 1226.
36 L. Dati and M. Carrattieri, Le nuove norme contro il terrorismo internazionale, Rimini, 
Maggioli, 2005, p. 192. 
37 In its original wording, in 1980, Article 270 bis reads: “Anyone who promotes, constitutes, 
organises or directs associations aimed at the completion of violent acts with terrorist purposes 
or for the subversion of the democratic order is punished with imprisonment from seven to 15 
years. Anyone who participates in these associations is punished with imprisonment from four 
to eight years”.
38 In all other circumstances, judges had to rely upon the offence of simple conspiracy 
(Article 416 CP). See Cass. Pen. 17 April 1996, in Cass. Pen., 12, 1997; Cass. Pen. 13 July 
1998 in CED Cass 212161, 1998; Cass. Pen. 1 June 1999 in Dir. Pen. Pr., 4, 2000, p. 487 note 
A. Piccioli.
39 The amendment reads as follows: “the terrorist intent subsists also when violent acts are 
carried out against a foreign State, institution or international organization”.
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As for the scope of Article 270 bis CP, some have argued that Law 438/2001 would 
have been better had it reorganised all the provisions in the Codice Penale concerning 
political offences. In particular, legal writers said that it would have been desirable 
to enact a single new provision related to all associations pursuing political ends ― 
whether national or international ― with the use of force or military means  40.
2. Providing material assistance to terrorist activities 
Law 438/2001 has also introduced a specific offence of ‘assisting the members 
of a terrorist association’	(Article 270 ter CP). “Assistance” has to be distinguished 
from the offender’s involvement in the group or activity as an accomplice or his/
her abetting the criminal association. It may consist of providing terrorists with a 
safe haven or food, hospitality, means of transportation or communication. For this 
offence, it is enough that assistance is provided to a single member of the association 
and does not directly contribute to the perpetration of a specific criminal offence or to 
the existence of the association. In such cases, the offender’s participation in the crime 
has not yet risen to the level of conspiracy. Individuals guilty of an offence under 
Art. 270 ter are liable to four years’ imprisonment. Providing continuous assistance 
represents an aggravating factor for the purpose of defining the penalty. 
3. Glorification of terrorism 
In its current version, the Italian Codice Penale does not define the glorification 
of terrorism as a specific criminal offence. 
Article 302 CP establishes a general offence of direct incitement to commit 
intentional offences against the state (such as association for terrorist purposes and 
assistance to those taking part in the association − Articles 270 bis and ter CP); 
punishable with a term of imprisonment of up to eight years. This provision was 
enacted during the 1920s and was used in Fascist times to punish all forms of dissent, 
and then used again, less oppressively, during the 1960s and 1970s. Following the 
enactment of the Republican Constitution in 1948, the Corte Costituzionale found 
these articles incompatible with Article 21 of the Constitution on freedom of expression 
in certain cases. 
More recently, Article 15(1) bis Law 155/2005 introduced a new aggravating 
circumstance to the offence of public incitement to commit an offence (Article 414 
CP) for the judge to take into account for sentencing purposes “(...) if the incitement 
or glorification concerns terrorism offences or crimes against humanity the sentence 
will be increased by half”  41. In this context, for example, the judge might have to 
ascertain on a case by case basis whether certain acts of proselytism within Mosques 
can concretely result in acts of violence and thus represent a terrorism offence as 
defined by Article 270bis in combination with Article 270 sexies.
40 E. Rosi, “Terrorismo internazionale”, Dir. Pen. Pr., 2, 2002, p. 150, at p. 157-159.  
41 Article 414(4) CP (“Istigazione a delinquere”).
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Indirect incitement addressed to unspecified persons was only punishable until 
1999 when Law 205/1999  42 repealed Article 303 CP. This provision formerly 
punished public incitement and apology of the offences against the state with a term 
of imprisonment from three to twelve years. This offence was drafted in a very broad 
way as someone could be prosecuted for the mere fact of having incited. 
4.  The new offences of recruiting or training for terrorism purposes 
As required by the Council of Europe 2005 Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism,	 in Italy, Law 155/2005 introduced into the Codice Penale two new 
offences, namely recruiting (Article 270 quater CP) and training individuals for 
terrorism purposes  (Article 270 quinquies CP). In fact, a growing number of cases 
of enrolling Islamic fighters could not be prosecuted under the existing provisions 
because there was insufficient evidence to charge suspects with preparatory acts under 
Article 270 bis.
A prosecution for the offence of recruitment and training of potential terrorists 
does not require proof of a specific association agreement. It is enough that the 
activities suggest the existence of a terrorist organisation and a terrorist purpose on 
the basis of the newly formulated Article 270 sexies.
Articles 270 quater and quinquies establish a term of imprisonment of seven to 
fifteen years for recruiting potential terrorists and of five to ten years for training them. 
The trainee is sanctioned with the same penalty as the trainer. The mere fact of being 
recruited is not punishable under Article 270 quater.
These offences are at risk of curtailing freedom of association and assembly ex 
Article 11 ECHR, which may only be restrained under the conditions of legality, 
necessity and proportionality. 
Recruitment or training is not criminalised in relation to all the offences listed in 
Article 1 of the 2002 Framework Decision. It is true that recruitment or training for 
terrorist purposes could be punished under Article 270 bis as a form of participation 
in an “association for terrorist purposes”. However, this provision does not encompass 
the recruitment or training done by individuals without any connection with a terrorist 
organisation. 
C.	 Lacunas	in	the	implementation	of	specific	FD	provisions
The most recent monitoring of the 2002 Framework Decision done by the 
European Commission in November 2007  43 underlines that Italy has not perfectly 
implemented Article 1 of the European Framework Decision listing terrorist offences. 
The Italian provision does not list offences or types of behaviour which are to be 
considered as terrorist acts under specific circumstances.
Although it includes no list of offences as in the case of the French definition, the 
core Italian provision (Article 270 sexies CP) in fact identifies only a limited number 
42 Law 205/1999 (Delega al governo per la depenalizzazione dei reati minori e modifiche 
al sistema penale e tributario). 
43 Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 
13 June 2002 on combating  terrorism, COM (2007) 681 final, 6 November 2007.  
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of acts as terrorist offences. Other terrorist offences are only taken into account as 
aggravating circumstances (e.g. ‘glorification of terrorism’).
With regards to the 2008 Framework Decision, the Italian Codice Penale contains 
no offence of direct and indirect public provocation to commit a terrorist offence. 
As explained above, the criminalisation of recruitment and training for terrorism 
purposes is also partially compliant with the European requirements. The domestic 
provision punishes the recruitment or training in order to commit acts of violence 
or sabotaging fundamental public services only. Italy considered that its narrower 
existing criminal provision met the European requirements so that no amendment 
was needed. The criminalisation within the Italian Codice Penale of the recruitment 
(Article 270 quater) and training (Article 270 quinquies) for terrorism purposes is also 
partially compliant with the European requirements. 
4.	 National	case	law
Before looking at the details of national case law, it is interesting to reflect 
briefly on principles of statutory interpretation because recent legislation has left 
courts awkward problems of this sort. It has long been said that penal laws ought 
to be construed strictly  44. Where doubt arises, the underlying principle is that any 
ambiguities have to be resolved in favour of the defendant (in dubio pro reo)  45. 
In Italy, this principle is laid down in legislation. The Italian criminal code 
(Article 1 CP) mentions explicitly that the judge may never punish acts that are not 
expressly defined as offences nor sanction them with a penalty that is not established 
by law. Under Italian law (principio di tassatività – legality principle), criminal law 
must not be extensively construed to the accused’s detriment (in malam partem). If, 
however, such a broad interpretation would mitigate the responsibility of the individual 
(in bonam partem), the limit does not apply  46. On the other hand, the legality 
principle requires that the legislator avoids the drafting and enactment of complex and 
ambiguous offences that might give rise to the courts engaging in perilous teleological 
interpretation of the legislation.
From September 2001, there have been around 100 convictions for terrorism-
related offences. Most cases involve participation in a terrorist association and not 
the commission of a terrorist act in itself. The average sentence is four years of 
imprisonment. 
As previously underlined, before the amendment of Article 270 bis, the 
‘association for terrorist purposes’ was only applicable to terrorist groups that were 
planning attacks within the national territory. Hence, defendants in proceedings which 
44 See for instance: “What nullum crimen forbids is the analogical extension of penal 
statutes (...). Strict construction was adopted in the eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries 
to mitigate the ferocity of the penal system”. G.L. Williams, Criminal Law: the general part, 
2nd edn., London, Stevens, 1961, p. 586.
45 As in Eur. Court HR, 25 May 1993, Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. no. 14307/88. 
46 In accordance with the doctrinal interpretation of Article 14 of the general provision 
on the law (Disposizioni sulla legge in generale): “Criminal and exceptional legislation does 
not apply beyond the cases and circumstances for which it is provided”. See G. Marinucci and 
E. Dolcini, Manuale di diritto penale. Parte Generale, Milano, Giuffrè, 2003, p. 43-48.
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started before the introduction of the offence of ‘association for international terrorism 
purposes’ by Law 438/2001 were charged and convicted of simple ‘associazione per 
delinquere’ ex Article 416 CP, aimed at abetting illegal immigration or trafficking 
false identity documents.
In the most recently reported cases, where the defendants were accused of 
‘association for international terrorism purposes’, sentences ranged between five and 
ten years of imprisonment  47. 
Interestingly, before the 2005 legislative reform in Italy  48 and the introduction 
in the Penal Code of a definition of terrorism, the Corte di Cassazione pointed to 
the EU Framework Decision of 2002 as the most important term of reference for 
establishing a technical legal notion of terrorism  49. This instrument then became the 
inspiration for national legislation.
The interpretation of Article 270 bis CP (association for terrorist purposes) 
generates difficulties both at the investigation and trial stage. 
When investigating into and then bringing an individual to trial, what is required 
is evidence which tends to prove his association with a terrorist group, rather than 
evidence of the acts that he has done  50. Information on different groups is often 
insufficient. The judge has to assess the concrete dangerousness of individual offenders 
in relation to an international context with which he is not always familiar. The case 
law of the Corte di Cassazione has consequently been inconsistent. 
In some cases, the Corte di Cassazione has adopted a relaxed approach to the 
notion of association and the assessment of individual responsibility  51. In these 
cases, the simple ideological adherence to criminal purposes has been considered 
enough for a charge under Article 270 bis  52. Legal provisions do not identify what 
makes a criminal group or a violent plot a threat to international security. The role 
played by each individual within the organisation is also often irrelevant. 
In other cases, on the other hand, the Corte di Cassazione has ruled that, for 
criminal liability under this provision, the defendant must take some concrete step 
towards putting the plan into action and that mere membership of the group is not 
enough  53. In these cases the Court was not prepared to allow the provision to be 
used to punish the mere manifestation of a wish to commit an act  54.
47 A. SPataro (ed.), “Dati sulle sentenze di condanna”, p. 44.
48 Law 155/2005.
49 As in Cass. Pen., 21 June 2005 in Foro it., II, 2006, p. 345. For a comment see 
V. Santoro, “La lettura ‘europea’ di vecchie norme”, Guida Dir., 30, 2005, p. 78; G. Frigo, 
“Per uscire dall’impasse del codice penale”,  Guida Dir., 6, 2005, p. 88.
50 A common denominator among most suspects is the fact of belonging to an ideological 
area of Islamic fundamentalism confirmed by interceptions, seizure of books and various 
material.  Investigations take many different directions touching on historical events, sociological 
concepts and analyses of international institutions, etc. 
51 As in Cass. Pen., 13 October 2004 in Foro it., II, 2005, p. 218; Cass. Pen., 9 February 
2005 in Dir. Giust., 20, 2005, p. 77, note R. Oliveri del castillo.  
52 As in Cass. Pen., 25 May 2006 in Foro it., II, 2006, p. 541.
53 As in Cass. Pen., 15 June 2006 in Guida dir., 40, 2006, p. 60; Cass. Pen., 11 October 
2006  in Cass. Pen., 2007, p. 1469 and in Foro it., II, 2006, p. 77.  
54 See also Cass. Pen., 21 November 2001 in Foro it., II, 2004, p. 29.
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A particularly controversial matter has been the tendency to use, as evidence in 
support of pre-trial measures, the fact of a group’s appearance on a list of terrorist 
groups  55. The use of such lists has been considered acceptable to encourage further 
investigations into the activities of a certain group deemed as terrorist. However, as 
argued by the Corte di Cassazione, any further use is inadmissible and, certainly, 
being included on a banned list cannot constitute evidence of terrorist purposes as 
required by Article 270 bis CP  56. The risk is that, if it is interpreted too broadly, 
Article 270 bis becomes a blanket provision violating the principle of legality and 
legal certainty. 
Moreover, in recent years the issue in case law has been dominated by the dispute 
over the legal standing of individuals claiming to be “freedom fighters”. This is a long-
running issue that is not confined to Italy.  A significant example of this dispute is the 
contrasting interpretation at different stages of the Andar Al Islam case in 2005 by the 
Tribunale di Milano (24 January 2005) and by the Tribunale di Brescia (31 January 
2005)  57.
A first ruling had been given in Milan by a judge for the preliminary hearing 
(GUP) to the effect that violent or guerrilla actions carried out during wartime 
(provided that they comply with humanitarian international law) do not fall within the 
notion of international terrorism, except where they are intended to terrorise civilians. 
The Corte di Cassazione had also already taken this line in the case of Maamri Rachid 
et al (17 January 2005).
In Brescia, the judge for the preliminary investigations (GIP) then ruled, however, 
that acts committed in pursuance of a programme of violence, even where this takes the 
form of the suicide bombing of a military target in another country, must be considered 
an offence under Article 270 bis CP and not as legitimate guerrilla actions.
5.	 Conclusion
A.	 The	impact	of	the	definition	of	terrorism	on	existing	legislation	
Academic opinion is divided on the impact of Article 270 sexies CP on existing 
legislation and case law. Particularly controversial is the scope and possible impact 
of the blanket provision that brings any action deemed as terrorist either under 
international law or under conventions binding on Italy within the general definition. 
The general definition of terrorism provided in the first part of Article 270 sexies 
CP is thought, by some writers, to be broad enough by itself to cover any conceivable 
form of terrorism  58. This would make a cross-reference to international instruments 
redundant. 
Moreover, some writers consider that the vagueness of the definition leaves 
judges with too much discretion, calling into question both the principle of legality 
55 Trib. Brescia, 31 January 2005 in Dir. Giust., 6, 2005, p. 92.
56 As in Cass. Pen., 30 September 2005 in Dir. Giust., 44, 2005, p. 78 ; Cass. Pen., 
11 October 2006. 
57 Trib. Milano, 24 gennaio 2005 and Trib. Brescia, 31 January 2005 in Dir. Giust., 6, 
2005, p. 92.
58 A. Valsecchi, “Misure urgenti”, p. 1226. 
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and the riserva di legge  59 in criminal matters (ex Article 117 of the Constitution as 
interpreted by the Corte Costituzionale)  60. 
By contrast, an argument in favour of this blanket provision would be that the 
clause provides for automatic recognition in Italian domestic law of any future 
provision under international or European law. 
In addition, not only does Article 270 sexies CP finally provide a provision that 
meets the constitutional requirement for precision in the definition of criminal offences 
(ex Article 25(2) of the Constitution)  61, but the open reference to international law 
also allows judges to give concrete sense to an otherwise vague definition  62. On 
this view, the new law rubberstamps what has long been judicial practice. Article 
270 sexies CP similarly assists judges in interpreting the terms of Articles 270 quater 
and quinquies CP but it offers no help in determining whether a group constitutes an 
“association for terrorist purposes” under Article 270 bis CP.
B.	 The	controversial	criminalisation	of	preparatory	acts	
An important feature of current counter-terrorism legislation is the development of 
criminal offences in inchoate mode and the criminalisation of all sorts of preparatory 
acts. Meant for preventive purposes, these offences – combined with a vague and 
unclear definition of terrorism – have the potential to catch and severely punish 
individuals irrespective of whether they have yet caused any identifiable harm  63. 
Italy has been more hesitant than other countries in this respect. For instance, 
despite European requirements, Italy has not criminalised alleged terrorist speeches 
(or the mere public expression of opinions) to the same extent nor has the country 
criminalised the possession of articles for terrorist purposes. 
Moreover, Italian legislation has progressively expanded the notion of conspiracy 
and relevant provisions on aiding and abetting. The provisions described in this 
contribution form part of a tradition of criminalisation that dates back many years. 
Waves of emergency legislation have led to the proliferation of offences of  “association 
for criminal purposes” (reati associativi). Historically related to terrorism and 
organised crime, these forms of conspiracy became more widely applicable following 
the introduction in 1930 of the standard associazione per delinquere ― Article 416 
CP  64. Academic commentators have often advocated the abolition of these vaguely 
59 I.e. in criminal matters legal requirements must be prescribed by a statutory text.
60 L. Dati, “Commento art 15 d.L. 27 luglio 2005 n. 144”,  in L. Dati and M. Carrattieri, 
op. cit., p. 192-193. 
61 A. Valsecchi, “Il problema della definizione di terrorismo”, p. 1158-59.
62 E.g. referring to the 12 international instruments for the suppression of terrorism, which 
clearly identify a series of conduct to be prosecuted as terrorist acts.
63 On this particular issue please see Katja šugman and Francesca Galli’s contribution on 
inchoate offences within this same publication.
64 Article 416 CP (as amended) – “When three or more people associate to commit an 
offence or more, those who promote, constitute or organise the association are punished with 
a term of imprisonment between three and seven years. The participation in the association is 
punished with a term of imprisonment between one and five years (…). The penalty is raised 
if the number of associates is ten or more’. The association for criminal purposes was first 
introduced in 1859 and then called ‘associazione di malfattori’. 
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defined offences. For instance, the constitutional legitimacy of Article 270 bis has 
been fiercely challenged  65. Under new legislation, it is, too, frequently the case that 
sanctions are more severe than in ordinary cases.
65 S. Reitano, “Le misure di contrasto al terrorismo internazionale”, Indice penale, 3, 
2004, p. 1173, at p. 1210. 
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ETA, the largest terrorist organisation currently operating in Spain, is maintaining 
a ceasefire that it declared itself. Despite this and the fact that much of the operational 
capacity it employed in some periods when it was active is no longer at its disposal, 
it has still not been dissolved and pursuit-type operations continue to be carried out 
by Spanish and French police forces. The Spanish central government’s attitude 
towards ETA, in particular the assessment of negotiations that have taken place, is 
a big point of political discussion at the moment and has sparked particularly heated 
debate. Although Spain suffered the worst attack on European soil to date following 
the resurgence of religion-based international terrorism (Madrid, 11 March 2004), 
there is currently much less judicial and political controversy attached to that than 
there is about ETA. There have been many terrorist incidents and the vast majority 
have been linked to ETA. In fact, hundreds of individual crimes have been committed 
in recent years. 
What is most striking about the evolution of Spanish anti-terrorist criminal law 
is probably its counter-cyclical pattern. Anti-terrorist legislation managed to contain 
certain guiding principles in the 1980s despite the fact that ETA was carrying out major 
attacks throughout the country, including an intense bombing campaign in Madrid 
and Barcelona. Meanwhile, the so-called ‘dirty war’ was allegedly being carried out 
by State police units through the Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups and allegations of 
torture were commonplace. It was only after the reduced incidence of ETA activity 
* Commendation goes to Hannah Crawford (student, University of Cambridge) for her 
assistance in translating this text into English.
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and their waning political influence in the Basque country that criminal law has 
been bolstered both in terms of its design and application (e.g. it has an increasingly 
extended scope and strength now)  1. Some of the special rules that were established 
relating to terrorism have been extended to cover other areas of criminal law which 
have evolved in the same way  2.
B.	 The	limited	impact	of	EU	instruments	on	Spanish	Law
The impact of EU policies on Spanish anti-terrorist legislation has been very 
limited due to the fact that Spanish laws have already allowed a very broad body of 
anti-terrorist criminal law to emerge. Therefore, remarkably, neither public debate nor 
scientific discussions have referred to European efforts made in this area. The contents 
of the Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA have not been debated in public and have 
not influenced national legislation, with the exception of the use of the 2008 FD as 
justification – by the legislature – for the latest expansion of anti-terrorist legislation 
in 2010. In particular, it was not necessary to implement the Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA, since the extraordinarily extensive and tough Spanish anti-terrorism 
criminal law that has been in place since 1980 (and during the dictatorship) had just 
been considerably expanded and deepened through a reform carried out in 2000. 
Coupled with discussion about the existence of new types of internationally organised 
terrorist networks and the use of the franchise model by these networks, the FD 2008 
has served to encourage further reform and broadly drafted offences have been in 




The main features of Spanish anti-terrorist criminal law are set out in the new 
provisions contained in the 1995 PC  4. The code was dubbed the ‘Democratic Penal 
Code’ because, before it was adopted, criminal legislation had been reformed at 
various points after the end of General Franco’s dictatorship but without modifying 
the Penal Code in its entirety  5. The new Penal Code made a number of long expected 
1 See the synthesis in M. cancio meliá, “Strafrecht und Terrorismus in Spanien. 
Anmerkungen zur Entwicklung der Terrorismusgesetzgebung nach der Diktatur”, Journal der 
Juristischen Zeitgeschichte, 1/2009, p. 15 and f.
2 Regarding terrorism see m. cancio meliá, “Terrorism and Criminal Law: the Dream of 
Prevention, the Nightmare of the Rule of Law”, New Criminal Law Review, 14, 2011, p. 108 
and f.
3 On the subject of reform of organised crime and terrorism see, in detail, M. cancio 
meliá, “Delitos de organización: criminalidad organizada común y delitos de terrorismo”, in 
J. díaz-maroto villareJo (ed.), Estudios sobre las reformas del Código penal (operadas por 
las LO 5/2010, de 22 de junio, y 3/2011, de 28 de enero), Madrid, Civitas, 2011, p. 643 and f.
4 See the summary in m. cancio meliá, Los delitos de terrorismo. Estructura típica e 
injusto, Madrid, Reus, 2010, p. 134 and f.
5 General Franco’s dictatorship had made use of the Penal Code dating back to the 
nineteenth century and had made only small changes to it.
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technical improvements to the existing one. In addition, according to all the experts in 
the field, it extended the number of activities to be considered criminal and included 
much tougher punishments than had been in the criminal law that was in force during 
the dictatorship  6.
With regard to counter-terrorism legislation, it is worth noting that the criminal 
law in place during Franco’s dictatorship – namely the offences contained in Articles 
57bis and 174bis (b) of the 1973 PC  7 – was reworked by the 1995 PC into much 
more extensive and intensive legislation and also contained more specifically defined 
offences.
These were more extensive, i.e. broader in their application, because a series of 
offences were established that extended sentences for certain crimes committed when 
“belonging to, acting as officers of [acting in the service of something means serving 
the organisation without being a member of it], or collaborating with” organisations 
of a terrorist nature (Arts. 571, 572, 573 PC), as well as a type of ‘catch-all’ offence 
that (potentially) covers any criminal act (Art. 574 PC). In all of these cases, the 
punishment was increased beyond that of the corresponding crime, that is, in addition 
to the sentence fixed by law for the “common” offence, as murder, kidnapping, or 
illicit fire arm possession: the sentence is to be aggravated, so that terrorist murder 
is to be punished harder as common murder. As far as ascertaining the existence of a 
criminal organisation is concerned, it was assumed that such a group’s purpose is to 
“subvert the constitutional order or seriously disrupt the public peace”, a collective 
purpose that marks differences to “common” organised crime: in this sense, terrorism 
can be defined as political organised crime. In addition to the aggravated common 
offences referred to before, there are several offences which consist in some form 
of collaboration (without being a member) with a terrorist organisation. Art. 575 
PC contains an aggravation circumstance for any economic crime committed with 
aim to support a terrorist organisation  8; besides, there exists a specific offence of 
collaboration with a terrorist organisation, through any means, such as information 
gathering, transport of organisation members, hiding of weapons, etc.  9. On the 
other hand, the so-called crime of “individual terrorism” – not a part of the previous 
body of legislation – was introduced  10 and was intended to include certain types of 
behaviour within the scope of the anti-terrorist legislation which take place in street 
disturbances carried out without violence against other people  11 and by which means 
the political group closest to ETA staged a “popular movement”. According to this 
offence, those who perform what is considered criminal behaviour in order to subvert 
the constitutional order or to seriously disrupt the public peace, without belonging 
6 The dictatorship had, in any case, also used the military to combat terrorism and certain 
forms of political dissent.
7 I.e. clauses dealing with aggravating offences, the first being general and the second more 
specific, and the offence for collaborating with an armed group (Art. 174bis (a) PC 1973).
8 Art. 575 PC: committing economic crimes to raise funds for a terrorist organisation.
9 Art. 576 PC; current sentence: between five and ten years imprisonment and a fine.
10 Art. 577 PC; the sentence: aggravation of that of the relevant corresponding offences.
11 In Basque: kale borroka, “street struggle”, “fighting in the street”: the burning of buses 
or Automated Telling Machines.
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to or acting on behalf of a terrorist organisation, may nevertheless be considered 
perpetrators of terrorist offences.
Introduced by the Organic Law 7/2000, Art. 578 PC defines two different 
offences, one consisting of “glorification or justification” of terrorist offences and 
their perpetrators, and the other dealing with various types of harm to the victims of 
such crimes or their families  12. The same reform in 2000 also introduced special 
rules regarding terrorist offences committed by minors.
Finally, Articles 579 and 580 PC are used to regulate, on the one hand, the 
preparatory acts  13, a special penalty of disqualification (Art. 579.2 PC), the issue 
of repentant perpetrators (Art. 579.3 PC) and international recidivism (Art. 580 PC). 
Moreover, just being a member of one of the organisations was considered to be a 
separate crime in itself  14.
2. The concept of terrorism
The legislation introduced in 1995 was also (much) more intense, i.e. clearer and 
deeper in its content as a definition of the special characteristics of terrorist offences, 
because it includes elements that had not existed before in the previous legal definition 
of terrorism. The previous legislation simply referred to “armed bands” and “terrorist 
or rebel elements”. The new one chose to reintroduce the term “terrorism” as the 
section heading. Articles 571 onwards of the PC define terrorism as an act carried out 
with the “purpose of subverting the constitutional order or seriously disrupting the 
public peace”.
The new law therefore introduced a genuine criminal concept of terrorism that 
explains the special characteristics of terrorist offences, allows for the interpretation 
of the scope of terrorism and justifies why the penalties prescribed for such offences 
are more serious than those for corresponding common offences.
It can be argued that, generally, wrongdoing in all offences related to organisations 
implies the seizure of the public sphere and a disregard for the State’s monopoly of 
violence  15. Compared to common criminal organisations, terrorist organisations 
carry out particularly serious violent acts with political significance which call into 
question the political system.
Specifically, the concept of terrorism in Spanish law  16 consists of three elements 
contained within Articles 571 and f. of the Penal Code. Terrorists are defined as 
armed units that intimidate the masses and whose collective aim is to subvert the 
12 The sentence: imprisonment from one to two years.
13 Art. 579.1 PC; punishable only in certain offences, such as conduct of a preparatory 
nature consisting of acts of communication: the planning, provocation and conspiracy to 
commit a crime.
14 Now contained in Art. 571 PC; current sentence: six to twelve years’ imprisonment for 
ordinary members and eight to fourteen years for leaders.
15 See the expression in M. cancio meliá, “Zum Unrecht der kriminellen Vereinigung: 
Gefahr und Bedeutung”, in M. PawliK et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Günther Jakobs zum 70. 
Geburtstag am 26. Juli 2007, Köln, Carl Heymanns, 2007, p. 27 and f. 
16 M. cancio meliá, Los delitos de terrorismo, p. 154 and f., 167 and f., 176 and f.; 
id., “Sentido y límites de los delitos de terrorismo”, in c. garcía valdes et al. (eds.), Estudios 
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constitutional order or to seriously disrupt the public peace. This concept of terrorism 
should be included in the interpretation of the various terrorist offences.
a. The concept of a	terrorist group or organisation
The first feature of the definition of terrorism is the existence of a collective 
structure, a group as a distinct reality. Only a group with sufficient density can erode 
the State’s monopoly of violence. This requirement gains even more force in terrorist 
organisations, whose agenda has immediate political significance.
The concept of an organisation  17 is a functional one. In order to determine what 
constitutes a terrorist organisation, one must first consider what it is that they do. 
Doctrine has developed various aspects to understand the concept of an organisation. 
These can be condensed into four elements: participation, a system of membership, 
the longevity of the organisation and its internal structure.
b. Mass intimidation and aggression
The second aspect of the general notion of terrorism in Spanish law deals with 
the specific way in which the terrorist organisation acts. The word terrorism implies a 
certain type of violence. As such, according to the Spanish Royal Academy dictionary, 
both definitions favour this notion: “rule by terror; a succession of violent acts carried 
out to instil terror”. The legal concept of terrorism also includes a reference to the 
procedure employed in the perpetration of each offence by a terrorist organisation. 
As stated by the Spanish Constitutional Court, “inherent in any terrorist activity is the 
purpose, or in any case the outcome, of igniting a situation of social insecurity or alarm 
Penales en homenaje a Enrique Gimbernat, t. II, Madrid, Edisofer, 2008, p. 1879 and f., with 
further references.
17 On the concept of organisation in this context see, for example, C. lamarca Pérez, 
Tratamiento jurídico del terrorismo, Madrid, Ministerio de Justicia, 1985, p. 91 and f., 93 and f., 
228 and f.; J. garcía san Pedro, Terrorismo: aspectos criminológicos y legales, Madrid, Centro 
de Estudios judiciales, 1993,  p. 127 and f.; J.C. camPo moreno, Represión penal del terrorismo. 
Una visión jurisprudencial, Valencia, Editorial General de Derecho, 1997, p. 32 and f.; on the 
concept of organisation in unlawful associations generally, see also A. garcía-Pablos de molina, 
Asociaciones ilícitas en el Código penal, Barcelona, Bosch, 1977,  p. 221 and f., 234 and f., p. 236 
and f.; id., “Asociaciones ilícitas y terroristas”, in cobo del rosal and baJo fernández (eds.) et 
al., Comentarios a la Legislación penal, t. II, El Derecho penal del Estado democrático, Madrid, 
Edersa, 1983, p. 109 and f., 117; córdoba roda, “Libertad de asociación y Ley penal”, Anuario 
de Derecho Penal y Ciencias Penales, 1977, p. 7 and f.; on the German doctrine in general, see 
H.-J. rudolPhi, “Verteidigerhandeln als Unterstützung einer kriminellen oder terroristischen 
Vereinigung i. S. der §§ 129 und 129a StGB”, in W. frisch and W. schmid (eds.), Festschrift 
für Hans-Jürgen Bruns zum 70. Geburtstag, Köln, Carl Heymanns, 1978, p. 319 and f.; id., 
u. stein, “Commentary on §§ 129 f.”, in Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 7. 
ed., München, Luchterhand, 2005, § 129 n. 6-6d; Th. lencKner, “Commentary on §§ 129 f.. 
StGB”, in schönKe/schröder, Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 26. ed., München, C.H. Beck, 
2001, § 129 n. 4; H. ostendorf, “Commentary on §§ 123 f.”, in U. Kindhäuser et al. (eds.), 
Nomos-Kommentar Strafgesetzbuch, vol. 1, 2. ed., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005, § 129 n. 12, all 
of which contain further references.
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as a result of systematic, repeated and often indiscriminate criminal behaviour”  18. 
This approach may be considered the instrumental definition for terrorism. This term 
is fitting if one is to take into account that terrorism is essentially a communication 
strategy. One element of this instrumental strategy is the widespread use of violence 
in challenging the State and thus provoking certain reactions amongst the public and 
State institutions. To achieve this, objective mass intimidation is necessary. In order to 
do this, a particularly effective mechanism is used: collective fear is fostered through 
selective victimisation via acts of violence. This selection might be more or less 
stringent  19 or it might be generic (the Spanish; the West; ‘infidels’). But it is always 
random. The attack is not directed against the victims as human beings but against the 
category of person that they represent. There is a complete disregard for the right of 
the individual and the victim’s identity becomes irrelevant. The act is an instrument 
of mass intimidation. 
The specific acts of terrorism are the basis of considerable discussion regarding the 
application of the notion of terrorism: What treatment do organisations associated with 
a terrorist group deserve? Where might terrorism come in relation to an organisation 
and its social context? In Spain  20 this question arises in connection with the strategy 
of the terrorist organisation ETA when it staged an entire national movement to define 
its activities in political and sociological terms: through groups of prisoners or of their 
families, youth organisations, organisations for the promotion of Euskara (Basque 
language), etc. Many people had the impression that ETA was making a mockery 
of the law through its diversification into organised spheres of activity in public 
life: public presence and activities of several political and social organisations that 
identified themselves by supporting ETA’s views on the independence of the Basque 
Country (and approving of ETA’s violent activity) was considered in the rest of Spain 
to be intolerable. 
Regarding the organisation Jarrai/Haika/Segi – the various names of a separatist 
youth organisation linked to the political arm of the “ETA world”, Batasuna, who were 
devoted, besides legal political activity, to orchestrating serious public disorder – several 
18 “Característico de la actividad terrorista resulta el propósito, o en todo caso el efecto, 
de difundir una situación de alarma o de inseguridad social, como consecuencia del carácter 
sistemático, reiterado, y muy frecuentemente indiscriminado, de esta actividad delictiva”; 
Sentence of the Constitutional Court (STC) 199/1987, legal foundation 4.
19 For example: by only targeting police officers, members of the army and political 
representatives. 
20 On the German precedent – related to the so-called extreme left-wing terrorism of the 
Rote Armee Fraktion in the 1970s and 1980s – the excessive description of behaviour occurred 
due the aim of establishing a possibility to prosecute subjects unrelated organically to the group 
being able to undertake typical forms of propaganda. So the situation arose that one could be 
prosecuted for collaborating with a terrorist organisation if one was found painting supportive 
graffiti (“Long live the RAF!”; or simply drawing the symbol of that organisation). Apart from 
the disappearance of this terrorism phenomenon it was the legislator in 2002 (i.e. after the 
formal self-dissolution of the organisation) that prevented these excesses by making it clear in 
the drafting that types of propaganda could only be carried out by members of the organisation as 
part of their membership; for more information see NK2-ostendorf (supra note 7), para. 129(3).
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years ago the Audiencia Nacional (AN)  21 decided to term this as a “common” illegal 
organisation. This ruling was reviewed by the Supreme Court  22, which declared 
these groups to be terrorist organisations. To qualify as an illegal organisation, the AN 
argued that even if it has a purpose that coincides with that of the terrorist organisation 
ETA, the two should not be confused since their respective actions are distinct from 
one another. Moreover, in the case of Jarrai and its successors, “… they were never 
signatories to the use of weapons in terms recognised by the... law...”. In this sense 
we are dealing with an organisation “peripheral” to another illegal activity involving 
weapons. The majority of the second chamber of the Supreme Court, however, take a 
much more flexible reading of the legal framework: “... the aim pursued, determines 
the terrorist action... the terrorism concept, a terrorist organisation or group, does not 
always identify with that of an armed gang, as mentioned by the court in an appealed 
decision, but instead it is the nature of the act and its purpose which determine whether 
or not it is an act of terrorism”  23. 
This position of the Supreme Court is to be considered incorrect: the activities 
of these organisation do not fit into the definition of terrorism provided by Spanish 
criminal law. While, on the one hand, it can be agreed that the type of organisation 
required by the legal definition of terrorism concurs, on the other hand, the type 
of violence they use may not fit with that definition. Mass intimidation referred to 
by the PC needs the use of violence against persons. The violence carried out by 
certain types of peripheral group to ETA, as the youth organisations mentioned, is 
not directed specifically against people, so that it cannot be considered “terrorism”. 
Even if the aim of the acting persons is to support ETA, to consider their activities 
terrorism, they would have to be connected directly to ETA, to the use of terrorist 
means. In conclusion, antiterrorist criminal law makes no mention of the State of mind 
of the agent to qualify his conduct as terrorism. It defines his deeds. Treating these 
other offenders as if they were terrorists seems to be due to distrust in the ordinary 
mechanisms of the rule of law. 
21 The Sentence of the Audiencia Nacional (SAN) 27/2005 (sección 4ª) 20.6.2005; see, 
in full, the extensive and critical consideration of this resolution by A. fernández hernández, 
“JARRAI–HAIKA–SEGI: de asociación ilícita a organización terrorista”, Revista Penal, 2006, 
a supporter of considering organisations in question as terrorist organisations, p. 95 and f., 99 
and f.; regarding the armed nature of the organisation, see p. 105 and f.
22 Sentence of the Supreme Court (STS) 50/2007 (19 January 2007), as wisely anticipated 
by A. fernández hernández in the title of his study on the AN resolution: “JARRAI-HAIKA-
SEGI...”, op. cit., p. 95 and f.
23 “… la finalidad perseguida, lo que configurará la acción como terrorista, frente a las 
acciones aisladas o no permanentes que no alcanzarían tal consideración. Y, que, de cualquier 
modo, el concepto terrorismo, organización o grupo terrorista, no siempre se identifica con el 
de banda armada, como hace la sentencia recurrida, sino que es la naturaleza de la acción 
cometida, la finalidad perseguida con esta actuación, la que determina el carácter terrorista 
o no de la misma”.
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c. Strategic projection
We may now consider the third element of the criminal definition of terrorism: the 
strategic projection which the terrorist organisations use to carry out their activity. This 
third element in the concept of terrorism deals with the objectives that are pursued. 
The aims that we are concerned with are not individual desires or objectives. 
They are instead a collective programme of action in the sense that the very system 
of wrongdoing is the terrorist organisation itself: the objectives are the strategic 
projection of the group beyond the tactical means used for their execution. In the 
Spanish Penal Code this programme of action is encapsulated by the phrase “to 
subvert the constitutional order or seriously disrupt the public peace”.
Thus, Spanish criminal law  24 explicitly incorporates elements of a political 
nature in the definition of terrorist offences, which are defined by their “political 
purpose”  25. This option is not applied by other criminal justice systems. In those 
systems, terrorism is characterised only by the means employed. 
The definition of the aims that qualify a criminal activity as terrorism came from 
the provisions in Articles 571 and 572 of the Penal Code: Article 571 mentions “the 
organisations or groups whose purpose is to subvert the constitutional order or seriously 
disrupt the public peace”. Article 572 says that “terrorist groups or organisations” are 
those “described in the preceding article”. Consequently, all organisations that try 
to subvert the constitutional order or seriously disrupt the public peace are terrorist 
(given that they use mass intimidation as a means). The first possibility is subverting 
the constitutional order. “Subverting”, overturning an order means changing its 
foundations  26. In the legal system of a democratic State, radically changing the 
constitutional order at its core cannot be illicit. In this sense, it is better said that it 
is the methods used in terrorism (i.e., mass intimidation) that make it a crime, not 
its aims. But then, what means “subverting the constitutional order” exactly? If it 
is licit to pursue a change of the constitutional order, why should this element of 
“subverting the constitutional order” be part of the offences of terrorism? Put another 
24 In the current regulation; amongst the political crimes of dictatorship (in a strict sense), 
which were termed as terrorist conduct, and the 1995 Penal Code there was an intermezzo of 
“depoliticisation” at the beginning of the political transition after 1977, not using even the word 
“terrorism”; for an analysis see C. lamarca Pérez, op. cit., p. 162 and f.
25 See, for example, STS 17 June 2002.
26 And in this sense, to destroy: this term is loaded with negative references from the 
offset; so the dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy contains the meanings “disturb, stir, 
destroy” and indicates that it should be used from a moral perspective. It has already been 
mentioned, before it was included in the regulation, by L. arroyo zaPatero that the aim of 
terrorism is to “subvert the constitutional order” (“La reforma de los delitos de rebelión y de 
terrorismo por la Ley Orgánica 2/1981, de 4 de mayo”, Cuadernos de Política Criminal, 15, 
1981, p. 405); in the same way C. garcía valdés, “La legislación antiterrorista: derecho vigente 
y proyectos continuistas”, Anuario de Derecho Penal y Ciencias Penales, 1984, p. 290 and f., 
295, emphasises the separatist element of targeting the terrorist organisation ETA as a sign of 
the attack to the constitutional order in the case of offences committed by it J. gómez calero, 
“Delitos de terrorismo”, in M. cobo del rosal and m. baJo fernández (eds.), Comentarios a 
la Legislación Penal. vol. XI. La reforma penal y procesal sobre los delitos de bandas armadas, 
terrorismo y rebelión, Madrid, Edersa, 1990, p. 267 and f., 269 and f.
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way: what is the additional wrongdoing that justifies the aggravated penalties and 
makes a crime specifically terrorist? Affecting the basic elements of the constitutional 
system – it could be said that it is the additional wrongdoing that justifies a greater 
penalty and more extensive criminalisation in the definition of terrorist crimes  27. 
If the organisation uses especially dangerous conduct and mass fear as a means of 
political communication, this increases the level of gravity of the wrongdoing relating 
to the individual crimes committed by the organisation. In this sense, it can be said 
that the political element peculiar to terrorism implies a specific damage to the State 
organisation in itself. If we can consider that, in general, any criminal organisation 
defies the monopoly of violence corresponding to the State, the specific element of 
terrorist organisations is that they pursue more than that, that the challenge to the State 
is stronger  28: they intend to make politics, including changing the foundation (the 
constitution) of the political organisation of the State. What the terrorist organisation 
wants is to call into question the decision-making bodies established by the State. That 
is the constitutional order that the terrorist is trying to subvert and, in this sense, it 
could be said, as has been pointed out by the Constitutional Court, that “... terrorism... 
means... a threat to the very system of democracy”  29. A combination of the two 
factors mentioned above, i.e. on the one hand the organisation and its special danger 
and on the other hand the use of terror and a communication strategy, coupled with 
this third factor of political projection, explains the legal and criminal concept of 
terrorism.
However, the description in the Spanish Penal Code does not end with reference 
to subversion. Mention is also made of the organisation’s agenda including the 
“serious disturbance to the public peace”. Upon first reading, the contrast in terms 
of different notions about what is subverting the constitutional order and what is 
seriously disturbing the public peace. A first impression of what this term means 
could be that the legal reference to seriously disturbing the public peace simply refers 
to an expression of mere public order without political relevance  30. However, this 
approach to the understanding of the notion of “public order” – objective tranquillity, 
absence of social unrest and public insecurity – is unsatisfactory: it is tautological and 
therefore unable to define how these offences are wrong  31. Instead of this police-like 
27 M. garcía arán, “De los delitos de terrorismo”, in J. córdoba roda et al. (eds.), 
Comentarios al Código penal. Parte Especial, vol. II, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2004, p. 2606: “the 
aim of creating insecurity, alarm or fear as a form of political activism is a criminally relevant 
objective”.
28 The same term is referred to by the Constitutional Court (STC 89/1993): terrorism is 
“… a challenge to the very democratic essence of the State”.
29 STC 199/1987.
30 For example, M. Prats canut, in G. Quintero olivares (ed.), Comentarios a la Parte 
Especial del Derecho penal, 5ª ed., Pamplona, Aranzadi, 2005, p. 2093; M. Polaino navarrete, 
“Delitos contra el orden público (V). Delitos de terrorismo”, in cobo del rosal et al. (eds.), 
Curso de Derecho penal español. Parte Especial, II, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 1997, p. 906.
31 The same line of argument is taken by garcía arán, op. cit., p. 2607, stating that by 
limiting the concept to merely “tranquillity in public places” in the sense of the position alluded to 
previously, refers to an “idea of public order which has since died out”.
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(factual) understanding of “public peace”, the term has to be seen as meaning also 
a political aim, not as profound as the constitutional order, but also on the political 
level. So, the attacks of the 11 March 2004 in Madrid  32 can be understood to have 
been designed to change Spanish foreign policy. That is to say, they did not strictly 
attempt to subvert the judicial and constitutional order of the State and yet it was an 
overtly political move, disturbing “public peace” in the sense of the legal definition of 
terrorism. This is how “seriously disturbing the public peace” should be interpreted. 
Therefore, terrorist violence in penal terms is by definition political even if it does not, 
strictly speaking, seek a change of regime. 
B.	 Evaluation
The dual specificity of the Spanish legislation is clear. On the one hand, it contains 
not only offences creating new forms of criminal liability (criminal collaboration with 
a terrorist organisation and membership of a terrorist organisation) but also toughens 
up all the other “common” offences (inherited from the previous legislation) where 
there is a connection with a terrorist organisation  33. It is therefore an extremely 
tough and wide-ranging set of legislation. Moreover – and this is the particular novelty 
of the 1995 Penal Code – it contains a very specific description of the distinguishing 
features of these terrorist offences.
If one compares the terrorism offences in the Spanish PC above with the content of 
the 2002 Framework Decision and the legislation in nearby countries’ legal systems, it 
is clear that none of the latter systems have a range of terrorist offences comparable to 
those set out in Spanish criminal law. The Spanish system is especially broad in this 
area of legislation, as has even been recognised in case law:
“We must begin with a crucially important assumption: Our criminal legislation 
regarding terrorism is one of the most advanced and comprehensive in the world. 
There is nothing more to create. All that remains to do is to adequately interpret the 
legislation that we have”  34.
No adaptation of Spanish legislation was therefore necessary following the 
adoption of the 2002 FD.
3.	 The	2010	reform	and	the	FD	2008
A.	 Introduction
The comprehensive reform of Spanish criminal law following Organic Law 
5/2010 – justified in this sphere by the FD 2008 – introduces the following changes.
32 On this topic see J. Jordán, “El terrorismo islamista en España”, in A. Blanco et al. (eds.), 
Madrid 11–M. Un análisis del mal y de sus consecuencias, Madrid, Trotta, 2005, p. 89 and f., 101 
and f.
33 Arts. 571, 572, 577 PC, with the all-encompassing end clause (“any other offence”) 
contained in Art. 574 PC.
34 SAN 36/2005 (Section 3), 26 September 2005: “Tenemos que partir de una premisa 
de crucial importancia: Nuestra legislación penal en materia de terrorismo es una de las más 
avanzadas y completas del mundo, por lo que aquí no hay nada que crear. Se trata tan solo de 
interpretar adecuadamente la legislación que tenemos”.
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Firstly, now all terrorist offences have been brought together into one chapter. 
In the previous legislation, belonging to a terrorist organisation was dealt with in 
conjunction with other forms of “illicit association” (and other “anti-constitutional” 
crimes) and “instrumental” crimes of terrorism (activities carried out within terrorist 
organisations, such as murder, injury, collaboration, etc.) were regulated separately.
Secondly, the definition of terrorism has been modified in line with the reform 
of some new offences of “organised crime”. A distinction is now made between a 
terrorist organisation – a stable group with a specific structure – and a mere terrorist 
“group”, neither structured nor permanent.
Thirdly, the concept of collaboration with a terrorist organisation has been extended, 
identifying new types of applicable conduct such as “recruitment, indoctrination, 
training or education” (Art. 576(3) PC).
In fourth place, a new offence of terrorism financing has been set out, including 
both intentional and reckless conduct and establishing the punishment of legal persons 
(Art. 576bis PC).
In fifth place, a new type of propaganda has been defined, consisting of the public 
broadcasting of “messages and slogans designed to cause, encourage or facilitate” the 
commission of terrorist offences (Art. 579(1) II PC).
Together with other minor modifications, probation has also been introduced for 
terrorist crimes (Arts. 579(3) and 106 PC). 
B.	 Change	in	location
The profound realignment of organised crime offences brought about by the 
reform also affects offences relating to terrorism. This, of course, was inevitable since 
terrorism is the most serious form of organised crime  35.
There is no longer a separation between the crime of belonging to a terrorist 
organisation and other terrorist offences. Now both segments of the legislation 
are contained in separate sections in the new Chapter VII (terrorist groups and 
organisations and terrorist offences) of the section dedicated to crimes against public 
order. However, for systematic reasons, it would have been better to locate these 
offences amongst the offences against the Constitution.
C.	 Concept	of	“organisation	or	group”
When defining a terrorist group or organisation, it is necessary to refer to the 
common definitions of an “organisation” and a “group” in the new offences of 
organised crime. Until now, the twin description “organisation” and “group” were 
not defined by law. After the 2010 reform, the offences of common organised crime 
provide a legal definition of these two forms of collective structure, and this will have 
to be introduced also in the framework of terrorist criminal organisations. The typical 
description of the agenda of a terrorist organisation remains unchanged  36, but the 
35 See, for example, also on this topic F. muñoz conde, Derecho penal. Parte Especial, 
18. ed., Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2010, p. 921 and f.; I. sánchez garcía de Paz, in M. Gómez 
tomillo (ed.), Comentarios al Código penal, Valladolid, Lex Nova, 2010, p. 1936 and f.
36 Subverting the constitutional order or seriously altering the public peace and the 
unwritten element of instrumental terrorism is not affected (mass intimidation through serious 
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characterisation of a terrorist organisation itself has changed considerably with respect 
to its structural definition. Although the previous legislation included the terrorist 
group and organisation, it merely made mention of them without defining them. In 
fact, it seems that the new legislation of organised crime distinguishes between a type 
of criminal organisation in the strict sense (the “criminal organisation” in Art. 570bis) 
and this special type of smaller criminal collective or organisation which Art. 570ter 
defines as a “criminal group”. 
Apart from the inadequate and vague distinction made between these two 
collective forms, “organisation”, and “group”, if the aim for this new model is that 
it will be an adaptation of the typical description of terrorism, it is ignoring the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in defining the concepts of a terrorist group and 
organisation (not what the legislature terms the “penal response”)   37. It has always 
been defined in these two ways since 1995, emphasising that, in dealing with the same 
concept, the inclusion of a “group” should only serve to make clear that the size of 
the organisation does not determine its qualification  38: it is in fact characterised by, 
in addition to its programme of political terror, its permanency, division of tasks and 
functional structure. Furthermore, when the legislature refers to the peculiarities of 
“certain terrorist groups or cells which have recently developed at an international 
level”  39 it is looking for a way to justify their occurrence in a way that fits with the 
latest trend in public opinion. But the truth is that the concept of organisation or group 
that was established by courts until this reform has been perfectly capable to describe 
the new types of organisation that are used in the new “wave” of terrorist activity  40; 
although new organisations do not have a clear, well-defined top-down structure like 
European organisations in the last century, they share the need to create the cells 
aimed to concrete action. These cells are already an organisation/group according to 
the understanding of scholars and courts. Indeed, there are already a certain number 
of convictions in Spain for belonging to these types of cells. It was not necessary to 
dilute the unitary concept of a terrorist organisation  41.
Therefore, the new difference between an organisation and a group now governed 
by Art. 571(3) of the Penal Code, using the new general definition mentioned 
before, which does not incorporate some of the requisites established in the previous 
regulation, is due to an interested and expansionist reading of international and EU 
norms. In their application to terrorism, they scramble and confuse a notion that was 
perfectly well established in case law, which referred to the structural elements of the 
concept of an organisation.
crimes against the public).
37 Preamble, XXIX, second paragraph.
38 M. cancio meliá, Los delitos de terrorismo, p. 157, 158 and f., 161.
39 Preamble, XXIX, third paragraph.
40 See, for example, SAN 36/2005 (Chamber 3), 26 September 2005; 6/2007 (Chamber 1), 
7 February 2007.
41 M. cancio meliá, Los delitos de terrorismo, op. cit., p. 161.
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D.	 Recruitment,	indoctrination,	training	or	education	(Art.	576.3	PC)
The new legislation aims to redefine the offence of collaboration to include what 
might be referred to as incitement, propaganda, indoctrination and training of terrorist 
organisations.
This addition is unnecessary, redundant and disruptive. Firstly, the definition 
is factually unnecessary: the recruitment, training and education of subjects for the 
inclusion in a terrorist organisation is typical behaviour of those involved in such 
an organisation. Therefore, they already fit perfectly under the crime of belonging 
to a terrorist organisation. Secondly, if, occasionally, there may be an outsourcing 
of their activities to people who are not members of the organisation, all forms of 
behaviour are characterised as collaborative from the outset, in the first and second 
sections of Article 576 PC  42. Art. 576(2) PC already contains an express reference 
to “the organisation or attendance of practical training” along with a general clause 
that includes “any other equivalent form of cooperation, assistance or intervention”. It 
would therefore seem that the definition of this new act is completely unnecessary  43. 
Thirdly, the fourth aspect of the new legislation which deals with conduct is disturbing. 
The offence termed as “indoctrination” paves the way towards the incrimination of 
mere expressions of opinion. How are we to define indoctrination? By separating it 
from the freedom of expression? How do we distinguish between it and the offence 
of “justification” of terrorist crimes, which carries a much more lenient sentence for 
its perpetrators (Art. 578 PC)? What does it mean to say that the indoctrination is 
“directed” at the commission of terrorist crimes  44? The problems with interpretation 
are endless. The principle of legality – as expressed in the statement of purpose – is 
severely at risk  45.
Finally, it must be observed that the legislature is out of touch with reality when it 
refers  46 to the FD 2008/919/JHA to explain the new definition  47. The Framework 
Decision makes no mention of “indoctrination” – it refers only to “provocation 
to commit a terrorist offence” (in addition to the recruitment and training already 
included, as aforementioned, in Art. 576(1) PC) – and instead stipulates (in para. 14) 
that “the expression of radical or controversial public opinion with regards to sensitive 
political issues, including terrorism, falls outside the scope of this Framework 
Decision, particularly of the definition of public provocation to commit terrorist 
42 Likewise R. garcía albero, “La reforma de los delitos de terrorismo, Arts. 572, 573, 
574, 575, 576, 576bis, 577, 578, 579 CP”, in G. Quintero olivares (ed.), La reforma penal de 
2010: análisis y comentarios, Pamplona, Aranzadi, 2010, p. 369 and f., 376; M. llobet anglí, 
“Delitos de terrorismo”, in I. ortiz de urbina gimeno (ed.), Memento Experto Reforma Penal 
2010, Madrid, Lefebvre, n. 6106.
43 In this sense see M. llobet anglí, op. cit., n. 6110 f.
44 Remember the preparatory acts of encouragement or provocation already contained in 
Art. 579(1) I PC.
45 In this sense see F. muñoz conde, Derecho penal. Parte Especial, p. 929 and f.; 
T.S. vives antón et al., “Terrorismo”, in T.S vives antón et al., Derecho penal. Parte Especial, 
3nd ed., Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2010, p. 792 and f.
46 Preamble, XXIX, fourth paragraph.
47 Likewise R. garcía albero, op. cit., p. 374 and f.
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offences”. Thus the mysterious ambiguities that have given rise to what the legislature 
refers to as “legal qualms”  48 either do not exist  49 or just mean that the scope of 
the new definition is incompatible with the rule of law  50. The EU is not responsible 
for this disastrous state of affairs, but it serves – once again – as a spurious pretext for 
poor legislation.
E.	 Financing	(Art.	576bis	PC)
The reform introduces a second new development with reference to collaboration: 
the criminalisation of behaviour related to the financing of terrorist organisations. This 
new offence does not come into Spanish law in relationship with the FD 2008/919/
JHA, but is a consequence of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism  51; in any case, this quite special matter – which should 
have been included in the money laundering regulations – is now a part of the reform 
based, according to the Spanish legislature, on the EU 2008 FD.
In the first paragraph of Article 576 PC, the supply or gathering of funds is declared 
illegal. In the second paragraph, reckless conduct in connection with malicious 
financing is declared illegal too and the third paragraph establishes the individual’s 
legal liability.
With regards to malice, it is defined as behaviour carried out “in any way, directly 
or indirectly” to provide or gather funds for the commission of terrorist crimes or for 
a terrorist organisation. As clarified by the text itself, it is enough that the financing be 
carried out “with the intention of being used, or in the knowledge that it will be used”, 
that is to say, it is not necessary that the funds have any consequence. The offence 
is established and thereafter the subjective elements of “intent” and “knowing” are 
considered, bringing all of their evidentiary difficulties with them. This definition 
of conduct – in its plain meaning without modification or adaptation – reiterates 
the definition contained in Article 2 of the Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism. 
In any case, here too we have a completely unnecessary and redundant definition  52. 
The types of conduct that deal with effective economic support included in the new 
text are already referred to as a means of collaborating with a terrorist organisation in 
Art. 576 PC – or in the pre-existing and equally redundant  53 Art. 575 PC  54 – so 
this new definition makes little sense.
When dealing with the mere act of gathering funds “with the intention that those 
funds might be used”, but without making actual contact with the organisation, the 
48 Preamble, XXIX, fourth paragraph.
49 Given that the corresponding conduct had already been laid out in the old Art. 576 PC.
50 Note that, again, the doctrine established in STC 136/1999 is ostensibly ignored. It 
declared the inclusion of a variety of behaviours in the crime of collaborating with a terrorist 
organisation unconstitutional because of their disproportionate nature; see M. llobet anglí, 
op. cit., n. 6115.
51 Of 9 December 1999; in force in Spain since 9 May 2002.
52 Likewise F. muñoz conde, op. cit., p. 930.
53 See, in detail, M. cancio meliá, Los delitos de terrorismo, p. 256 and f.
54 Likewise R. garcía albero, op. cit., p. 377.
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definition intends only to punish the intention, and moreover, carries with it the 
same penalty that exists for those who uncover an individual’s personal information 
or who provide arms or funding, that is, the most serious forms of collaborative 
conduct contained in Art. 576(1) PC. Again, the legislature completely ignores the 
STC 136/1999  55, which warned about the unconstitutionality of an unlimited and 
indiscriminate classification for conduct of varying severity. The confusion today 
exists between Art. 576 PC and 575 PC (which still exists), and has meant that exactly 
the same cases receive incongruous sentences, an occurrence which will become 
more frequent now as a result of this entirely unnecessary new development. The 
legislator was warned: the report of the General Council of the Judiciary  56 regarding 
the 2007 preliminary draft indicated that in any event, the basis for this provision 
was a disclaimer clause in Art. 576(2) PC, and failing that, “absurd interpretational 
difficulties”  57 would ensue.
Recklessness is referred to in the Law 10/2010 of 28th April, which deals with the 
prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, which in turn responds to the 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/60/CE of 26 October 2005 relating 
to the prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist 
financing. Regardless of the evaluation of this legal mechanism, it seems clear that 
this offence should not have been included under crimes of terrorism. The illegal 
aspect of the offence is the money laundering – a definition chosen, for example, by 
the German legislature. In any case, it is not a terrorist crime as it lacks the essential 
elements of such an offence, all of which include malice.
F.	 Propaganda	crime	(Art.	579.1	II	PC)
Finally, the reform incorporates in the second paragraph of Article 579(1) PC a 
new type of residual offence that could be described as propaganda. The conduct is 
typically understood as the distribution or dissemination – by whatever means – of 
“messages or slogans” intended to “provoke, encourage or promote” terrorist offences, 
“... generating or increasing the risk of their actual commission”. The messages or 
slogans must be directly linked to the risk of commission of an offence.
The new wording ought to be regarded as deeply flawed, clearly unconstitutional 
and one which raises considerable difficulties of implementation. The legislature 
continues from here on a road towards criminalising the belief in an ideology  58.
With respect to the former, although the reference to the origin of the risk is 
an acknowledgment of the STC 235/2007  59, besides being a veiled reference to 
FD 2008/919/JHA, what is clear is that, in its entirety, this text does not comply 
55 Containing the TC’s ruling in the so-called Herri Batasuna National Roundtable case.
56 From 2 February 2009.
57 See also M. llobet anglí, op. cit., n. 6139.
58 M. cancio meliá, Los delitos de terrorismo, p. 248 and f., with additional references. 
59 Wherein the Constitutional Court declared the crime of justification of genocide 
constitutional, and unconstitutional the criminalisation of its denial, since the legitimate scope 
of such offence was seen as limited in any case by the Constitution – freedom of speech – 
strictly to indirect incitement to commit the act, and mere denial of genocide means not yet 
inciting to it.
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with the Constitution. In this case, it deals plainly and simply with the definition of 
ideological adherence, that is to say, a subject matter that is even less than an apology 
or justification  60. If you add to this offence the new description of “indoctrination” 
contained in Art. 576(3) PC, the crime of terrorist threats in Art. 170(2) PC and the 
crime of glorification in Art. 578 PC  61, it is notable that, in terms of substance, 
the definition of terrorist crimes has been extended to include the mere expression 
of an opinion  62, and procedurally, a whole host of worrying opportunities for the 
criminalisation of protest have been made available. It seems clear that we have gone 
beyond what is to be constitutionally permitted in a society driven by the rule of 
law  63.
Finally, it should also be stressed that the legislature is not telling the truth when 
it uses  64 the FD 2008/919/JHA as a justification for the introduction of this term 
of “indoctrination”  65. The Framework Decision only requires the inclusion of 
“provocation to commit a terrorist offence”, understood to include the broadcasting 
of messages to incite the commission of said terrorist offences, behaviour that was 
already covered by the PC (in Art. 579.1) and which is different from what is now 
included in the reform. It is one thing to induce and another to encourage or promote 
terrorist offences.
Regarding the latter, by dint of an ambiguous definition – also harmful to the 
principle of legality  66 – it opens the door to endless flaws, interpretative confusion 
and to potentially wrong effects in practice: Does it “encourage” the “perpetration” 
of terrorist crimes to yell, for example, “gora ETA militarra”  67? Or is exaltation 
instead, to be considered amongst the conduct included in Art. 578 PC? Or perhaps 
it is provocation as defined by Article 579(1) I PC? Or could it come under “a public 
cry for the commission of violent acts” by a terrorist organisation, as laid out in Art. 
170(2) PC?
Is a criminal policy rational if it arrests and prosecutes individuals who engage in 
this kind of demonstration for terrorist crimes and offenders  68? The very fact that the 
legislature intervened here – albeit on improper, but very revealing terms – warning 
about the potential “breeding ground”  69 indicates that there is space in the new legal 
60 In the words of T.S. vives antón et al., Parte Especial, p. 795, “preparatory acts of 
preparatory acts” are punished; R. garcía albero, op. cit., p. 377, refers to the term “provocación 
impropia” (“incitation in a broader sense”). Also the State Council pointed out in its report on 
the draft version of the reform that this conduct needed to be restricted.
61 See the delimitation efforts of M. llobet anglí, op. cit., n. 6177 and f.
62 See also amendment no. 217 in the Senate (presented by Grupo Parlamentario Entesa 
Catalana de Progrés).
63 Likewise muñoz conde, op. cit., Parte Especial, p. 935.
64 Preamble, XXIX, fourth paragraph.
65 Likewise R. garcía albero, op. cit., p. 377.
66 Here too see amendment no. 5 in the Senate (Sampol i Mas PSM-EN).
67 The ritual cry of ETA supporting militants: long live ETA!
68 As an example: The German legislature – which delved deeply into this area in the 1970s 
and 1980s – abolished the criminalisation of propaganda in the year 2001, limiting it to cases in 
which members of an organisation use this propaganda in order to recruit new members.
69 Preamble, XXIX, fourth paragraph.
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definition for the criminalisation of all types of sympathisers or alleged sympathisers 
– provoking an action/reaction phenomenon  70 that, despite being well understood, 
has the potential to be developed further through the new definition. 
4.	 Conclusion
Given the above observations, an assessment of the recent reform of terrorist crime 
reinforced by the implementation of the FD 2008 is straightforward. It can be succinctly 
characterised as being opposite to the “profound reorganisation and clarification”  71, 
which is what the legislature claims to have done with these offences. Instead of 
improving the many flaws that previously existed, the legislature has created more 
confusion and made matters worse. The content of reform in this area ranges from 
being unnecessary to being redundant to being clearly unconstitutional. The toughest 
and most extensive antiterrorist legislation throughout Europe has deteriorated further 
by creating new ways for the judiciary to interpret trifling rules.
In the first place, the reform confuses, as mentioned above, the concept of a 
terrorist organisation by introducing a general means of distinguishing between 
criminal organisations and groups, and by doing away with the common definition of 
membership. Secondly, it produces redundant and flawed definitions of what conduct 
is to be understood as collaboration and preparatory acts. The legislature does so by 
invoking the FD 2008/919/JAI as if it were a mantra for the justification of reforms 
that have nothing to do with what this rule even states  72.
The sole purpose of the responsible political actors was reform for the sake of 
reform, or, more accurately, reform for the sake of being able to show to the public 
that “something” had been done. 
Thus, in short, it seems that Spanish anti-terrorist legislation contains significant 
discrepancies with regard to several key elements of the Constitution and the main 
characteristics of the rule of law: in particular the principles of legality (accuracy 
mandate), of proportionality, of fundamental rights in criminal proceedings and the 
constitutional requirement of rehabilitation. The FD has proven useful only with regard 
to the FD 2008 in politically justifying an extension of the law, which exceeds what 
70 See only cancio meliá, Los delitos de terrorismo, p. 62 and f., 72 and f., 77, with 
further references.
71 Preamble (XXIX, first sentence).
72 As an example, it is worth mentioning the transposition of the FD in Germany (a country 
with an antiterrorist criminal law that could be described as tough). It was carried out by the 
introduction in 2009 of paras. 89a, 89b and 91 Strafgesetzbuch – which has caused a very critical 
reaction in the country’s doctrine: thus, for instance, the author of the monograph referring to 
the reform writes “welcome to Absurdistan”, M. zöller, “Willkommen in Absurdistan: Neue 
Straftatbestände zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus”, Goltdammer’s Archiv, 11, 2010, p. 607 
and f., with further references; it deals with conduct that had already been included in Spain in 
Arts. 576 or 579 (see also regarding the reform in that country N. gazeas, th. grosse-wilde, 
a. Kiessling, “Die neuen Tatbestände im Staatsschutzrecht – Versuch einer ersten Auslegung 
der §§ 89a, 89b und 91 StGB”, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 2009, p. 593 and f.). Using EU 
law as justification, but with provincial ignorance of comparative law.
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was set out in EU legislation. It seems clear that an “enemy criminal law”  73 exists in 
this area of Spanish criminal law and is justified in political debate as being necessary 
for the prevention of future crimes in this area but that it is in fact contaminating other 
parts of the criminal justice system. 
73 On the concept of “Enemy Criminal law”, see G. JaKobs, “Kriminalisierung im Vorfeld 
einer Rechtsgutsverletzung”, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 97, 1985, 
p. 753 and f.; id., “¿Derecho penal del enemigo? Un estudio acerca de los presupuestos de la 
juridicidad”, in M. cancio meliá and G. gómez-Jará díez (eds.), Derecho penal del enemigo. 
El discurso penal de la exclusión, t. 2, Madrid/Buenos Aires, Edisofer/BdF, 2006, p. 93 and 
f. Stressing the analytical power of the concept and against its compatibility with a (criminal) 
law in the Rule of Law, see M. cancio meliá, “Feindstrafrecht?”, Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft, 117, 2005, p. 267 and f.; id., “De nuevo: ¿’Derecho penal’ del 
enemigo?”, in g. JaKobs and m. cancio meliá, Derecho penal del enemigo, 2nd ed., Madrid, 
Civitas, 2006, p. 85 and f. In the opinion adopted here, the international controversy generated 
by this topic has been very fruitful, see the various articles contained in M. cancio meliá and 
G. gómez-Jara díez (eds.), op. cit. 
“No thank you, we’ve already got one!”
Why EU anti-terrorist legislation has made little impact  
on the law of the UK  1
John R. SPencer
1.	 Introduction
The UK has a long history of exposure to terrorism. Indeed, it could be said to 
date back 400 years, to the famous Gunpowder Plot, when Guy Fawkes and some 
fellow Catholics attempted to assassinate the Protestant King James I by blowing 
up the Houses of Parliament as he attended the official opening of the Parliamentary 
session on 5 November 1605. To this end, the conspirators got as far as smuggling 
36 barrels of gunpowder into cellars underneath: a quantity which, according to a 
reconstruction carried on the 400th anniversary in 2005  2, would have destroyed the 
Houses of Parliament with everybody in them, and also devastated the area around, 
had they exploded. The plot was detected just before this happened. The plotters were 
caught and some of them at least were interrogated under torture. They were then tried 
for treason, and on conviction put to death by “drawing, hanging and quartering” – the 
gruesome method of execution officially prescribed for male traitors until 1814. As 
British readers will well know, the thwarting of the plot is still commemorated with 
bonfires and fireworks on the 5 of November every year. 
1 See generally C. WalKer, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-terrorist Legislation, London, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, and C. WalKer, Terrorism and the Law, Oxford and New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2011. For comparative studies see A. Oemichen, Terrorism 
and Anti-terror Legislation: the Terrorised Legislator – a Comparison of Counter-terrorism 
Legislation and its Implications on Human Rights in the Legal Systems of the United Kingdom, 
Spain, Germany and France, Oxford, Antwerp and Portland, Intersentia, 2009, and F. Galli, 
British, French and Italian Measures to Deal with Terrorism (doctoral thesis, University of 
Cambridge). 
2 For the ITV production, The Gunpowder Plot, Exploding the Legend, broadcast in 
November 2005.
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In the second half of the nineteenth century the Fenians, an Irish republican group, 
resorted to terrorism in furtherance of their cause. The year 1867 saw a dramatic 
incident that was long remembered: the “Clerkenwell outrage”, an inept attempt 
by Fenians to secure the release of some jailed colleagues by blowing up the wall 
of a prison, killing 12 people in the street and injuring many others in the process; 
and the following year saw an incident no less dramatic when O’Farrell, a Fenian 
sympathiser, shot and gravely injured Prince Alfred, Queen Victoria’s second son, in 
an unsuccessful assassination attempt while on an official visit to Australia  3. The 
early 1880s then saw London subjected to what was called the Fenian “dynamite 
campaign”: a series of bomb explosions at high profile targets, several of them on 
the London Underground – though unlike the attacks on the London Underground in 
2005, the aim seems to have been to damage property rather than to kill passengers. 
These explosions left a permanent mark on English law in the form of the Explosive 
Substances Act 1883. This law, which is still in force, set a trend by creating heavily-
punishable offences aimed at preliminary conduct: including possessing explosives in 
suspicious circumstances.
Up to and into the middle years of the twentieth century, unrest in Northern 
Ireland continued to manifest itself from time to time in terrorist attacks in mainland 
Britain: most notably an Irish Republican Army bombing campaign in 1939. Then in 
1969 began “The Troubles”: a 29-year period of unrest and near-insurrection, with 
recurrent outbursts of violence between Protestants and Catholics, and recurrent 
bombing campaigns, some of them again in mainland Britain – the bloodiest of which 
were the Birmingham pub bombings in 1974, in which two bombs killed 21 innocent 
civilians and injured 162  4. This unhappy period came to an end with the Good 
Friday Agreement in 1998.
During the Troubles Parliament had passed a series of anti-terrorist laws that were 
intended to be temporary. When the end of the Troubles appeared to be in sight, the 
government of the day ordered an official enquiry into the law relating to terrorism, 
with a view to putting the law on a permanent footing. This enquiry, which was 
carried out by Lord Lloyd of Berwick, a senior judge, led to a Report in 1996, many 
of the recommendations of which the Labour government (which in the meantime 
had come to power) accepted. The result was that the United Kingdom law relating to 
terrorism was comprehensively overhauled and restated in the Terrorism Act 2000: a 
mini-code of 131 sections (articles) and 14 Schedules (annexes). It was with this new 
law that the UK faced the new wave of Islamic terrorism that began in earnest with 
the destruction of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, and continued with 
various incidents in the UK, the worst of which were the London bombings of 7 July 
2005  5.
3 Incidentally provoking my maternal great-great-grandfather, a prolific pamphleteer, to 
write yet another pamphlet: S. Cozens, The Attempted Assassination of His Royal Highness 
Prince Alfred, Launceston, Tasmania, 1868.
4 The resulting prosecution led to the “Birmingham Six Case”, a famous miscarriage of 
justice: see R v McIlkenny et al (1991) 93 CrAppR 287.
5 A list of terrorist plots in the UK since July 2005 can be found on the website of the 
Security Service at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/terrorist-plots-in-the-.html.  
“no thanK you, we’ve already got one!”     119
And so it was that, like Spain, the UK had already equipped itself with a 
comprehensive set of laws against terrorism at the time the 2002 EU Framework 
Decision on Terrorism was adopted. The UK’s new laws, furthermore, already went 
considerably further than the Framework Decision required. In consequence it was 
not necessary to amend UK law to give effect to the 2002 Framework Decision, which 
has had no discernable influence on UK law.
How far UK anti-terrorism law already exceeded the requirements of the 
Framework Decision can be seen by taking the different elements of the 2002 
Framework Decision in turn, and setting them alongside the law of the UK as it then 
stood. 
2.	 UK	anti-terrorist	law	at	the	time	the	Framework	Decisions	were	adopted
In discussing “UK anti-terrorist law” a problem arises because the United 
Kingdom is made of three separate legal entities: England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. In principle, each has its own criminal justice system, including its 
own criminal law. However, the Westminster Parliament is able to enact legislation that 
applies throughout the whole of the United Kingdom and, starting with the Terrorism 
Act 2000, has regularly used this power to make uniform laws in respect of terrorism. 
Insofar as terrorist acts are caught by the ordinary criminal law, however, that law 
may differ as between one part of the UK and another. In what follows, remarks about 
the “general law” refer specifically to the law of England and Wales. As regards the 
matters of general law discussed in this chapter, in broad terms the position under 
the “general law” of Scotland and Northern Ireland will in fact be much the same 
– although there may be differences of terminology and minor detail.
The 2002 Framework Decision required all EU Member States to ensure that their 
national law provided for (in essence) the following five things.
The first was enhanced penalties for a list of offences set out in Article 1 when 
committed in the context of terrorism, as defined in the Framework Decision, “save 
where the sentences imposable are already the maximum possible sentences under 
national law”. Under UK law, broadly speaking all of the offences so listed already 
carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment – the heaviest penalty permissible 
under UK law since the abolition of capital punishment. A possible gap in UK law 
in this respect concerned in Article 1(i) of the Framework Decision, which required 
Member States to put threats to commit any of the other crimes mentioned in Article 1 
on the same footing as actually committing them, the coverage of UK law in respect of 
threats being a little patchy. However, even here the most obvious cases were already 
covered in a manner sufficient to do what the Framework Decision required  6.
The second requirement, imposed by Article 2, was to make membership of 
terrorist groups a criminal offence, and to create a criminal offence of directing 
terrorist groups that carries a maximum penalty of at least 15 years. In the UK, 
membership of proscribed terrorist groups was already punishable (with up to 10 
6 For example, s. 2 of the Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983, criminalising terrorist 
threats to use nuclear material for terrorist purposes, s. 38 of the Public Order Act 1986, 
criminalising terrorist threats to contaminate food.
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years’ imprisonment)  7 and directing them already constituted an offence punishable 
with life imprisonment  8.
The third requirement, imposed by Article 3 together with Article 5, was to ensure 
that “aggravated theft”, “extortion” and the creation of false administrative documents 
in connection with terrorism were punishable by “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive penalties”. In 2002 this sort of behaviour already carried heavy penalties 
under the general law. In English law, for example, theft of any item – however trivial 
and for whatever purpose – in theory carries a possible maximum penalty of seven 
years’ imprisonment  9; extortion constitutes the offence of blackmail, which carries 
a maximum penalty of 14 years  10; and preparing false administrative documents is 
forgery, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years  11.
The fourth requirement was to ensure that, in connection with all of these 
offences, criminal liability extended to accessories and to attempts to commit them. In 
the UK, accessories (to all crimes, whether grave or trivial) were already punishable, 
under the general law, to the same extent as principals  12, and there already existed 
a generalised criminal liability for attempt  13, applicable to all but the most trivial 
offences  14.
The fifth requirement was to ensure that criminal liability for all these offences 
attached to legal persons as well as natural ones. In the UK, a generalised criminal 
liability for legal persons – created by judicial activism rather than by legislation – had 
already existed for around 90 years  15.
It was the same story, essentially, with the second EU Framework Decision of 
2008.
The 2008 instrument required Member States to criminalise a further range of 
behaviours: namely “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence”, “recruitment 
for terrorism”, “training for terrorism”, and “aggravated theft”, extortion and preparing 
false administrative documents in connection with these forms of misbehaviour. As 
regards this list of new offences the UK, once again, had got “ahead of the game”. 
In reaction first to the destruction of the World Trade Centre in 2001, and then the 
London bombings of July 5 2005, the UK government had caused Parliament to pass 
three further pieces of legislation relating to terrorism, each of which added to the 
7 Terrorism Act 2000, s. 11.
8 Terrorism Act 2000, s. 56.
9 Theft Act 1968, s. 7.
10 Theft Act 1968 s. 21 (3).
11 Forgery Act 1981 s. 6 (2).
12 For England and Wales, see the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s. 8: “Whosever 
shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same 
be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to 
be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender”.
13 For England and Wales, see the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s. 1.
14 Under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, there is no liability for attempting to commit a 
“summary offence” – the English equivalent of a contravention.
15 In the absence of a criminal code, the details must be found in textbooks; such as Smith 
and Hogan’s Criminal Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell (13th edition 2011, by D. Ormerod), 
Chapter 10.
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measures already provided for by the Terrorism Act 2000. Of these, the Terrorism Act 
2006 had already done all and more than the 2008 Framework Decision was to require 
of Member States two years later. In the paragraphs that follow, we shall examine the 
offences which the Framework Decision required Member States to create, and see 
what UK criminal law already provided for.
Training people in the use of firearms, explosives, or chemical, biological or 
nuclear weapons for unlawful purposes was already a criminal offence in the UK, 
punishable with up to 10 years’ imprisonment, under Sections 54 and 55 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000  16. To this, the Terrorism Act 2006 had added a new offence 
of training in a wider range of terrorist “skills”, together with offences of receiving 
terrorist training and attending a place where terrorist training is given.
Recruitment for terrorism was not, and still is not, a specific criminal offence as 
such. However, it is impossible to recruit a person for terrorism without committing a 
number of other criminal offences that are heavily punishable. As is further explained 
below, under the general law of all parts of the UK it was (and of course still is) a 
criminal offence to incite a person to commit any other criminal offence. To recruit 
a person to commit any specific act of terrorism which amounted to a crime would 
therefore make the inciter of the offence of inciting the commission of that criminal 
offence. Recruiting a person to join a terrorist organisation without any particular 
act of terrorism immediately in mind would, if the terrorist organisation had been 
officially proscribed, constitute the criminal offence of inciting that person to commit 
the offence of belonging to a terrorist organisation, contrary to Section 11 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000.
The 2008 Framework Decision defines “public provocation to commit a terrorist 
act” as “the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, 
with the intent to incite the commission of one of the offences [listed in Article 1(1) 
of the Framework Decision of 2002]”. Under UK law, any intentional provocation to 
commit one of these offences – even if done privately rather than publicly – would 
have made the inciter guilty of the general offence of incitement. Case-law dating 
from the nineteenth century held that, to make a person guilty of the crime of 
incitement, “general incitement” was enough. Thus in the case of Most  17 a man was 
convicted of incitement to murder  18 when he published an article in a revolutionary 
newspaper advocating the assassination of kings, and in Abu Hamza  19 a firebrand 
Muslim preacher was convicted of incitement to murder in respect of sermons inciting 
the faithful (in general) to kill infidels (in general). However, in the aftermath of the 
London bombings in 2005 Tony Blair’s “New Labour” government decided that a 
wider offence was needed, aimed at those who “glorify” – that is to say, publicly praise 
– terrorist acts committed in the past. With that in mind it promoted the legislation 
16 At an earlier stage it was a criminal offence under specific legislation aimed at terrorism 
in Northern Ireland.
17 (1881) 7 QBD 244.
18 A specific statutory offence, usually called “solicitation to murder”, under s. 4 of the 
Offences against the Person Act 1861; and which explicitly covers incitement to murder persons 
who are outside the UK.
19 [2006] EWCA Crim 2918, [2007] QB 659.
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that, after lengthy debates in Parliament, eventually became law as Section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006. This created a new offence of “direct or indirect encouragement 
or other inducement” to acts of terrorism. Going far beyond the law of existing law 
of incitement, and indeed far beyond the offence of “public provocation to commit 
a terrorist act” required by the 2008 Framework Decision, this new offence is not 
limited to those who intend to cause others to commit terrorist acts, but also catches 
those who are merely “reckless” as to whether their statements will encourage others 
to commit them. This potentially renders guilty not only those who desire their words 
to provoke terrorist acts, but also those who utter them merely foreseeing that their 




From what has been said so far, readers will have already noticed that a striking 
feature of criminal law in the UK is its taste for “inchoate offences” – in other 
words, offences criminalising preliminary acts. For example, there has long existed 
in all parts of the UK a general offence of conspiracy, the actus reus of which is 
(merely) agreeing with another person to commit a criminal offence – whether the 
offence be grave or trivial, and irrespective of whether any action is thereafter taken 
to put the agreement into effect  21. This offence is far wider than, for example, its 
approximate equivalent in French law, association de malfaiteurs  22, which is limited 
to agreements to commit offences punishable with at least five years’ imprisonment, 
and also requires the agreement to be caractérisé par un ou plusieurs faits matériels; 
and the English offence of conspiracy, unlike association de malfaiteurs, carries no 
automatic exemption de peine for the repentant conspirator who, having agreed to 
commit a crime, then changes his mind and alerts the authorities  23. Similarly, as 
previously mentioned, English law (and the law of the other parts of the UK) has 
long recognised a general offence of incitement – of which the person who incites 
another to commit a crime is guilty, irrespective of whether his incitement causes the 
person incited to take any action. In England and Wales, this offence was replaced in 
2007  24 by a new and even broader statutory offence of “encouraging or assisting”, 
which penalises not only those who incite others to commit crimes, but also those 
who provide assistance in advance, for example by supplying equipment – once again, 
irrespective of whether the crime it was intended to facilitate takes place  25.
20 There is no statutory definition of recklessness in the UK, but it is generally taken to 
mean “advertent negligence”; i.e., taking an unreasonable risk, being aware that it exists; for a 
discussion see Smith & Hogan, note 15 above, p. 118.
21 In England and Wales the offence of conspiracy, originally existing at common law – i.e. 
without any statutory basis – is now contained in s. 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977.
22 Code pénal Art. 450-1.
23 Code pénal Art. 450-2.
24 Serious Crime Act 2007 s. 44 and f.
25 The provisions are very complicated. For a critical analysis, see D. Ormerod and 
R. Fortson, “Serious Crime Act 2007: The Part 2 Offences” [2009] Crim LR 389.
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This tradition of preliminary offences has been developed by the creation of 
a range of new and specific inchoate offences related to terrorism. These include: 
possession of articles for terrorist purposes  26; collection of information for terrorist 
purposes  27, eliciting, publishing or communicating information about the armed 
services useful for terrorism  28; the preparation of terrorist acts  29; and possession 
of radioactive materials for terrorist purposes  30. All of these specific offences carry 
heavy maximum penalties – 10 years, 14 years, or imprisonment for life. They exist 
in addition to the offences of recruitment, training, being trained and membership of 
proscribed organisations which have already been mentioned. And they also co-exist 
with the specific preliminary offences in relation to explosives and explosions created 
by the Explosive Substances Act 1883; possession of an explosive substance with 
intent to endanger life  31, and making or possessing an explosive under suspicious 
circumstances  32.
Not only do these preliminary offences criminalize people for conduct which 
has not yet caused anybody any harm. Many of them have a further controversial 
feature in that the burden of proof is in part reversed. That is to say, they contain a 
provision saying “Where fact X is proved, fact Y is presumed, unless the accused 
is able to demonstrate the contrary”. An example is Section 57 of the Terrorism Act 
2000. This makes it an offence to possess “an article in circumstances which give 
rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a purpose connected with the 
commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism”, and then provides that 
“it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that 
his possession of the article was not for [such a purpose]”. These “reverse burdens”, as 
they are usually called, are questionably compatible with Article 6(2) of the European 
Convention, and in consequence have provoked a difficult body of case-law attempting 
to construe them in a way that does not contravene it  33.
4.	 A	further	striking	feature:	in	criminal	procedure,	a	tough	pre-trial	regime
From the previous paragraphs, readers will rightly infer that the substantive law in 
relation to terrorism in the UK is both wide-ranging and severe; and as they will now 
discover, in the parallel context of procedural law the UK has created a very tough 
regime of investigatory measures for dealing with cases of suspected terrorism, in 
particular as regards pre-charge detention for questioning by the police – or to put it 
in French law terms, garde à vue.
26 Terrorism Act 2000 s. 57, maximum penalty 15 years.
27 Terrorism Act 2000 s. 58, maximum penalty 15 years.
28 Terrorism Act 2000 s. 58A, maximum penalty 10 years.
29 Terrorism Act 2006 s. 5, maximum penalty life imprisonment.
30 Terrorism Act 2006, s. 9 and 10, maximum penalty life imprisonment.
31 Explosive Substances Act 1883, s. 3 (b).
32 Explosive Substances Act 1883, s. 4.
33 See, inter alia, R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326; Sheldrake v DPP and 
Attorney General’s Reference (no. 4 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43 [2005] 1 AC 264, and R v G, R 
v J [2009] UKHL 13, [2010] 1 AC 43.
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Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 gave the police power to arrest, without 
warrant, any person whom a constable “reasonably suspects to be a terrorist” – a 
“terrorist” meaning someone who has committed any of a range of specified offences, 
or who “is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts 
of terrorism”  34. Under the Act in its original form, a person so arrested could be 
detained for questioning by the police for maximum of seven days: 48 hours on the 
authority of the police themselves, and thereafter on the authority of a “warrant for 
further detention” issued by one of a specified list of judges  35. In the aftermath of 
the destruction of the World Trade Centre on 9/11, Parliament happily acceded to the 
Home Secretary’s wish to double this maximum period to 14 days  36. 
Then when, in the aftermath of the London bombings in July 2005, Tony Blair’s 
“New Labour” government introduced the Bill which eventually became the Terrorist 
Act 2006, this included a proposal to increase the maximum period from 14 days to 
90. To make the point at issue here absolutely clear to Continental readers, what was 
under discussion was not the period during which a terrorist suspect, having been mis 
en examen by a juge d’instruction, could be held in a prison in order to be available 
for further questioning by the juge d’instruction, but the period during which the 
suspect could be held by the police for questioning by them: what the French would 
call garde à vue. This astonishing proposal was too authoritarian a measure even for 
the normally supine House of Commons and – though he had the vocal support of 
The Sun, Rupert Murdoch’s hugely successful tabloid newspaper, which called on 
M.P.’s to “give Tony his 90 days” – the government’s supporters in the House of 
Commons rebelled and, to the humiliation of Tony Blair, the government lost the 
crucial vote. In the end, a compromise was reached under which the detention period 
was doubled once again – from 14 days to 28 days – under a temporary amendment 
to the law which lapsed unless each year Parliament renewed it  37. Three years later 
Tony Blair’s successor as Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, keen to show that he could 
succeed where his predecessor had failed, pushed an extension of the detention limit 
to 42 days through the House of Commons. But the amendment was blocked by the 
Upper Chamber, the House of Lords, and so the maximum period remained fixed at 
28 days. The Coalition government which took office after the 2010 election decided 
not to renew the temporary provision which turned the 14 days into 28, and in January 
2011 it lapsed. So one year later, as this chapter goes to press, the maximum period 
during which terrorist suspects may be held for questioning by the police is once more 
14 days  38.
The background to the previous government’s attempts to extend the period 
during which the police can detain terrorist suspects for questioning is another feature 
of British criminal justice which seems very odd to continental lawyers’ eyes: the fact 
34 Terrorism Act 2000, s. 40.
35 Terrorist Act 2000, Schedule 8, para. 29(4).
36 Criminal Law Act 2003, s. 306.
37 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2006, s. 25.
38 Though at the time of writing, a legislative is change is being discussed which, if 
enacted, would give the Home Secretary a limited power, for use in national emergencies, to 
extend the maximum period once again.
“no thanK you, we’ve already got one!”     125
that, as a general rule, the authorities have no legal power to question a person once 
criminal proceedings have been formally instituted against him and he has made the 
transition from suspect to defendant. Whereas continental lawyers see nothing wrong 
in permitting public prosecutors, or juges d’instruction, to put questions to defendants 
at this stage provided they have the legal right to refuse to answer them, British lawyers 
perceive “post-charge questioning” (as they call it) to be inherently oppressive. If 
this seems strange to continental eyes, it must of course seem even stranger that it 
was partly respect for this principle that led the previous government to attempt to 
extend enormously the powers to detain for questioning enjoyed by the police. Having 
failed to get its way in this respect, in 2008 the previous government then managed to 
persuade Parliament to pass a law which made “post-charge questioning” possible in 
terrorist cases  39; but having secured their enactment the government did not bring 
these provisions into force, and they seem destined to remain in limbo on the statute-
book as “virtual law”.
The Terrorism Act 2000 also provided a legal basis for the police to stop and 
search any pedestrian or driver at random – that is, whether or not the police have 
any ground for suspecting the person whom they decide stop to be a terrorist. Under 
Section 44, a senior police officer who believed the existence of this power would 
be “expedient for the prevention of terrorism” could issue a general order activating 
this power in his area: an order which would then last for 28 days. By issuing a 
new order each time the old one lapsed, the Metropolitan Police in London exploited 
Section 4 to give themselves what amounted to a permanent power of random stop 
and search within the whole of the Greater London area. This resulted in a challenge 
to the European Court of Human Rights, which condemned the United Kingdom for 
failure to respect Article 8 of the Convention (right to privacy, etc.)  40. In giving 
judgment, the Court made this comment:
“[84] In this connection the Court is struck by the statistical and other evidence 
showing the extent to which resort is had by police officers to the powers of stop 
and search under s. 44 of the Act. The Ministry of Justice recorded a total of 33,177 
searches in 2004/5, 44,545 in 2005/6, 37,000 in 2006/7 and 117,278 in 2007/8. In his 
report into the operation of the Act in 2007, Lord Carlile  41 noted that while arrests 
for other crimes had followed searches under s. 44, none of the many thousands of 
searches had ever related to a terrorism offence; in his 2008 report Lord Carlile noted 
that examples of poor and unnecessary use of s. 44 abounded, there being evidence 
of cases where the person stopped was so obviously far from any known terrorism 
profile that, realistically, there was not the slightest possibility of him/her being a 
terrorist, and no other feature to justify the stop”.
In response to this judgment, the government – now the Coalition of Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats which had replaced New Labour after the General Election in 
39 Counter-terrorism Act 2008 s. 22-27.
40 Gillan v UK 50 EHRR 1105 (45), [2010] Crim LR 415, 533.
41 The Terrorism Act 2000, and later Acts dealing with terrorism, require the government 
to lay an annual return on the working of the legislation before Parliament. To this end, the 
government appoints an independent person to conduct the review. Until recently, the post was 
held by Lord Carlile. His annual reports are published by The Stationery Office.
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2010 – caused Section 44 to be amended so as to reduce the powers it gives to the 
police  42. 
5.	 The	practical	difficulties,	despite	a	muscular	pre-trial	regime,	of	convicting	
terrorists	in	the	criminal	courts
By this stage, readers will have understood that the United Kingdom has equipped 
itself with a set of criminal offences relating to terrorism that are considerably more 
repressive than the EU Framework Decisions requires, and has matched them with an 
equally authoritarian set of procedural rules in relation to the investigation of suspected 
terrorist offences by the police. Yet, paradoxically, it was still the perception of the 
previous (New Labour) Government that the prosecution of terrorists in the criminal 
courts was unduly difficult. And to some extent this perception was justified, because, 
despite the severity of the law, two features of the trial process in the UK combine 
make the conviction of suspected terrorists in the criminal courts an uphill struggle.
The first is that terrorist offences, like all other serious offences, have to be tried 
in the Crown Court, where the tribunal of fact in disputed cases is a jury. In the UK, 
this means a jury composed entirely of lay persons, selected from the electoral roll at 
random, which deliberates in the absence of the judge, and delivers a simple verdict 
or “guilty” or “not guilty”  43; and one from whose decision, where the verdict is “not 
guilty”, the prosecution has no right of appeal, however clearly the evidence may have 
established the guilt of the accused. To a government that is desperately anxious to 
neutralise a suspected terrorist who it believes to be acutely dangerous, trial by jury 
in this shape and form appears to be an instrument that is worryingly unreliable; and 
there are grounds for this perception, as we shall see.
In the first place, there is the risk of “jury nobbling”: that jurors will be bribed 
or – a more likely scenario in terrorist cases – intimidated. Where, as in Northern 
Ireland, the community is deeply divided, with one section sympathetic to the cause 
the terrorists are fighting for and another section bitterly opposed to it, to this risk is 
added the further risk of prejudice, either for or against the accused. For this reason, 
jury trial was for many years suspended for terrorist cases in Northern Ireland, such 
cases being tried before High Court judges sitting on their own. Though in reality they 
seem to have rendered justice fairly and even-handedly, these “Diplock courts”  44, as 
42 Terrorism Act (2000) (Remedial Order), SI 2011 no. 631. But by this time, unfortunately, 
the excessive use of “stop and search” powers seems to have done serious damage to relations 
between the police and the public, particularly young persons belonging to ethnic minorities. 
In August 2011 riots broke out in a number of cities in the UK. Interviews with young people 
who had taken part in them revealed that the experience of being “stopped and searched” was a 
major factor in alienating young people from the police, and society in general.
43 In Scotland there is a third possibility, a verdict of “not proven” – which has all the 
legal consequences of a “not guilty” verdict, although unlike a “not guilty” verdict it carries 
overtones of lingering suspicion.
44 So called because they were introduced following a recommendation contained in 
Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in 
Northern Ireland, chaired by Lord Diplock (Cmnd. 5185 1972). On the judicial performance 
of the Diplock Courts, see J. JacKson and S. Doran, Judge without Jury – Diplock Trials in the 
Adversary System, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995.
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they were called, were strongly opposed on ideological grounds, because – rightly or 
wrongly – jury trial is widely seen in the common law world as an important democratic 
safeguard; and this in part because of the jury’s power to acquit obviously guilty 
people in the teeth of the evidence where they feel the prosecution was oppressive, or 
because the jurors are out of sympathy with the law which the defendant was accused 
of breaking. In consequence, as part of the Northern Ireland “Peace Process”, the 
Diplock courts are in the process of being abolished there  45; and their extension to 
other parts of the UK is not at present a political possibility.
In addition to the particular problems which led to the creation of the Diplock 
courts in Northern Ireland there is the more general problem, or perceived problem, 
that juries are “too soft” and tend to acquit in cases where the evidence is clear and 
reason suggests that they should convict. 
Whether UK juries really are systematically “too soft” in this respect is a much 
debated topic which cannot be properly examined here. A recent and well-respected 
study  46 suggests that on average they convict in 64 per cent of the cases in which 
they are called upon to determine the issue of guilt or innocence – or in other words, 
that they acquit in 36 per cent of cases; figures which to continental lawyers will seem 
astonishing, at any rate until they realise that even in the Crown Court juries try only 
the small minority – some 12 per cent  47 – of cases where defendants plead “not 
guilty”, most defendants eventually pleading guilty, commonly as part of some kind 
of deal between prosecution and defence. 
But whether or not juries are systematically inclined to acquit in cases where 
they should convict, there can be no doubt that juries sometimes include individuals 
who are exceptionally credulous, or highly irresponsible, or both, and in England 
and Wales and in Northern Ireland, where a majority of at least 10 jurors out of 
12 is required to convict  48, it takes only three of them to derail a trial. A striking 
demonstration of this phenomenon occurred in March 2011 in a high-profile case, the 
trial of Delroy Grant. Grant, nicknamed “the Night Stalker”, was accused of a series 
of rapes and other grave sexual offences, committed in the course of burglaries over a 
space of 17 years. To this string of offences he was linked by DNA evidence that was 
seemingly irrefutable. His defence was that his former wife, from whom he was now 
estranged, had saved up samples of his semen and persuaded a confederate to break 
into burgled houses and distribute it, in order to incriminate him. After eight hours of 
deliberation, the jury eventually convicted – but then only by a majority of 10 to 2. In 
other words, of the jurors in that case, two were sufficiently cretinous to feel that this 
preposterous defence left them with a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. 
45 The current legal basis for non-jury trials in Northern Ireland is Sections 1-9 of the 
Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007. These should have expired by now, but in the 
face of further terrorist activity in Northern Ireland the government has recently extended them 
by a further two years: see the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 (Extension of 
duration of non-jury trial provisions) Order, SI 2011/1720.
46 C. Thomas, Are Juries Fair?, Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/10, February 2010, 
p. 27.
47 Ibid., p. 26.
48 Scotland, by contrast, uses a jury of 15, which convicts by a simple majority.
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Had there been not two but three of them, he would have escaped conviction, at least 
on that occasion  49. 
A final problem with jury trial is that, in its modern UK form at least, it is 
extremely slow, and in consequence extremely expensive. Two weeks after the London 
bombings on 7 July 2005, another group of would-be suicide bombers tried to carry 
out a similar attack, but thanks to a defect in the explosives their bombs failed to go 
off. When prosecuted, they claimed that they had always intended their bombs not 
to explode. This defence was almost as implausible as Delroy Grant’s explanation of 
the presence of his DNA on the bodies of people he had raped. Yet the resulting jury 
trial nevertheless took five and half months to examine it from every possible angle 
before reaching what, to any sane observer, must have seemed the obvious conclusion 
from the outset. The main beneficiaries of this lengthy and expensive state of affairs 
are the barristers involved in jury trials, in whose ranks, inevitably, are to be found 
the most enthusiastic defenders of the institution – so causing the journalist Simon 
Jenkins, a jury sceptic, to condemn jury trial as the “barristers’ Common Agricultural 
Policy”  50.
The difficulty of convicting terrorist suspects – and indeed many other dangerous 
criminals – in the criminal courts is magnified by the restrictive rules of evidence that 
apply in criminal cases; and in particular, by the rule that the contents of intercepted 
telephone-calls and intercepted letters are not admissible as evidence. In all three parts 
of the UK the authorities have the legal power to intercept communications, but any 
incriminating statements that so come to light may only be used “operationally”: that 
is, as a starting-point for the collection of other material which is legally admissible. 
So if, for example, the police tap the telephone of a latter-day Guy Fawkes and record 
him plotting with his fellow-conspirators to blow up the Queen at the official opening 
of Parliament, the prosecution may not use the tape-recording of this incriminating 
conversation if Fawkes and colleagues are then brought to trial, and will have to 
resort to other means to prove his guilt. As the law stands, the prosecution can adduce 
evidence of the fact that Fawkes and his colleagues spent the period leading up to 5 
November telephoning one another – but it may not adduce evidence of what was 
said. The difficulties this creates for prosecutors are graphically described by Lord 
Lloyd, a senior judge with experience in such cases, in his evidence to an official 
committee  51:
“… even if there is just enough other evidence to bring them to trial, it is painful 
to watch the prosecution attempting to prove a conspiracy by adducing evidence of a 
pattern of telephone conversations between the conspirators when the best evidence 
is there on the tape recording”.
49 In English law, this would have produced what is known as a “hung jury”; a situation 
which is neither an acquittal nor a conviction, and which entitles the prosecution, if it so wishes, 
to proceed to a new trial.
50 In an article entitled “Trupti Patel and the rotten courts of Salem”, The Times, 13 June 
2003.
51 Written evidence to the Chilcot Committee, note 53 below.
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The origins of this rule are not, as might be thought, the ancient traditions of 
the common law and its concern for civil liberties. In fact the opposite is true. The 
rule is modern, and its basis is a statute, first enacted in 1985 and then re-enacted in 
2000. And the purpose of the rule is not to protect civil liberties, but rather raison 
d’Etat. The official explanation for the rule is that the ban is necessary to prevent 
criminals and terrorists from discovering that their telephones are tapped, and the way 
that this is done – facts which, if they were known, would render useless what is at 
present a valuable method of monitoring the activities of criminals and terrorists. But 
as everybody, including major criminals and terrorists, already knows that telephones 
are sometimes tapped by the authorities and letters sometimes intercepted in the post, 
this explanation looks very unconvincing. And the underlying reasoning, if it is sound, 
appears to prove too much: it would also justify banning fingerprint evidence lest 
burglars took to wearing gloves and DNA evidence lest rapists took to using condoms. 
Sceptics widely believe that what really lies behind the rule is a desire to protect the 
acts of the executive in its various manifestations from uncomfortable examination 
in the courts. As the consequence of a series of historical accidents, in all three parts 
of the UK warrants to intercept communications are issued not by judges, but by 
Ministers: usually the Home Secretary. Neither they nor their civil servants wish the 
legality or propriety of their decisions to issue warrants to be scrutinised by judges in 
any prosecutions that might follow, and to avoid this, prefer a situation in which the 
fruit of the intercept can only be used as “operational material”, even though this is a 
dreadful obstacle to prosecution.
In recent years, the ban on using telephone intercepts as evidence has been 
much criticised, and successive governments have come under increasing pressure 
to promote legislation to remove it  52. In January 2008 an official committee 
recommended its removal  53, after which the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, 
announced his conversion to the idea. But since then, nothing more has happened. 
And so the ban remains, and with it, the needless difficulties that it creates for the 
conviction of terrorists in the criminal courts.
6.	 The	legislative	response,	administrative	detention,	rather	than	reform		
of	criminal	evidence	and	procedure
In response to the perceived problems of prosecuting terrorists, the previous 
Government – alone among the governments of the Member States of the EU – 
decided to introduce, for terrorist suspects, a regime of administrative detention, by 
order of the Home Secretary. 
The first version of this, enacted by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Disorder 
Act 2001, applied solely to foreign terrorist suspects whom the Home Secretary 
52 See, inter alia, Intercept Evidence: Lifting the Ban. A JUSTICE report. October 2006 
(available on the JUSTICE website); J. SPencer, “Intercept evidence – the case for change”, 
Justice of the Peace, 172, 2008, p. 651-655 and 671-672; J. SPencer, “Telephone-tap evidence 
and administrative detention in the UK”, in M. Wade and A. MalJevic (eds.), A War on Terror?, 
New York, Dordrecht, Heidelberg and London, Springer, 2010.
53 Privy Council Review of Intercept as Evidence; Report to the Prime Minister and the 
Home Secretary, 30 January 2008, Cm 7324.
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would have liked to deport, but could not because they might be tortured or killed if 
returned to their country of origin. In 2005, this form of administrative detention was 
– sensationally – condemned by the House of Lords  54 as contrary to the European 
Convention on Human Rights  55. It was in this case that one of the judges, Lord 
Hoffmann, made the following remark which has become famous:
“[97] The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in 
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but 
from laws such as these. This is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve. It is 
for Parliament to decide whether to give terrorists such a victory”.
The House of Lords condemned the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Disorder Act that permitted to the Home Secretary to hold foreign terrorist suspects 
in jail without trial indefinitely as contrary to the European Convention on Human 
Rights for two main reasons: first, because they contravened Article 5 (the right to 
liberty), and secondly because they discriminated unfairly and unnecessarily between 
citizens and foreigners, and hence contravened Article 14 of the European Convention 
(prohibition of discrimination). Potential terrorists, it was said, could as easily be 
nationals as foreigners, and if there was no need for the Home Secretary to be able to 
impose indefinite administrative detention on terrorist suspects who were nationals, 
there was no need for him to be able to impose it on those who happened to be 
foreigners.
In response to this decision, the government did not – as many hoped – abandon 
its attempt to impose administrative detention on suspected terrorists. Instead its 
response was to devise a new scheme for administrative detention that it hoped the 
courts would accept as compatible with the Convention. In the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005, the government persuaded Parliament to enact a regime of “control orders”. 
Instead of allowing him to put suspects in prison, this allowed the Home Secretary to 
impose a range of different restrictions on their lives, the most severe of which would 
amount in practice to putting them under house arrest. And to avoid the complaint 
about discrimination, these new powers applied to citizens as well as to foreign 
nationals. Of these control orders there were in principle two types: “derogating 
control orders”, where the restrictions amounted to an infringement of liberty as 
protected by Article 5 of the Convention, and “non-derogating control orders”, where 
the restrictions imposed were less severe. Derogating orders were made by a court, 
on the application of the Home Secretary. Non-derogating orders were made by the 
Home Secretary, but subject to review by a court. To make a non-derogating control 
order, the Home Secretary must have had “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the 
individual is or has been involved in terrorism”, and must have considered that the 
imposition of a control order was necessary “for purposes connected with protecting 
members of the public from a risk of terrorism”. The role of the reviewing court was 
limited. According to the Act, “the function of the court… is to consider whether the 
54 I.e. the House of Lords which was until 2009 as the final court of appeal, not the Upper 
Chamber of the Legislature.
55 A v Secretary of State for the Home Office [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68, [2005] 2 
WLR 87.
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decision of the Secretary of State to make the order he did was obviously flawed”. The 
reviewing court sat in private – and unlike the criminal courts, telephone intercepts 
were admissible in evidence. It was also a feature of the procedure that the evidence, 
on which the order is made, though disclosed to the court, was kept from the person 
who is the subject of the order.
Unsurprisingly, control orders proved extremely controversial, and attempts to 
impose them were regularly challenged in the courts. In all, only 38 control orders 
were imposed, all of them of the “non-derogating” type. In seven of these cases, the 
subject of the order absconded, never to be seen again, and the remainder provoked 
an orgy of litigation. To cut a long legal story very short, the judges were uneasy 
about them and the resulting case-law imposed limits on their use which, in the view 
of those who approved of them, greatly undermined their usefulness. From the Home 
Secretary’s point of view, the final blow was a decision of the House of Lords in 
June 2009 which held that, in the light of the decision of the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights in A v United Kingdom  56, a person seeking to 
challenge a control order must be permitted to know the case against him, and given 
a chance to answer it; and it was therefore not sufficient, in cases where the Home 
Secretary believed that disclosing the nature of the case to the “controlee” himself 
would be dangerous, for the nature of the case and the supporting evidence to be 
disclosed to a “special advocate” who was not allowed to have any contact with the 
controlee  57.
When the Labour government lost the General Election in May 2010 and a 
Coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats came to power, the leading Coalition 
politicians had been highly critical of the outgoing government’s heavy-handed record 
on matters affecting civil liberties and one of the first things the new government did 
was to announce that there would be an “urgent review” of control orders. This led those 
who were critical of administrative detention for terrorist suspects to hope that it would 
now be abolished: but this was not to be. Instead, in January 2011 the Home Secretary 
announced that, though control orders were to be abolished, they would be replaced 
by a new regime of administrative detention to be called “Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures” – or “TPIMs” for short: an announcement which provoked 
Shami Chakrabati, the Director of the human rights group Liberty, to say that “Spin 
and semantics aside, control orders are retained and rebranded, if in a slightly lower-
fat form”, and “As before, the innocent may be punished without a fair hearing and 
the guilty will escape the full force of the criminal law”  58. A Bill to this effect was 
introduced in Parliament which, in December 2011, became law as the Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act. The main “lower-fat” elements in TPIMs 
are two: first, in order to make one, the Home Secretary must have a “reasonable 
belief” that the person in question is or has been involved in terrorist activity, whereas 
control orders required no more than “reasonable suspicion”; and secondly, whereas 
56 Application no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009; (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 29. 
57 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF (no. 3), [2009] UKHL 28, [2010] 2 
AC 269.
58 BBC News, 26 January 2011.
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control orders once made could be renewed indefinitely, a person may not be detained 
under a TPIMS for more than two years unless there is evidence of further terrorist 
activity. The new law, needless to say, does nothing to change the exclusionary rule 
that prevents the use of telephone intercepts in criminal proceedings. 
To my friends in Continental Europe, these developments in the United Kingdom 
are a paradox. Was it not at Runnymede, in England, that the autocratic King John was 
forced in 1215 to sign Magna Carta, the celebrated Clause 29 of which provides that:
“No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or 
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed, nor 
will we pass upon him nor condemn him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers, 
of by the law of his land…”.
And was it not in England that, in the constitutional conflicts of the seventeenth 
century, a King was first deprived of his sovereign power to imprison his subjects at 
his will? So how can it be that it is the United Kingdom, the cradle of civil liberties, 
which alone of all the countries in the European Union has reacted to the threat of 
terrorism by legalising administrative detention? 
The answer, I fear, involves another paradox. The United Kingdom, unlike Italy, 
and Germany, and most of the rest of the European Union, has not experienced within 
living memory the reality of a regime where civil liberties are not respected. Not 
since the seventeenth century has it been ruled by a dictator, not since 1066 has it 
been occupied by a foreign power, and never in the twentieth century was it ruled 
by a communist government that treated civil liberties with practical contempt. It is 
human nature, unfortunately, to take for granted and to fail to value those good things 
that you have always had. As the saying goes, “you never think about the well until 
the well runs dry”.




If one were to have read the Austrian media in the last two years, one might have 
come away with the impression that Austria is a country full of terrorists and that 
it has a real terrorism problem. By way of example, these are the sorts of headlines 
that have appeared: ‘Activists for fathers’ rights suspected of terrorism’; ‘Students 
continue to be suspected of terrorism and are still in pre-trial detention’; ‘Terrorism 
trial against animal rights activists ends after more than one year’. 
The question is: Is this really a terrorism problem? Or is it a problem of terrorism 
provisions that have gone too far? Or is it a problem of the application of these 
provisions? These cases will be discussed later on in this analysis.
Prior to 2002, the year when the EU Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
combating terrorism  1 came into force, the Austrian Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) 
did not contain any provisions on terrorism. Terrorist acts were (only) punished on the 
basis of existing criminal offences. It was not considered necessary to punish people 
for merely being members of a terrorist association, before they committed a specific 
offence (or were attempting to commit a criminal offence) such as murder, kidnapping 
or the hijacking of an aeroplane. With regard to offences punishing preparatory 
acts (before the concrete infringement of protected legal interests like life or limb, 
property and liberty), Austrian law contained provisions on ‘Criminal conspiracy’  2 
and ‘Criminal association’  3. In 1993, the offence of ‘Criminal organisation’ was 
introduced as it was regarded as a shortcoming in the fight against organised crime 
1 OJ, no. L 164, 22 June 2002, p. 3.
2 Verbrecherisches Komplott, S. 277 öStGB. 
3 Kriminelle Vereinigung, S. 278 öStGB. 
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that Austrian criminal law did not contain a provision according to which a member 
of a criminal organisation could be punished merely because of his/her membership 
of a criminal organisation  4.
2.	 Legislation	to	implement	Framework	Decisions	2002	and	2008
A.	 Transposition	of	Framework	Decision	2002/475/JHA
To implement Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism (and 
the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism  5, implemented 
at the same time), the Austrian Criminal Code was amended in August 2002  6. A new 
criminal offence of ‘terrorist group’ was established; higher penalties were introduced 
for offences qualified as terrorist and a statutory definition of ‘terrorism financing’ 
was introduced. The following explanations only relate to the provisions transposing 
the Framework Decision. 
1. Terrorist offences
The list of terrorist offences in principle was taken from the Framework Decision 
(Article 1(1)) into Austrian legislation. The provision lists all statutory definitions of 
offences which correspond to the offences in Article 1(1) FD  7. The terrorist offences 
are murder, grievous bodily harm, kidnapping, aggravated coercion, aggravated 
dangerous threat, aggravated destruction of data if this can cause a significant danger 
to the life of another person or to another’s property, intentional endangerment of the 
public and of the environment, seizure of aircraft, intentional endangerment of air 
traffic and criminal offences according to Section 50 of the Weapons Act or Section 
7 of the Act on Munitions. The list of offences was only limited in comparison to the 
Framework Decision in that not every attack on the physical integrity of a person  8 
and every threat is a terrorist offence but only grievous bodily harm and aggravated 
dangerous threats fall under the provision. On the other hand, the scope of the list seems 
to be wider because the list of offences is more general than the list of behaviours in 
the Framework Decision.
To be qualified as being a terrorist offence, an offence must “cause grave and 
long lasting disturbance to public life” or “grave damage to economic life”. It is 
not necessary for these consequences to actually materialise. In fact, it is sufficient 
for it to be likely that the act has such a consequence. It is a so-called ‘offence of 
potential endangerment’ for which it is required that an act is appropriate to cause a 
4 Report of the Parliamentary Judicial Committee, JAB StGNov 1993, 2.
5 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999, signed 
by Austria on 24 September 2001 and ratified on 15 April 2002.
6 Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz (Act Amending Criminal Law) 2002, BGBl, no.134, 2002.
7 S. 278c öStGB.
8 According to the Explanatory Report to the Government Bill (EBRV 1166 BlgNR 21. 
GP, p. 38), in a practical case it is not thinkable that a minor assault could be appropriate to 
cause a grave and long-lasting disturbance to public life or grave damage to economic life.
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consequence  9. The terms used are new in Austrian criminal law and it is yet unclear 
how they should be interpreted. The Explanatory Report to the Government Bill 
merely states that a grave disturbance or destruction of public life and of economic 
life is necessary  10. A grave disturbance is presumed to be where the act is of a size 
that it may lead to a massive disturbance of public life in a bigger region (e.g. in a 
big city) because, for example, public security cannot be guaranteed  11. How long a 
long-lasting disturbance must last is regarded differently in Austrian doctrine. It must 
last at least two months to be regarded as long-lasting  12.
Grave damage to economic life is an extensive failure or total breakdown in the 
operation of important branches of the economy or of big enterprises, which results 
in the supply to the population of goods, services, infrastructure and communication 
systems not being guaranteed or not being sufficiently guaranteed or results in financial 
and capital markets being hit hard. An example could be the complete breakdown in 
the supply of energy, water or food, of traffic facilities (railway, streets or air traffic) 
or large parts of agriculture. There is no fixed level or amount as to what constitutes 
grave damage. In parts of the doctrine € 800,000 is seen as relevant damage  13.
This likelihood of terrorism must not only objectively exist but it must also 
include the intent of the perpetrator. Dolus eventualis is sufficient. 
The terrorist aim provided for in Article 1(1) FD was introduced into Austrian 
law as a subjective element of the offence. It is required that the perpetrator acts with 
the intent to intimidate the population seriously, to unduly compel the government or 
international organisation to perform, acquiesce or abstain from performing any act or 
to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic 
or social structures of a country or an international organisation. It is not necessary 
that the offender has the intention to achieve any of these aims, but conditional intent 
(dolus eventualis) is sufficient  14.
Moreover, based on Article 1(2) FD, the Austrian Criminal Code contains a 
negative definition of terrorism: an act is not a terrorist offence if it aims to establish 
or re-establish democratic or constitutional order or to exercise or protect human 
rights  15. People who exercise their legitimate right to express their opinion must not 
be accused of terrorism even if they commit a criminal offence when exercising this 
9 w. wessely, “Zu den neuen Terrorismustatbeständen im StGB”, Österreichische 
Juristen-Zeitung, 2004, p. 827, at p. 828.
10 Explanatory Remarks to the Government Bill, EBRV 1166 BlgNR 21. GP, p. 38.
11 f. Plöchl, in f. höPfel and e. ratz (eds.), Wiener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 
Wien, Manz, 2009, § 278c marginal number 8.
12 Compare ibid., § 278c, marginal number 8: “some weeks”; c. bertel and K. 
schwaighofer, Besonderer Teil II, 9th ed., Wien, Springer, 2010, § 278c marginal number 2: “at 
least some months”.
13 b.P. oshidari et al., Salzburger Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, Wien, Lexis Nexis, 
2005, § 275 marginal number 18.
14 See w. wessely, op. cit., p. 828; e.m. maier, “Strafrecht – Kriegsrecht – 
Ausnahmezustand? Der Rechtsstaat vor der Herausforderung des Terrorismus”, Journal für 
Rechtspolitik, 2006, p. 27 (30).
15 S. 278c(3) öStGB.
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right. The Explanatory Remarks to the Government Bill note that this provision will 
in particular refer to acts (e.g. by political opposition groups) which are committed in 
non-democratic societies outside the European Union and which must be adjudicated 
in Austria  16. However, these acts can remain punishable (if they are not justified in 
another way) but not as terrorist offences.
For terrorist offences, the Austrian legislator has established an aggravating 
circumstance which changes the range of penalties: if a criminal offence is described 
in law as a terrorist offence, this is not a specific offence, but it has the consequence 
that the maximum sentence provided for that offence is raised by half   17, but it must 
not be more than 20 years  18. 
2. Introduction of the ‘terrorist group’ offence
Besides this aggravating circumstance of terrorist offences, a new offence of 
‘terrorist group’ was introduced  19. The statutory definition distinguishes between 
three different offences:
1. Directing a terrorist group is punishable by custodial sentences from five to fifteen 
years. 
2. If the terrorist group only refers to threatening to commit a terrorist offence, 
directing a terrorist group is punishable by a custodial sentence between one and 
ten years. In this distinction, Austrian legislation follows Article 5(3) FD. 
3. Participating in the activities of a terrorist group as a member is also punishable 
by custodial sentences between one and ten years.
The definition of ‘terrorist group’ in the Austrian Criminal Code corresponds 
exactly to the definition of Article 2(1) FD. A terrorist group is a group of more 
than two persons, established over a period of time, whose aim is for one or more 
members of the group to commit one or more terrorist offences  20. The group must 
be established over a period of time but it is sufficient that the association is directed 
towards committing a single terrorist offence  21. It is not necessary that the group 
has a high degree of organisation. A formal membership or formally determined 
roles within the group are not necessary. But the association must not be accidentally 
created only to commit one criminal offence  22. 
Directing means the authority to issue orders to the other members of the terrorist 
group. It is not necessary for it to be a comprehensive authority; it can also be limited 
to subareas of the organisation, but it must be of relevance for the whole association. 
The main criterion is that the person has, de facto, a leading position, which gives him/
16 Explanatory Report to the Governmental Bill, EBRV 1166 BlgNR 21. GP, p. 39 f; seen 
as problematic by c. bertel and K. schwaighofer, op. cit., § 278c marginal number 4.
17 S. 278c(2) öStGB.
18 Twenty years is the maximum for prison sentences limited in time in Austrian criminal 
law. Beyond that, only life imprisonment penalties are foreseen. But it is not admissible to 
change a prison sentence which is limited in time to life imprisonment. 
19 S. 278b öStGB. 
20 S. 278b(3) öStGB. 
21 f. Plöchl, op. cit., § 278b marginal number 7.
22 w. wessely, op. cit., p. 831.
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her the authority that his/her orders, instructions and commands are actually obeyed 
and carried out. Therefore directors are persons who belong to the leader board or 
take part in the leadership of the association. This can be an ideological or operational 
leadership that decides on the strategic objectives of the association and can give 
orders to members  23.
Participating as a member of a terrorist group requires that, in the framework 
of a terrorist aim, a person commits a terrorist offence or participates in terrorist 
activities by supplying information, by financial means or by supporting the terrorist 
group in another way with the knowledge that s/he supports the terrorist group or its 
criminal activities. Such support can also take the form of recruitment or training for 
terrorist purposes. It is not necessary that the organisation has already started to act. 
Participating in a terrorist group may be punished with a custodial sentence of up to 
ten years. 
3. Political discussion during the transposition of the 2002 Framework Decision 
During the legislative process, there was criticism that the new provisions do not 
systematically fit into the Austrian criminal law system and that they are too vague  24. 
According to the case law of the Austrian Constitutional Court, a statutory definition 
of a criminal offence must be so precise that, for a citizen, it is clear which behaviour 
is punishable  25. During the legislative process, doubt was cast on whether the new 
provisions fulfil this requirement given that many indefinite legal terms are used and 
their interpretation is decisive as to whether a person is punishable or not. It was 
regarded as a problem that the preparatory stage of criminal offences was criminalised, 
which necessarily means that the statutory requirements for criminal liability cannot 
be very concrete. Moreover, some people cautioned that these provisions could also 
be applicable to the actions of NGOs (e.g. environmental organisations). The negative 
definition of terrorism was criticised in particular as being too indefinite as it would 
not be clear enough what the democratic circumstances are and what the acts to 
establish them are  26. Whether, for example, Palestinian, Kurdish or Iraqi groups act 
for these aims can be a question of political opinion. But the answer to this question 
can be decisive as to whether a behaviour is punishable as a terrorist offence or not. 
Therefore it is difficult to anticipate which type of behaviour is punishable and which 
is not as the assessment of the behaviour as being punishable depends on decisions 
which are primarily of a political nature.
23 f. Plöchl, op. cit., § 278b marginal number 10; h. hinterhofer, Strafrecht Besonderer 
Teil II, 4th ed., Wien, WUV Universitätsverlag, 2005, p. 251.
24 See e.g. the statements of experts regarding the draft of the Ministry of Justice: http://www.
parlinkom.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXI/I/I_01166/index.shtml#tab-VorparlamentarischesVerfahren. 
25 See Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) 30 June 1988, VfSlg 11.776; 4 March 
1992, VfSlg 13.012. See also R. thienel, in K. KorineK and m. holoubeK (ed.), Österreichisches 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Wien, Springer, 1999, Article 7 EMRK marginal number 12.
26 See, e.g., statement of the Constitutional Service of the Federal Chancellery, GZ 
602.474/2-V/A/5/02 and the statement of Amnesty International Austria on the ministerial 
draft; w. wessely, op. cit., p. 829; h. hinterhofer, op. cit., p. 253; e.m. maier, op. cit., p. 31.
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B.	 Transposition	of	Framework	Decision	2008/919/JHA:		
the	‘Terrorism	Prevention	Law’	
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA was transposed into Austrian law together 
with the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005)  27 in 
two stages in December 2010 and November 2011. In December 2009, a big “terrorism 
prevention law” (Terrorismuspräventionsgesetz) had been drafted and announced by 
the Austrian Ministry of Justice and presented by the government in the summer of 
2010  28. This draft bill had contained new statutory definitions of the offences of 
‘training for terrorist purposes’, ‘instruction on the commission of terrorist offences’ 
and ‘provocation to commit terrorist offences and approval of terrorist offences’  29. 
Due to many protests against it, only parts of it were passed by the Parliament in 
December 2010  30. 
Inter alia, NGOs and associations of journalists argued that the statutory definitions 
would be so indefinite that even journalists who report about terrorist groups would be 
threatened with punishment according to the provision of ‘instruction on the commission 
of terrorist offences’. NGOs saw it as a problem that the proposed provisions were so 
indefinite that they could be used to repress civil society organisations which are not 
wanted by the state. It was seen as a problem that every public call to protest where 
means of coercion are used (e.g. the occupation of places to hamper the construction 
of a building) to force a government or other public authority to behave in a certain 
way could fall under the offence of ‘provocation to commit terrorist offences and 
approval of terrorist offences’  31. 
1. Training for terrorist purposes
Due to these discussions, in December 2010 only a law establishing a new offence 
of “training for terrorist purposes”  32 was passed by parliament, as it was considered 
necessary to implement the FD 2008  33. According to this provision, a person is 
punishable for instructing somebody how to make or use explosives, firearms or other 
weapons or noxious or hazardous substances or in other specific methods or techniques 
for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence if s/he knows that the skills provided 
are intended to be used for this purpose. Here, the Austrian provision corresponds to 
Article 3(1)(c) FD. The statutory definition requires the knowledge of the offender 
27 CETS no. 196.
28 Government Bill for a Federal Law amending the Criminal Code to prevent terrorism 
(Terrorism Prevention Law 2010), 674 BlgNR 24. GP, p. 1.
29 “Ausbildung für terroristische Zwecke”, “Anleitung zur Begehung einer terroristischen 
Straftat”, “Aufforderung zu terroristischen Straftaten und Gutheißung terroristischer 
Straftaten”.
30 Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Strafgesetzbuch, die Strafprozessordnung 1975, das 
Staatsanwaltschaftsgesetz und das Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz zur Stärkung der strafrechtlichen 
Kompetenz geändert werden (strafrechtliches Kompetenzpaket), BGBl, 2010, no. 108.
31 See, e.g., “Widerstand gegen Bandion-Ortners Anti-Terror-Gesetz”, Die Presse, 
15 January 2010.
32 S. 278e öStGB. 
33 See Report of the Parliamentary Judicial Committee (JAB), 1009 BlgNR 24. GP, p. 2.
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that the imparted abilities shall be used for the purpose of the commission of one or 
more terrorist offences. Whether these abilities are actually used for the commission 
of terrorist offences is irrelevant for criminal liability according to this provision. It 
is punishable by a custodial sentence of one to ten years, which corresponds to the 
penalties for being a member of a terrorist group  34. 
Although there was no legal requirement either in the EU 2008 Framework 
Decision or in any other international legal instrument, the Austrian legislator did not 
only introduce a criminal offence of active training but made also punishable the fact 
of being trained. The Austrian government considered it necessary to introduce such 
a provision in order to prosecute people who travel abroad to be trained in terrorist 
camps  35. The provision of Section 278e(2) öStGB in particular covers participation 
in terrorist camps for the purpose of committing terrorist offences. The perpetrator 
must have the intention of using the acquired skills to commit a terrorist offence. 
For this ‘passive’ education, a custodial sentence of up to five years is provided. But 
the penalty must not be higher than the penalty foreseen for the intended criminal 
offence.
2. Instruction on the commission of terrorist offences
In spite of the discussions on the government bill  36 in autumn 2011 the other 
two criminal provisions were – nearly in the same wording as in the government bill – 
passed by the Austrian parliament  37. According to the new provision of “instruction 
on the commission of terrorist offences”  38 a person is punishable, if s/he offers a 
media, which is, due to its content, intended to instruct the commission of a terrorist 
offence or offers such information on the internet or makes it accessible to another 
person if s/he acts with the intention of inciting the commission of a terrorist act. 
This special intention was added to the statutory definition after the above-mentioned 
objections to limit the offence and to prevent journalists reporting about terrorist 
activities being punishable according to this provision. For that offence a prison 
sentence of up to two years is foreseen. The same penalty is foreseen for a person who 
procures such information in such a media or from the internet to commit a terrorist 
offence. 
Whereas the provision on “training for terrorist purposes” refers to a typical 
education situation between teacher and pupil, the provision of “instruction on 
the commission of terrorist offences” covers situations where information is made 
available as instruction to commit terrorist offences or the private study of information 
from media or from the internet. Additionally to make the information available, the 
34 S. 278b(2) öStGB.
35 See Explanatory Remarks to the Governmental Bill, 674 BlgNR 24. GP, p. 5.
36 Governmental Bill for a Federal Law amending the Criminal Code to prevent terrorism 
(Terrorism Prevention Law 2010), 674 BlgNR 24. GP, p. 1.
37 Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Strafgesetzbuch zur Verhinderung von Terrorismus sowie 
das Strafgesetzbuch und die Strafprozessordnung 1975 zur Verbesserung des strafrechtlichen 
Schutzes der Umwelt geändert werden, BGBl I, 2011, no. 103.
38 S. 278f öStGB. 
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circumstances of the circulation must be appropriate to motivate someone to commit 
a terrorist offence. 
3. Provocation to commit terrorist offences and approval of terrorist offences
According to the new provision of “provocation to commit terrorist offence” and 
“approval of terrorist offence”  39 a person is punishable for provoking the commission 
of a terrorist act in print, broadcast or in another media or otherwise publicly in a 
way that is available for many people. Whereas the Framework Decision provides 
that such a provocation must cause a danger that one or more terrorist offences be 
committed, Austrian law does not require the behaviour to have caused such a danger. 
Therefore the Austrian definition of the offence seems to be wider than the one in the 
Framework Decision. A penalty of imprisonment of up to two years is envisaged in 
the legislation. 
In the same way, a person shall be punished for the endorsement in a media or 
otherwise in public of the commission of terrorist offences in a way which is appropriate 
to create the circumstances in which one or more offences may be committed  40.
According to the Explanatory Report to the Government Bill, this provision shall 
complete two existing offences to prosecute the so-called “preachers of hate”  41. 
There are two criminal offences in the Austrian Criminal Code which could serve 
as instruments in such cases: The offences of “provocation to commit a criminal 
offence and endorsement of criminal acts”  42 and “sedition”  43, according to which 
it is punishable to call for or endorse a hostile act against certain groups (e.g. religious, 
racial or ethnic groups) in a way which might endanger public order. The government 
considered it necessary, however, to introduce a new criminal provision since the 
provision of S. 282 öStGB requires that the act is noticed by at least 150 people 
and this requirement would not make it possible to counter such “preachers of hate” 
effectively as this criterion would be too strict and therefore not all cases could be 
covered  44. According to the new provision of S. 282a öStGB it will be sufficient for 
the provocation to commit a terrorist offence that around 30 persons gain access to the 
content of the provocation.
Besides the introduction of these new provisions the definition of “sedition” 
was also amended since the old version required that the means of commission was 
appropriate to endanger public order and therefore the legislator saw it as too narrow 
to be used to combat “preachers of hate”. This definition was extended.
39 S. 282a öStGB.
40 S. 282a(2) öStGB
41 Explanatory Report to the Government Bill, 674 BlgNR 24. GP, 6.
42 “Aufforderung zu mit Strafe bedrohten Handlungen und Gutheißung mit Strafe bedrohter 
Handlungen”, S. 282 öStGB.
43 “Verhetzung”, S. 283 öStGB
44 Explanatory Report to the Governmental Bill, 674 BlgNR 24. GP, 6.
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C.	 Jurisdiction
To fulfil the requirements of both Framework Decisions on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, a new provision was introduced into the Criminal Code  45. This 
provision does not only refer to the offences of “terrorist group” (Section 278b 
öStGB), “terrorist offences”  46, “training for terrorist purposes”  47 and “instruction 
on the commission of terrorist offences”  48, but also to certain other criminal offences 
if they are linked to terrorist offences: aggravated theft  49, blackmailing  50 and 
falsification of documents  51. Such offences are linked to terrorist offences if they 
are committed with the aim of committing one of the terrorist offences in Sections 
278b to 278f öStGB.
In these cases it is foreseen that Austria has jurisdiction irrespective of double 
criminality requirement (Section 64(1)), if
− the offender is Austrian or if s/he has acquired Austrian citizenship later and still 
has it when the criminal procedure has started;
− the offender has his/her residence or his/her habitual abode in Austria; 
− the offence has been committed for the benefit of a legal person established in 
Austria;
− the offence has been committed against the National Council, the Federal Council, 
the Federal government, a provincial parliament, a provincial government, the 
Constitutional Court, the Administrative Court, the Supreme Court or another 
court or authority or against the Austrian population;
− the offence has been committed against an institution of the European Union or a 
body set up in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community 
or the Treaty on European Union which is based in Austria;
− the offender was a foreigner at the time of the offence, stays in Austria and cannot 
be extradited regardless of whether his/her behaviour is also punishable according 
to the laws in the state where the offence is committed  52.
With these provisions Austria fulfils all the requirements of Article 9(1) FD  53.
These provisions have, inter alia, the consequence that participation in terrorist 
camps abroad is prosecuted in Austria independently of the criminal liability of the act 
under the law of the territory in which the act has been committed, if, for example, at 
the time of the commission of the offence, the offender is Austrian, resident in Austria 
or s/he stays in Austria and cannot be extradited. 
45 S. 64 öStGB.
46 S. 278c öStGB.
47 S. 278e öStGB.
48 S. 278f öStGB.
49 S. 128 to 131 öStGB.
50 S. 144, 145 öStGB.
51 S. 223, 224 öStGB.
52 See F. höPfel and U. Kathrein, in f. höPfel and e. ratz (eds.), op. cit., Manz, Wien 
2011, § 64 marginal number 22d.
53 For more details see Explanatory remarks to the Government Bill (EBRV), 1166 BlgNR 
21. GP, p. 21 f.
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3.	 Case	law
With regard to the application of the provisions in practice, so far only one case 
of terrorism has been brought to court  54. This was a case of a Muslim couple who, 
as members of Al Qaida, published a video message on the internet requesting the 
Austrian and the German government to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. 
The threat that they expressed was that, if the governments did not do that, they 
would bitterly regret not doing it. Moreover, on the internet, they called for terrorist 
offences to be carried out, particularly in football stadiums during the 2008 European 
Championship and against Austrian and foreign politicians and international buildings 
in Vienna. They were convicted, inter alia, of directing a terrorist group  55. 
Although the Austrian Supreme Court made two decisions in this case  56, legal 
questions on the interpretation of the terrorism provisions did not play an important 
role in this case. This may be due to the fact that it was, in the first instance, a trial 
before a jury, where a reasoning of the judgement by the court is not foreseen and 
therefore the available legal remedies are limited. In the first decision, the Supreme 
Court rendered the judgement null and void for procedural reasons because, in the 
judgement, the establishment of facts concerning the constituent fact of “established 
over a period of time” was missing. But the Supreme Court did not go into details 
about how to interpret the element of crime “established over a period of time”.
There were two other – procedural – aspects in this proceeding which were 
discussed at great length (also in public) during the procedure:
a. During the investigation procedure the first known case of an online search was 
carried out by the police although an explicit rule has been missing in Austrian 
criminal procedure. A special type of spy software was clandestinely installed on 
the suspects’ computer and made screenshots every 60 seconds and subsequently 
transferred these pictures to the police. Furthermore, key log data was transferred 
and monitored by the police so that the police acquired a picture of nearly all the 
computer activities of the suspects. However, the Regional Court in Criminal 
Matters in Vienna  57 regarded the online search of a computer, executed by the 
police, as admissible and applied the rules on the surveillance of the content of 
telecommunication and on optical and acoustic surveillance to these investigative 
measures. 
 The Austrian Supreme Court  58 did not say anything about the admissibility of 
carrying out the measure, but stated that there is no legal prohibition on using the 
results of the online search in a trial. According to the Supreme Court, bans on 
the use of evidence are only provided in exceptional cases but this was not such a 
54 In May 2012, another case was brought to Court in Vienna, in which four men have been 
charged with being members of a terrorist group and having organised trips to terrorist camps. 
55 S. 178b(1) öStGB.
56 Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) 27 August 2008, 13 Os 83/08t, Juristische Blätter 
2009, p. 527; 27 August 2009, 13 Os 39/09y (unrep.).
57 Landesgericht für Strafsachen Wien (Regional Court for Criminal Matters Vienna), 
12 March 2008, 443 Hv 1/08h.
58 Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) 27 August 2008, 13 Os 83/08t, Juristische Blätter 
2009, p. 527.
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case. Therefore it was admissible to use the results. This action by the police and 
the fact that the court saw it as admissible was criticised by parts of the doctrine, 
which regarded it as necessary that there are explicit statutory provisions which 
permit such an investigative measure, which encroaches in a particularly intensive 
way on the private sphere of a person and gives insight into the thinking and 
wishes of persons. The similar reference to the provisions on telecommunication 
surveillance and optical and acoustic surveillance has not been regarded admissible 
because surveillance with electronic means is different  59. As a consequence of 
this investigative procedure, the introduction of rules on online search has been 
discussed and a group of experts has been appointed to write up a draft of a legal 
basis for online searches. This working group suggested that a group of judges 
should be competent to decide on the admissibility of such a measure since an 
online search would not only concern the current communication of the suspect 
but also other data which was saved in the past. But until now there have been no 
explicit provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure  60.
b. The second ground for public discussions was that the female defendant appeared 
totally veiled with a burqa at trial. After the court had asked her to take off the 
burqa and she had refused to do that, she was excluded from the trial because 
this was seen as being unseemly behaviour. The Austrian Supreme Court  61 
did not see it as a violation of fundamental rights and confirmed the legitimacy 
of the exclusion. According to the Supreme Court, it is a fundamental rule of 
human communication in Austria for the face to be unveiled. Therefore it would 
have been up to the defendant to give convincing reasons why her behaviour 
was not only a politically and ideologically motivated demonstration for which 
the court was not the right place. The Supreme Court did not see the exercise of 
a religious custom in the veiling of the face as it would not be a typical practice 
in the Islamic religious community. This triggered a lively debate on procedural 
rules and freedom of religion in Austria.  62 
4.	 Application	of	terrorism	provisions	in	investigation	proceedings
The provisions on terrorism have been discussed at great length by the Austrian 
public in recent years. The reason for this is that some investigation proceedings 
show how far reaching the scope of application of the terrorism definitions can be 
59 See b.-c. funK, “Online-Durchsuchung und Grundrechte”, in bundesministerium für 
inneres (ed.), Online-Durchsuchung, Wien, Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2008, p. 55 
(58); see also the Report of the interministerial Working Group “Online-Durchsuchung” from 
13 March 2008.
60 c. PilnaceK, a. Pscheidl, “Das Strafverfahren und seine Grundsätze (Teil I) — Alte 
Hüte im neuen Gewand oder Fundgrube für die Auslegung?”, Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung, 
2008, p. 629 (633); a. venier, “Die Online-Durchsuchung. Oder: Die Freiheit der Gedanken”, 
Anwaltsblatt, 2009, 480.
61 Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) 27 August 2008, 13 Os 83/08t, Juristische 
Blätter, 2009, p. 527 with a commentary  of h. schütz.
62 See e. Pentz, “Verschleierung: ein “ungeziemendes Benehmen”? Der Umgang der 
österreichischen Justiz mit einer verschleierten Angeklagten”, juridikum 2008, p. 147 and f.
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and what consequences this can have. As already mentioned at the beginning of this 
analysis, there have been several criminal investigations which have been based on 
the suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 
In one case, the leaders of an association of divorced fathers who were fighting 
for the right to visit and to take custody of their children were investigated. They were 
suspected of having shown in videos judges who have made decisions in family cases 
and insulted them in the internet. Moreover, activists demanded in the internet to give 
back a “stolen child” (meaning a child where the right of the father to visit the child 
was limited), otherwise they would fetch the child with other means  63.
In another case, some students were accused of terrorism. They were suspected 
of setting two dustbins on fire and wanting to obstruct the deportation of foreigners. 
After a lengthy period of surveillance, a video was found in one of the students’ 
notebooks, which showed a police transport of foreigners without a residence permit 
from the detention for deportation to the airport. This video had been made by these 
art students for their studies, due to this video the police suspected them of wanting 
to hamper a deportation and thus planned the disturbance of the flight traffic and 
liberation of prisoners. Therefore they were accused of wanting “to compel a public 
authority to perform or abstain from performing an act”. The students were kept in 
pre-trial detention for seven weeks and the investigations into the possibility of their 
belonging to terrorist group were pursued for several months  64. 
In both cases, the charges were dropped after a certain period of investigative 
proceedings. But both cases show the extensive interpretation and application of 
terrorism provisions by the police. Currently, the topic is particularly sensitive in 
Austria because there was a major criminal procedure against activists of animal 
liberation groups who were accused of being members of a “criminal organisation” 
(not a terrorist association, although this would have been more obvious). After 
more than one year of trial they were found not guilty, not only not guilty of being 
members of a criminal organisation but also of any other offence. However, during 
the investigation, a lot of invasive investigative measures had been applied such as 
acoustic and optical surveillance and undercover investigations, which were always 
justified because they were suspected of being members of a criminal organisation. 
As a result, there is a discussion in Austria on how the scope of application of these 
organisation and preparatory offences can be limited. And this discussion does not 
only concern the statutory definition of criminal organisations but also of terrorist 
groups.
The aforementioned cases reveal one major problem of the statutory definition 
of “terrorist group” and other terrorist offences. Even if the case is dropped later 
or the persons are found not guilty, the provision on a “terrorist group” as well as 
the one on a “criminal organisation” are used in investigative proceedings to carry 
out investigative measures which would not be allowed only because of the specific 
offences that the people are suspected of. 
63 See “Justiz: Väter-Aktivisten unter Terrorverdacht”, Die Presse, 20 February 2010; 
“Väter-Aktivist unter Terror-Verdacht”, Kleine Zeitung, 25 February 2010.
64 See “Kunststudenten unter Terrorverdacht”, Der Standard, 14 February 2011.
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Intrusive procedural investigation measures such as telephone tapping, data 
mining or optical and acoustic surveillance require either concrete suspicion of severe 
crimes which are punishable by high custodial sentences (e.g. custodial sentences of 
more than ten years for optical and acoustic surveillance) or the suspicion of a criminal 
organisation or terrorist group or punishable acts committed or planned within the 
framework of such an organisation or association. Therefore if, for example, only 
offences with lower penalties, such as the destruction of property, have been committed 
or can be proved, several investigative measures are not allowed but if there is a 
suspicion of terrorist association, the whole range of measures can be applied. 
Moreover the suspicion that someone might belong to a terrorist group (or 
criminal organisation) under certain circumstances seems to be easier to construct as 
a prerequisite for an investigation measure than the suspicion of an offence against 
life and limb or against property if it is not so clear whose behaviour has caused 
damage. For the suspicion of a terrorist group or a criminal organisation, the judicial 
authorities seem to consider sufficient that there are contacts between the suspects and 
the suspicion that one of the members of these groups could have committed such an 
offence. Often this suspicion is quite vague and is per se – as the mentioned cases show 
– not sufficient for a conviction, since the terrorist aim cannot be proven in the end. 
The wide scope of application of preparatory offences such as the terrorist provisions 
does not require the suspicion of a concrete criminal offence. This makes it quite easy 
for the police to refer to these provisions to carry out investigative measures, since it 
is not necessary to prove that an act actually caused a damage or injury. 
This is the main problem of terrorist offences in practice. To cover behaviour in the 
preparation phase of a criminal offence, it is necessary to choose formulations of the 
statutory definitions which are quite broad and only require a few objective elements. 
The statutory definition of a terrorist group only requires the participation in a group of 
at least three persons established over a period of time. These are requirements which 
are not very difficult to prove, but which do not make a group a terrorist group. 
The circumstance which is essential to be a terrorist group is terrorist intent. This 
is a purely subjective element, for which it is often not possible to present concrete 
elements, but which depends on the arguments put forward by law enforcement 
authorities. Austrian law does not require that planning for terrorist attacks is 
specifically and firmly established. It is sufficient that there is a general plan to 
commit any terrorist offence (not necessarily specified at the moment) by at least 
one member of the group  65. Determining whether an offence is a terrorist offence 
primarily depends on whether the perpetrator intends to intimidate a population 
seriously; to compel unduly a government or international organisation to perform, 
to allow or abstain from performing any act; or to seriously destabilise or destroy 
the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or socials structures of a country 
or an international organisation. Since dolus eventualis is sufficient, it does not 
require specific prerequisites to assert a suspicion which is necessary for investigative 
measures. The consequence of all this is that it is, in some cases, easier to come up 
65 See f. Plöchl, op. cit., § 278b marginal number 7.
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with elements to suspect somebody of terrorist (or organised crime) offences since the 
statutory definitions are broader than for other offences. 
This means that there is a danger that the existence of a suspicion of a terrorist 
offence is pointed out to carry out an investigative measure in spite of a lack of real 
evidence for such an offence. Even if this does not lead to a conviction, this can have 
serious consequences for the suspects as the legal proceedings against the animal 
activists shows. The long proceedings against them meant that they incurred huge 
costs (for defence lawyers) and resulted in them losing their jobs, having a presence 
in the media for months and damaging their reputation 
However, this is not only a problem of legal provisions but also of the police and 
of the prosecution authorities that apply these provisions to such groups. It is clear that 
it is not the purpose of these offences to prosecute groups protesting about political, 
social or economic issues. It is the task of the police and public prosecution services to 
apply these provisions to those cases that should be covered by these provisions. The 
statutory definitions of offences may be broad but law enforcement authorities should 
interpret them in a way that they are only applied in cases which were intended to be 
covered by these provisions.  
5.	 Conclusion
Criminal law is increasingly seen as a means to prevent terrorism as the name of 
Austrian government bill (“Terrorism prevention law”) suggests. This aim highlights 
the problem of the criminal provisions against terrorism. Terrorists are often not afraid 
of being punished as they are either ready to die or go to prison for their terrorist acts. 
In that sense, it is difficult to say whether criminal law provisions are an appropriate 
means of preventing terrorism. In order to have any preventive effect they have to 
cover behaviour long before the commission of a concrete offence.
To achieve this aim, rather high penalties are provided for actions which are 
carried out in the forefront of concrete infringements of legally protected interests. 
The provisions on terrorist offences make a type of behaviour punishable which 
would not be punishable per se  66. The main problem of such offences – not only 
terrorist offences, but also the provisions on criminal organisations – is that the main 
factor for punishment is the aim of a behaviour which is not particularly dangerous 
per se. As a consequence, the statutory definitions of offences are rather broad and 
vague. This makes it difficult to state whether such behaviour is really dangerous and 
worthy of punishment. 
The problem of these broad definitions could be seen in Austrian practice where 
groups protesting or fighting for rights have been prosecuted for terrorism or organised 
crime. If the legal provisions enable the application of such provisions to cases which 
are definitely not cases of terrorism (or organised crime), it is the task of the legislator 
to provide for limitations to the offences. The existing negative definition of terrorism 
in Austria is too narrow and too indefinite to solve this problem. If the legislator does 
not provide limitations to the offences, there is a danger that such provisions are used 
and abused to investigate or prosecute opposition groups. It is therefore necessary 
66 See f. Plöchl, op. cit., § 278a marginal number 2 and § 278b marginal number 2.
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– on a national as well as on a European level – to find limitations to the statutory 
definitions, which clearly exclude the application of terrorism provisions to opposition 
groups and NGOs. 

Domestic provisions and case law:  
the Belgian case  1
Anne weyembergh and Laurent Kennes
1.	 The	context
Until recently, the terrorist threat facing Belgium was far more limited than the 
threat facing other Member States of the EU, such as Italy, Spain, France, Germany 
and the UK. 
However, this does not mean that it was totally non-existent. As was the case for 
numerous other western European States, in first half of the 1980s Belgium had to 
face extreme left-wing domestic terrorism, especially the activities of the so-called 
cellules communistes combattantes (CCC) [Combatant communist cells]. Although 
this group carried out a number of terrorist attacks which resulted in the death of two 
firemen and three injured persons  2, they were not as serious as those carried out by 
the German Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) or the Italian Brigate Rosse  3.
During the late 1980s and 1990s, no significant terrorist threat was recorded. 
But the situation changed about ten years ago. Although, as in other EU countries 
(see for instance the case of Italy), domestic terrorism does not seem to present the 
main danger any more, two recent cases show that such a threat has not completely 
disappeared: one concerns the left-wing extremist group parti communiste politico-
1 The authors wish to thank Julie Dutry (currently Substitut du procureur du Roi and until, 
February 2012, attaché à la DG Législation − SPF Justice, in charge of terrorism files) for her 
precious assistance and observations. Parts of this has been inspired by A. Weyembergh and 
L. Kennes, Droit pénal spécial, Limal, Anthemis, 2011, T. 1, p. 101 and f.
2 See especially the attack of 1st May 1985 in front of the head office of the Fédération des 
entreprises de Belgique (FEB).
3 For more information about the CCC’s activities and links with RAF and Action directe, 
see especially R. HaQuin and P. StéPhany, Les grands dossiers criminels en Belgique, Bruxelles, 
Racine, 2005, p. 261 and f.
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militaire (PCPM)  4 and the other concerns the right-wing extremist group Blood and 
Honour Vlaanderen  5. 
However, according to intelligence and investigative authorities, the international 
terrorist threat and especially the threat related to Islamist terrorism has become of 
major concern. With some exceptions (see especially the Nizar Trabelsi case, also 
known as the case of the military barracks of Kleine Brogel  6), criminal judicial 
procedures and/or judgments in Belgium do not concern the preparation or realisation 
of specific terrorist attacks on Belgian territory. Instead, they concern participation 
in terrorist groups. Belgium seems to serve as a logistics base for terrorist Jihadist 
groups, cells and networks. It also appears that recruitment and training for terrorism 
has been organised from Belgium (see especially the Afghan kamikaze network case, 
also called the Malika El Aroud case  7). These latter cases also show that Belgium 
has not avoided the phenomena of homegrown terrorism and self-radicalisation.
Unlike Spain or France for instance, Belgium is not, as such, a target for separatist 
terrorist organisations. However, some members of organisations such as ETA or the 
PKK are present on Belgian territory and have been arrested  8.
By comparison with other EU Member States such as the UK, Belgium does 
not face a significant threat from animal rights groups or environmental eco-terrorist 
groups. 
2.	 The	legislation	adopted	to	implement	the	2002	and	2008	FDs
Before the transposition of the 2002 FD, Belgium was among the Member States 
of the EU that did not have terrorist offences as such in their criminal law. Belgian 
criminal law did not refer to terrorist offences as such because the terrorist threat 
was limited and because terrorist cases could be dealt with on the grounds of other 
incriminations and qualifications – as was especially shown by the convictions handed 
out in the CCC group case  9 and the Nizar Trabelsi case or case of the military 
barracks of Kleine Brogel  10.
4 Also called case of the secours rouge international. This case is still pending. In March 
2012, the Chambre du Conseil of Brussels should pronounce itself on the transfer of the four 
individuals concerned to the tribunal correctionnel.
5 This case is still pending. The decision of the Tribunal correctionnel de Dendermonde 
should be issued some time in March 2012.
6 Among the facts forming the basis of the case was the attempted suicide attack against 
the military barracks of Kleine Brogel (see infra).
7 See infra.
8 In this regard, see for example the TE-SAT 2011 report (EU Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Report), p. 21 and 37.
9 Four members of the Cellules communistes combattantes (CCC) [Communist combatant 
cells], including Pierre Carette and Bertrand Sassoye, were tried by the Cour d’assises 
de Bruxelles in September and October 1988. It resulted in their being sentenced to life 
imprisonment (réclusion à perpétuité). 
10 The individuals concerned, including Nizar Trabelsi, were sentenced in a decision 
in the first degree of 30 September 2003 by the tribunal correctionnel de Bruxelles, which 
was subsequently confirmed by a decision of the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles in June 2004 (see 
infra).
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The implementation of the 2002 FD through the Belgian law of 19 December 
2003 concerning terrorist offences  11 introduced significant legislative changes. It 
inserted terrorist offences and offences related to a terrorist group into Belgian law. 
The implementing law of 19 December 2003 introduced a new Title Iter in the second 
part of the Criminal Code  12, containing Articles 137 and following, which will be 
analysed afterwards. 
Belgium has not implemented the 2008 FD yet. A draft bill has been prepared by 
the Ministry of Justice but has not even been officially submitted to the parliament 
because of the long-running Belgian political crisis and the successive resignations of 
governments. Following the establishment of a new government in December 2011, 
the implementation of the 2008 FD is one of the priority files of the new Minister of 
Justice, Annemie Turtelboom. It may well be that more than was the case with the 
transposition of the 2002 FD, the transposition of the 2008 FD could result in sensitive 
debates related to the vague and extensive definitions of the offences concerned, to 
the consequently large margin for manoeuvre left to the judges and to the respect of 
the legality principle. The potential conflict with freedom of speech and expression 
could of course also be raised. The need for transposition could be debated too. For 
recruitment and training for terrorism, some could argue on the basis of the existing 
case law (see infra) that the pre-existing terrorist offences and especially the offences 
related to a terrorist group are sufficient. However the question would then be whether 
the interpretation of the existing offences by case law only meets the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) requirements in order to consider it a complete transposition, which 
gives sufficient guarantees in terms of legal security  13. For “public provocation to 
commit a terrorist offence”, it could be argued that it is already covered by an ancient 
11 Moniteur Belge, 29 December 2003. This law also implemented the UN Convention for 
the repression of terrorism financing of 9 Dec. 1999 (Article 141 CP).
12 For more information about this law, see especially M.-A. beernaert, “La loi du 19 
décembre 2003 relative aux infractions terroristes : quand le droit pénal belge évolue sous la 
dictée de l’Union européenne”, J.T., 2004, p. 585 and f.; D. flore, “La loi du 19 décembre 
2003 relative aux infractions terroristes : genèse, principes et conséquences”, in Questions 
d’actualités de droit pénal et de procédure pénale, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, p. 209 and f.; 
V. hameeuw, “Strafbaarstelling van terroristische misdrijven : van Europees kaderbesluit tot 
het Belgische Strafwetboek”, T. Strafr., 2005, p. 2 and f.
13 Transposition into national law does not necessarily require that its provisions be 
incorporated formally and verbatim in express, specific legislation ; sometimes a general legal 
context may, depending on the content of the directive, be adequate. The Court nevertheless 
demands that the transposition is carried out in such a way as to guarantee the full application 
of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner. The provisions of directives must 
be implemented with unquestionable binding force, and the specificity, precision and clarity 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of legal certainty. In this regard, the Court has ruled that, in 
order to achieve the clarity and precision needed to meet the requirement of legal certainty, it is 
not sufficient that the settled case-law of a Member State interprets the provisions of national law 
in a manner deemed to satisfy the requirements of a directive (ECJ, case C-144/99, Commission 
v. Netherlands, paras. 20 and 21) (see K. lenaerts and P. van nuffel, Constitutional Law of 
the EU, London, Thomson, Sweet and Maxwell, 2nd ed., 2005, p. 766 and f.).
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law dating back to 1891  14, which incriminates incitement to commit criminal 
offences in general. However such law only covers direct incitement whereas the 
2008 FD covers both direct and indirect incitement. That is why, according to the 
Belgian federal prosecutor, J. Delmulle, for example, it would not be sufficient to rely 
on the existing legislation  15. 
3.	 The	legislation	in	detail
A.	 Definition	of	offences	and	penalties
The new Title Iter introduced by law of 19 December 2003 into the Belgian 
Criminal Code concerning terrorist offences includes Articles 137 to 141ter of the 
Criminal Code (hereafter CC). 
With these new provisions, only two types of offences defined in the 2002 FD 
were explicitly implemented, namely terrorist offences (Articles 137 and 138 CC) on 
the one hand (1) and the offences relating to a terrorist group (Articles 139 and 140 
CC) on the other hand (2). Concerning the third type of offences referred to in the 
FD, i.e. offences linked to terrorist activities, they were considered as being already 
covered by Belgian criminal law. The Belgian legislator also took the opportunity to 
put domestic law into line with the UN International Convention of 9 December 1999 
on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Although the transposition of the 
2002 FD covered most of the 1999 Convention requirements, the contribution to the 
commission of a terrorist offence committed independently of a terrorist group was 
added (3). The Belgian legislator also added some clarification regarding the scope of 
the provisions concerned (4).
1. The terrorist offences (Articles 137 and 138 CC)
Article 137 gives a definition of the terrorist offences which is quite faithful to the 
requirements of the 2002 EU FD. The three constituent elements are present, namely 
the material acts, the particular seriousness of the danger created and the moral 
element or terrorist intent.
Article 137, para. 2 and 3, list the material acts which can constitute a terrorist 
offence. They are either pre-existing criminal offences (para. 2)  16 or new offences 
which did not exist previously and which are only punishable as terrorist offences 
(para. 3)  17. In line with the 2002 EU FD, the threat to realise one of the offences 
14 See Loi du 25 mars 1891 portant répression de la provocation à commettre des crimes ou 
des délits [Law of 25 March 1891 on repressing provocation to commit crimes or offences].
15 See the hearing of 3 February 2009 of J. Delmulle, Federal prosecutor concerning the 
evaluation of antiterrorist legislation on 3 February 2009, Doc. parl., Chambre, S.O. 52, 2008-
2009, 2128.
16 They cover, for example, homicide, voluntary grievous bodily harm, hostage taking, 
abduction, massive destruction or damage of constructions (bridges, buildings, dikes, roads, 
etc), means of transportation (ships, cars, aircrafts, etc.), computer systems – insofar as this 
destruction or damage puts human lives in jeopardy or leads to significant economic losses –, 
etc.
17 They cover, for example, the making and storage of nuclear and chemical weapons, 
use of such arms or biological arms, research and development of chemical arms, release of 
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identified is also provided for. According to the explanatory note, however, such a 
threat must be serious  18.
To be qualified as terrorist offences, these acts must result in a serious danger: 
they must be acts which, because of their nature or context, could seriously harm a 
country or an international organisation. 
Terrorist offences imply a terrorist intent, which is defined in the same terms as in 
the FD: the offence must have been committed “with the aim of seriously intimidating 
a population, or unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to 
perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying 
the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or 
of an international organization”. 
Article 138 provides for the penalties in full conformity with the EU FD. For the 
pre-existing offences listed in Article 137, para. 2, Article 138, para. 1, organises a 
system of aggravation of the penalties. The sanctions are those provided for for the 
pre-existing offences systematically aggravated. For example, the fine is replaced by 
a sentence of imprisonment of one year to three years, imprisonment of six months 
maximum is replaced by a prison sentence of three years maximum, etc. Regarding 
the new offences of Article 137, para. 3, the penalties are provided for by Article 138, 
para. 2. They are all of a criminal nature, except for the threat which is sanctioned with 
a prison sentence of three months to five years if it concerns an offence punishable 
with a correctional sentence (“peine correctionnelle”) and by a prison sentence of five 
to ten years if it concerned an offence punishable with a criminal sentence (“peine 
criminelle”). 
2. The offences relating to a terrorist group (Articles 139 and 140 CC)
Before examining the act of participation in a terrorist group, the existence of a 
terrorist group must be scrutinised. That is the reason why Article 139, para. 1, first 
defines such a group. The definition is expressed identically as in the 2002 FD, namely 
“a structured association of more than two persons, established over a period of time 
and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences covered by Article 137”. The notion 
of “structured association” is not defined as such. In this regard, reference is to be 
made to the definition of Article 2, para. 1, of the 2002 FD. The article nonetheless 
stipulates that an organisation whose real purpose is solely of political, trade union 
or philanthropic, philosophical or religious nature, or which solely pursues any other 
legitimate aim, cannot, as such, be considered a terrorist group.
Article 140 CC makes it a criminal offence to participate in the activity of a 
terrorist group. Such participation can take two forms: either the situation of anyone 
who participates in an activity of a terrorist group, including by providing information 
or material resources to that group or through any form of financing of a terrorist 
group’s activity, in the knowledge that such participation aids the commission of 
dangerous substances which put human lives in jeopardy and the disruption of the supply of 
fundamental natural resources which put human lives in jeopardy.
18 Doc. parl., Chambre, S.O. 2003-2004, n° 51-258-1, p. 11.
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a crime or délit of the terrorist group (para. 1) or the direction of a terrorist group 
(para. 2). 
The requirement that the participant has the knowledge that such participation 
aids the commission of an offence is essential and must be demonstrated by the public 
prosecutor. Participation without such knowledge is not sanctioned by Article 140. The 
travaux préparatoires are very clear in this respect  19. This element of knowledge is 
a fortiori required for acts of direction of a terrorist group  20.
The penalties for leading a terrorist group are more severe than those incurred for 
“mere” participation: whereas the participant will be sanctioned with a prison sentence 
of five to ten years and a fine from 550 to 27,500 euros, the leader will be sanctioned 
with a prison sentence from 15 to 20 years and a fine from 5,500 to 1,100,000 euros. 
3. Contribution to the commission of a terrorist offence committed independently 
of a terrorist group (Article 141 CC)
Article 141 was added to put Belgian law in line with the UN International 
Convention of 9 December 1999 on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
Although the transposition of the 2002 FD covered most of the 1999 Convention 
requirements, the contribution to the commission of a terrorist offence committed 
independently of a terrorist group was not as such covered. This was inserted by 
Article 141, which punishes each person who, outside the cases provided for in Article 
140, furnishes the means, including a financial contribution, with a view to committing 
a terrorist offence of Article 137 by way of a prison sentence from five to ten years and 
a fine from 550 to 27,500 euros.
B.	 Two	clauses	framing/restricting	the	scope	of	application	of	the	offences	
(Articles	141bis	and	141ter	CC)
Articles 141bis and 141ter CC give some details about the scope of the legislation 
concerning terrorist offences. 
19 Doc. parl., Chambre, S.O., 2003-2004, n° 258/001, p. 13: “(…) the person must know 
that his/her participation contributes to the perpetration of crimes and offences by a terrorist 
group. An example of this might be people who financially support an organisation to allow 
it to buy weapons. The existence of the ‘terrorist group’ depends to a large extent on these 
anonymous people who finance it or give it a basis through material or intellectual services. It 
is desirable to incriminate such behavour in a person, who knowingly allows the perpetration of 
a crime or an offence. The form that these contributions take or their occasional or systematic 
nature is not taken into account”.
From the so-called travaux préparatoires it also emerges that the crimes and délits to the 
commission of which the participation should contribute “are, in first place, terrorist offences 
but may include other offences. We know that terrorist groups are often guilty of other offences 
such as money laundering to collect the funds necessary for their activities” (Doc. parl., 
Chambre, S.O., 2003-2004, n° 258/001, p. 13) (free translation).
20 From the travaux préparatoires, it results that: “it will be more generally about 
people who take on the main responsibilities within the group. For this category of people, a 
heavier penalty is justified because of their central role in the ‘terrorist group’, they are more 
knowledgeable about the offences than anyone else and because they take the final decisions” 
(Doc. parl., Chambre, S.O., 2003-2004, n° 258/001, p. 14) (free translation).
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Reflecting the eleventh para. of the preamble of the 2002 FD, Article 141bis 
excludes from the scope of Articles 137 to 140, on the one hand, actions by armed 
forces during periods of armed conflict, as defined and governed by international 
humanitarian law and, on the other hand, inasmuch as they are governed by other 
rules of international law, actions by the armed forces of a State in the exercise of 
their official duties.
Article 141ter contains a safeguard clause related to fundamental rights and 
freedoms, in particular freedom of assembly and association. This clause was very 
much criticised since it is of limited use in legal terms because it is obvious that 
Belgium is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, including its 
Articles 8 to 11. It underlines the sensitivity of the new provisions related to terrorist 
offences.
C.	 Some	specific	procedural	rules	applicable	to	terrorist	offences	
We will limit ourselves to mention three specific procedural rules applicable to 
terrorist offences. 
First, some specific investigation methods (méthodes particulières de recherche 
or MPR) and other particular investigation techniques can be used where terrorist 
offences are concerned  21. 
The Belgian law dated 19 December 2003 added the terrorist offences to the list 
of offences where telephone tapping was allowed, a list which is contained in Article 
90ter, para. 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Code d’instruction criminelle 
(hereafter CCP). The latter provides for a list of offences which, by reference, determine 
the scope of application of various other measures implying an interference in privacy 
and authorised by the Code, such as, for example, undercover operations, observation 
technology enabling law enforcement officers to look at what is happening in houses, 
hearing witnesses on the basis of anonymity, discreet visual controls or proactive 
investigations.
Second, the terrorist offences are submitted to specific rules concerning 
extraterritorial competences, which are inspired by Article 9, para. 1, of the EU 
2002 FD. Belgian authorities have jurisdiction in respect of offences covered by the 
Title Iter of the Criminal Code perpetrated outside Belgium when:
− the offence was committed by a Belgian national or any person who has his/her 
main residence in Belgium (Article 6, 1°ter of the Preliminary Title of the CCP);
− the offence was committed against a Belgian national, a Belgian institution or an 
institution or a body of the European Union having its seat in Belgium (Article 
10ter 4° of the Preliminary  Title of the CCP);
− extraterritorial competence is imposed under a rule of international law binding 
on Belgium (Article 12bis of the Preliminary Title of the CCP).
21 See M.L. cesoni, “Terrorisme et involutions démocratiques”, Rev. dr. pén., 2002, p. 141 
and f.
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Third, the Office of the Federal Prosecutor (the so-called parquet fédéral) may 
exercise prosecution when a good justice administration requires it (Article 144ter of 
the Code judiciaire). In practice, such centralisation nearly always happens  22. 
4.	 Brief	assessment	of	the	Belgian	implementing	law
Generally speaking, the Belgian law of 19 December 2003 is in line with the 
2002 FD. As emerges from the previous brief description, the imprint of the 2002 FD 
is indeed very much present. The report from the Commission on the implementation 
of the FD pointed out a gap existing in the transposition law  23. This lacuna concerns 
the incrimination of attempted minor terrorism offences (the so-called tentatives de 
délit). The draft bill implementing the EU 2008 FD should fill this gap.
The Belgian law of 19 December 2003 was severely criticised, especially by part 
of Belgian doctrine, by defence lawyers and by NGOs working in the field of human 
rights protection. One of the main criticisms it had to face concerned the vagueness 
of some constituent elements of the terrorist offences and the resulting breach of 
the legality principle. In spite of such criticisms, the proposal, which subsequently 
became the law of 19 December 2003, was adopted without too many difficulties. 
In its advice on the draft proposal  24, the Council of State (Law section) considered 
that, although checking the realisation of some of the constituent elements of the 
terrorist offences could create difficulties, the proposal met the requirements of the 
legality principle  25. It concludes on this point by stating that “Whether regarding 
the appreciation of the intentional element or that of the materialness of the offence, 
it will be up to jurisdictions to interpret Article 136bis in a restrictive way by basing 
themselves on the objective elements that emerge from the file. For possible scenarios 
on the borderline, the benefit of the doubt will go to the accused”  26.
During the discussions in parliament, some members noticed the broad margin 
of manoeuvre left to the judicial authorities  27 and underlined the need to safeguard 
22 See especially circulaire commune de la ministre de la Justice et du Collège des 
procureurs généraux relative à l’approche judiciaire en matière de terrorisme [joint circular of 
the Ministry of Justice and the College of general prosecutors relating to the judicial approach 
to terrorism] (COL 9/2005). Such circular was several times completed by addenda, as COL 
18/2006 (concerning special investigation judges – juges d’instruction) and COL 2/2007 about 
the Organe de Coordination pour l’Analyse de la Menace (OCAM) [the Coordination Body 
for Threat Analysis]. On the advantages of such centralisation, see J. Delmulle, Doc. parl., 
Chambre, S.O. 52, 2008-2009, 2128, p. 18 et s., p. 52.
23 Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 
13 June 2002 on combatting terrorism (6 November 2007, COM (2007) 681 final), p. 8.
24 For a critical approach of this advice, see. M.L. cesoni, “Une évaluation des législations 
antiterroristes: les nouvelles incriminations”, op. cit., p. 12.
25 It considered that the draft proposal “is not drafted in such a way that the notions that 
it contains would deprive those subject to the rule of the requirement of precision, clarity and 
predictability (Conseil d’Etat, Opinion no. 34.362/4, § 8) (free translation).
26 Ibid. (free translation).
27 See for example M. Giet (Doc. parl., Chambre, S.O. 2003-2004, n° 51-258-4).
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human rights  28. Their interventions only resulted in the maintenance or development 
of formal guarantees as the ones provided for in Article 141ter CC  29. 
The proposal was first adopted within the Chambre des Représentants on 13 
November 2003 by 131 votes to three with one abstention. It was then transmitted 
to the Senate where a few senators said that they were concerned about the broad 
definition of terrorist offences and/or referred to the concerns expressed by some 
NGOs  30. These objections were, however, quickly set aside and the text was adopted 
by the Senate on 5 December 2003. 
After the adoption of the law, three NGOs (Ligue des droits de l’homme, Liga 
voor Mensenrechten and the Syndicat des avocats pour la démocratie) introduced a 
request for annulment before the Belgian Constitutional Court. Through a decision 
dated 13 July 2005, the Court rejected the request  31. It did not consider necessary to 
refer a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice as requested by the NGOs. 
On the basis of the case law of the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
Constitutional Court identified some possible difficulties of interpretation, particularly 
regarding the terrorist intent or mens rea of the terrorist offences. But it considered 
that the courts will have to strictly interpret the relevant penal provisions  32, to take 
into consideration the various formal safeguards contained in Title Iter CC (Articles 
139, para. 2, and 141ter CC)  33. And it concluded that even if it leaves a wide margin 
of appreciation to the judge, the law does not confer on him an autonomous power of 
incrimination, which would affect the competences of the legislator.
Despite this ruling, the risks for the legality principle continued to be stressed  34. 
The extensive interpretation of the offences related to a terrorist group given by some 
28 See for example Mr Giet, Muls, Mrs Claes and Taelman (Ibid.).
29 “En cette matière, il vaut mieux être inutilement explicite que dangereusement 
silencieux et ambigu” [“In this area, it is better to be uselessly explicit than dangerously silent 
and ambiguous”], Doc. parl., Chambre, S.O. 2003-2004, n° 51-258-4, p. 10-11.
30 See Mr Vankrunkelsven and Mrs Nyssens, Sénat de Belgique, S.O. 2003-2004, 3-332/3, 
3 December 2003.
31 Ruling no. 125/2005 (available on the website http://www.arbitrage.be/): “The principle 
of criminal legality proceeds (...) from the idea that criminal law must be formulated in terms 
that allow everyone to know, at the moment when they adopt a particular behaviour, if it is 
punishable or not. It requires that the legislator indicates, in sufficiently precise, clear terms 
and offering legal certainty, what facts are punished so that on the one hand the person who 
adopts a particular behaviour can evaluate beforehand in a satisfactory way what the criminal 
consequence of this behaviour will be and, on the other hand, that too much power of appreciation 
is not left to the judge. However, the principle of legality in criminal law does not prevent the 
law attributing a power of appreciation to the judge. It is necessary to take account of the nature 
of generality of laws, the diversity and variability of situations as well as the subjects that they 
apply to and the evolution of behaviours that they punish” (free translation).
32 See point B.7.2.
33 See point B.7.3.
34 See especially the concern expressed by Greenpeace and trade unions at their hearings 
of 9 June 2009 on their assessment of the legislation on terrorist offences, Doc. parl., Chambre, 
S.O. 52, 2008-2009, 2128, p. 59 and f.) and the concern of NGOs active in the field of protection 
of human rights as the Ligue des droits de l’homme and the Comité de vigilance en matière 
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courts – and especially the ruling of the Court of Appeal of Ghent in the DHKP-C 
case  35 – as well as variations in the interpretations by case law – in this DHKP-C 
case – have partly fed such worries. 
Another criticism addressed to Articles 137 and f. CC concerns the preventive 
nature of the incriminations provided. Such a criticism relates especially to the 
incrimination of the threat to realise a terrorist offence even if not followed by any 
effect (Article 137, para. 3, 6°) or to the incrimination of the contribution to an offence 
which has eventually neither been committed nor even attempted (Article 141)  36. 
More generally speaking, a source of concern is the shift of the judicial intervention 
from a reactive and repressive nature (downstream of the criminal acts) towards a 
preventive nature (upstream of the criminal acts)  37 or the move or enlargement of 
criminal law towards prevention and its consequences.
It is a safe bet that the future amendments which should soon be brought to Title 
Iter CC in order to implement the EU 2008 FD will not hush up the aforementioned 
criticisms or put an end to the practical implementation/interpretation difficulties.
5.	 Terrorist	offences	in	Belgian	case	law
Since 2003, more than 40 individuals have been tried before the Belgian courts 
under terrorism charges  38. In 2010, 65 new files were opened (54 went through the 
‘information’ process and 11 through the ‘instruction’ process). 
To our knowledge, up until now, no prosecution has been launched and no case has 
been brought to the Belgian courts on the basis of the qualification of terrorist offences 
(Articles 137 and 138 of CC). But four main cases have given rise to prosecutions and 
judgments involving offences related to a terrorist group (Articles 139 and 140 CC). 
They all concern facts committed after the entry into force of the Belgian law dated 
19 December 2003. These four cases are the following: 
− The case of the Moroccan Islamic Combattant Group (GICM − Groupe islamique 
combattant marocain) (A)
− The DHKP-C case (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party–Front) (B)
− The case of the Iraki kamikaze network (affaire dite de la “filière kamikaze 
irakienne”) (C) and
de lutte contre le terrorisme (Comité T) (see the annual reports of this Comité T available on 
the website : http://www.liguedh.be). See also M.L. cesoni, “Une évaluation des législations 
antiterroristes: les nouvelles incriminations”, avis pour la Commission de la Justice de la 
Chambre, octobre 2009 and M. moucheron, “Chronique de criminologie. Le terme terrorisme 
et la construction européenne: une histoire obscure”, Rev. dr. pén., 2004, p. 889 and f.
35 A. weyembergh and V. santamaria, “Lutte contre le terrorisme et droits fondamentaux 
dans le cadre du troisième pilier. La décision-cadre du 13 juin 2002 relative à la lutte contre le 
terrorisme et le principe de la légalité”, op. cit.
36 See M.L. cesoni, “Une évaluation des législations antiterroristes : les nouvelles 
incriminations”, op. cit., p. 4, 13, 14 and 17.
37 See the hearing of D. Vandermeersch, Doc. parl., Chambre, S.O. 52, 2008-2009, 2128, 
p. 43.
38 For numbers, see also those provided in the successive TE-SAT reports.
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Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid, waves of searches carried out in March 
and June 2004 in Brussels and in Maaseik led to the arrest and prosecution of 13 
people for having created a support cell for the GICM in Belgium. In this context, 
they were suspected of having supported the transfer to Europe of members of the 
group, some of them having received military training in Afghan camps linked to Al 
Qaeda and others being Islamist extremists sought in Morocco. They were said to 
have provided false documents as well as logistics support (lodging, vehicles, GSM 
etc.). These people were, inter alia, prosecuted for taking part in the activities of a 
terrorist group or as a leader of such a group.
On 16 February 2006  39, the Tribunal correctionnel of Brussels convicted most 
of the defendants under the abovementioned qualifications. On 15 September 2006, 
the Court of Appeal of Brussels toughened up the penalties of the four defendants by 
default. Three of them then opposed this decision, which resulted in a contradictory 
ruling on 19 January 2007  40. The court was seized of criminal procedure issues 
which will not be detailed here  41. As to the qualifications linked to the terrorist 
group, some defendants contested that the GICM could be qualified as a terrorist 
group as defined by Article 139, para. 1, of the criminal code  42. On this point, the 
court expressly rejected the argument put forward by the defence counsel according 
to which it would be up to the public prosecutor to prove the involvement of the group 
of defendants in terrorist attacks or to target preparatory acts showing that they would 
have contributed to the perpetration of crimes and délits by a terrorist group. The court 
declared on this point that “it is in no way required that the group structured with a 
view to committing terrorist offences has already committed them for its members to 
be punishable, nor even that it is preparing a specific one”  43. 
The court also examined if each of the three defendants had taken part in a terrorist 
group activity in the knowledge that this involvement contributed to the committing 
of a crime or a délit by the group and in what capacity. The court noted that this was 
the case when the three defendants had taken part in an activity of the terrorist group 
GICM, in particular by being members of the Belgian cell of this group, this cell being 
an essential logistical support cell for the smooth organisation of the terrorist group.
Finally, the court convicted two defendants in their capacity as leaders of the 
terrorist group. Basing itself on the travaux préparatoires, the court underlined that it 
does not need to be the only leader, i.e. to be the only person at the top of the hierarchy 
39 Corr. Bruxelles (54th Chamber bis), 16 February 2006.
40 Bruxelles (12th Chamber), 19 January 2007.
41 On its competence, on the specific investigation methods authorised by the examining 
magistrate, on the information provided by the Sûreté de l’Etat or the hearings carried out in 
Morocco and in France (p. 13 to 32).
42 Judgement, p. 33 to 36.
43 Judgement, p. 33 (free translation).
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of a group but that the person must have a ‘key role’ by taking on responsibilities 
fundamental to the smooth running of the group and by taking decisions or initiatives 
needed to ensure the permanence of its structure  44. They were sentenced respectively 
to seven and six years imprisonment.
As for the third defendant, convicted for taking part in activities of the terrorist 
group GICM, he was sentenced to five years imprisonment.
The three people convicted by the Court of Appeal then introduced a pourvoi en 
cassation, which the Court of Cassation rejected on 27 June 2007  45. As the domestic 
appeals’ procedures had been exhausted, an appeal to the European Court of Human 
Rights was made at the end of 2007  46.
The analysis of this decision shows very clearly that, in order to convict a person 
on the basis of offences related to a terrorist group (Article 139-140 CP), it is sufficient 
to establish the existence of a terrorist group and of an act of participation in one of 
this group’s activities. There is no need to establish commission or a plan to commit a 
terrorist offence in Belgium or abroad (Article 137).
B.	 The	DHKP-C	case	(Revolutionary	People’s	Liberation	Party–Front)
Eleven defendants were taken to court, of which several had been arrested in 
Knokke in September 1999 in an appartment where weapons, munitions, false papers 
and documents relating to the armed struggle led by the DHKP-C in Turkey were 
found. Two defendants were accused of being leaders of a terrorist group, namely 
Bahar K. and Musa A. 
This case resulted in a high number of judicial decisions, namely four decisions 
on the substance of the case and two rulings by the Cour de cassation. 
On 28 February 2006  47, the tribunal correctionnel of Bruges deemed that the 
DHKP-C corresponds to the definition of a terrorist group. Musa A. was sentenced to 
six years, in particular as a leader of a terrorist group and Bahar K. to four years as a 
‘mere’ participant in the activities of a terrorist group and not as a leader.
Via its ruling of 7 November 2006  48, the Court of Appeal of Ghent confirmed 
DHKP-C as a terrorist group  49. The sentences handed out were more severe for 
some defendants, including Musa A., who was sentenced to six years imprisonment 
44 Judgement, p. 62.
45 Cass. 27 June 2007, P.07.0333.F/1.
46 In this regard El Haski v. Belgium still pending (see also decision by the Court of 29 
June 2010, Hakimi v. Belgium).
47 Corr. Bruges (14th Chamber), 28 February 2006.
48 Ghent (6th Chamber), 7 December 2007.
49 On this occasion, the Court of Appeal of Ghent expressly underlined that registering 
the DHKP-C on the European Union’s terrorist organisations’ list is not sufficient as proof 
and does not exempt the judge from assessing whether the organisation matches the criteria of 
terrorist group as defined in Article 139 of the criminal code (judgement, p. 125-126; along the 
same lines, see also Court of Appeal of Antwerp, 7 February 2008, p. 48). With regard to these 
lists, see, among others, S. lavaux et P. Pieters, “Les listes nationales et internationales des 
organisations terroristes”, Rev. dr. pén., 2008, p. 715 and f.
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and Bahar K., sentenced to five years imprisonment this time in his capacity as leader 
of a terrorist group.
On 19 April 2007  50, this decision was quashed by the Court of Cassation, for 
procedural reasons that have nothing to do with what capacity the defendants were 
acting in  51.
The case was then referred to the Court of Appeal of Antwerp, which delivered 
a ruling on 7 February 2008  52. The court acquitted Musa A. and Bahar K. of the 
offence of taking part in the activities of a terrorist group, and by extension, of the 
offence consisting of leading such a group. 
The Antwerp Court of Appeal’s decision therefore offered a fundamentally 
different view of the facts that had been referred to it but also on the interpretation of 
the offences of taking part in the activities of a terrorist group. The reasoning for the 
decision is formulated, on this point, in the following terms:
“It does not emerge from any element of the file that the defendants had formed a 
terrorist group during the period during which they were facing charges. No element 
emerges that they had for a single moment the intention to form an association in 
order to commit terrorist offences as set out in the law. It clearly emerges that they do 
not condemn this kind of offence and quite the reverse. It is not up to the court to judge 
the way that the defendants think”.
In this respect, the court refers to Article 141ter of the criminal code:
 “No provision of this chapter can be interpreted as aiming to reduce or hinder 
rights or fundamental liberties such as the right to strike, freedom of meeting, of 
association or of expression, including the right to found trade unions with others and 
to consort for the defence of their interests and the related right to demonstrate and 
such as enshrined in particular by Articles 8 to 11 of the European convention for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. No element emerges from the 
file that during the period covered by the charges, the defendants have gone beyond 
the exercise of the rights of which the law foresees that they cannot in any case be 
reduced or hindered”  53.
The ruling was quashed, rightly we think, by the Court of Cassation on appeal 
by the federal prosecutor. On 24 June 2008, the Court of Cassation in particular 
considered that taking part in the activities of a terrorist group does not require that 
the perpetrator has directly taken part in a terrorist offence in Belgium or abroad. The 
ruling of the court is formulated in the following terms:
“12. The means, in this branch, invokes violation of Articles 139 and 140 of the 
criminal code: from the fact that the aforementioned defendants are not implicated 
in terrorist attacks committed abroad, it cannot be legally deduced that the criminal 
organisation does not exist.
50 Cass., 19 April 2007, P.06.1605.N/1.
51 The ruling was based on the violation of Articles 6, para. 1 European Convention on 
Human Rights and 14 para. 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
do not only require that the legal body is independent and impartial but also that there is no 
appearance of dependance or partiality.
52 Antwerp (13th Chamber), 7 February 2008.
53 Judgement, p. 159 (free translation).
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13. Article 140, para. 1, of the criminal code punishes any leader of a terrorist 
group defined in Article 139 of the same code.
Article 139, al. 1, of the criminal code, stipulates that by a terrorist group must 
be understood the structured association of more than two people, established in time, 
and which acts in a concerted way to commit terrorist offences covered in Article 
137.
14. A leader of a terrorist group can be punished if it is established that it 
concerns a terrorist group and, subsequently, that the person concerned is the leader 
of this group. Incrimination does not require that this person has him/herself had the 
intention of committing any terrorist offence in Belgium or elsewhere or that he/she 
was involved when the latter was committed. 
By deciding otherwise, the appeal judges have not legally justified their 
decision”  54.
Following this second ruling of cassation, the case was referred to the Court of 
Appeal of Brussels, which delivered its decision on 23 December 2009  55. This ruling, 
clearer and, in law, more convincing than that of the Court of Appeal of Antwerp, 
acquits the defendants from the charges based on the offences linked to a terrorist 
group. The court of appeal gave as reasoning for its decision that no element emerged 
from the file that these two defendants would have played a leading role within a 
terrorist group or that they would have taken part in an activity of a terrorist group in 
the sense of Article 140 of the criminal code. According to the court, it is neither shown 
that the activities reproached of the two defendants during the period in question have 
contributed to the commission of a crime or of a délit by the terrorist group or that 
they knew of it. The court pointed out that, inter alia, the information disseminated in 
the DHKP-C information office and its interpretation by the defendants falls under the 
protection of the right to freedom of expression  56. 
The epic legal journey of this case shows the difficulty for the judicial authorities 
to apply, in practice, the offences of leading a terrorist group or taking part in its 
activities. Whereas the two first appeal courts (of Bruges and Ghent) gave an extensive 
interpretation of the offence of participation in a terrorist group’s activities and 
especially an extensive interpretation of the notion of direction of such a group, the 
last two ones (of Antwerp and Brussels) gave, on the contrary, a strict interpretation 
of these notions. Such variations fed the abovementioned criticisms and concerns 
relating to the vagueness of the definition of the terrorist offences. 
C.	 The	case	of	the	Iraki	kamikaze	network		
(affaire	dite	de	la	“filière	kamikaze	irakienne”)
This case followed the kamikaze attack by Muriel Degauque in Iraq in November 
2005 and the death of her husband, killed by the Americans when he was preparing 
to commit a suicide attack. Six people faced charges for their involvement in a group 
transferring Jihad recruits to Iraq. One of them, namely Bilal S., was in particular 
charged for having taken part in the activities of a terrorist group as a leader. Four 
54 Cass., 24 June 2008, P.08.0408.N (it is our underlining) (free translation).
55 Brussels (13th chamber), 23 December 2009.
56 Judgement, p. 30 to 32.
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others were charged for having taken part in the activities of a terrorist group as 
members. That was the case for Youness L., who had basically gone to Iraq to fight 
the American ‘invader’ and had had a leg amputed there. Another defendant, Pascal 
C. converted to Islam and a friend of the husband of Murielle Degauque, had provided 
support during his departure and had then proceeded to convert his young companion, 
aged 19, in order to leave together for Iraq.
This case was the subject of a first decision by the Tribunal correctionnel of Brussels 
dated 10 January 2008  57. The court looked at the application of the aforementioned 
clause of Article 141bis of the criminal code  58. It rejected the arguments made by the 
defence of some of the accused invoking this so-called ‘exclusion clause’ of Article 
141bis CP. It considered that the behaviour of the defendants concerned came under the 
law on terrorism and not international humanitarian law  59. The court convicted Bilal 
S., in particular as being a leader of a terrorist group  60 to ten years imprisonment, 
the reason for the severity of this sentence being because of its particularly dangerous 
nature. Youness L. and Pascal C. were, for their part, convicted inter alia as members 
of a terrorist group  61 to five years of prison but benefited from a suspension for 
the time exceeding the custodial detention that they had already undergone. Another 
defendant was sentenced to the same punishment but together with a partial suspended 
sentence. A fifth defendant was sentenced to a lighter punishment of 28 months.
Both the defence counsel and the public prosecutor launched an appeal of the 
judgement. Through a ruling of 26 June 2008  62, the Court of Appeal of Brussels 
confirmed – via a reasoning different from that pursued by the Tribunal correctionnel 
of Brussels – the rejection of the application of the exclusion clause of Article 141bis 
but considerably reduced the sentences given against the defendants and acquitted 
Pascal C. The reasoning of the court with regard to the latter is interesting as regards the 
interpretation of the notion of participation in a terrorist group. The court established 
that Pascal C. had direct contacts and phone contacts with the other members of the 
group and particularly with the person who directs the group, that he shared their views, 
was arrested in their company, that he provided assistance to a potential kamikaze 
recruit. But the Court of Appeal considered that such assistance was not of the same 
nature as the assistance provided for by other members of the group. The acts of 
participation by Pascal C. could be justified by other motives than the will to take part 
in a terrorist group and more particularly by his friendship with the abovementioned 
kamikaze candidate. The court consequently concluded that Pascal C. did not commit 
an act of participation in a terrorist group’s activities with the knowledge that these 
acts would allow the realisation of offences by the group. 
57 Tribunal corr. Bruxelles (49th Chamber bis), 10 January 2008.
58 See infra.
59 On the difficulty for Belgian judges to qualify complex and distant situations on the basis 
of international humanitarian law, see O. venet, “Infractions terroristes et droit humanitaire: 
l’article 141bis du code pénal”, JT, 2010, p. 169 and f.
60 See judgement, p. 128.
61 Judgement, p. 137.
62 Court of Appeal Bruxelles (12th Chamber), 26 June 2006.
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D.	 The	case	of	the	Afghan	kamikaze	network		
(affaire	dite	de	la	“filière	kamikaze	afghane”)
This case was about ten people facing charges of taking part in the activities of a 
terrorist group, of which three as leaders. Among the latter facing charges was Malika 
E.A., accused inter alia for her responsibility for the creation and management of a 
Jihadi website and for her role in recruiting and financing potential fighters wanting 
to go back to Waziristan to do some military training there and, if necessary, to fight 
alongside the Taliban on Afghan soil.
Through its ruling of 10 May 2010  63, the Tribunal correctionnel of Brussels 
declared eight of the ten defendants guilty, of which Malika E.A., who was sentenced 
to eight years of imprisonment mainly for taking part as a leader of a terrorist group. 
This description and this sentence, as with that given against Muhammed E.A.B. for 
taking part in a terrorist group, have been confirmed by the Court of Appeal, which 
gave its decision on 1 December 2010  64. In general, these two decisions confirmed 
the principles previously highlighted for the interpretation of the applicable legal 
provisions, inter alia in the case of the Iraqi network. They have, inter alia, also ruled 
out the application of Article 141bis of the criminal code. And having concluded in 
the realisation of the legal conditions of the existence of a terrorist group, the Court 
of Appeal confirmed that Malika E.A. did take part in the activities of such a group 
by basing itself in particular on her intervention in the creation and management 
of a Jihadi propaganda site, on her active participation in the recruitment of Jihadi 
combatants, on her aid for the financing of potential combatants and on her aid for the 
translations of texts with a Jihadi connotation posted on the aforementioned website. 
The court also confirmed her function as a leader by basing itself on her coordinating 
activities, which shows the importance of her responsibilities and her key role within 
the terrorist group. As for the participation by Muhammed E.A.B. in the activities of 
this group, it was also confirmed on the basis of his role as an intermediary in bringing 
Jihadi recrutis to the area, advice provided to Malika E.A. and his collaboration in 
bringing necessary funds to the Jihadi group.
6.	 Perception	of	the	instrument	at	the	national	level
The perception of the 2002 FD and of the national implementing provisions 
depends in particular on the professional profile or background of the persons. 
Schematically, two groups emerge, whose opinions are difficult to reconcile. 
On the one side, defence lawyers  65 and NGOs working in the field of human 
rights protection and other NGOs are very critical: as seen previously, criticisms 
relate to the legality principle and to the preventive nature of some of the new 
incriminations  66.
63 Tribunal correctionnel, Bruxelles (49th Chamber), 10 May 2010.
64 Court of Appeal Bruxelles (11th Chamber), 1 December 2010.
65 In this regard see for instance the contribution of C. marchand to this book.
66 See the hearing of D. Vandermeersch, Doc. parl., Chambre, S.O. 52, 2008-2009, 2128, 
p. 43.
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On the other side, prosecution authorities and others involved in the fight against 
terrorism are rather positive towards the new offences, especially underlining their 
necessity, the improvement of investigative techniques and cooperation in the field. 
This is not to say that they are considering the Belgian law of December 2003 as 
perfect. They also identify some problems, such as the difficulties raised by the 
exclusion clause of Article 141bis.
The doctrine is divided. Some authors are quite critical  67 whereas others are 
more positive towards the legislation  68.
7.	 Conclusion
As seen in the developments noted above, Belgian law was very much marked by 
the EU 2002 FD. Its imprint is very strong if we compare Article 137 and f. CC with the 
text of the framework decision. Consequently, it was subjected to similar criticisms. 
It remains to be seen how – and when – the 2008 EU FD will be implemented. It will 
surely result in criticisms and concerns. Those will probably be even stronger than in 
the case of the 2002 EU FD since the new offences added by the 2008 one go even 
further upstream from the commission of terrorist offences. The need for practitioners 
to interpret them narrowly will be all the more essential.
67 See for example M.L. cesoni.
68  See for example D. flore.

Denmark: criminal law as an anchorage point 
for proactive anti-terrorism legislation
Jørn Vestergaard
1.	 Introduction:	Two	packages	of	anti-terrorist	legislation	in	Denmark
The response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was to put considerable effort into 
shoring up security both at international and domestic levels. This included many 
specific measures enacted by the international community and by individual States. In 
global, European and national contexts, inter alia, the UN 1999 Terrorist Financing 
Convention  1 and the wide-ranging United Nations Security Council Resolution SCR 
1373  2, which was passed shortly after 9/11, both had a big impact on legislation. 
With its batteries recharged and renewed determination, the European Union again 
took up the challenge of preparing various legislative acts. Up until then, negotiations 
on legislative acts had been moving ahead only very slowly. Political agreement was 
1 The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999. Denmark was one of the 
many countries that had not yet ratified the convention in 2001. The convention obliges States 
to criminalise direct or indirect provision or collection of funds where the intention is for them 
to be used in order to carry out an act of terrorism. For an act to constitute an offence, it shall 
not be necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an act of terrorism. Support 
for humanitarian aid may, depending on the circumstances, be considered a criminal act if 
the recipient of the funding is known to be involved in terrorism. The convention also places 
demands on legislation regarding jurisdiction, judicial cooperation, prosecution, extradition, 
the freezing and confiscation of assets, criminal liability for legal persons, etc.
2 UN Security Council Resolution no. 1373 of 28 September 2001 is binding under 
international law. This initiative substantially expanded the Security Council’s powers as an 
international legislature. The Security Council made a significant contribution to the globalisation 
of criminal law by committing all Member States to criminalise certain acts, freeze individuals’ 
and others’ funds, etc., on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
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quickly reached on two Framework Decisions, one on combating terrorism  3 and 
another on a European arrest warrant  4. In order to comply with the UN Security 
Council’s resolutions on targeted sanctions, the EU also established shared blacklists 
requiring Member States to freeze the assets of listed individuals and organisations, 
etc. The intrusiveness of these lists and the flimsy nature of the legal safeguards 
associated with them raise a number of fundamental questions with regard to due 
process and fundamental rights  5.	
This strong response in terms of measures to combat and prevent international 
terrorism has had a particularly profound impact on criminal law  6.	 In Denmark, 
the events of 9/11 immediately triggered a series of legislative initiatives. These were 
clustered into a single anti-terrorism package, which was enacted in 2002. A second 
anti-terrorism package was adopted in 2006 in the wake of the terrorist bombings in 
Madrid and London. Together, the two anti-terrorism packages significantly expanded 
the scope of substantive criminal law.
The amendments to the provisions in the substantive part of the Penal Code have 
prompted grave concerns as some of the legislative initiatives represent far-reaching 
new forms of criminalisation with a rather indeterminate scope. The boundaries 
of criminal law have been pushed so that they encompass various modalities of 
participation in activities that might represent a hypothetical risk of facilitating actual 
terrorist acts but that might actually be only very remotely linked to such activities. 
The actus reus as well as the mens rea requirements for incurring criminal liability 
are stipulated in quite vague terms, not only in the statutory provisions, but also in 
the preparatory work for the underlying legislation. In general, the two anti-terrorist 
packages consist of rushed measures based on preparatory work that is of insufficient 
legislative quality. The enacted criminal law provisions consist partly of verbatim 
transcripts of formulations found in EU law and other international sources that are 
not suitable as paradigms for drafting statutes under a domestic legal order. 
3 The Council’s Framework Decision 2002/475 of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism. 
Following political agreement on the FD, on 27 December 2001, the Council adopted two 
common positions that expressed agreement on the need for criminalisation, freezing of assets, 
police and judicial co-operation, see the common positions 2001/930 and 2001/931 CFSP.
4 Council Framework Decision 2002/584 of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest 
Warrant.
5 A vast amount of literature and jurisprudence has emerged with regard to the regimes 
concerning listing and freezing. For a recent account, see J. Vestergaard, “Terror Financing 
– Asset Freezing, Human Rights and the European Legal Order”, New Journal of European 
Criminal Law, 2011/2, p. 175-200. Among the particularly lucid contributions to the literature, 
those by Cameron and Eckes, respectively, deserve special attention. Regarding Danish law on 
the freezing regime, see section at the end of this article. 
6 For a thorough examination of the international legislation and its impact on national law, 
see Erling J. Husabø and I. Bruce, Fighting Terrorism through Multilevel Criminal Legislation. 
Security Council Resolution 1373, the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism and 
their Implementation in Nordic, Dutch and German Criminal Law, Leiden/Boston, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2009.
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2.	 Terrorism	provisions	as	a	point	of	reference	for	other	legislation
The provisions regarding acts of terrorism and offences related to terrorism 
enshrined in the Penal Code (PC) do not just prescribe a ban on certain acts, making 
them punishable offences that a perpetrator may be convicted of in a criminal court. 
They also constitute an anchorage point to which all other legislation on combating 
and preventing terrorism is attached, i.e. a common point of reference. Thus, the rules 
laid down in the Penal Code provide the basic foundations for many other components 
of subsequent anti-terrorism legislation, i.e. for regulations that determine the nature 
and scope of special powers held by various government bodies regarding cases 
involving “crimes against the State”  7.	
A whole series of statutes found elsewhere in legislation are linked to these 
provisions. Therefore, the provisions defining terrorist offences are integrated into 
other legislation as they constitute parts of the material criteria demarcating the 
limits for other offences and as they, further, set the boundaries for the exercise of 
various powers vested in the courts, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and 
other government authorities. Consequently, the substantive criminal provisions 
considerably influence decision-making regarding, for example, instigating coercive 
and particularly intrusive measures in criminal investigations and proceedings, 
disclosing or exchanging sensitive personal information and other kinds of data, refusing 
to grant citizenship, expelling foreigners from the country, placing aliens in detention 
or restricting their freedom, etc. The concerns about potentially undermining legal 
rights due to the adoption of vague and wide-reaching provisions under substantive 
criminal law relate in particular to the contagious effect of the legislative initiatives 
on decision-making in intelligence, investigative and administrative law contexts, 
where there is considerable risk of due process and fundamental rights being put in 
jeopardy. The provisions are conducive, for example, to an exaggerated propensity 
to authorise disproportionate control measures – including, in particular, targeting 
political activists and people with a non-Danish ethnic background – who belong to 
groups that communicate via unclear and/or coded messages or use militant rhetoric.
3.	 The	core	provision	on	terrorist	acts	–	Section	114	PC  8
A.		 Legislation
The 2002 anti-terrorism package inserted a new and innovative Section 114 into 
Chapter 13 of the Penal Code  9.	The provision did not in itself broaden the already 
existing scope of criminalisation. Evidently, terrorist acts could earlier have been 
punished under previously established provisions concerning various forms of serious 
crime, irrespective of a perpetrator’s terrorist motive. Politically, however, there was 
a desire “to convey more clearly that terrorism in all its forms is unacceptable in a 
7 Such “crimes against the State” are determined by the provisions in Chapters 12 and 13 of 
the Penal Code. The anti-terror provisions in Sections 114-114 h PC are placed in Chapter 13.
8 See Annex at the end of this contribution.
9 A provision with the same numbering previously contained a so-called ‘corps ban’ 
against supporting or participating in certain militant groups; the provisions have now been 
moved to Sections 114 f and 114 g, which will be analysed later.
170     the interPlay between euroPean instruments and domestic Provisions
democratic society”, as the Government’s explanatory memorandum to the bill put it. 
Under the new Section 114, the maximum penalty for all kinds of terrorist acts now 
became life imprisonment, a noticeably more severe punishment than that authorised 
for at least some of the particular offences included under the new statute, as the acts 
listed in Section 114 can be of a quite varying nature and, accordingly, attributed a 
different degree of culpability.
The amended Section 114 contains a definition of “terrorism”. The statutory 
definition lists a number of offences committed with the intent to seriously “intimidate 
a population”, to compel a government or an international organisation or to destabilise 
or destroy the social order in certain specified ways (see a partial citation of the actual 
statute below). 
In the explanatory memorandum that forms the preparatory work for Section 
114, it was stated that the statute covers both acts that have a further political 
purpose and actions whose goal is solely to generate general unrest and economic 
chaos. The statute is particularly open and far-reaching, among other things because 
the Penal Code, in line with the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, has 
adopted the term “destabilise or destroy (...) fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures”. The concept of “structures” is not used in a similar 
manner anywhere else in Danish legislation. The legislative material upon which the 
legislative act is based contains no particular indication of how the concept should be 
interpreted in a criminal law context. It covers the highest of government authorities 
as well as municipal and decentralised official bodies. From a legal perspective, this 
lack of clarity is quite worrying, especially in light of the fact that the latitude for 
sentencing extends – without any differentiation – all the way to life imprisonment as 
the maximum penalty. 
In line with the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, liability for violation 
of Section 114 PC also requires that the act committed may “seriously damage” a 
country or an international organisation. The exact meaning of this observation is 
not particularly clear although it is worth noting that some sort of legally relevant 
distinction was meant to be established. According to the travaux préparatoires 
however, the intention was not, for example, to limit the scope of the application 
of this provision to any specific type of harm, e.g. damaging basic infrastructure. In 
principle, therefore, Section 114 covers any form of serious harm.
The mens rea element required under Section 114 may be any form or degree 
of intent. In principle, therefore, even dolus eventualis (Eventualvorsatz, bedingter 
Vorsatz) could imply criminal liability. The same applies to the subsequent 
provisions on various offences related to terrorism. In other words, depending on 
the circumstances, it may be sufficient that a person has realised the risk of a certain 
occurrence qualifying as an actus reus element under Section 114.
The intent at the heart of the terrorism statute must be related to causing one or 
more of the specifically listed consequences of committing an offence of the sort 
particularly enumerated in the provision. Such “terrorist intent” may entail: 
– seriously intimidating a population, or 
– unduly compelling a government, in Denmark or abroad, or an international 
organisation, to perform or abstain from performing any act, or 
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– seriously destabilising or destroying “the fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation”.
In other words, the technical completion of the offence stipulated under Section 114 
has been moved forward in the sense that it depends on the perpetrator’s preparatory 
acts and the relevant intent, not on the commission of a fully-fledged act of terrorism. 
Thus, a defendant may be deemed criminally liable without any of the consequences 
listed actually occurring. The offence has been completed when one of the crimes 
listed in the provision has been committed, provided that the perpetrator acted with 
the necessary intent to bring about one of the stated consequences. A terrorist act can 
also consist of threatening to commit one of the offences specifically listed under 
Section 114.
It is well known that major difficulties arise in terms of reaching a consensus 
on the definition of terrorism both when drafting international agreements and in 
domestic legislative contexts  10.	 Two themes in particular give rise to different 
views. One is the possible recognition of a right of resistance for freedom fighters 
combating an oppressive regime or an occupying power and the other related to what 
is understood as being State terrorism. During the 6-7 December 2001 discussions 
about the Commission’s proposal for a Framework Decision on combating terrorism, 
Council statement 109/02 was issued in order to express political agreement that, for 
the Member States of the European Union, the proposed Framework Decision would 
cover acts “committed by individuals whose objectives constitute a threat to their 
democratic societies respecting the rule of law and the civilisation upon which these 
societies are founded”. Further, it was stated that the Framework Decision “cannot 
be construed so as to argue that the conduct of those who have acted in the interest 
of preserving or restoring these democratic values… could now be considered as 
‘terrorist’ acts”  11. 
According to the Council statement mentioned above, the Framework Decision 
can also not be used for incriminating, on terrorist grounds, “persons exercising their 
fundamental rights to display their opinions, even if in the course of the exercise of 
such rights they commit offences”  12.	 In principle, this implies that demonstrators 
and activists cannot normally be charged under sections related to terrorism. The legal 
boundaries are, however, still fluid.
10 Under the auspices of the United Nations, a draft comprehensive convention has been 
under discussion for several years.
11 Even though acts committed in the interest of preserving or restoring democratic values 
are, in principle, not considered to be terrorist in nature, the type and proportionality of the 
act may be of crucial relevance for the legal assessment. The killing of civilians can, under 
certain circumstances, be deemed to be an act of terror, even if the purpose was to rebel against 
a dictatorship or expel an occupying power. See below about the case against individuals 
associated with the company “Fighters+Lovers”.
12 The aim of the Council’s statement is reflected more broadly in the Framework Decision’s 
preamble recital 10, which declares respect for fundamental rights, such as those expressed in 
the ECHR and national constitutional traditions, e.g. regarding freedom of assembly, association 
and expression.
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The Council statement regarding the interpretation of the Framework Decision is 
quoted in the memorandum issued by the Danish Parliament’s Judiciary Committee 
accompanying the bill concerning the 2002 anti-terrorism package. The Committee 
noted that the Council statement should be taken into consideration in the interpretation 
of the new statute to rule out criminal liability in atypical cases not reasonably meant to 
be covered  13. The Penal Code provisions on terrorist activities and related offences 
must therefore be implemented in the light of these statements. When conducting an 
overall assessment of whether such a specific incident qualifies as terrorism, it may 
be relevant to include information on the perceptions of authoritative players in the 
international community, e.g. the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council.
The phrasing chosen in Section 114 is essentially the same as that of the Framework 
Decision. This reflects an unfortunate legislative technique. It is one thing that an 
intergovernmental legal act such as a Framework Decision uses relatively broad and 
vague terms. Depending on the circumstances, this may be reasonable and necessary, 
as international legislation may cover declarations of principle of a more or less 
general nature, which – although binding on the contracting States – may be phrased 
with a relatively high level of abstraction that requires meticulous transposition 
into the domestic law of the individual Member States. Wording of this sort is not 
necessarily suitable when it comes to defining offences under national criminal law, 
where a higher degree of precision should ideally be sought in accordance with a 
lex certa principle. The legislative technique used in the present context can hardly 
be said to meet the usual requirements for either readability or clarity and precision. 
Indeed, other Member States have opted to implement the framework decision in 
completely different ways to Denmark.
It is a matter of particular concern that the new provision under Section 114 
operates with a general maximum penalty of life imprisonment. In doing so, the 
legislature has, in quite a broad area covering very different types of offences, granted 
vast discretionary sentencing power to the judiciary. This sends a confusing signal to 
the courts and the public, since all the offences listed are placed on an equal footing 
in terms of sentencing latitude. The lack of differentiation between various degrees 
of culpability for specific offences is in itself problematic. Furthermore, increasing 
the maximum penalty indiscriminately to life imprisonment for all the underlying 
offences implies that there is no statute of limitations for any of the offences listed. 
This may very well be appropriate for some of the specific offences covered by the 
new provision, but in certain types of cases it would appear unreasonable that less 
serious offences do not have a statute of limitations.
B.	 Case	law	
When Section 114 was enacted in 2002, it did not appear very likely that the 
new statute would often – if ever – be adopted in criminal judgements. Rather, it 
was expected that the provision would be used as a legal basis for court decisions 
13 A majority of the Judiciary Committee’s members expressed the view that “the concept 
of terrorism is defined in relation to the legitimate State, which is based on universal values: 
human dignity, liberty, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”.
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regarding preliminary procedural actions, e.g. wiretapping, bugging, data-sniffing, 
room searching, etc. However, in a proportionally large number of actual cases, 
defendants have been indicted and convicted under Section 114. The reasons behind 
such a substantial number of terrorist cases will not be scrutinised further in this article. 
It is sufficient here to point to the possible impact on Islamic radicalisation from the 
fact that Denmark is a close ally of the USA, that the Danish government has been a 
very active and vocal participant in the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
that the political climate in Denmark is utterly tainted by xenophobic and anti-Muslim 
sentiment and that the publication of the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in the 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten has been noticed all over the world and has caused anger 
and uproar in Muslim communities. 
1. Glostrup case  14
T was found guilty of attempted terrorism under Section 114(1)(1) PC (homicide), 
see Section 21 PC (attempt). T and two co-defendants were charged with planning a 
trip to Bosnia in order to procure weapons and explosives for use in a terrorist act at 
an unspecified location either in Denmark or abroad. The co-defendants were an 18-
year-old Swedish citizen, M1, and a 19-year-old Turkish national living in Denmark, 
M2. M1 and M2 subsequently acquired at least approximately 19.8 kg of explosives, 
a suicide belt, a detonator and a pistol with a silencer and ammunition. The attempted 
offences were prevented by the arrest of M1 and M2 by the local police in Bosnia. 
When apprehended, M1 had a suicide video in his possession. Both were subsequently 
convicted by Bosnian courts of planning a terrorist act and sentenced to prison for 
eight and six years respectively. 
Initially, T was supposed to travel with the other two to Bosnia, but he was 
prevented from doing so when his father learned of their plans and confiscated his 
passport. Observing that, on the one hand, T had been found guilty of attempting 
the most serious form of terrorism, and that, on the other hand, he had merely just 
turned 16 at the time of the offence, the Supreme Court sentenced him to seven years 
imprisonment. 
Three other defendants were found guilty by the jury but the verdicts were overruled 
by the High Court judges. The Director of Prosecution (Rigsadvokaten) subsequently 
dropped the charges against two of the three and pursued a new indictment against 
the third. At the retrial, this defendant was acquitted by the jury despite the presiding 
judge favouring a guilty verdict in his summing-up prior to the jury’s deliberations.
The case gave rise to discussion about the court’s accommodation of the prosecutor’s 
wish to present character witnesses in order to shed light on the defendants’ religious 
beliefs and possible radicalisation, including one of the defendants’ former teachers. 
The prosecutor subsequently contended that T, who is also a Jordanian national, 
should be deprived of the Danish citizenship he obtained at birth. The authorisation 
for such a measure had recently been established by an amendment to the Act on 
Citizenship. On this count, however, the municipal court decided in favour of the 
14 U 2008.127 H. U = Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen, a weekly journal recording court cases of 
common interest. H = Højesteret, i.e. the Supreme Court.
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defendant. T was born in Denmark to parents who were Danish citizens. He grew up 
in Denmark. He speaks and writes fluent Danish. Conversely, T has only had very 
limited links with Jordan, where he would risk prosecution and conviction for the 
same crime for which he was convicted in Denmark or risk suffering harm specifically 
because he had a conviction for terrorism. 
2. Vollsmose case  15
Three defendants were convicted by a jury of attempted terrorism under Section 
114(1)(1) and (1)(7) [homicide and bomb detonation], see Section 21 [attempt] 
for jointly, including by conspiring, acquiring fertiliser chemicals and laboratory 
equipment, and by producing home-made explosives, having made preparations for 
the manufacture of one or more bombs for use in a terrorist act at an unspecified 
location in either Denmark or abroad, a plan that failed because the group members 
were arrested prior to completion of any terrorist act. The Supreme Court stated that 
the ordinary sentence for attempted terrorism by bomb detonation and homicide is 12 
years imprisonment  16. Thus, such sentences were imposed on two of the defendants. 
The third defendant’s involvement had been of a subordinate nature and, at one point, 
he had even tried to withdraw from the scheme. For these reasons, he was merely 
sentenced to five years imprisonment. A fourth defendant was entirely acquitted by the 
jury. The case raised questions about the Danish Security and Intelligence Service’s 
(Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, PET) use of informants and undercover agents, the 
partial lack of disclosure of case documents on file to the defence, the introduction of 
character witnesses and the court’s exclusion of defence witnesses. 
3. Glasvej case  17
Two defendants aged 22 were found guilty of attempted terrorism by acquiring 
bomb manuals and chemicals and by producing and detonating the unstable explosive 
TATP, which they had tested on the staircase in the building where they lived and in 
other places. The main perpetrator was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, the co-
defendant to eight years plus permanent expulsion from Denmark. The court based the 
sentencing decisions on the fact that there had been contacts with al-Qaeda and that 
the main perpetrator had attended training camps in Waziristan. A total of eight people 
had been arrested, of which only two were later indicted and convicted. 
4. Axe attack on “Mohammad” cartoonist  18
A 28-year-old Somalian man was convicted, inter alia, of attempted terrorism 
by endeavouring to assassinate the newspaper cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. The 
defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and to permanent expulsion 
from Denmark. The perpetrator broke into the cartoonist’s house on the evening of 
15 U 2008.1587 H.
16 Twelve years imprisonment is also the ordinary punishment for completed homicide. 
The normal penalty for attempted homicide is six years’ imprisonment. 
17 TfK 2009.762 Ø. TfK = Tidsskrift for Kriminalret, a monthly journal recording criminal 
law cases of common interest. Ø = Østre Landsret, i.e. the Eastern High Court. 
18 U 2011 27.78 V. V = Vestre Landsret, i.e. the Western High Court.
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1 January 2010 by smashing a window with an axe and was also in possession of 
a sharp-edged knife. His intention to kill the cartoonist was thwarted because the 
latter had taken refuge in his bathroom, which the police had previously secured as 
an emergency saferoom and because the police arrived minutes after Westergaard had 
pushed the emergency button.
For some months prior to the offence, the defendant had made multiple internet 
searches for information about militant Islamic groups and their attitudes and 
reactions to the cartoons and to Westergaard. Explaining his reasons for seeking out 
the cartoonist as his target, the defendant testified that he actually did not consider 
the Mohammad cartoons offensive per se but he felt provoked by Westergaard’s 
repeated endorsement of the justifications for publishing them without any empathy 
for Muslims insulted by the drawings. Consequently, the court found sufficient reason 
to assume that the defendant’s motive for attacking the cartoonist derived from the 
fact that Westergaard had drawn one of the newspaper cartoons and had participated 
actively in the debate about them. 
The court’s guilty verdict was justified as follows. The Muhammad cartoons and 
the debate about them has given rise to violent reactions all over the world, including 
attacks on Danish government institutions and has presented challenges to the basic 
principles of a democratic society, e.g. the freedom of expression within the framework 
of the law and the embedded right to participate in public debate. These reactions 
have still not ceased. As one of the cartoonists, Westergaard has attracted enormous 
public attention and has appeared as the very personification of both the cartoons and 
the justification for publishing them. This has led to Westergaard being given special 
police protection, which is commonly known.
Further, the court referred to the statement in the preparatory works of Section 114 
PC “that the concept of terrorism is defined in relation to the legitimate State, which 
is built upon universal values: human dignity, liberty, equality and solidarity, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The legitimate State is founded on the 
principles of democracy and the rule of law. Terrorism poses a threat to democracy, 
the free exercise of human rights and economic and social development”. The court 
also mentioned that the statute shall be interpreted in the light of the above mentioned 
Council statement upon which the EU Member States had expressed political 
agreement.
For these reasons, the court found that the attempted killing of Westergaard in his 
own home for having drawn a caricature of the Prophet Muhammad and subsequently 
defending his right to have it published must be considered a violation of Section 
114. 
In the High Court, three jurors voted to acquit the defendant of the count regarding 
attempted terrorism while the judges and the other three jurors voted to uphold the 
ruling of the municipal court. A request for admission of the case for a third instance 
review before the Supreme Court has been filed by the defence.
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5. Lors Doukaev case  19
A 25-year-old Chechen residing in Belgium was convicted, inter alia, of attempted 
terrorism by being in possession of a bomb containing TATP, which he intended to 
send to the offices of the newspaper Jyllands-Posten in Jutland. The newspaper is 
the one in which the Muhammad cartoons were initially published. The perpetrator 
entered Denmark under a false name, registered at the Hotel Jørgensen in downtown 
Copenhagen using a second fake identity and ordered a bus ticket to Liège under 
yet another false name. He brought with him to Denmark a bomb device and a gun, 
ostensibly for personal security, although he did not wish to provide further details 
regarding his alleged need for protection. He had worn varying disguises when visiting 
various shops. The bomb exploded in his hands in a bathroom at the hotel where he 
was lodging and, after a dramatic chase, he was arrested in a nearby public park. 
The defendant explained that, a few days before the explosion, he had defused 
the bomb because he no longer needed it, but while doing so had dropped some ball 
bearings into the TATP. When the bomb exploded, he was removing the metal balls 
from the explosive so that he would be able to bring the TATP with him home again 
safely. The explosion allegedly took place because he accidentally bumped the plastic 
box containing the explosives against the toilet bowl. However, technical analyses 
revealed that the metal balls had not been loose but had been fixed to a layer of 
cardboard and placed against the inside of the top cover of the box, and that there had 
been cardboard between the metal balls and the TATP.
Items found in the bathroom, where the toilet bowl had been blown to pieces, 
included fragmented metal balls in the ceiling and the floor, balls coated in glue 
residue, a nine-volt battery with its poles ripped out, the remains of cardboard and 
glue residue, ripped out pieces of bare wire formed into loops, fishing line coated with 
glue residue, a plastic box imprinted with a pattern of ball bearing balls and fragments 
of sample envelopes. Also found in the defendant’s bag in the bathroom was a map of 
the city on which the address of Jyllands-Posten appeared in his handwriting. A hard 
disk belonging to the defendant contained files about the manufacturing of explosives 
etc. as well as videos containing militant Islamist propaganda. 
As a result of an explosion when he was a child in Chechnya, the defendant wore 
a prosthetic leg. He had removed serial numbers from it, as well as from the gun, 
which might otherwise have identified him.
The court found that, at the time of the explosion, the defendant had packed the 
bomb into the two sample envelopes with the intent of sending them to the main office 
of the newspaper Jyllands-Posten. The defendant’s own explanations were rejected as 
unreliable. It was concluded that the bomb was supposed to go off when the letter was 
opened by staff at the newspaper.
6. Activist arsonists’ case  20
Five individuals belonging to a group of militant activists have been charged 
with attempted terrorism. The charges include arson attacks and attempted attacks on 
19 Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement, 30 May 2011, unreported.
20 Copenhagen police charge, August 2011. No indictment has yet been triggered.
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the Police Educational Centre, the Police Intelligence and Security headquarters, the 
Parliament building, the Greek embassy and several buildings belonging to private 
companies, e.g. in the fur trade.
4.	 Support	for	terrorism,	etc.
A.	 Legislation
Inspiration for the drafting of Penal Code provisions concerning miscellaneous 
types of conduct more or less closely related to actual terrorist acts was primarily 
derived from the templates used in the design of various UN legal instruments, and 
partly inspired by the Framework Decision.
It is a punishable preparatory offence under Danish law to fund or in some other 
way aid or abet a specific criminal enterprise, e.g. a concrete act of terrorism. The 
defendant will in that case become liable either as a co-perpetrator or as an accomplice 
to the act in question, possibly with reference to the general and extremely broad 
provision on criminal participation in Section 23 PC. Such liability requires that the 
defendant has acted with some degree of concretised intent that the main offence be 
completed, e.g. with regard to location, time and method. The new anti-terror legislation 
has made it a criminal offence to support a terrorist or a terrorist organisation as such 
or to facilitate such a person’s or entity’s activities, even though the general, and rather 
wide-reaching, rules regarding co-perpetration by aiding do not apply  21. 
In the absence of a sufficiently tangible intent to contribute to the commitment of 
a specific act of terrorism or terror-like act, providing economic or financial support to 
a terrorist, a terrorist group, or a terrorist organisation, may constitute a violation of the 
exceedingly vague and wide-ranging provision on financing, etc., in PC Section 114 b 
(originally 114 a)  22.	After amendments included in the 2006 anti-terror package, the 
criminal offences covered by 114 b are now set as follows: 
“Section 114 b.	 Imprisonment of up to ten years shall be imposed on anyone 
who 
1) directly or indirectly provides financial support for, 
2) directly or indirectly procures or collects funds for, or 
3) directly or indirectly makes money, other assets or financial or other similar 
services available to a person, group or association that commits or intends to commit 
acts covered by Section 114 or Section 114 a”  23.
The provision’s para. 1) covers the individual provider of contributions; para. 2) 
the middlemen; and para. 3) business people who interact with terrorists or terrorist 
organisations, etc. The phrase “directly or indirectly” implies that it is not of crucial 
significance whether the contact with a terrorist or terrorist group is direct or via 
– maybe even multiple – middlemen.
21 See Sections 114 b and 114 e PC.
22 The maximum penalty under Section 114 b is imprisonment for up to ten years. The 
Framework Decision “only” requires a maximum of at least eight years, see Article 5(3).
23 Regarding Section 114 a, see below about terrorist-like acts introduced in 2006 under 
the second anti-terror package.
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This provision also targets the funding of organisations whose activities include 
both humanitarian and terrorist activities. The idea is that it is in principle immaterial 
whether the actual support “allegedly has a humanitarian purpose” if the recipient “is 
known to commit terrorist acts”  24,	 as stated in the preparatory work ahead of the 
government’s bill. The justification offered in the explanatory memorandum is that 
the Terrorist Financing Convention requires the criminalisation of the procurement 
or collection of funds that “in whole or in part” are intended to be used to carry 
out terrorist acts  25. The stated justification is of questionable tenability, since the 
convention does not explicitly require the criminalisation of acts that have an entirely 
humanitarian purpose. If, in a specific case, it can be ensured in a satisfactory manner 
that no part of the funds are used for the purchase of weapons or explosives or for any 
other form of funding of terrorist acts, but exclusively for supplying food, medicine, 
teaching materials or for the construction of emergency shelters, then a possible 
course of action might be to interpret Section 114 b restrictively. It would, of course, 
be a completely different matter if a contributor merely claimed humanitarian motives 
but was unable to document adequate precautions to ensure that funds were not used 
for, or do not support, acts of terror. The judiciary has not subscribed to such an 
interpretation of the statute  26. 
B.	 Case	law
1. Fighters+Lovers case  27
Six activists had been involved, via the company Fighters+Lovers, in selling 
T-shirts worth approximately DKK 25,000 in order to transfer a portion of the profit 
to the organisations FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and 
the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). Allegedly, the money was 
earmarked for purchasing radio equipment for the FARC and a printing press for 
the PFLP. The activists were indicted for attempting to procure funding for terrorist 
organisations  28. All defendants were acquitted by the municipal court which did 
not, on the merits of the case, find sufficient grounds to consider the FARC and the 
PFLP as terrorist organisations. On appeal, the High Court found them guilty. Two 
were sentenced to six months imprisonment, two to four months and two to 60 days. 
The sentences for the last four individuals mentioned were suspended. One defendant 
was acquitted. 
24 The Terrorist Financing Convention contains a general definition of terrorism but 
otherwise refers in an appendix to the nine other conventions relating to various forms of 
terrorism, etc.
25 See Article 2(1). Security Council Resolution 1373 also requires criminalisation of 
financing, but does not explicitly require a ban on funding meant exclusively for humanitarian 
projects.
26 In this, the Danish judiciary is in line with the much criticised judgement of the US 
Supreme Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US (2010). The court observed, 
inter alia, that money raised for charitable purposes could be redirected to funding the group’s 
violent activities or unencumber other funds for use in facilitating such activities.
27 U 2009.1453 H.
28 See Section 114 b(2) PC, see Section 21 (attempt).
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The High Court held that the FARC has been responsible for launching 
indiscriminate mortal attacks in which civilians were victims and that the FARC has 
killed civilians, subjected civilians to serious violence and carried out kidnappings, 
including of politicians and a presidential candidate, in order to undermine the political 
process in Columbia.
As far as the PFLP is concerned, the court found that the organisation had, in 
a number of incidents, attacked and killed civilians, e.g. by using car bombs and 
suicide bombers, and that the PFLP’s militant wing, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, 
had carried out attacks, including suicide attacks, in which civilians had been killed 
and wounded. 
The defendants’ assertion was that, according to the preparatory memorandum, 
Section 114 PC must be interpreted restrictively in the light of the Council statement 
linked to EU’s Framework Decision on combating terrorism, which should imply 
that the two organisations’ militant actions would not be covered by the provision. 
However, this assertion was not accepted by the court. The defendants’ references 
to the Colombian government’s violations of human rights and Israeli violations of 
Palestinian human rights did not justify the assaults on civilians by the FARC and the 
PFLP.
The court found that the defendants had been aware, or at least had considered 
it predominantly probable, that the FARC and the PFLP had committed terrorist 
acts covered by Section 114 of the Danish Penal Code or had intended so to do. 
The majority finding of the court stressed the defendants’ own explanations about 
the FARC and PFLP’s activities and that the website of Fighters+Lovers stated that 
anti-terror legislation meant that the firm’s customers could find themselves in legal 
trouble if they purchased T-shirts in support of the FARC and the PFLP. The fact that 
the funds were allegedly raised for humanitarian purposes was therefore insignificant 
to the High Court’s ruling on the question of guilt or innocence. However, one of the 
judges stated that the FARC must be considered a rebel movement and the PFLP a 
resistance movement and that such organisations therefore cannot be assigned the 
required terrorism intent. Thus, this member of the court voted to acquit all of the 
defendants entirely.
One of the defendants had been indicted solely because he had placed a poster 
on his hot-dog cart displaying the T-shirts and a web address. The court found his 
participation to be insufficient for a conviction. 
The court stressed that the actions had been planned, well organised and 
premeditated. The sentences imposed differed due to the contribution by each of the 
defendants to the criminal undertaking.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court ruling but suspended all the sentences 
due to an acknowledgement of the fact that the scope of Section 114 b PC had been 
questionable previous to the trial.
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2. ‘Rebellion’ case  29
An association labelled Rebellion (Foreningen Oprør) published documents in 
Danish, English and Spanish on its website, calling for European democracy and 
solidarity movements to participate in continuing resistance to European anti-terror 
legislation, the EU terror lists, and the international “war on terror”. The documents 
also stated that the association had transferred substantial amounts to the PFLP 
and the FARC. The documents contained proposals for a campaign that included 
fundraising in various countries, the publication of information about the initiative 
and a conference attended by representatives of all of the participating organisations 
in Copenhagen. The aim was to publicise a joint transfer of the funds collected for 
the liberation movements and the issuing of a common statement. Since there were 
sufficient grounds to assume that the documents were published as part of an attempt 
to procure financial support for terrorist groups, they were seized, a ruling upheld 
by the Supreme Court. Later, a spokesperson for the association was convicted and 
sentenced to six months suspended imprisonment under Section 114 b (1)(2) PC.
3. Horserød-Stutthof Foreningen & Den Faglige Klub  30
The 72-year-old chairman of an association of former concentration camp prisoners 
was convicted and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Due to the defendant’s age, 
the court suspended four months. Subsequently to the Fighters+Lovers judgement, his 
association had collected DKK 17,700 for the PFLP. Consequently, he was convicted 
of a similar offence as the defendants in the Fighters+Lovers case, and at this time 
mitigating circumstances regarding legal uncertainty were no longer accepted. 
Likewise, a chairman for a labour union movement was convicted and sentenced to 
six months’ suspended imprisonment for collecting DKK 10,000 intended for the 
FARC.
Inclusion on either the UN or EU terror list will normally constitute sufficient 
grounds for seizure under the regulations contained in the Administration of Justice 
Act. On the other hand, the mere fact of a person or organisation being included on 
either list does not necessarily in itself imply sufficient proof in criminal proceedings 
that the party involved is a terrorist/terrorist group. In principle, this depends on the 
court’s assessment of the evidence presented, as was demonstrated in the municipal 
court’s judgement on the Fighters+Lovers indictment. In practice, however, inclusion 
on a terrorist list will serve as a compelling presumption that financial or other support 
for the person or organisation concerned is covered by Section 114 b PC. Obviously, 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies will have sufficient reason to initiate 
investigations in case of activities connected with individuals or groups on a terror 
list. 
29 U 2007.1831 HK and Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement, 16 March 2010, 
unreported.
30 Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement, 16 June 2011, unreported. 
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4. Al-Aqsa case  31
In 2005, charges were brought – for the first time – under Section 114 b PC 
(originally Section 114 a) against the chairperson and treasurer of the al-Aqsa 
Association in Denmark. The investigation was initiated in 2002, when information 
was received that members of the association had collected and transferred funds 
to organisations and individuals in the Middle East with links to Hamas, which is 
on the EU terror list. The prosecution service failed to provide sufficient evidence 
that the involved organisations were part of Hamas or that the transferred funds were 
forwarded to Hamas. The High Court therefore upheld a municipal court acquittal by 
a vote of 3-3.
The mens rea requirement under Section 114 b is intent and even the lowest 
degree of intent is sufficient. It is sufficient that the perpetrator acted in the light of 
an assumption that the recipient or client would have some kind of connection to 
terrorism. In other words, there is no requirement that the individual has concretisised 
a criminal intent with regard to location, time and method of perpetration. Depending 
on the circumstances, loans or advice may constitute punishable offences if the 
provider possessed the requisite perception of the customer or client’s links to terrorist 
activity. It is therefore a punishable offence for banks, other financial institutions and 
individuals to make money or other financial services available to such individuals or 
entities or to disseminate information about such services, irrespective of whether it is 
done in the knowledge that the funds or services will be used to facilitate or carry out 
specific acts of terrorism. 
Section 110 c PC contains rules about the violation of prohibitions that are part 
of international or EU sanctions adopted in order to implement foreign and security 
policy decisions, including with a view to countering terrorism. Violations of sanctions 
against third countries, individuals, groups or legal persons can be punished with equal 
severity, irrespective of whether the sanctions are set by the UN Security Council or 
the EU, and regardless of whether they are implemented under the auspices of the UN 
or the EU. In instances related to terrorism, the statute is ancillary to Section 114 b.
5.	 Promoting	terrorism
A.	 Legislation
An “extended complicity rule” has been added to the Penal Code, which prohibits 
any form of assistance etc. to an individual, a group or an association that commits 
or has the intention to commit terrorism or an act related to terrorism  32. This statute 
even covers activity which cannot be attributed to specific acts of terrorism
“Section 114 e. Imprisonment of up to six years shall be imposed on anyone 
who otherwise advances the activities of an individual, a group or an association, 
committing or intending to commit actions included in Sections 114, 114 a, 114 b, 
114 c, or 114 d”.
31 Eastern High Court appellate judgement, 6 February 2008, unreported. 
32 See Section 114 e (originally Section 114 b as introduced in 2002 and amended in 2006 
to become Section 114 e).
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According to the preparatory work done for the anti-terrorism legislative 
packages, the aim of this provision is, inter alia, to target anyone who provides 
professional and general advice that is not directly related to a specific terrorist act, 
e.g. in the form of a lawyer or accountant offering assistance to an organisation that 
the provider knows commits terrorist acts. This may imply the attribution of criminal 
liability to “a person who, in relation to a specific act of terror may only be complicit 
at third or fourth hand”, as it is noted in the government’s explanatory memorandum 
to its bill. It is acknowledged in the memorandum that an extension of the criminal 
law concept of complicity to “broadly include any form of support for organisations 
without necessarily being able to attribute the funding to specific acts of terror can 
raise fundamental concerns”. Still, it is further stated that “we are dealing here with 
extremely serious crimes of a generally dangerous nature”. However, the statute does 
not actually in itself criminalise “extremely serious crimes of a generally dangerous 
nature” but covers offences characterised by a noteworthy distance to such acts.
In the preparatory work, it is also stated, in broad terms and with regard to the 
application of Section 114 e, that a person “who wilfully promotes criminal activity or 
enterprise in a group of people with familiarity of the group’s overall terrorist aim, and 
thus provides a form of contribution to the commission of a terrorist act, as defined 
in the bill, would be punishable under the extraordinary complicity rule, even if the 
person concerned has no intent to contribute to a specific terrorist act”. These remarks 
leave several loose ends.
With regard to the part of Section 114 e that relates to complicity to an offence 
under the above mentioned Section 114 b (1)(2), a highly unusual innovation under 
Danish criminal law has been introduced, i.e. a statutory liability for “complicity to 
complicity”, meaning even complicity in remote participation of a kind that in itself 
would not normally qualify as complicity. However, at the core of the statute there is 
naturally a portion of reason and courts have not applied the provision excessively. 
B.	 Case	law
1. Said Mansour case  33
The very first person to be indicted under the new anti-terror provisions was a 
Danish citizen of Moroccan origin. This radical Islamist was found guilty under Sections 
114 b PC (now Section 114 e and 136(1) (public incitement to crime) and Section 266 b 
(hate speech)  34.The defendant had produced and distributed materials that explicitly 
called for militant jihad, including by depicting known terrorists and celebrating 
suicide bombings and the killing of innocent hostages. The materials unmistakably 
constituted incitement to commit acts of terror against the alleged enemies of Islam. 
The court stated that the defendant’s activities should be characterised as professional 
and general advice to terrorist groups related to al-Qaeda and groups inspired by al-
Qaeda, that the materials could be used to recruit members to such groups and that such 
individuals would be bolstered in their intent to commit terrorist acts. The defendant 
was sentenced to three years and six months of imprisonment. 
33 Copenhagen City Court judgement, 11 March 2007, unreported. 
34 Partially see Section 21 (attempt).
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The prosecutor contended that the convicted defendant, who is also a Moroccan 
national, should be deprived of his Danish citizenship. The authorisation for such 
a measure had recently been established by amendment to the Act on Citizenship. 
On this count, the court decided in favour of the defendant, referring inter alia to 
the length of the sentence imposed, the duration of his stay in Denmark, the lengthy 
period since his last trip to Morocco and the risk of exposing him to ill treatment upon 
his return to Morocco. 
In the aforementioned case concerning two members of the al-Aqsa association 
in Denmark and the association per se, the charges were in principle brought under 
Section 114 b, or subordinately under 114 e. As previously mentioned, the case referred 
to the collection and transfer of funds to certain organisations in the Middle East.
2. TRO Denmark case  35
In the television news programme Sunday Magazine broadcast by Danmarks 
Radio (DR), the organisation Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO Denmark) 
was accused of having sent money collected for tsunami victims to the Tamil Tigers, 
an organisation that appears on the EU terror list. DR presented documents from the 
Canadian intelligence service that describes TRO in Canada as a front for the Tamil 
Tigers. Based on the TV programme, the Public Prosecutor for Economic Crime 
(“the Fraud Squad”) launched investigations into TRO’s activities with regard to 
possible violations of Section 114 b PC (now Section 114 e). Accounts belonging to 
the organisation were seized. In the course of the investigations, TRO Denmark was 
added to the USA’s terror list, but the court was not sufficiently furnished with in-
depth information as to why the organisation had been included on that list. However, 
the court found that the conditions for seizure (‘freezing’) with a view to confiscation 
had been met by reference to inclusion on the US list. The Danish Board of Appeal 
Permission has granted permission to challenge the seizure in the Supreme Court.
3. ROJ TV A/S & Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S METV  36
Two companies have been convicted of facilitating terrorism by repeat 
broadcasting of propaganda in favour of the Kurdish organisation PKK/Kongra Gel, 
which has been blacklisted by the EU. The broadcasts include interviews with PKK 
leaders and sympathisers, coverage of battles between Kurds and Turkish authorities, 
and reports from PKK training camps. The Copenhagen Municipal Court supported 
the prosecutor’s claims that the broadcasting system has acted as a mouthpiece for 
the PKK, e.g. by advocating association with the PKK and participation in terrorism 
actions conducted by PKK and by glorification of the PKK and terrorism actions 
committed by the organisation. The indictment was addressed to the two corporations 
as legal persons. Each company were sentenced to 40 day fines of DKK 64,000 
(equivalent of € 8,500). The prosecutor’s demand that the corporations be legally 
35 Eastern High Court ruling, 8 April 2008, unreported. 
36 Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement of 10 January 2012. In addition to indicting 
the two companies, the prosecutor seized their bank accounts in order to secure trial costs and 
payment of possible fines. However, the court held that a freezing measure would infringe the 
defendants’ right of expression under ECHR Article 10, see U 2011.918 Ø.
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disqualified from broadcasting TV programmes was overruled. In accordance with 
the travaux préparatoires concerning the rules on criminal responsibility for legal 
persons, the court found no authorisation for depriving companies from the right to 
exercise certain rights, as such authorisation is only granted with regard to individuals. 
Thus, the judgement represents a kind of paradox, as the broadcasting system has 
been convicted of facilitating terrorism, but hasn’t been banned from continuing 
its activities. Previously, an independent administrative board has considered the 
question of revoking the corporation’s broadcasting licence three times without 
finding sufficient reason to do so. As neither the defendants nor the prosecutor are 
fully satisfied by the judgement, an appellate process is to be expected.
6.	 The	“corps	ban”
A.	 Legislation
Provisions prohibiting affiliation with or support for militant groups were 
introduced in 1934 by special legislation and in 1952 transferred to the Penal Code in 
the form of the then current Section 114. The amendments established by the relevant 
anti-terror packages split this traditional ‘corps ban’ into two separate statutes, now 
Sections 114 f and 114 g. According to the first of these provisions, criminal liability 
may be invoked for participating in or supporting a militant group’s activities even if 
the activity is less serious than actual terrorist activity. Thus, both statutes are ancillary 
to the preceding terrorism-related provisions.
“Section 114 f.	 Imprisonment of up to six years shall be imposed on anyone 
who, by any act other than those included under Sections 114-114 e, participates in 
or provides substantial financial support or other considerable support to any corps, 
group or association, which intends, by use of force, to exert influence on public 
affairs or cause public order disturbances”.
“Section 114 g. Fine or imprisonment of up to two years shall be imposed on 
anyone who participates in an illegal military organisation or group”.
B.	 Case	law
No judgement has ever included a count relating to the corps ban. The prevalence 
of criminal investigations conducted with a reference to this provision is not publicly 
known. The ban is vague and wide-ranging but it does, however, only cover support 
of a major significance. In light of this, it seems odd that the aforementioned provision 
in Section 114 b, with a ten-year punishment framework and a highly indefinite scope, 
does not include a more significant requirement.
7.	 Terrorism-like	offences
The 2006 anti-terrorism package further extended the scope of criminalisation, 
including via the insertion of a new Section 114 a into the Penal Code. The amendment 
act also entailed restructuring procedures and redeploying competences for law 
enforcement agencies, etc. The scope of application for various agencies’ executive 
powers was considerably extended by the new amendments to the Penal Code. Thus, 
the second anti-terrorism package not only expanded the scope of substantive criminal 
law but also made it even easier to initiate investigations, surveillance, etc.
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In an effort to justify the criminal law part of the 2006 anti-terrorism bill, reference 
was made to a wish to accede to the 2005 convention established by the European 
Council on the Prevention of Terrorism. Basically, the European Convention obligates 
States to criminalise incitement/recruiting/training in terrorism (see below). However, 
at the time when the convention was being prepared, agreement could not be reached 
on a general definition of terrorism. The convention text therefore only contains an 
empty framework provision for so-called terrorist offences. This concept is then 
completed by reference to a number of older conventions listed in an appendix to the 
new convention. These conventions deal with terrorist acts as well as other more or 
less violent offences without necessarily identifying a particular purpose, motive or 
intent with respect to intimidating a population, threatening a government, etc., such 
as is required to prove terrorist intent under the EU Framework Decision and Section 
114 of the Danish Penal Code. The conventions cover security for diplomats, airlines, 
maritime vessels, nuclear power plants and platforms on the continental shelf. They 
also cover hostage-taking, terrorist bombings and the funding of terrorism. Admittedly, 
the conventions listed in the appendix to the European Convention were adopted with 
an overall aim of combating terrorism in various guises, but they also include a diverse 
range of other types of acts, irrespective of whether these entail a terrorist motive 
or not. The conventions reflect the fact that the UN has not been able to establish 
a consensus on a uniform definition of terrorism, which is why the “salami-slicer 
method” has been employed instead. When, occasionally, the opportunity arose after 
the occurrence of yet another type of serious attack on common goods recognised as 
such by the international society, an additional convention was introduced, focusing 
on specific types of actions, of which some, but not all, have a terrorist aim. 
The new Section 114 a is a rambling, verbose and unreadable statute that lists the 
above-mentioned global conventions. It authorises enhanced sentences for offences 
that are covered by the conventions but which do not constitute terrorist acts in the 
stricter sense of Section 114. 
“Section 114 a.	If one of the acts mentioned under Section 1-6 below is committed 
without the act being covered by Section 114, the punishment may exceed the statutory 
maximum penalty for the offence by up to half (...)”  37.
The opening of the statute quoted above is then followed by a long-winded and 
complicated catalogue, in six separate paragraphs, of the offences that trigger the 
prescribed enhancement of the ordinarily authorised sentencing maximum. Each 
paragraph consists of a long list of selected provisions from the substantive part of the 
Penal Code, accompanied by a requirement that the particular offence is also covered 
by one of the specified treaty provisions. For considerations of space, only the simplest 
paragraph, which is found in 114 a(3), will be cited here:
“3) Violation of Section 261(1) or (2) when the act is covered by Article (1) of the 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages dated 17 December 1979”.
37 The second part of the first paragraph under Section 114 a provides that the punishment 
under certain conditions can be increased to imprisonment for up to six years, although the 
ordinary maximum sentence for the offence concerned is less than four years’ imprisonment.
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Each of the five other paragraphs lists a dozen separate statutes from the Penal 
Code. No other provision in the code has been phrased in a style even remotely 
resembling this chaotic and illegible manner. 
Section 114 a does not require that the perpetrator acted with specific terrorist 
intent, as that described in Section 114.
In itself, Section 114 a solely concerns harsher sentencing. However, since all 
the other statutes regarding the prevention of terrorism refer directly to Section 114 a, 
this provision actually creates several new criminal offences. It therefore also has 
a legal and practical impact in relation to which offences trigger the authority and 
powers of various government agencies. As such, the statute constitutes a link to other 
provisions, including the provision on support and funding (now Section 114 b), the 
special and very wide-ranging complicity rule (now Section 114 e), the new sections on 
recruitment and training for terrorism or terrorist-like acts (Section 114 c and Section 
114 d, respectively), as well as the provision about public incitement or approval of 
the offences covered by Part 12 or Part 13 of the Penal Code (Section 136(2)). 
In 2008, the Framework Decision on the Combat of Terrorism was amended to 
include provisions equivalent to those of the European Convention. No additional 
legislative initiative was needed under Danish law.
8.	 Recruitment	and	training	for	terrorism,	etc.
A.	 Active	recruitment	or	training	for	terrorism,	etc.
A State that accedes to the 2005 European Convention on the prevention of 
terrorism must criminalise recruitment and training for terrorism. The 2006 anti-
terror package contained two long-winded sections about this  38. Both of these 
provisions relate not only to actions covered by the actual provision on terrorist acts 
in Section 114 but also to the additional provision on terrorist-like activities under the 
new Section 114 a  39. Both Section 114 c and Section 114 d include activities that 
might lead someone to either commit or facilitate an as yet unspecified terrorist act or 
terrorist-like activity. 
The provisions are subordinate to the aforementioned anti-terrorism statutes. The 
first sentence of the first subsections of each of the two provisions reads as follows:
“Section 114 c(1). Imprisonment of up to ten years shall be imposed on anyone 
who recruits another person to commit or facilitate acts covered by Sections 114 or 
114 a or to join a group or association in order to facilitate that the group or association 
commits acts of this nature”.
“Section 114 d(1). Imprisonment of up to ten years shall be imposed on anyone 
who trains, instructs or in any other way teaches another person to commit or facilitate 
acts covered by Sections 114 and 114 a, knowing that this person has an intention to 
use the skills to pursue such an aim”.
38 See the amended statutes under Sections 114 c and 114 d PC.
39 Both Section 114 c and Section 114 d authorise enhanced sentencing maxima: 
“Under particularly aggravating circumstances, the maximum sentence may be increased to 
imprisonment for up to 16 years. Particularly aggravating circumstances are considered to 
involve offences of a systematic or organised nature”.
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The mens rea requirement under both of the cited provisions is intent. However, 
it is uncertain what the requirement is with respect to the concretisation of such intent 
with regard to type of terrorism offence, location, time and method of perpetration in 
relation to the activities towards which the recruitment/training is aimed. Supposedly, 
the idea cannot be that a person who recruits/trains somebody will become criminally 
liable in instances where someone has been influenced to do something entirely non-
specific within the rather broad scope of offences covered either by a definition of 
actual terrorist acts or any of the adjacent terrorism offences. If that were the case, it 
would be an offence to incite a person to – at one time or another, in some context, 
in some way and somewhere – commit, or in some way or other be complicit in the 
commitment of, one or other of the many possible forms of terrorism offences which 
in themselves can be very distant from actual terrorist acts. It makes little sense to 
assume that a person can incur liability without at least having envisaged one or more 
types of crime that could, in the line of actions, actually be committed. 
Ostensibly, the offences criminalised under Section 114 d(1) might include training 
in skills that it, under certain circumstances, could be perfectly legal to acquire and 
practise, but which can also be used in connection with a terrorist or terrorist-like 
action. However, the mens rea requirement includes two requirements.  Liability for a 
“teacher” requires that the “pupil” intends to use the acquired skills for the stipulated 
purpose, and that the former has knowledge of this, i.e. acts with direct intent. 
B.	 Active	recruitment	or	training	for	terrorism,	etc.
The second subsections of Sections 114 c and 114 d ban recruitment and training 
to commit or facilitate acts covered by Section 114 b, which, as mentioned above, 
prohibits various forms of financial support for terrorists or terrorist organisations  40. 
The wording is as follows:
“Section 114 c(2). Imprisonment of up to six years shall be imposed on anyone 
who recruits another person to commit or facilitate acts covered by Section 114 b or 
to join a group or association in order to facilitate the group or association to commit 
acts of this nature”.
“Section 114 d(2). Imprisonment of up to six years shall be imposed on anyone 
who trains, instructs or in any other way teaches another person to commit or facilitate 
acts covered by Section 114 b, knowing that this person has an intention to use the 
skills to pursue such an aim”.
Here too, the mens rea requirement is intent. The above ambiguity, concerning the 
requirements for specification of the involved parties’ intent in relation to the offence(s) 
for which the recruitment/training is designed, is no less valid in this context. 
As in relation to Section 114 d(1), criminal liability under 114 d(2) requires that 
the “pupil” intends to use the acquired skills for the specified purpose, and that the 
“teacher” has knowledge of this, i.e. acts with direct intent.
40 In Section 114 b there is, as mentioned, a reference to the terrorist acts and terror-like 
acts covered by Sections 114 and 114 a.
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C.	 Passive	recruitment	or	training	for	terrorism,	etc.
The new provisions in the second anti-terrorism package also made it a criminal 
offence to “let yourself” be recruited or trained “to commit or facilitate” terrorist 
acts or terror-like acts  41. The European Convention does not in any way oblige 
the signatory States to establish such criminalisation. In the preparatory comments 
by the Danish government to the bill, this spectacular legislative innovation was 
merely explained by a bland remark that, as a counterpart to the criminalisation of 
active recruitment and training for terrorism, it would allegedly be “natural” to also 
criminalise letting yourself be recruited or trained “to commit terrorist acts” and 
that this would be in line with the general trend to advance the boundaries for the 
use of criminal law to protect society against terrorism. The preparatory work does 
not explain what the new provisions require in order to impose criminal liability on 
individuals who cannot be held liable under the ordinary rules on criminal attempt 
in instances where the intent of the person concerned is not sufficiently specific. It 
is not easy to imagine how sensible boundaries of these extremely vague and far-
reaching provisions can be construed in a manner that makes a rational handling of 
evidence possible. It is no coincidence that other European countries have refrained 
from introducing any such provisions.
9.	 Incitement	to	terrorism,	etc.,	and	expressions	of	sympathy
A.	 Public	incitement	to	crime
The 2005 European Convention obliges signatories to criminalise public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence. Under Danish law, this did not necessitate 
any criminalisation of new offences, as the Penal Code already contains a general 
provision on public incitement to “crime”  42. 
Until the abovementioned 2007 judgement in the case against the Danish-
Moroccan Said Mansour, this provision had not been used since 1938.
The preparatory work concerning Section 136 might be taken to support an 
exceedingly broad scope of application. The previously mentioned question of the 
requirements regarding the necessary specification of the culprit’s intent is also 
relevant with respect to this provision  43.
B.	 Public	approval	of	a	crime	against	the	State,	etc.	
Indirectly, the two anti-terrorism packages criminalised expressions of sympathy 
in relation to terrorism activity to a wider extent than was previously the case. An 
old provision regarding public approval of a crime against the State is contained in 
Section 136(2) PC. Technically, this statute is completed by a general reference to all 
offences under Chapters 12 and Part 13 of the Penal Code. As the statutes on terrorism 
offences are placed in Chapter 13, the anti-terrorism packages have endowed Section 
136(2) with a broader range of application. 
41 See Sections 114 c(3) and 114 d(3) PC, respectively.
42 See Section 136(1) PC.
43 The maximum punishment under Section 136(2) is imprisonment for up to two years.




It is not only attacks on Danish national interests that are covered by Sections 
114-114 e PC. The overall subject of protection can be “a country or an international 
organisation” and the territorial reach of the anti-terrorism provisions is not subject to 
limitations. The provisions also include acts that do not require force to be deployed in 
order to exert influence on Danish affairs or to undermine the Danish social order but 
that are directed against the fundamental interests of other countries or international 
organisations  44. Thus, these provisions also serve to protect public affairs and 
social orders elsewhere, including from acts committed exclusively abroad. This is a 
consequence of a desire to better address terrorism’s global reach, as required under 
UN Security Council Resolution 1373. 
The abovementioned corps ban is, however, only directed against participation 
in or support for a group that aims at the use of force to exert influence on Danish 
public affairs or to destabilise the social order in Denmark. Support for a group whose 
militant activities are directed against other countries’ interests can only be punished 
if the offence is covered by any of the preceding provisions in Sections 114-114 e.
It would, quite clearly, be excessive if the anti-terrorism provisions, with all their 
built-in weaknesses in terms of ambiguity and vagueness, were applied in such a 
wide-ranging manner that any State – including dictatorships and the most repressive 
regimes – were in principle protected by them. The previously mentioned Council 
statement and the Judiciary Committee’s remarks in its preparatory report relating 
to the first anti-terrorism package help mitigate the risk of such an exaggerated 
application. However, also in this context, it is difficult to predict what will happen 
in practice. And, as demonstrated by the judgements in the abovementioned cases 
regarding support for the FARC and the PFLP, even oppressive regimes are protected 
in instances where the resistance victimises civilians.
2) Case law: Weapons for Bengal resistance movement  45
In 2010, the Ministry of Justice decided to extradite a Danish citizen to India, where 
the individual concerned was accused of criminal offences committed in 1995. He 
acknowledged having participated in dropping weapons meant for a Bengal resistance 
movement from an aircraft. In 2002, Indian authorities had submitted a request for 
extradition subsequent to a change in Danish law that had made it possible to extradite 
Danish citizens for prosecution also to States outside the Nordic countries. 
The ministry linked the conduct of the accused to the statute on terrorist acts, 
which in 2002 had been inserted into the Penal Code, i.e. Section 114 PC. Previously, 
equivalent rules had not existed. The ministry also cited Section 114 f PC with the aim 
of offering a subordinate response to the requirement regarding double criminality. 
44 As far as Sections 114 b-e PC are concerned, this is made explicit by a reference to 
Sections 114 and 114 a. 
45 U 2011.2904 Ø.
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The Hillerød Municipal Court overruled the administrative decision on extradition 
on the grounds that diplomatic assurances offered by the Indian government could not 
be taken at face value. This ruling was sustained by the High Court.
B.	 Corporate	liability
As a kind of secondary effect, the 2002 anti-terrorism package considerably 
expanded the area in which penalties may be imposed on legal persons (“corporate 
liability”). Prior to this, such liability could only be incurred for a breach of the Penal 
Code if the offence was committed with a view to the legal person concerned making 
some form of profit. This condition was abolished by an amendment of the provision 
in Section 306 of the Penal Code. Hereafter, a legal person can now become criminally 
liable for any violation of a Penal Code statute if the general requirements regarding 
such corporate liability are met  46.
“Section 306.	 Criminal liability can be attributed to companies, etc. (legal 
persons) under the rules contained in Chapter 5 for violation of this Act”.
In this connection, too, the stated reason for the amendment was a reference to 
the requirements contained in the UN Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 
Financing (1999). However, the scope of the Penal Code’s provision on corporate 
liability is completely general in scope, as it does not merely include terrorism-related 
activities but any violation of a Penal Code statute. 
C.	 Danish	jurisdiction
The legislation based on the two anti-terror packages did not involve any 
amendments of the general rules on Danish criminal jurisdiction. However, the 
accession to a number of international conventions, most recently regarding terror 
bombing, funding of terrorism and nuclear terrorism, has been accompanied by 
particular legislation implying the establishment of universal jurisdiction, i.e. access 
to prosecute terrorists and their accessories regardless of where the offence was 
committed and regardless of the victim and the perpetrator’s nationality. This is a 
consequence of the general scheme established in Danish criminal law according to 
which there is Danish jurisdiction if “the act is covered by an international provision 
under which Denmark is obliged to exercise jurisdiction”  47. Furthermore, there 
is Danish jurisdiction in cases where Denmark refuses to extradite a suspect for 
46 Chapter 5 of the Penal Code contains the general condition required for imposing 
criminal responsibility on a legal person (see Sections 25-27 PC). The authorised sanction is 
a fine. The fact that Section 306 was amended under the first anti-terrorism package has given 
rise to the widespread misconception that the statute is an “‘anti-terrorism provision”. This was 
persistently claimed when the organisation Greenpeace was convicted “under anti-terrorism 
rules” when it was fined for breach of the peace under Section 264 PC after activists hung 
banners opposing genetically modified crops out of the windows of the Danish Agriculture and 
Food Council’s offices.
47 See Section 8(5) PC.
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prosecution abroad if the offence under Danish law may incur a penalty of more than 
one year of imprisonment  48.
D.	 Freezing	and	confiscation	of	assets
The 2002 anti-terrorism package authorised the confiscation of money and other 
assets not linked to an offence that had already been committed if there is a risk 
that the funds may be used in connection with a criminal offence (see Section 77 
a(2) PC). Previously, only material objects which, “due to their nature”, gave rise to 
such a risk, could be confiscated. The amendment was justified partly by reference to 
requirements in the Terrorist Financing Convention according to which States must 
take appropriate steps to identify, detect and freeze or confiscate not just the proceeds 
of terrorist acts but also funds earmarked for use in connection with acts of terror. 
Reference was also made to UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which imposes on 
States stringent commitments to freeze assets linked to terrorism. However, the new 
provision’s application is not limited to offences related to terrorism. The provision 
will not normally be invoked for amounts of less than €15,000. 
Likewise, the provisions for seizure (“freezing”) were extended with a view to 
providing a basis for subsequent confiscation; see the Administration of Justice Act 
Sections 802 (suspects) and 803 (non-suspects). 
In a separate code on preventative measures against money laundering and 
terrorism, banks and other professionals have an obligation to report suspicious 
transactions related to money laundering to the police and to await further 
communication from them before any transaction may be completed. By temporarily 
making resources unavailable to a customer or client, a preliminary freezing of 
funds occurs. The circle of those required to provide notification as well as their 
commitments have been expanded due to anti-terrorism requirements and efforts to 
prevent money laundering  49.	This also came to include unusual transactions related 
to funding terrorism (e.g. the ‘blackwashing’ of lawful money). 
E.	 The	prosecutorial	authority	of	the	Minister	of	Justice
Traditionally, Chapter 13 of the Penal Code covers “crimes against the constitution 
and the supreme Government authorities, etc.”, i.e. attacks on the State’s internal 
security. The new provisions introduced by the two anti-terrorism packages form part 
of Chapter 13. The 2006 anti-terror legislation added ‘terrorism’ to the title of the 
chapter. As a matter of principle, offences referred to in Chapter 13 of the Penal Code 
are prosecuted only on the orders of the Minister of Justice  50.	This system relies on 
the fact that, in some instances, such offences are tainted by political components and 
are rather vaguely described and of uncertain scope. Actually, this system does not 
imply that the minister personally assesses whether an indictment should be made. In 
48 See Section 8(6) PC.
49 The new confiscation rules also entailed the implementation of changes to the EU’s 
moneylaundering directive 2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005, see EP/Rdir 2001/97. The 
amendment widened the scope for the obligation to report suspicions about lawyers, accountants, 
etc.
50 See Section 118 a PC.
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practice, a recommendation to this effect is prepared and submitted by the Director of 
Prosecution (Rigsadvokaten), and the minister will normally follow the prosecutor’s 
advice. All things being equal, however, the fluid state of the law in this area implies 
a significant risk of politicisation, arbitrariness and abuse of power in relation to 
intelligence gathering, investigation and the way in which the prosecution service 
exercises discretion. 
F.	 Evidence	problems
The cases that have led to criminal charges and subsequent prosecutions for 
violation of the terrorism provisions have been characterised by the severe difficulties 
involved in providing adequate evidence. However, none of the cases have concerned 
terrorist acts that have actually been completed. The charges have either focused on the 
preparation of terrorist acts or on the support for or facilitation of terrorism activities. 
Some cases relating to attempted terrorist acts have mainly been based on information 
derived from the surveillance of groups of people over considerable periods of time. 
If such intelligence or police information points to a significant risk of an imminent 
terrorist act, it will trigger immediate pre-emptive intervention. At this point, there is 
not necessarily sufficiently evidence to form a solid basis for an indictment, let alone 
a conviction. However, the risk of a terrorist act being committed may be considered 
serious enough that it would be irresponsible not to indict the suspect, even if an 
approach via continued surveillance could provide more clarity about how far the 
suspicions are justified.
The prosecutor’s material has generally been quite complex and difficult to 
decipher as much of the information is characterised by a certain degree of ambiguity. 
The individuals monitored communicate – via telephone calls, internet chat, sms, etc. 
– in a particular jargon, which can either be construed as a form of subcultural dialect or 
as a code, possibly in languages other than Danish. This makes it difficult to determine 
exactly what the aim of the more or less suspicious behaviour and arrangements is, 
and whether specific terrorist intent can be proven. This has, for example, given rise to 
evidence being presented on whether the accused’s attitude to society is characterised 
by ideological or religious “radicalisation”. In cases of funding terrorism, it has been 
relevant to obtain information about conditions in faraway countries and this has posed 
particular difficulties in relation to obtaining reliable information from independent 
sources. So far, the acquittal rate has therefore been relatively high. In several cases, 
there has been considerable uncertainty as to the validity of both convictions and 
acquittals. This has attracted particular attention in cases where jurors and judges have 
reached different conclusions concerning the question of guilt or innocence.
11.	 Conclusion
This contribution has focused on the compatibility of recent anti-terrorism 
legislation in Danish criminal law with the basic principles of the rule of law and of 
due process. The packages of anti-terrorism legislation introduced in 2002 and 2006 
include a range of rather uncertain and wide-reaching provisions that fundamentally 
challenge the principle of legality. 
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The basic provision in Section 114 of the Penal Code covers terrorist acts per 
se. This provision is construed as implementing the basic requirements of the 2002 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. The Framework Decision’s terminology 
is applied directly, e.g. in the sense that the definition of a terrorist act has been 
transcribed literally into domestic law. Such a legislative technique causes substantial 
problems with regard to interpretation of the law by the national judiciary.
A vast number of supplementary statutes are characterised by a substantial 
widening of the scope of criminal law. These provisions are inchoate in the sense 
that they criminalise various activities that are more or less remote from actual or 
attempted terrorist acts as well as participation in such activities. They not only 
cover funding and other means of supporting terrorism but any conceivable kind 
of facilitation, incitement, training or recruitment. This method of criminal law has 
rightly been labelled “proactive”. To a significant extent, the legislature has even 
over-implemented various legal instruments that are binding on Denmark by virtue of 
European Union law or other international obligations. 
The anti-terror statutes have been drafted in a somewhat loose manner without 
sufficiently thorough legislative preparation. 
The provisions in the Penal Code constitute a common point of reference for all 
of the other anti-terrorism legislation. The challenges regarding rule of law and due 
process therefore also relate to secondary legislation in fields such as law enforcement, 
criminal procedure, intelligence gathering, public law, the treatment of foreigners, 
etc.
In certain respects, the judiciary has acted as a deliberate backstop in order to 
avoid any interference with the rule of law. 
194     the interPlay between euroPean instruments and domestic Provisions
Annex	–	Section	114(1)	Penal	Code  51
A person who commits one or more of the acts listed below with an intent to seriously 
intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Danish or foreign government authority or 
an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or to destabilising 
or destroying fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country 
or an international organisation, is guilty of terrorism and shall be sentenced to a prison term of 
up to life imprisonment, when the act due to its nature or the context, in which it is committed, 
might cause a country or an international organisation grave harm: 
1) Homicide according to Section 237 PC. 
2) Aggravated assault according to Section 245 PC or Section 246 PC. 
3) Deprivation of liberty according to Section 261 PC 
4) Traffic sabotage according to Section 184(1) PC; unlawful disturbances in the operation 
of public means of communication, etc., according to Section 193(1) PC; or aggravated 
vandalism according to Section 291(2) PC; depending on the commitment of such offences 
in a manner which might cause danger to human lives or substantial financial losses. 
5) Hijacking of public means of transportation according to Section 183 a PC. 
6) Aggravated weapons law violations according to Section 192 a PC or the Weapons and 
Explosives Act Section 10(2). 
7) Arson according to Section 180 PC; explosion, spreading of damage-inducing gasses, 
flooding, shipwreck, railway or other traffic-accident according to Section 183(1)-(2) 
PC; health-endangering contamination of the water supply according to Section 186(1) 
PC; health-endangering contamination of products intended for general distribution, etc., 
according to section 187(1) PC. 
8) Possession or application, etc., of radioactive substances according to Section 192 b PC. 
(2) A person who, with the in para. (1) mentioned intent, transports weaponry or explosives 
shall be sentenced accordingly. 
(3) A person who, with the in para. (1) mentioned intent, threatens to commit one of the 
acts mentioned in paras. (1) and (2) shall also be punished accordingly.
51 Translation by the author.
Anti-terrorism related criminal law reforms 
and human rights in Hungary
Katalin Ligeti
1.	 Introduction
Hungary has not, as yet, suffered from any terrorist attacks. It is neither considered 
as a target for international terrorism nor has it experienced domestic terrorist cases. 
Hungary probably had its longest exposure to international terrorism during the 
period of the Cold War. Before 1989, Hungary and other socialist countries actively 
supported plans that were being laid for terrorist acts against the West. The Hungarian 
security services were in contact with various terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s, 
mostly by providing them with logistical and training support to prepare the terrorist 
acts. It is also known that “[b]etween 1979 and 1985, the group led by the infamous 
Carlos visited Hungary on a number of occasions: they maintained an apartment, 
where they stored and probably received weapons, and it was in Budapest that they 
met the representatives of ETA, the IRA and the Italian Red Brigades. Officials of the 
Hungarian Ministry of Interior booked rooms for them in the Thermal Hotel on Margit 
Island, where Ulrike Meinhof, founder of the German Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), 
also spent some time. Presumably it was also in Budapest that they plotted the 21 
February 1981 attack against the Munich headquarters of Radio Free Europe, where 
eight persons were wounded”  1.
The role of the Hungarian secret service was scrutinised after the country’s political 
transition away from communism in 1989 and the Hungarian Minister of Interior, 
Mr. Balázs Horvàth, revealed this information to the Hungarian parliament and to 
the public on 26 June 1990  2. The Prosecutor General has initiated an investigation 
1 F. Köszeghy, “From the Cold War to the war on terrorism: Did September 11 have an 
impact on Hungarian law enforcement?”, Fundamentum, 2005, 1, p. 94.
2 See reference in F. Köszeghy, “From the Cold War to the war on terrorism”. 
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against the high-ranking officials in the Hungarian secret service who were allegedly 
responsible for organising contact with and support for the said terrorist groups. A 
criminal investigation was also launched against Carlos. The prosecution service, 
however, declared the investigation to be closed after one year as all the suspects 
made reference to professional privilege, which was not suspended by their superiors. 
The argument was that witness statements on the said classified information would 
raise the terrorist threat against Hungary. 
One may certainly question the factual basis for this argument. It remains the 
case, however, that, since 1991, there has been no evidence of international terrorist 
groups being present in Hungary  3. However, some people believe that Hungary 
could be being used as a transit country. So far, no evidence has been produced in 
support of this idea.
In sharp contrast to the low level of terrorism threat and to the fact that there were, 
practically speaking, no cases in the field of terrorism, the Hungarian legislator was 
very active in adopting anti-terrorism related criminal laws. This legislative activism 
covered both substantive and procedural criminal law as well as the establishment of 
various agencies engaged in counter-terrorism. In the following pages, I will highlight 
this transformation by first focusing on the substantive law definition of terrorist 
offences and the tendency to expand forms of participation and preparation. This will 
be followed by a discussion of procedural provisions related to counter-terrorism 
and an assessment of human rights. It will be argued that the overly broad definition 
of terrorist offences in the various international instruments leads to a situation in 
Hungary whereby people who obviously have nothing to do with terrorism are being 
convicted of terrorism. 
2.	 Substantive	criminal	law	in	force
A.	 	Some	general	remarks	about	Hungarian	substantive	criminal	law
The reform of the criminal justice system is an important part of the overall 
reform that started in Hungary after the political transition away from communism 
in 1989. The overall reform was aimed at reinforcing the rule of law in Hungary 
and establishing the institutions of a democracy and a market economy. This general 
reform has not yet been finalised and one could reasonably estimate that, by the time 
it has been completed, it will have taken approximately 20 years. 
Within this 20-year period of constant reforms, two different eras may be 
demarcated. One may describe the first era as the era of partial reforms. Focusing for 
now only on substantive criminal law, in this era whole chapters of the Hungarian 
Criminal Code [hereafter referred to as HCC] were redrafted at least once, such as, 
for example, the chapter on economic offences, on offences against state security and 
the one on offences against state property. Parallel to this, other provisions have also 
3 It should be mentioned that the only terrorist attack carried out on Hungarian territory 
took place in 1990, when a bomb attack was carried out on the airport motorway against Jewish 
people emigrating from Russia to Israel via Hungary. The remote-controlled bomb exploded 
sooner than planned, under the police car leading the convoy, and police officers were wounded 
instead of the Jewish migrants. By the time the police got over their surprise, the terrorists had 
left the country. They were identified by foreign secret services later.
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been amended, for example the offences against the environment and sexual offences. 
Although amendments of this kind substantially changed the HCC, they did not aim 
at an all-encompassing reform of the country’s criminal law. They introduced only 
partial changes.
By contrast to this first era, the ultimate purpose of the criminal justice reform that 
has been going on since 2001 is to re-codify substantive criminal law. The Ministry of 
Justice set up a committee in 2001 and entrusted it with the task of drafting the new 
criminal code. Academics, members of the judiciary, the prosecution service and the 
bar all took part in the work of the committee. Three proposals have been produced for 
a new general part  4 of the criminal code between 2001 and 2006, but the work on the 
new criminal code came to a halt in 2006. Between 2006 and 2010, Hungary endured 
a period that can only be described as featuring a lack of governance, where cause and 
effect are difficult to distinguish. The so-called ‘lie speech’ of former Prime Minister 
Gyurcsány of 2006 led to ongoing protests against the then ruling social-liberal 
coalition, which brought the work in the ministries and the parliament to a standstill. 
Finally instead of a new general part, an amendment  5 was adopted in 2009, which 
included a substantial reform of the system of punishments for crimes. The remaining 
work on the new criminal code was therefore left to the current government, which 
announced that it would table a new draft by the end of 2011. At the time of writing 
this article, the Draft Criminal Code is undergoing the administrative consultation 
procedure required before a draft law can be submitted to the parliament. According 
to the legislative schedule of the ministry, the draft should be adopted in 2012 and 
enter into force in 2013. 
This article is based on the existing HCC. However, reference will be made to 
expected changes relating to terrorist offences indicated in the new Draft Criminal 
Code. As has been pointed out earlier, the 1978 socialist Criminal Code – still in force 
at the time of writing this article – underwent substantial changes  6. Regardless of 
these modifications, the unified structure of the HCC and soviet concepts in describing 
criminal responsibility remained intact. This results in the fact that there are no extra 
statutes outside the HCC. Even in the field of international crimes or organised crime, 
all offences are contained in the HCC. 
B.	 Incrimination	of	terrorist	offences	
The HCC does not distinguish between domestic and international terrorism and 
regulates offences related to terrorism in Section 261. 
4 I.A. Wiener, A Btk. Általános Része de lege ferenda (The general part of criminal law 
de lege ferenda), Budapest, 2003, p. 195; A. Gál and K. Györgyi, A Btk. Általános Része (The 
general part of criminal law), manuscript; K. Ligeti, Az új Büntető Törvénykönyv Álalános 
Részének Koncepciója (Commented draft of the General Part of the new Hungarian Criminal 
Code), Büntetőjogi Kodifikáció, 2006, no. 1.
5 Act no. LXXX of 2009.
6 More than hundred laws have been adopted in order to modify the Criminal Code and 
there have been more than a dozen decisions of the Constitutional Court that declared criminal 
law provisions to be unconstitutional.
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The 1978 socialist Criminal Code contained the offence of terrorism. The original 
offence description was based on two actus reus: the perpetrator deprived the victim 
of his/her liberty, or seized considerable assets or property in order to enforce an 
undue demand. The demand had to be addressed to a government agency or social 
organisation. 
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Section 261 HCC was 
modified  7 in order to criminalise the financing of terrorism. This amendment served 
to implement the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
and incriminates the provision or collection of funds to promote the commission of 
terrorist offences. 
With the exception of the above-mentioned amendment, the original definition 
of terrorism of 1978 remained in force in Hungary for more than two decades. Due 
to a lack of practical relevance, the structure and the elements of the offence did not 
undergo any legislative scrutiny. 
This relative disinterest of the Hungarian legislator in the provisions related to 
terrorism radically changed during Hungary’s accession to the EU. As part of the 
acquis communautaire, Hungary had to implement the 2002 EU Framework Decision 
on Combating Terrorism  8 [hereafter referred to as the 2002 FD on Terrorism]. This 
was done by Article 15 of Act No. II of 2003 and resulted in the complete redrafting 
of the provisions related to terrorism. The new Section 261 HCC was then once again 
amended in 2009 in order to make some technical corrections to the norm and to 
raise the applicable penalty levels  9. It is worthwhile to mention that Hungary did 
not formally implement the 2008 Framework Decision on Terrorism  10. Preparatory 
acts of terrorism had been defined in Section 261 HCC so broadly that it did already 
include the preparatory acts to be incriminated under this new Framework Decision 
(see explanations Chapter C below).
These amendments resulted in a complex system of incriminations and a 
substantial expansion of criminal responsibility. The current version of Section 261 
HCC is contained in the Annex at the end of this article. It contains the following 
incriminations:
− Subsections (1) and (2): definition of terrorist offences,
− Subsection (3): commutation of the punishment,
− Subsection (4): definition of sui generis preparatory acts of terrorism,
− Subsection (5): definition of offences related to organising or otherwise supporting 
a terrorist group,
− Subsection (6): abandonment of the terrorist offence,
− Subsection (7): definition of the offence of threatening to commit a terrorist 
offence,
7 Act no. LXXXIII of 2001.
8 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combatting terrorism, OJ, no. L 164, 
22 June 2002, p. 3. 
9 Act no. LXXX of 2009.
10 Council Framework Decision of 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combatting terrorism, OJ, no. L 330, 9 December 2008, 
p. 21. 
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− Subsection (8): incrimination of the omission to report an act of terrorism,
− Subsection (9): explanatory provisions listing the offences which may qualify as 
a terrorist offence if committed with a terrorist intent as well as definition of a 
terrorist group.
For a better understanding of the new version of Section 261 HCC, it is useful to 
recall that the 2002 FD on Terrorism includes three types of offences: terrorist offences, 
offences related to a terrorist group and offences linked to terrorist activities. 
As far as the definition of a terrorist offence is concerned, the 2002 FD on Terrorism 
combines two elements: an objective element, as it refers to a list of nine types of 
serious criminal conduct, as defined by the laws of the Member States, and a subjective 
element, a special intent, which makes these types of conduct terrorist offences. This 
is implemented by Subsection (1) of Section 261 HCC verbatim. Subsection (1) of 
Section 261 HCC renders the offences listed in Subsection (9) punishable if committed 
in order to (i) coerce a government agency, another State or an international body into 
doing, not doing or countenancing something; (ii) intimidate the general public; (iii) 
conspire to change or disrupt the constitutional, economic or social order of another 
State, or (iv) to disrupt the operation of an international organisation.
Subsection (9) of Section 261 HCC lists those offences that qualify as a terrorist 
offence if committed with the special intent. It is worth mentioning that the Hungarian 
legislator considered the nine offences enumerated in Article 1 of the 2002 FD on 
Terrorism as criminological concepts rather than definitions of offences. In order to 
avoid any confusion and to assist the work of Hungarian practitioners, Subsection 
(9) of Section 261 HCC explicitly defines which offences of the HCC correspond 
to the nine offences listed in the 2002 FD on Terrorism. The evaluation report of the 
Commission of 2007 found that the abovementioned legislative technique resulted in 
a correct and full transposition of Article 1 of the 2002 FD on Terrorism  11. 
In contrast, the Commission concluded that Hungarian criminal law was, in several 
instances, inconsistent regarding the two other offences contained in the 2002 FD on 
Terrorism. As to offences linked to terrorist activities, the Commission stated that 
there is no specific corresponding offence in the HCC. Nevertheless, the Commission 
found that Hungary will be able to achieve, in some cases, similar results by treating 
these offences as acts of collaboration with a terrorist group or as participation in 
specific terrorist offences. 
With a view to the third group of offences – offences related to a terrorist group 
– the Hungarian legislator implemented the respective provisions of the 2002 FD 
on Terrorism in Subsection (5) and point b) of Subsection (9) of Section 261 HCC. 
Since these incriminations relate to participation in a terrorist act, I will study them in 
Chapter C.3 (see below). 
Finally it should be mentioned that – although not specifically required by the 
2002 FD on Terrorism – the Hungarian legislator declares punishable in Subsection 
(7) of Section 261 HCC a public threat to commit a terrorist act. 
11 Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision 
of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, Brussels, 6 November 2007, COM (2007) 681 final, 
p. 5.
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C.	 Participation	in	terrorist	acts
With regard to participation in terrorist criminal acts, two articles of the 2002 FD 
on Terrorism are of special interest: those regulating offences related to a terrorist 
group and inciting, aiding or abetting. 
1. Offences related to a terrorist group
In conformity with the 2002 FD on Terrorism, point b) of Subsection (9) of 
Section 261 HCC declares that a terrorist group “shall mean a group consisting of 
three or more persons operating in accord for an extended period of time whose aim 
is to commit [terrorist offences]”. According to the 2002 FD on Terrorism  12, a 
terrorist group is not a randomly formed group for the immediate commission of an 
offence and does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity 
of membership or a developed structure.
Academic scholars in Hungary agree that a terrorist group is a special form of 
a criminal organisation, where the special feature of the group relates to its terrorist 
objective: the commission of terrorist offences  13. However, it should be borne in 
mind that the definition of a criminal organisation in the HCC foresees a structured 
group with a hierarchy where the members of the group have attributed tasks  14. This 
definition of a criminal organisation is not compatible with the definition of a terrorist 
group of the 2002 FD on Terrorism since the latter expressly does not require that the 
members of the group have a formally defined role or that the group has a developed 
structure. Due to the lack of any jurisprudence related to terrorist groups in Hungary, 
it is difficult to assess whether structured relations within the group are a prerequisite 
for a terrorist group or not. Such a criterion is not stated in point b) of Subsection (9) 
of Section 261 HCC and, in view of the Pupino jurisprudence  15, Hungarian courts 
interpreting this provision should, in conformity with the 2002 FD on Terrorism, not 
take account of such criteria in their deliberations. 
The advocated lex specialis relationship with criminal organisations has the 
significant practical consequence that a terrorist group can always be regarded as a 
criminal organisation so that the criminal law consequences of criminal organisations 
deriving from the general part of the HCC would also apply to a terrorist group. This 
would result, on the one hand, in the mandatory increase of the maximum penalty up 
to 20 years of imprisonment according to Section 98 HCC. On the other hand, the 
confiscation of the assets obtained during membership of a terrorist group would be 
excluded only if the legal origin of the property is proven  16. In other words, in cases 
of terrorist financing, the burden of proof would be shifted to the defendant to prove 
the legal origin of the assets. 
12 Article 1(2) second sentence.
13 A.V. NeParáczKy, Die Vorverlagerung der Strafbarkeit am Beispiel der 
Terrorismusverfolgung aus ungarischer Perspektive, Osnabrück, V&R unipress, 2011, p. 414.
14 Point 8 of Section 137 HCC.
15 ECJ, 16 June 2005, Judgement C-105/03, Maria Pupino, ECR, I-5285.
16 Section 77/B (1) b), (4) and (5) c) of HCC.
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Subsection (5) of Section 261 HCC incriminates two types of acts related to terrorist 
groups: the organising of a terrorist group and otherwise supporting the activities of 
the terrorist group. The first type of criminal acts relate to preparatory acts carried 
out for organising a terrorist group. Accordingly, the perpetrator instigates, suggests 
offers, undertakes to participate in the commission or agrees on joint perpetration 
in connection with the organisation of a terrorist group. The criminal acts listed in 
Subsections (4) and (5) have different objectives: whereas the perpetrator in Subsection 
(4) aims at preparing at least one terrorist offence in the sense of Subsections (1) and 
(2); the perpetrators of Subsection (5) organise a terrorist group in order to commit 
terrorist offences later on in the framework of this group. The actus reus, therefore, is 
not aiming at the planned act, but at the organisation of a terrorist group. 
The second type of criminal act relates to any other form of support for the 
activities of a terrorist group. Whereas the first type of criminal act aims at organising 
the terrorist group, the second type of criminal act presupposes a terrorist group 
that already exists. Such others forms of support might be providing information, 
weapons or training to the members of the group. It follows, from the systematic 
analysis of Section 261 HCC, that, if a person provides means that are directly used 
for committing a terrorist offence in the sense of Subsections (1) and (2), such a 
person will incur accomplice liability under Subsections (1) and (2). In this case the 
person did not support the activities of the terrorist group as such but the commission 
of a particular terrorist offence. 
As regards offences related to a terrorist group, the Commission concluded in its 
evaluation that “Hungary does not incriminate the direction of a terrorist group”  17. 
Though directing a terrorist group is not explicitly mentioned in Subsection (5) of 
Section 261 HCC, one may certainly argue that the wording “any other form of 
supporting” also encompasses the direction of an already existing terrorist group. 
However, such an extended interpretation would cover direction only if it manifests 
itself in certain activities in support of the terrorist group. On the contrary, it does not 
incriminate the mere status of being the head of a terrorist group.
The 2008 FD on Terrorism further broadened the scope of preparatory acts of 
terrorism that should be criminalized. However, the existing incrimination of “any 
other form of supporting” is so broad that it also includes acts like those contained in 
the 2008 FD on Terrorism, i.e. recruitment and training for terrorism. Therefore, the 
2008 FD on Terrorism was formally not implemented in Hungary. 
2. Inciting, aiding or abetting
Section 261 HCC does not contain any specific provision on inciting, aiding or 
abetting in relation to terrorist offences. However, the general rules on participation 
apply also to Section 261 HCC. 
Section 21 HCC regulates accomplice liability. Accordingly accomplices are the 
instigator and the abettor. Both forms are dependent on the principal perpetrator’s 
17 Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision 
of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, Brussels, 6 November 2007, COM (2007) 681 final, 
p. 5.
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offence and require that the principal perpetrator attempted to commit or committed 
an international offence. An instigator is a person who intentionally induces another 
person to commit a criminal offence whereas an abettor is a person who intentionally 
grants assistance for the perpetration of the criminal offence  18.
3. Preparation of terrorist acts
In its general part, the HCC incriminates the attempt to commit a criminal act in 
relation to all intentional offences. According to Sections 16-17 of the HCC, attempt 
is criminalised if somebody intentionally initiated a criminal offence but did not 
complete it. It follows from Sections 16-17 HCC that criminal attempts at terrorism 
are punishable under Hungarian criminal law. The attempt carries the same level of 
sanction as the main offence.
As distinct from attempt, preparatory acts prior to criminal offences are not 
punishable as a rule. According to Section 18 HCC, preparatory acts are only punishable 
if expressly provided in criminal law, i.e. in the special part of the HCC. Section 18 
HCC lists, in general terms, the most usual forms of preparatory acts. Accordingly, 
“if it is expressly prescribed by law, any person who provides for the perpetration of 
a crime the conditions required therefore or facilitating that, who invites, offers for, 
undertakes its perpetration, or agrees on joint perpetration, shall be punishable for 
preparation”. 
In relation to terrorist offences, the Hungarian legislator decided to set out, in 
Subsection (4) of Section 261 HCC, a whole list of preparatory acts. Subsection (4) 
constitutes an independent criminal act (so called delictum sui generis). Therefore 
the listed acts do not constitute preparatory acts in the sense of Section 18 HCC any 
longer but they are the actus reus of the sui generis terrorist offence as stipulated in 
Subsection (4). This sui generis offence is completed before the perpetrator initiates 
the terrorist offence of Subsection (1) of Section 261 HCC. It follows from the sui 
generis character of Subsection (4) that the attempt at committing a terrorist offence 
in accordance with Subsection (4) is also criminalised. 
Since providing or raising funds to finance terrorist activities comes close to 
the scope of preparatory acts enumerated in Section 18 HCC, the legislator opted to 
include the criminalisation of terrorist financing in Subsection (4). In order to commit 
the offence of terrorist financing, it is sufficient that the perpetrator provides or collects 
funds to promote the commission of a terrorist offence. It is not required that the funds 
are actually used for the commission of terrorist offences. However, if the provision or 
collection of funds is inextricably connected in time with the commission of a terrorist 
offence, the person providing or collecting the funds will be prosecuted for aiding and 
abetting the terrorist offence. In the latter scenario the person will be considered as 
an accessory to the terrorist offence of Subsection (1) even if s/he did not participate 
directly in the commission of the terrorist act  19.
18 For details on accomplice liability see K. Karsai and Zs. Szomora, “Criminal Law in 
Hungary”, in International Encyclopaedia of Laws – Criminal Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2010, pp. 255-257.
19 A.V. NeParáczKy, Die Vorverlagerung der Strafbarkeit, p. 412.
anti-terrorism related criminal law reforms and human rights in hungary     203
3.	 Criminal	procedural	law
A.	 Some	general	remarks	on	Hungarian	criminal	procedural	law
After the political transition in Hungary away from communism, the reform of 
the soviet system of criminal procedural law was unavoidable. Several provisions 
were adopted in 1989 and 1994 in order to bring Hungarian criminal procedure into 
line with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights  20. These 
amendments brought about substantial changes in three areas: the right to liberty and 
security  21, the right to compensation  22 and equality of arms  23.
Due to the introduction of amendments, a process that began in 1989, the 
Hungarian criminal procedure had been considerably transformed by the mid-1990s. 
However, it retained several features of soviet-type procedural laws. First of all, with 
regard to the allocation of competencies, Hungarian criminal procedural law differed 
from the western European model as it assigned a limited role to judges in the pretrial 
process while it guaranteed powers to the police that were reserved for prosecutors 
in the western-type continental mixed system. It is typical of soviet-type procedural 
laws that, with reference to the principle of substantive justice and by underestimating 
the requirement of legal certainty, they widely allowed the binding force of final 
court judgments to be lifted. Thus, the adoption of a new criminal procedural law was 
unavoidable. 
The new Code on Criminal Procedure (Act XIX of 1998, hereafter referred to as 
HCCP) entered into force in January 2003 and introduced substantial changes  24: the 
competence of the single judge was broadened, the principle of expediency gained 
more importance than hitherto and the number of special procedures was increased 
to allow for the speedy consideration of cases. The position of the victim was 
strengthened. Judicial competencies in the preparatory procedure were significantly 
broadened: the most serious coercive measures may be ordered exclusively by judges; 
20 T. Bán and K. Bárd, “Az Európai Emberi Jogok Egyezménye és a magyar jog (The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Hungarian Law)”, Acta Humana, 6/7, 1992, p. 1.
21 In order to guarantee the right to liberty and security the new provisions prescribed 
that suspects might be kept in custody without a judicial decision only for 72 hours: if the 
judge were not to order pre-trial detention, the suspect was to be released. Moreover, the 1994 
Act ensured that at the hearing held in the matter of the pretrial detention, the suspect and the 
defence counsel were to be presented with the prosecution’s evidence and given an opportunity 
to reflect on it. Article 6, 17 of Act XCII of 1994.
22 The rules on compensation for detention were also amended in line with the Strasbourg 
case law on the presumption of innocence. Article 21 of Act XCII of 1994.
23 The 1994 Act contained several provisions that were meant to guarantee the equality 
of arms. It provided that, if the police or the prosecutor appointed an expert during the 
investigation, then – upon the request of the accused or defence counsel – the court was under 
the duty to appoint another expert for the same fact. The Act also guaranteed that the accused 
and the defence counsel were to be informed of the fact that the prosecutor had filed an appeal 
and of the content of the prosecutor’s motion submitted on the appeal of the defence. Article 4, 
14, 15 of Act XCII of 1994.
24 See details in K. Bárd, “The development of the Hungarian criminal procedure between 
1985 and 2005”, in A. JaKab, P. taKács and A.F. Tatham (eds.), The Transformation of the 
Hungarian Legal Order 1985-2005, The Hague, Kluwer, 2007, p. 214-233.
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the secret gathering of data and other secret policing methods are similarly bound to a 
judicial decision; the terminated investigation may be continued on a judicial order; in 
cases where the evidence cannot be examined at the trial or when this can be assumed, 
it is the judge who will examine the evidence in the investigation phase in order to 
ensure that the evidence can be considered by the trial court.
HCCP therefore clearly aimed at a separation of procedural functions and 
was characterised by a strong commitment to principles of a fair trial. Meanwhile, 
however, the legislator amended the HCCP and e.g. suppressed the judicial control 
over covert policing methods, reintroduced the use of evidence not directly examined 
or considered by the trial court and declared cross examination to be an exception 
instead of being the rule. Even though these amendments have been justified by the 
ever growing perils of organised crime and terrorism, Hungarian law enforcement 
and the judiciary have been unable to prove the existence of such organised crime. 
According to criminal statistics, hardly any offence is committed within the framework 
of a criminal organisation and there are no cases of terrorism. These facts certainly 
question the legitimacy of the latest legislative reforms. 
The above mentioned recent amendments that also introduced new investigation 
methods for the prosecution and prevention of organised crime and terrorism are 
undermining the carefully built up balance between the competence of the police, the 
intelligence service and the prosecution as well as fair trial principles. 
B.	 Criminal	procedure	applicable	to	organised	crime	and	terrorism	 
The HCCP contains a set of covert investigation methods which are mainly 
relevant for the detection and investigation of organised crime and terrorism. These 
covert investigation methods are coupled with provisions on pro-active investigation 
stipulated in the Police Act  25 and the Act on the National Intelligence Services  26. 
Consequently, currently there is a dual regime of covert methods in place in 
Hungary: pro-active investigation and covert investigation, which cover a plethora of 
criminal technical methods  27. It is very important to note that pro-active forms of 
investigation may be used not only by the police and the intelligence services but also 
by the prosecution services  28. The prosecution service may order the police to carry 
out pro-active forms of investigation in a given matter and circumvent the higher 
standards of covert investigation in this way. This anomaly was heavily criticised 
by the Hungarian Constitutional Court  29, leading to new rules on the evidentiary 
nature of secretly obtained information. Nevertheless, the law adopted pursuant to the 
decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court did not abolish the possibility for the 
prosecution services to resort to pro-active investigation besides covert investigation. 
In the following section, I will give a brief summary of the two regimes.
25 Act no. XXXIV of 1994 on the Police.
26 Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Intelligence Services.
27 F. Géza, A rendészet elmélete, 2005, KJK-OKRI, Budapest.
28 Articles 63-69 of Act no. XXXIV of 1994 on the Police and Article 8(1) of the Act no. 
CXXV of 1995 on the National Intelligence Services, Article 9/A of Act. no. 189 of 2011 on 
the Prosecution Service.
29 Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 2/2007 of 24 January 2007.
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1. Pro-active investigation methods
The Act on the National Intelligence Services stipulates that the fight against 
terrorism is one of the tasks of the intelligence services  30. In order to fulfil this 
task, the intelligence service may resort to “covert information gathering” (külső 
engedélyhez kötött titkos információgyűjtés). Article 56 of the Act on the National 
Intelligence Services specifies the criminal technical methods that fall within the 
scope of covert information gathering.
Similarly, Article 69 of the Police Act enumerates which pro-active investigation 
methods may be employed by the police. These correspond to the ones regulated 
in Article 56 of the Act on the National Intelligence Services. These pro-active 
investigation methods comprise four covert investigation techniques:
− searching a private residence (clandestine house search) and recording the findings 
of the search by technical means,
− surveillance of a private residence and recording the findings by technical 
means,
− search of correspondence and other postal items and recording the findings by 
technical means,
− surveillance of telecommunication including telephone tapping and surveillance 
of email correspondence.
The rules of the application of such methods are not further detailed in the Police 
Act or in the Act on the National Intelligence Services. These rules are specified in the 
joint Ministerial Order no. 218 of 2006 of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of 
the Interior. The order is classified as being a professional secret. The content of the 
order is therefore not available to the public.
Common to all forms of pro-active investigation is that they may always be 
initiated if the interest of national security requires it. There are no further elements 
of the threshold for using pro-active methods. Therefore, pro-active investigation 
methods may be employed both for intelligence and crime detection purposes. All 
pro-active investigation methods may be performed only on the basis of a warrant. 
Such a warrant may be issued either by a judge or by the Minister of Justice.
2. Covert investigation methods
Covert investigation (titkos adatgyűjtés) is regulated by Section 200 HCCP as 
part of the investigation. Covert investigation may be performed by the prosecution 
services and the police and means the use of one or more of the following four 
investigation techniques:
− surveillance of private residences and recording the findings by technical means,
− search of correspondence and other postal items and recording the findings by 
technical means,
− surveillance of telecommunication including telephone and email,
− surveillance of computer systems.
30 Article 4-6 of Act no. CXXV of 19.
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Subsection (1) of Section 200 HCCP specifies the threshold for employing covert 
investigation. Accordingly, covert investigation may be initiated only against a given 
person and only upon reasonable suspicion that a serious crime has been committed  31. 
Furthermore Section 201 HCCP sets out three general criteria to examine the legality 
of the covert method employed in concreto; namely that such method is (i) necessary; 
(ii) proportionate (least possible intrusion into the private sphere); (iii) and is likely to 
obtain the sought after result.
Covert investigation always requires judicial authorisation and may only be used 
for crime detection purposes. Judicial authorisation is granted by the pre-trial judge. 
3. The use of secretly obtained information as evidence in the criminal procedure
The secrecy of the method employed in order to obtain certain information or 
data represents a major challenge from the viewpoint of human rights’ guarantees. 
The HCCP therefore contains strict rules on the admissibility of such information and 
data as evidence in the criminal procedure. The present provisions on the admissibility 
of secretly obtained information and data entered into force as of 1 January 2011. 
Act CXLVI of 2010 modifying the HCCP proclaimed new rules on the principle of 
appropriation, which regulates the earmarking of information. 
As described earlier, in order to initiate pro-active investigation or covert 
investigation, it is always necessary to obtain authorisation. The warrant authorising 
such a method specifies the aim of the covert method: intelligence purpose or crime 
detection purpose, and, more concretely, the detection of which particular crime. 
In general, there are two problems linked to the use of secretly obtained information 
as evidence in the criminal procedure:
a) Under what conditions may information be used as evidence in the criminal 
procedure which was obtained either by pro-active investigation or by covert 
investigation authorised, however, only for the detection of a specific crime? 
b) Under what conditions may information be used as evidence in the criminal 
procedure which was obtained by pro-active investigation authorised only for 
intelligence purposes?
Concerning the first question, Subsection (1) of Section 200 HCCP stipulates 
that data obtained as a result of the covert investigation may be used as evidence in 
the criminal procedure against the person and concerning the crime who and which 
were subject of the warrant authorising covert investigation. Problems arise if the 
prosecution service endeavours to introduce the data obtained by covert investigation 
as evidence in the criminal procedure:
− against an accused who was the subject of the warranted covert investigation, 
albeit for a different crime than the one the accused is charged for in the criminal 
procedure. According to Section 206 HCCP, such use is allowed if the requirements 
31 Such serious crimes are defined as all deliberate offences to be punished with 
imprisonment of at least five years; crimes committed in a businesslike manner; trafficking 
in human beings; child pornography, pandering and abuse of office. The latter four offences 
are enumerated in particular because they are not necessarily punished by five years of 
imprisonment, only in the aggravated form.
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of covert investigation are also met in respect of that latter crime, which was 
originally not authorised by the judicial warrant;
− against an accused who was not subject of the warranted covert investigation. 
Subsection (5) of Section 206 HCCP stipulates that the result of covert 
investigation may be used against all perpetrators of the crime underlying the 
judicial warrant. A perpetrator must be understood as defined in substantive 
criminal law. Accordingly, all co-perpetrators as well as instigators, aiders and 
abettors are covered.
In respect of the second question Section 206/A HCCP stipulates that information 
stemming from pro-active investigation warranted for national security purposes may 
be introduced as evidence in the criminal procedure only if the criteria laid down 
in Section 201 HCCP are met. In this case, since the most recent reform of 2010, 
extended use is permitted (i.e. using the information for a crime or against a person 
different than the one specified in the warrant)  32.
C.	 Specialised	law	enforcement	and	administrative	agencies	in	the	field		
of	counter-terrorism
Although Hungary is not a target of international terrorism, in order to allow 
efficient cooperation with other EU Member States and third countries in terrorism 
cases, Hungary has strengthened its law enforcement structure by setting up specialised 
police agencies in this field. 
In particular two police agencies, the Anti Terrorism Unit and the Co-ordination 
Centre against Organised Crime, are involved in counter-terrorism work. The Anti 
Terrorism Unit is a police agency under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior 
and its role is proactive investigation of terrorist activities. Whereas the criminal 
investigation of terrorist acts is the duty of the police, who have an exclusive national 
competence and are empowered to exchange information directly with counter parts 
abroad. 
The Co-ordination Centre against Organised Crime (hereafter referred to as 
CCOC) is a cooperative independent interagency body whose main role is not to fight 
against terrorism but it can contribute to this within the remit of its responsibility and 
support law enforcement bodies and intelligence agencies. The CCOC acts under the 
authority of the government through the Minister of the Interior. Law enforcement 
bodies and intelligence agencies as well as the prosecution are “providers” and 
“consumers” of the CCOC outcomes.
In order to guarantee efficient co-operation between Hungary and other countries, 
a national action plan against terrorism was adopted. An interministerial group has 
been set up to link the national action plan to EU and international counter-terrorism. 
The Inter-Ministerial Anti-Terror Task Force is a specific administrative body whose 
role is to monitor Hungarian counter-terrorism strategy in the light of the relevant 
policies of EU and international organisations.
32 Subsection 2 of Section 206/A of Act no. XIX of 1998 as amended by Act no. CXLVI 
of 2010.
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4.	 Conclusion
As has been described above, Hungary has adopted a series of anti-terrorism 
related criminal laws from the mid 1990s onwards. They resulted in the substantially 
extended criminalisation of preparation of and participation in offences as well as in 
enlarged competences of the law enforcement authorities to use covert methods of 
information and evidence gathering.
This legislative activism, which was also motivated by the obligation to implement 
the respective EU and international instruments into Hungarian law, stands in sharp 
contrast to the lack of any relevant case law in Hungary. 
Since 1989, there has been only one act of international terrorism in Hungary and 
this did not result in prosecution  33. In the last decade, Section 261 HCC has been 
mainly used for prosecuting cases of hostage-taking. Since Section 261 HCC defines 
a terrorist offence, inter alia, as a violent crime against persons with the special aim of 
unduly compelling any state organ, it embraces cases like, for example, hostage-taking 
at police stations or in prisons where the perpetrator makes the release of the hostages 
dependent on fulfilling his/her demand by the respective state organ (policeman or 
prison guard). These hostage-taking cases have obviously nothing in common with 
the terrorist cases that the legislator had in mind when drafting Section 261 HCC. One 
may therefore conclude that the broad and unspecific definition of terrorist offences 
and aims in the various international instruments has led to a situation in Hungary in 
which perpetrators have been convicted as terrorists despite obviously have nothing 
to do with terrorism.
33 See fn 3.
anti-terrorism related criminal law reforms and human rights in hungary     209
Annex–	Section	261	CC
(1) Any person who commits a violent crime against persons or commits a crime that 
endangers the public or involves the use of a firearm referred to in Subsection (9) in order to 
(a) coerce a government agency, another State or an international body into doing, not doing or 
countenancing something; (b) intimidate the general public; (c) conspire to change or disrupt 
the constitutional, economic or social order of another State, or to disrupt the operation of an 
international organisation; is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment between ten to 
twenty years, or life imprisonment.
(2) Any person who seizes considerable assets or property for the purpose defined in Paragraph 
a) and makes demands to government agencies or nongovernmental organisations in exchange 
for refraining from harming or injuring said assets and property or for returning them shall be 
punishable according to Subsection (1).
(3) The punishment of any person who:
a) abandons the commission of the criminal act defined under Subsections (1) and (2) before 
any grave consequences are able to materialise; and 
b) confesses his conduct to the authorities; in such a manner as to cooperate with the authorities 
to prevent or mitigate the consequences of such a criminal act, apprehend other coperpetrators 
and prevent other criminal acts may be reduced without limitation.
(4) Any person who instigates, suggests, offers, undertakes to participate in the commission, or 
agrees on joint perpetration of any of the criminal acts defined under Subsection (1) or (2), or 
in order to promote the commission of the offence ensures the conditions required therefore or 
facilitating that, or provides or collects funds to promote the commission of the offence is guilty 
of felony punishable by imprisonment from two to eight years.
(5) Any person who is engaged in the conduct referred to in Subsection (4) or in the commission 
of any of the criminal acts defined under Subsections (1) and (2) in a terrorist group, or supports 
the terrorist group in any other form is guilty of felony punishable by imprisonment between 
five to ten years.
(6) The perpetrator of a criminal act defined in Subsection (4) or (5) shall not be liable for
prosecution if he confesses the act to the authorities before they become aware of it and reveals 
the circumstances of the criminal act.
(7) Any person threatening to commit the crimes specified in Subsections (1) and (2) is guilty 
of a felony punishable by imprisonment between two to eight years.
(8) Any person who has positive knowledge concerning plans for a terrorist act and fails to 
promptly report that to the authorities is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for up 
to three years.
(9) For the purposes of this Section:
a) ‘violent crime against a person and crime of public endangerment that involves the use of 
firearms’ shall mean homicide [Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 166], battery [Subsections 
(1)-(5) of Section 170], willful malpractice [Subsection (3) of Section 171], violation of personal 
freedom (Section 175), kidnapping (Section 175/A), crimes against transportation safety 
[Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 184], endangering railway, air or water traffic [Subsections 
(1) and (2) of Section 185], violence against public officials (Section 229), violence against 
persons performing public duties (Section 230), violence against a person aiding a public 
official (Section 231), violence against a person under international protection (Section 232), 
public endangerment [Subsections (1)-(3) of Section 259], interference with public works 
[Subsections (1)-(4) of Section 260], seizure of an aircraft, any means of railway, water or 
road transport or any means of freight transport (Section 262), criminal misuse of explosives 
or explosive devices (Section 263), criminal misuse of firearms or ammunition [Subsections 
(1)-(3) of Section 263/A], criminal misuse of military items and services, and dual-use items 
and technology (Subsections (1)-(3) of Section 263/B), criminal misuse of radioactive materials 
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[Subsections (1)-(3) of Section 264], criminal misuse of weapons prohibited by international 
convention
[Subsections (1)-(3) of Section 264/C], crimes against computer systems and computer data
(Section 300/C), robbery (Section 321), and vandalism (Section 324); 
b) ‘terrorist group’ shall mean a group consisting of three or more persons operating in accord 
for an extended period of time whose aim is to commit the crimes defined in Subsections (1)-
(2).
Part iii
Harmonisation of terrorist offences  
and European cooperation

Impact de l’incrimination de terrorisme  
sur la coopération européenne en matière  
de lutte contre le terrorisme
Gilles de Kerchove
Avant d’examiner l’impact que le rapprochement des incriminations et des 
sanctions réalisé par les décisions-cadres de 2002  1 et 2008  2 a pu avoir sur la 
coopération européenne en matière de prévention et de lutte contre le terrorisme 
(point 3), il convient de rappeler l’approche européenne en la matière (point 1) et 
de s’interroger sur l’adéquation de ces incriminations avec l’évolution de la menace 
terroriste (point 2).
1.	 L’approche	européenne	de	la	lutte	contre	le	terrorisme
Contrairement à l’approche militaire qui a prévalu aux Etats-Unis au cours des deux 
mandats du président Bush et qui continue de prévaloir dans une certaine mesure sous 
le mandat du président Obama, l’Union européenne et ses Etats membres privilégient 
une approche judiciaire de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Selon cette approche, l’acte 
de terrorisme est considéré comme un crime, un crime certes particulièrement abject, 
qui doit faire l’objet d’enquêtes, de poursuites et de procédures de jugement comme 
toutes les autres formes de crime. Certes, dans le cadre des conflits armés à caractère 
international ou non international, il est permis d’avoir recours aux moyens militaires 
(utilisation de la force, détention militaire jusqu’à la fin des hostilités, recours 
aux juridictions militaires, etc.) selon les règles définies par le droit international 
humanitaire et le droit international des droits de l’homme. Certes, la plupart des Etats 
membres se sont dotés de techniques spéciales d’enquête (enquêtes sous couverture, 
1 Décision-cadre du Conseil du 13 juin 2002 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme, JO, 
n° L 164, 22 juin 2002, p. 1. 
2 Décision-cadre du Conseil du 28 novembre 2008 modifiant la décision-cadre 2002/475/
JAI relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme, JO, n° L 330, 9 décembre 2008, p. 21. 
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interceptions administratives, perquisitions informatiques, sonorisations de locaux, 
collectes de données sensibles, etc.) pour détecter de la manière la plus précoce 
possible des projets d’attentats. Il n’en demeure pas moins qu’aucun Etat membre ne 
s’est doté d’un droit pénal d’exception.
La volonté de traiter les auteurs d’actes de terrorisme selon les procédures 
ordinaires du droit pénal répond au souci d’assurer une justice sereine. La société le 
doit aux victimes des actes de terrorisme et à leurs proches. La société doit également 
réagir elle-même, parce qu’au-delà des victimes directes des attentats, c’est elle qui 
est visée. Elle répond aussi au souci de « déglamouriser » l’entreprise terroriste. En 
traitant les auteurs d’actes de terrorisme comme des criminels de droit commun et 
non comme des combattants d’une idéologie, la société développe un contre-discours 
très efficace. Dans sa propagande, Al Qaeda n’a par exemple jamais fait référence aux 
auteurs de l’attentat de Madrid en 2004 qui ont été jugés par les tribunaux ordinaires 
et, la plupart, condamnés au terme d’un procès équitable. Il n’a en revanche cessé 
d’encenser les détenus de Guantanamo, combattants d’une idéologie mortifère, dans 
l’espoir de convaincre des candidats au jihad de rejoindre ses rangs.
Il est à cet égard préoccupant de voir les efforts réalisés par l’actuel président 
américain pour abandonner le paradigme de la guerre contre le terrorisme (« the global 
war on terror ») qui a conduit aux excès que l’on sait (techniques d’interrogatoire 
« évoluées » comme le recours aux simulacres de noyade, programme de détention 
secret, vols secrets de la CIA, détention à durée illimitée sans procès, commissions 
militaires, etc.) neutralisés par le Congrès. Le vote par celui-ci en décembre 2011 du 
National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA)  3 signe un retour très net à l’approche 
militaire. Cette législation impose en effet, entre autres dispositions, la détention 
militaire de tout suspect de complicité avec Al Qaeda ayant participé à la planification 
d’un acte terroriste qui serait arrêté sur le sol américain et qui n’aurait pas la nationalité 
américaine ou ne serait pas résident aux Etats-Unis. Elle consacre par ailleurs 
la politique actuelle du gouvernement qui se réserve le droit de choisir, au vu des 
éléments du dossier, l’une des quatre réponses suivantes : la détention de ce suspect 
dans une prison militaire jusqu’à la fin du conflit avec Al Qaeda, son jugement devant 
une commission militaire, son jugement devant une juridiction de droit commun ou 
son transfert dans un Etat tiers. 
Sans aménagement, le NDAA risque de compliquer considérablement l’excellente 
collaboration policière et judiciaire qui s’est développée entre les Etats membres et 
les Etats-Unis depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 et d’affaiblir la crédibilité du 
discours du président Obama qui s’est exprimé résolument en faveur d’un changement 
de paradigme, de l’approche militaire à l’approche judiciaire.
2.	 Une	incrimination	adaptée	à	la	menace
L’approche judiciaire suppose que l’on dispose d’une incrimination bien adaptée 
aux comportements et modes opératoires des auteurs d’actes terroristes. Il n’est 
du reste pas impossible que la décision du président Bush de recourir à l’approche 
3 112th Congress, 1st Session, H1540CR.HSE : « National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012 », Sections 1021 et 1022.
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militaire tienne à la conviction, non corroborée par les faits, de son administration du 
caractère non adapté du droit pénal américain pour lutter contre un acteur non étatique 
comme Al Qaeda.
Au sein de l’Union européenne, la décision-cadre de 2002 doit beaucoup à 
l’action commune du 21 décembre 1998 relative à l’incrimination de la participation 
à une organisation criminelle  4 en ce qu’elle incrimine non seulement la commission 
d’un acte violent mais également la simple participation aux activités d’un groupe 
terroriste (pour autant que cette participation contribue aux activités criminelles du 
groupe terroriste). Comme pour la répression du crime organisé, il a été considéré 
nécessaire d’attaquer toutes les formes de collaboration et de contribution aux activités 
de l’organisation terroriste, qu’elles soient matérielles ou intellectuelles. La décision-
cadre s’inspire également de l’incrimination française d’association de malfaiteurs en 
relation avec une entreprise terroriste dont la portée est particulièrement large. 
Certes, la décision de rapprocher le droit pénal des Etats membres en la matière ne 
date pas des attentats du 11 septembre 2001, puisque la commande en a été faite par le 
Conseil européen lors de sa réunion de Tampere en octobre 1999. Mais elle s’inscrit 
bien dans le contexte de l’époque, celle de la lutte contre une organisation − Al Qaeda 
− dont la structure s’apparente à celle d’une entreprise multinationale (maison-mère, 
filiales, relations hiérarchiques, etc.). 
En 2008, il a été jugé nécessaire d’enrichir l’incrimination pour couvrir de 
nouveaux modes opératoires : le recrutement, l’incitation à commettre un acte 
terroriste, surtout par le biais d’Internet, et l’entraînement. 
Deux évolutions amènent à s’interroger à nouveau sur l’adéquation de 
l’incrimination de terrorisme avec la réalité du comportement criminel. Il s’agit d’une 
part du développement du phénomène des loups solitaires (« lone wolves ») et d’autre 
part du déplacement de candidats au jihad vers les zones de combat.
Comme l’ont montré les attentats commis par Breivik en Norvège le 22 juillet 
2011, de plus en plus d’attentats ou de projets d’attentats sont le fait d’individus isolés. 
D’aucun se sont interrogés sur le point de savoir si les actes commis par Breivik 
relevaient du terrorisme, du nihilisme ou de la pure démence meurtrière en raison du 
fait qu’ils ne s’inscrivaient pas dans la logique d’une organisation poursuivant un but 
précis (l’instauration d’un califat pour Al Qaeda, l’autonomie du peuple kurde pour le 
PKK, l’autonomie du peuple tamoul au Sri Lanka pour le LTTE, etc.). Il ne fait aucun 
doute, même si les analyses psychologiques ont confirmé le dérangement mental de 
Breivik, que son acte relevait bien du terrorisme : il avait pour but de faire pression sur 
le gouvernement norvégien pour endiguer, selon son manifeste de 1 518 pages « 2083 
− Une déclaration d’indépendance européenne », la progression de l’islam en Europe 
et préserver la suprématie de l’occident chrétien. Le fait d’avoir attaqué des bâtiments 
publics à Oslo ainsi qu’un camp de vacances de jeunes militants du parti du Premier 
ministre sur l’île d’Utoya confirme une certaine logique dans son délire meurtrier. Le 
fait qu’il n’appartenait à aucune organisation n’enlève rien au caractère terroriste de 
son entreprise.
4 JO, n° L 351, 29 décembre 1998, p. 1. 
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L’affaiblissement d’Al Qaeda, l’accessibilité sur Internet des informations 
permettant d’accomplir un attentat de grande ampleur ainsi que le phénomène 
de mimétisme conduisent à penser que les actes terroristes seront demain de plus 
en plus le fait d’individus isolés incapables d’exprimer leurs griefs dans le cadre 
démocratique. D’autres attentats ou projets d’attentats récents au cours desquels des 
personnes radicalisées au terme d’un processus individuel, agissant de manière isolée 
voire s’associant de manière spontanée à d’autres terroristes, montrent que l’exigence 
de l’article 2 de la décision-cadre de 2002, selon laquelle l’association doit être 
structurée, établie dans le temps et agir de façon concertée en vue de commettre une 
série d’infractions terroristes risque de devenir moins pertinente qu’elle ne l’était au 
lendemain des attentats du 11 septembre 2001.
L’autre phénomène qui s’est développé considérablement depuis l’adoption de 
la décision-cadre de 2008 est celui du déplacement de jeunes occidentaux vers les 
zones de jihad que sont l’Afghanistan, le Pakistan ou la Somalie, pour s’y entraîner et 
y combattre. Seuls deux Etats membres (l’Allemagne et l’Autriche) ont incriminé de 
manière spécifique le fait de se rendre dans un camp d’entraînement à l’étranger pour 
y acquérir une expertise particulière. Il serait peut-être souhaitable d’amender une 
deuxième fois la décision-cadre de 2002 pour tenir compte de cette évolution.
3.	 L’impact	de	l’incrimination	sur	la	coopération
Il ne fait aucun doute, comme le montrent Emmanuel Barbe et Roland Genson 
dans leurs contributions au présent ouvrage, que le fait que l’Union se soit dotée d’une 
incrimination commune de terrorisme a facilité ou est en voie de faciliter l’adoption 
de législations tendant à améliorer la prévention et la lutte contre le terrorisme, telles 
celles permettant le gel des avoirs des terroristes et organisations terroristes, la collecte 
d’informations sensibles comme le PNR ou l’imposition aux Etats membres d’une 
obligation d’informer Europol et Eurojust de toutes les enquêtes et poursuites entamées 
en matière de terrorisme ou l’imposition à une gamme assez large d’opérateurs 
(institutions financières, avocats, notaires, casinos) d’une obligation de déclarer des 
soupçons de financement de terrorisme. Ces législations imposent des obligations 
et établissent des mécanismes qui limitent l’exercice des libertés individuelles et ne 
sont acceptables que parce qu’elles permettent de prévenir et de lutter contre une des 
formes de criminalités les plus graves. Dans cette mesure, le fait de disposer d’une 
définition précise, d’un vocabulaire commun, contribue à forger le consensus tant au 
sein du Conseil que du Parlement européen. 
Il est, par ailleurs, indéniable que la décision-cadre de 2002 a eu un impact réel 
dans les nombreux Etats membres (vingt et un) qui ne disposaient pas d’une législation 
spécifique incriminant, en tant que tel, l’acte terroriste.
Il est difficile de mesurer, en revanche, l’impact de cette incrimination commune 
sur la coopération concrète entre les Etats membres et entre ceux-ci et Europol et 
Eurojust. En l’état actuel de l’intégration européenne, les Etats membres ont, en 
matière de lutte contre le terrorisme, une préférence pour l’action bilatérale, voire le 
« bi-multi » ainsi qu’en témoigne le nombre insuffisant d’enquêtes conduites avec le 
support d’Europol et de poursuites coordonnées par Eurojust.
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Il est cependant un domaine dans lequel l’incrimination commune a un impact 
opérationnel direct : il s’agit de la démarcation entre le champ d’action des services 
de renseignement et celui des services de police  5.
Traditionnellement, les services de renseignement agissent en amont de l’acte 
terroriste afin d’en déjouer la commission, la police intervenant dès lors que le crime 
est commis. Les décisions-cadres incriminant des comportements préparatoires 
à, voire distincts de, la commission de l’attentat en tant que tel (la participation à 
une organisation, le recrutement, l’entraînement), la police se voit contrainte d’agir 
beaucoup plus en amont en collectant des informations qui s’apparentent à du 
renseignement. Ceci contribue à faire bouger les lignes entre les responsabilités des 
uns et des autres.
5 Voy, par exemple, en ce qui concerne l’Allemagne, l’article 4 a du Bundeskriminalamt-
gesetz du 7 juillet 1997 (BGBl. I S. 1650), tel qu’amendé par l’article 2 de la loi du 6 juin 
2009 (BGBl. I S. 1226). L’article 4 a du Bundeskriminalamtgesetz a été introduit en 2009 afin 
d’élargir le champ de compétences du BKA à la prévention des risques en matière de terrorisme 
international.

How far do the new EU counter-terrorism 
offences facilitate police cooperation?
Roland Genson  1
The approximation of criminal law within the EU has two main purposes. One is 
to eradicate safe havens for criminals and the other is to facilitate crossborder judicial 
cooperation. Under this second heading, criminal investigations clearly benefit 
indirectly from the approximation of criminal law. The question I wish to address here 
is whether or not the approximation of criminal legislation – especially through EU 
counter-terrorism offences – may also directly affect police cooperation instruments.
Cooperation between law enforcement authorities in the fight against terrorism 
started well before the 2002 Framework Decision introduced an EU definition for 
terrorism. In fact, the fight against terrorism was the first area related to internal security 
in which EC Member States decided to work together. Outside the EC institutional 
framework, TREVI cooperation was launched in the 1970s. It was practical and 
operational cooperation that was intended to tackle terrorism and prevent it from 
spreading across Europe. From a law enforcement perspective, terrorism was – and 
still is – a very sensitive offence! In the 1970s, definitions differed depending on 
the criminal legislation of a particular Member State. The differences in definitions 
between Member States may have made transnational cooperation more complicated. 
However, despite this obstacle, the law enforcement community has never explicitly 
called for the approximation of terrorist offences across Europe. Member States’ 
services have managed to cooperate and to exchange information in the fight against 
terrorism on the basis of their respective national laws.
When Europol was set up under the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, 
Member States also decided to give Europol a competence in the fight against 
1 The views expressed are the personal reflections of the author and not those of the 
Council or its General Secretariat.
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terrorism. The Annex to the 1995 Europol Convention  2 listed all the possible areas of 
competence, including terrorism, but refrained from proposing any common definition 
for any one of those areas. Member States cooperate with Europol on all listed offences 
following the definitions provided by their national criminal legislation. During the 
negotiation of the Europol Convention, delegations did not consider it necessary to 
set up common definitions to allow Europol to function. Europol was considered to 
be a tool to enhance practical cooperation among law enforcement services and was 
designed so that it would not have an impact on national penal orders.
Terrorism and Organised crime offences can easily be compared when it comes 
to their complexity and sensitivity. A glance at criminal codes in the 1990s shows that 
some EU Member States have criminalised these offences as such, but have different 
understandings concerning their constituent elements, whereas others do not recognise 
Terrorism and Organised crime offences in their national criminal law. 
But, clearly, developing common EU policies to fight organised crime and 
terrorism would be much easier if all the partners used the same concepts. This 
became quite clear in 1997 with regard to Organised crime. At that time, there was 
a considerable amount of political will within the EU to enhance in common the 
fight against organised crime. To achieve this, an up-to-date picture of the situation in 
Europe needed first to be put together through an annual EU organised crime threat 
assessment report. But how can such a report be drafted if the definition of a Criminal 
Organisation varies from one country to another? To respond to this concern, 
negotiations were set in motion and these led to the adoption of Joint Action 98/733/
JHA of 21 December 1998  3. The purpose was to make participation in a criminal 
organisation a criminal offence in the Member States of the EU.	Thus, since 1998, the 
law enforcement community has been able to share a common definition of Organised 
Crime, allowing for easier comparison and sounder cooperation based on such a 
common understanding. The approximation of criminal laws relating to Organised 
Crime can certainly be considered as a major step forward in the development of law 
enforcement cooperation in Europe. However, with regard to Terrorism, which can 
be considered as being just as sensitive as Organised Crime, the law enforcement 
community did not call for an approximation of definitions at EU level.
Would it thus be possible to conclude that, after 20 years of practical experience, 
multilateral EU police cooperation did not need such a common definition to be fully 
effective in the fight against Terrorism? Looking at one of the major police cooperation 
instruments negotiated at the end of the 1980s, the answer to this question cannot be a 
positive one. Articles 40 and 41 of the 1990 Schengen Convention, which implements 
the 1985 Schengen Agreement, provide rights for crossborder surveillance and hot 
pursuit. On the basis of Art. 40, in urgent cases, a police officer is allowed to continue 
a surveillance on the territory of another Schengen State, under certain conditions, and 
only if the observation relates to an offence listed in Art. 40 § 7. This list comprises 13 
different offences, but no reference is made either to Organised Crime or to Terrorism. 
2 Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the establishment 
of a European Police Office, OJ, no. C 316, 27 November 1995.
3 OJ, no. L 351, 29 December 1998, p. 1.
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This means that a police officer observing a person suspected of being a member of a 
terrorist organisation, for the purpose of obtaining evidence, was not allowed, under 
these Schengen rules, to continue his observation on the territory of another Schengen 
State in an urgent situation! Today, such a restriction is difficult to understand. There 
is no explanatory report to the Schengen Implementation Convention and the exact 
reasons for such an omission are not documented. But one may surmise that the 
Schengen negotiators did not want to consider these important types of offences as 
they did not exist in all criminal codes and, where they existed, the understanding of 
the offences was not necessarily the same from one Member State to another. For the 
application of Art. 40, the definition of the offence is the one given in the requesting 
State. It is therefore understandable that the Schengen partners tried to avoid situations 
where an observation on the territory of a Schengen State would take place for facts 
that would not necessarily be punishable in the requested State. The same reasoning 
may apply to the right of crossborder hot pursuit, provided for by Art. 41, in respect 
of those countries which only allowed such cross border hot pursuit in relation to 
offences listed under Art. 40. Again, it may seem strange today that these important 
crossborder police operation tools were not applicable to Terrorism and Organised 
Crime offences per se. But in my view, the most credible explanation for this omission 
was that there was no common definition and no common understanding amongst 
Schengen partners. This assessment may be confirmed by looking at Council Decision 
2003/725/JHA  4.
The Schengen acquis – including Articles 40 and 41 of the Schengen 
Implementation Convention – was integrated into the EU’s institutional framework 
through Protocol Number two, which was annexed to the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. 
As of 1 May 1999, the provisions of the Schengen acquis are EU acquis and can be 
amended through Council acts. In 2003, the Council decided to amend Art. 40 of the 
Schengen Implementation Convention. More specifically, the list of § 7 mentioned 
above was modified and six new offences were added, inter alia Participation in a 
Criminal Organisation and Terrorist Offences. For both, they are defined as referred 
to in the relevant Council acts establishing common definitions. These modifications 
were proposed on the initiative of three Member States. Negotiations within the 
Council were rather straightforward and one may assume that the simple addition of 
Participation in a Criminal Organisation and Terrorist Offences was only possible 
thanks to the previous approximation of these offences at EU level.
Another example related to Terrorism can be identified at Europol level. Since 
2007, Europol issues an annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report in Europe, 
which is an assessment of the terrorist threat in Europe. Clearly, it would be possible 
to draft such a report based on terrorist incidents as witnessed in all Member States. 
But the fact that there is a joint definition allows Member States to have a common 
reference and to inform Europol about all the facts relating to this reference, thereby 
enabling Europol to draft a more complete and perhaps more coherent picture of the 
terrorist threat in Europe. Also, from this perspective, the existence of an approximated 
4 OJ, no. L 260, 11 October 2003, p. 37.
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definition can be considered as adding value, facilitating law enforcement information-
sharing and providing a common framework to assess the threat at EU level.
From this short assessment, one may already conclude, on the one hand, that 
the fact that there was no common definition of Terrorist Offences could have been 
a serious factor restricting crossborder police cooperation in some aspects. On the 
other hand, since a common definition now exists, it has been possible and easy 
to extend pre-existing parts of EU police cooperation to terrorism too. Moreover, 
I am convinced that the existence of such a definition facilitated the negotiation 
of a number of law enforcement instruments without having to raise the question 
as to whether or not they should also apply to terrorism or whether or not specific 
safeguards would be needed to make them applicable to terrorism. Thus, the so-called 
Swedish Framework Decision  5 and the Prüm  6 cooperation mechanism are very 
useful police cooperation tools and are fully applicable, without any exception, for 
Terrorist Offences. Had a common definition not existed, terrorist offences may have 
been covered by a more specific regime. The existence of a common definition of 
Terrorist Offences probably avoided a number of long and exhausting discussions on 
some law enforcement instruments within Council working structures.
Another example worth mentioning is Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 
September 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist 
offences  7. This Decision aims, inter alia, at organising information-sharing about 
terrorist offences between Eurojust, Europol and Member States, imposing a number 
of obligations on Member States. Again, Terrorist Offences are defined in Art. 1 
by simple reference to the 2002 Framework Decision.  Adopting such a Council 
Decision, which obliges Member States to transmit data on terrorist cases to Europol 
and Eurojust, would probably not have been possible without a common definition.
Moreover, the existence of a common definition also has a series of advantages 
in the area of practical police cooperation. These include setting up terrorist-
related Analysis Work Files (AWF) at Europol, creating Joint Investigative Teams 
(JIT), running a ‘Check-the-Web’ project and the possible future use of common 
investigation techniques… All these actions are greatly facilitated if actors working 
on a joint project use the same counter-terrorism terminology and are able to refer to 
a common reference point.
As a final conclusion, we saw that, in the 1990s, the law enforcement community 
requested a common definition for Organised Crime. I am convinced that, sooner or 
later, the law enforcement community would have formulated a similar request for 
5 Council Framework Decision 2006/960 JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the 
exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member 
States of the European Union, OJ, no. L 386, 29 December 2006, p. 89 and OJ, no. L 75, 
15 March 2007, p. 26.
6 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of crossborder 
cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and crossborder crime, OJ, no. L 210, 6 August 
2008, p. 1 – see especially Chapter 4, Measures to prevent terrorist offences, where reference 
is made to Articles 1 to 3 of the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism.
7 OJ, no. L 253, 29 September 2005, p. 22.
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Terrorist Offences. There is no doubt that the existence of a common definition since 
2002 has avoided a lot of discussions during the negotiation of a number of police 
cooperation instruments and policies related to law enforcement.
A common definition of Terrorism facilitates joint assessments and allows for 
prevention activities. It facilitates crossborder police cooperation as well as information 
exchange. And it may also facilitate the use of coercive measures in transnational 
investigations.
Let me finish by setting out a brief outline of future developments. In November 
2010, the EU launched an EU policy cycle for organised and serious international 
crime. This policy cycle consists of four steps:
– threat assessment;
– identification of priorities and development of strategic plans;
– implementation and monitoring of action plans;
– evaluation and preparation of the next policy cycle.
The EU’s intention is to extend the policy cycle to other types of crime in the 
future. If it is to be extended to Terrorism as for Organised Crime, setting up such an 
EU policy cycle is very difficult to imagine without first having a common definition. 
In this respect, both the 2002 and the 2008 Framework Decisions will thus provide the 
indispensable basis on which to further develop operational EU policies in the fight 
against terrorism.

L’impact du travail de rapprochement  
des législations en matière d’infraction  
de terrorisme dans l’Union européenne  
en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme
Emmanuel Barbe
1.	 Introduction
Depuis le traité d’Amsterdam, l’Union européenne s’est livrée à un important 
travail de rapprochement du droit pénal des Etats membres, ayant conduit à l’adoption 
d’un grand nombre d’instruments  1, principalement des décisions-cadres. Depuis 
l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, il intervient dans le cadre de la procédure 
législative ordinaire et sous la forme de directives. En matière de terrorisme, ce 
rapprochement a principalement été accompli en décembre 2001, par l’adoption de la 
décision-cadre du 13 juin 2002  2.	Si ce texte a par la suite été complété en 2008  3, on 
peut cependant considérer que l’essentiel  4 des normes en matière de rapprochement 
des législations au sein de l’Union européenne pour ce qui concerne la définition du 
terrorisme a dix ans d’existence. 
Que peut-on attendre d’une telle législation, spécialement en matière de 
terrorisme ? 
Tout d’abord, et c’était sans doute l’aspect essentiel de la décision-cadre de 2002, 
un aspect de réprobation du terrorisme, qui est défini en tant que tel à travers son 
mobile. De ce point de vue, on peut considérer qu’il s’agit d’un succès. Les autres 
effets escomptés d’une législation spécifique aux infractions terroristes sont plus 
techniques, mais tout aussi importants : 
1 Hans Nilsson a recensé vingt et un textes adoptés depuis le traité d’Amsterdam. Voir 
son article « How to combine minimum rules with maximum legal certainty », Europarättslig 
Tidskrift, 2011, p. 665. 
2 JO, n° L 164, 22 juin 2002. 
3 JO, n° L 330/21, 9 décembre 2008. 
4 Définition du dol terroriste et de l’organisation terroriste notamment.
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− en matière transnationale, une telle législation permet de limiter les situations 
d’absence de double incrimination, lorsque les faits à l’origine d’une demande 
d’entraide judiciaire dans l’Etat requérant (ou Etat d’émission dans le système de 
la reconnaissance mutuelle) ne sont pas punissables dans l’Etat requis (ou Etat 
d’exécution), ce qui aurait pour conséquence un refus d’entraide (ou d’exécution 
d’un acte dans le système de la reconnaissance mutuelle) ;
− pour les pays qui disposaient d’une telle législation avant la décision-cadre de 
2001  5, son adoption a permis d’instaurer un régime procédural spécial, que ce 
soit en matière de compétence judiciaire, de règles d’enquêtes (régime de garde-
à-vue, sur les perquisitions, sur les interceptions des télécommunications, etc.), de 
procédures de jugement, voire d’exécution des peines.
Nous nous proposons de rechercher dans quelle mesure le fait, pour l’Union 
européenne, de disposer d’une législation spécifique au terrorisme a eu un impact sur 
l’un et l’autre de ces aspects.
2.	 La	législation	de	2002	a-t-elle	permis	d’éviter	les	difficultés	liées	à	l’absence	
de	double	incrimination	?	
La réponse à cette question oblige dans un premier temps à s’interroger sur une 
question essentielle : quelle est la nature des obligations qui découlent des décisions-
cadres adoptées en 2002 et en 2008 ? Les Etats membres doivent-ils adapter leur Code 
pénal national aux infractions prévues par la décision-cadre, et dans ce cas dépénaliser 
les comportements qui excéderaient ceux prévus par la décision-cadre, ou peuvent-
ils au contraire incriminer plus largement que les textes de rapprochement ? Pour 
prendre un exemple en matière de terrorisme, un Etat membre peut-il par exemple 
posséder dans son code pénal plus « d’infractions liées aux activités terroristes »  6 
que celles prévues par la décision-cadre de 2002 ? Un Etat membre peut-il disposer, 
dans son Code pénal, d’une incrimination de terrorisme dont le dol spécial (l’intention 
terroriste) se limiterait par exemple à la seule intimidation, sans que celle-ci soit grave, 
alors même que la décision-cadre prévoit explicitement une telle gravité  7 ?
5 Dans sa proposition de décision-cadre, la Commission indiquait que seuls six Etats-
membres disposaient d’une législation spécifique pour le terrorisme, les autres le réprimant 
comme une infraction de droit commun, c’est-à-dire, sans prendre en compte le mobile de 
l’infraction, et partant, en poursuivant sur la base des infractions d’assassinat, de destruction 
volontaire de biens, etc.
6 Article 3 de la décision-cadre 2002, dont la liste a été développée par la révision de 
2008. 
7 Voir l’emploi du mot « gravement » dans l’article premier de la décision-cadre : 
« chaque Etat membre prend les mesures nécessaires pour que soient considérés comme 
infractions terroristes les actes intentionnels visés aux points a) à i), tels qu’ils sont définis 
comme infractions par le droit national, qui, par leur nature ou leur contexte peuvent porter 
gravement atteinte à un pays ou à une organisation internationale lorsque l’auteur les commet 
dans le but de : 
−	 gravement intimider une population ou
−	 (...)
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En effet, dans la première hypothèse, celle d’une obligation d’ajuster le Code pénal 
national aux seules incriminations prévues par la décision-cadre, la décision-cadre 
devrait faire automatiquement disparaître tout cas d’absence de double incrimination ; 
dans la seconde hypothèse, celle permettant à un Etat membre d’incriminer au-delà 
des obligations, alors minimales, la décision-cadre ne ferait que réduire le risque 
d’absence de double incrimination (pour tous les comportements visés par la décision-
cadre), mais laisserait subsister, pour les comportements allant au-delà de la décision-
cadre, un réel risque de défaut de double incrimination. Ce risque est d’autant plus 
réel que durant la négociation de la décision-cadre, tout le débat s’est précisément 
focalisé sur des comportements que certains Etats membres (on votait à l’unanimité 
sous l’empire des précédents traités) ne voulaient absolument pas incriminer, alors 
qu’ils l’étaient dans la législation d’autres Etats membres. 
L’interprétation dominante, clairement traduite dans les législations nationales, est 
la seconde : les Etats membres restent libres d’incriminer au-delà des comportements 
prévus par la décision-cadre. Plusieurs éléments militent d’ailleurs en ce sens. 
En premier lieu, c’est toujours ainsi qu’a procédé le droit international public 
pénal avant l’Union européenne : il suffit, pour s’en convaincre, d’examiner les 
principaux textes adoptés dans les organisations internationales productrices de telles 
normes : les Nations unies, le Conseil de l’Europe, l’OCDE, etc. C’est manifestement 
la même méthode qui a été reprise par l’Union européenne au moment de l’entrée 
en vigueur du traité de Maastricht, puis avec les traités d’Amsterdam et de Nice. 
Naturellement, c’est un argument qui a une portée relative, le système de l’Union 
européenne ne pouvant être assimilé au droit international classique. Si l’on examine 
les deux décisions-cadres sur le terrorisme, il ne semble cependant pas contestable que 
la même méthode a été utilisée : dans toutes leurs dispositions, les textes obligent les 
Etats membres à prendre « les mesures nécessaires pour que soit rendu punissable » 
tel ou tel comportement qu’ils définissent ensuite. Certaines dispositions sont même 
facultatives : ainsi, l’article 6 de la décision-cadre de 2002 offre-t-il la possibilité aux 
Etats membres de réduire certaines peines quand l’auteur de l’infraction collabore avec 
la justice. Enfin, les dispositions sur les peines encourues sont tout à fait explicites : si 
l’article 5 de la décision-cadre de 2002 comporte dans ses deux premiers paragraphes 
des obligations impératives pour quelques infractions (peines suffisantes pour 
entraîner l’extradition au paragraphe 1, sévérité majeure des peines encourues pour 
les « infractions terroristes » par rapport à celles prévues, dans le droit national, pour 
les mêmes infractions lorsqu’elles n’ont pas un but terroriste), il en va différemment 
pour d’autres – les infractions les plus graves – pour lesquelles les Etats membres 
doivent s’assurer que les peines encourues ne soient pas inférieures à certains seuils. 
Les Etats membres sont donc tenus de retenir un seuil de peines encourues supérieur. 
Il est plus difficile de se référer, en revanche, au droit primaire. En effet, les deux 
décisions-cadres sur le terrorisme ont été adoptées sous l’empire de traités désormais 
remplacés par le traité de Lisbonne qui a profondément modifié les choses pour le 
−	 gravement déstabiliser ou détruire les structures fondamentales politiques, 
constitutionnelles, économiques ou sociales d’un pays ou d’une organisation 
internationale (etc.). 
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domaine de l’ancien troisième pilier. C’est donc à la lumière du traité de Lisbonne 
que la question doit être appréciée, d’autant qu’à compter du 1er décembre 2014, les 
décisions-cadres adoptées avec le traité d’Amsterdam seront soumises au même type 
de contrôle que les directives adoptées en application du traité de Lisbonne, suivant 
l’article 10 du protocole 36 sur le droit transitoire. 
Les règles relatives au rapprochement des législations pénales de droit pénal 
spécial  8 sont fixées par l’article 83 TFUE (ex-article 31 TUE), lequel dispose : 
« 1. Le Parlement européen et le Conseil, statuant par voie de directives 
conformément à la procédure législative ordinaire, peuvent établir des règles 
minimales relatives à la définition des infractions pénales et des sanctions dans des 
domaines de criminalité particulièrement grave revêtant une dimension transfrontière 
résultant du caractère ou des incidences de ces infractions ou d’un besoin particulier 
de les combattre sur des bases communes ». 
Se pose évidemment ici la question de la définition de la notion de règles 
minimales. Ainsi que l’écrit Hans Nilsson  9, la notion de règles minimales est 
nécessairement une notion autonome du droit de l’Union européenne, puisqu’elle 
figure dans le traité et qu’il est exclu que chaque Etat membre puisse en avoir une 
définition propre. De notre point de vue, le traité n’aide que peu à définir une telle 
notion : en effet, contrairement aux dispositions du traité relatives au rapprochement 
des règles de procédure pénale des Etats membres  10, celles sur le rapprochement 
du droit pénal spécial n’indiquent pas une finalité particulière à l’élaboration de 
ces normes minimales visant au rapprochement des législations, à part le « besoin 
particulier de les combattre sur des bases communes ». 
C’est finalement peut-être la notion de rapprochement (§ 3) qui pourrait constituer 
l’indice le plus important en faveur de l’interprétation dominante : en effet, dans cette 
hypothèse, la législation de l’Union européenne permet d’aboutir à un rapprochement 
des législations : celles-ci sont moins différentes après le processus de rapprochement 
qu’avant. Naturellement, il s’agit d’un rapprochement asymétrique, en ce sens que 
s’il peut obliger certains Etats membres à incriminer des comportements qui ne 
figuraient pas dans leur droit pénal, il ne contraint pas les autres à dépénaliser des 
comportements réprimés dans leur propre droit pénal qui iraient au-delà du texte de 
l’Union européenne.
Plusieurs arguments militent en faveur d’une telle interprétation. Tout d’abord, le 
traité ne permet pas, contrairement par exemple à la matière de l’entraide judiciaire en 
matière pénale  11 en matière de rapprochement des législations, d’utiliser l’instrument 
du règlement, applicable directement dans la législation des Etats membres. Ensuite, 
l’emploi du syntagme « règles minimales » ne figure certainement pas par hasard 
dans le traité. Si ses négociateurs avaient envisagé un rapprochement symétrique 
des législations, ils auraient eu l’opportunité de choisir une rédaction explicite ; on 
peut d’ailleurs s’y essayer : « Le Parlement européen et le Conseil, statuant par voie 
8 Pour reprendre la terminologie française. 
9 H. Nilsson, op. cit. 
10 Article 82(2) TFUE.
11 Article 82(1) TFUE. 
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de directives conformément à la procédure législative ordinaire, peuvent établir des 
règles minimales relatives à la définition des infractions pénales et des sanctions	». 
Dans son récent article  12, Hans Nilsson soutient, de façon très argumentée, le 
point de vue inverse. Selon lui, les définitions adoptées, à partir du moment où elles 
le seront dans des directives (ce qui juridiquement sera le cas pour les décisions-
cadres à partir de décembre 2014), obligent à un rapprochement symétrique, pour 
des raisons de prévisibilité juridique et d’unité du marché intérieur. Hans Nilsson 
indique qu’au demeurant, avec le traité de Lisbonne, les principes généraux du droit 
de l’Union européenne s’appliquent, ce qui milite encore plus fortement pour cette 
option : en matière de terrorisme, par exemple, il indique que la définition restrictive 
du dol terroriste résultait de la volonté du Conseil. Dans cette acception, le syntagme 
« règles minimales » indique que les règles de droit pénal général des Etats membres 
ne sont pas affectées, ce qui, dans certains cas pourrait malgré tout aboutir, en dépit 
de l’exercice de rapprochement, à des différences entre les législations des Etats 
membres. 
Que dire à ce stade ? 
Il semble absolument évident que l’intention du Conseil, même dans les directives 
adoptées depuis l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, n’est certainement pas 
de parvenir à des textes comportant également une obligation de dépénaliser pour 
un certain nombre d’Etats membres. Il est d’ailleurs frappant de constater qu’Hans 
Nilsson –  peut-être déjà conscient du caractère « explosif » de ses propres conclusions 
et de la difficulté majeure qui pourrait en résulter dans les négociations actuelles et 
futures de textes de rapprochement du droit pénal matériel des Etats membres si la 
crédibilité d’une telle analyse se propageait dans les délégations – se garde bien de 
tirer une telle conclusion, qui découle pourtant logiquement de son argumentation. En 
dernière analyse, seule la CJ sera habilitée à dire le droit dans ce domaine. Qui sait 
quand elle aura l’opportunité de le faire ?
De fait, et dans l’interprétation dominante de l’effet pour les Etats membres 
des décisions-cadres, il est certain que l’adoption d’un texte de rapprochement des 
législations de droit pénal matériel n’aboutit que partiellement à l’effet d’évitement 
des cas de double incrimination. 
Cependant, ce n’est pas par ce biais que la question de la double incrimination 
est traitée dans le droit de l’Union européenne, mais par le mécanisme inventé à 
l’article 2(2) de la décision-cadre instituant le mandat d’arrêt européen  13. Celui-ci 
interdit le contrôle de double incrimination pour une liste de trente-deux infractions, 
définies dans le droit de l’Etat d’émission, dès lors que les faits poursuivis sont punis 
d’une peine d’emprisonnement d’au moins trois ans. La seconde infraction de cette 
liste est « le terrorisme ». On relèvera qu’il n’est pas fait référence, pour la définir, à 
la décision-cadre de 2002, pourtant adoptée en même temps ou presque. L’article 2 
12 H. Nilsson, op. cit. 
13 JO, n° L 190/1, 18 juillet 2002. Pour les instruments antérieurs, et tout particulièrement 
pour la convention d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale du 29 mai 2000 et son protocole 
de 2001, où le mécanisme de vérification de l’absence de double incrimination joue encore 
pleinement pour l’exécution de mesures coercitives, le problème exposé ci-dessus reste donc 
entier. 
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ne fait pas plus référence à d’autres instruments adoptés antérieurement en lien avec 
d’autres infractions présentes dans la liste de l’article 2(2).
Cette absence de référence permet donc à l’autorité judiciaire d’un Etat membre, 
lorsqu’elle vise, dans un mandat d’arrêt européen, « le terrorisme », d’éviter tout 
contrôle de double incrimination, alors même que les faits poursuivis pourraient 
parfaitement se trouver dans la zone « asymétrique » de la décision-cadre, autrement 
dit, être punis dans l’Etat d’émission et pas dans l’Etat d’exécution. En d’autres 
termes, le système du mandat d’arrêt européen, lié à celui du rapprochement des 
législations pénales des Etats membres, aboutit à faire disparaître les problèmes de 
double incrimination pour les pays dont la législation en matière de terrorisme est la 
plus large ; en revanche, il n’a pas cet effet pour ceux des pays dont la législation est 
la plus limitative.
Certes, l’adoption de la décision-cadre sur le terrorisme n’a pas été pour rien 
dans la possibilité de faire adopter, en 2001, le système de la liste de l’article 2(2). 
Néanmoins, les limites de la méthode se sont retrouvées à plusieurs reprises dans la 
pratique, les juridictions de certains pays se trouvant confrontées à des incriminations 
existantes dans d’autres Etats membres et outrepassant largement les prévisions de 
leur législation nationale. Dans ces hypothèses, ce n’est certes pas par un contrôle de 
la double incrimination que les mandats d’arrêt européens ont été refusés – le texte 
l’interdit explicitement – mais par exemple par une application extensive de la clause 
dite de territorialité prévue à l’article 4(7)  14. 
C’est certainement pour cette raison que, à l’occasion de la discussion sur le 
mandat d’obtention de preuves, qui a repris le mécanisme de l’article 2(2) du mandat 
d’arrêt européen, l’Allemagne a explicitement exigé, pour ce qui la concerne, un 
« opt out »  15 sur le mécanisme de non-vérification de la double incrimination, 
notamment en matière de terrorisme dans l’hypothèse où le mandat d’obtention de 
preuve prévoirait l’exécution d’un acte coercitif. Dans sa déclaration en annexe de 
l’instrument  16, elle subordonne en effet, comme l’y autorise le texte, l’exécution 
d’une telle mesure au fait que l’infraction à l’origine du mandat d’obtention de 
preuve soit, pour ce qui concerne le terrorisme, exactement celle prévue par certains 
instruments internationaux, dont la décision-cadre de 2002 : partant, elle refusera 
l’exécution dans l’hypothèse d’incrimination de comportements qui outrepasseraient 
notamment  17 les prévisions de la décision-cadre de 2002. 
14 Article 4(7) : « 7) lorsque le mandat d’arrêt européen porte sur des infractions qui : a) 
selon le droit de l’Etat membre d’exécution, ont été commises en tout ou en partie sur le territoire 
de l’Etat membre d’exécution ou en un lieu considéré comme tel, ou b) ont été commises 
hors du territoire de l’Etat membre d’émission et que le droit de l’Etat membre d’exécution 
n’autorise pas la poursuite pour les mêmes infractions commises hors de son territoire ».
15 C’est-à-dire le droit de ne pas appliquer ce mécanisme.
16 JO, n° L 350/72, 30 décembre 2008.
17 En effet, les autres instruments visés dans cette déclaration utilisent également la 
méthode du rapprochement asymétrique. 
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3.	 La	législation	antiterroriste	comme	base		
de	mécanismes	procéduraux	dérogatoires	?
Depuis les attentats de 2001 aux Etats-Unis, mais également au Royaume-Uni et 
en Espagne, l’Union européenne, prenant la mesure des enjeux du terrorisme, a adopté 
toute une série d’instruments qui ont véritablement bouleversé les modes traditionnels 
de coopération policière ou judiciaire : 
− le traité de Prüm (27 mai 2005) constitue la mise en œuvre, réalisée par un petit 
groupe d’Etats membres à travers une convention internationale, du principe de 
disponibilité des données établi par le programme de La Haye  18. Il organise 
l’accès direct par la police d’un Etat membre à certains fichiers d’un autre, mais 
prévoit aussi d’autres formes de coopération entre Etats membres. Il a en partie 
été transformé en législation de l’Union européenne par la décision-cadre du 
23 juin 2008  19. Si la législation Prüm ne naît pas spécifiquement en matière 
de terrorisme, c’est bien le terrorisme qui a donné l’élan nécessaire pour qu’elle 
puisse être adoptée. On n’y relève pourtant qu’une seule mention de la décision-
cadre de 2002, à propos de la transmission spontanée d’information ;
− la décision-cadre 2005/671 du Conseil du 20 septembre 2005 relative à l’échange 
d’informations et à la coopération concernant les infractions terroristes  20. Ce 
texte impose la nomination d’autorités centrales en qualité de correspondants 
« terrorisme » aussi bien en matière policière que judiciaire. Il crée aussi 
certaines règles de disponibilités des données. Cette directive fait explicitement 
référence à la décision-cadre de 2002 pour définir le terrorisme, et donc son 
champ d’application. En l’espèce, seules les infractions explicitement visées 
par la décision-cadre, et non celles qui pourraient être prévues au-delà par les 
Etats membres, semblent concernées. Ce texte confirme pleinement les effets 
possibles d’une législation définissant le terrorisme : il a en effet un impact sur 
l’organisation des Etats membres dans la lutte contre le terrorisme  21 ;
− la directive du 15 mars 2006 sur la rétention des données  22	: demandée par 
le Conseil européen dans sa « déclaration sur la lutte contre le terrorisme » du 
25 mars 2004 consécutive aux attentats de Madrid, elle impose aux Etats membres 
d’instituer une obligation, pour les fournisseurs de service de télécommunications, 
de stocker les données dites de service  23, pour une durée non inférieure à six 
mois, mais pas supérieure à vingt-quatre mois. Cette directive ne mentionne 
jamais la décision-cadre de 2002 : de fait, la façon dont les Etats-membres 
peuvent utiliser les données n’est soumise qu’aux restrictions imposées par la loi 
18 JO, n° C 53/1, 3 mars 2005.
19 JO, n° L 210/1, 6 août 2008.
20 JO, n° L 253, 29 septembre 2005.
21 On notera que dans une note du 28 septembre 2010 (registre du Conseil n° 13318/1/10), 
le coordonnateur de l’Union européenne pour la lutte contre le terrorisme, Gilles de Kerchove, 
semble clairement indiquer qu’il considère que la centralisation et la spécialisation de lutte 
judiciaire contre le terrorisme sont un système préférable aux autres. 
22 JO, n° L 105, 13 avril 2006.
23 C’est-à-dire, pour faire simple, l’enveloppe des messages et non les messages.
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nationale de chaque Etat membre ; partant, elle n’est pas nécessairement limitée 
aux infractions terroristes ;
− la troisième directive relative à la prévention de l’utilisation du système 
financier aux fins du blanchiment de capitaux et du financement du terrorisme 
du 26 octobre 2005  24, qui impose des obligations relatives à la traçabilité des 
opérations financières dans le chef d’un certain nombre d’opérateurs financiers, y 
compris depuis 2005 des conseils juridiques, recourt à la définition européenne du 
terrorisme. C’est sans doute en raison de l’existence d’une telle définition, précise 
et bien définie, qu’il a été possible d’étendre non seulement les obligations liées à 
la directive, mais surtout les professionnels qu’elle concerne ;
− la conclusion d’accords avec des pays-tiers, au premier rang desquels les Etats-
Unis,
− sur l’utilisation des dossiers passagers des compagnies aériennes (Passenger 
Name Records : PNR : accord du 26 juillet 2007  25 conclu avec les Etats-
Unis), notamment à des fins de lutte contre le terrorisme, ne donne aucune 
définition du terrorisme. La révision de cet accord rendue nécessaire par 
l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne a été adoptée par le Conseil après 
un vote positif du Parlement européen, lors du Conseil JAI du 26 avril 2012. 
Il comporte une définition du terrorisme : celle de la législation américaine ; 
cela n’est pas illogique, dans la mesure où c’est ce pays qui utilisera ces 
données. On relèvera que la proposition de directive de la Commission 
européenne du 2 février 2011 pour un PNR européen  26, pour sa part, définit 
l’infraction de terrorisme par référence à la décision-cadre de 2002 ;
− sur le transfert vers les Etats-Unis depuis l’Union européenne des données de 
messagerie financière de la société Swift (accord du 26 juin 2010  27). Cet 
accord, qui limite l’usage des données collectées au terrorisme, fait également 
référence à la définition américaine des infractions terroristes  28. 
24 JO, n° L 309, 25 novembre 2005. 
25 JO, n° L 204/18, 4 août 2007.
26 COM (2011) 32 déf. du 2 février 2011. 
27 JO, n° L 195/5, 27 juillet 2010. 
28 Article 2 de l’accord : 
« Le présent accord s’applique à l’obtention et à l’utilisation de données de messagerie 
financière et de données connexes aux fins de la prévention, de la détection, des enquêtes ou 
des poursuites portant sur : 
a) les actes d’une personne ou d’une entité qui présentent un caractère violent, un danger pour 
la vie humaine ou qui font peser un risque de dommage sur des biens ou des infrastructures, 
et qui, compte tenu de leur nature et du contexte, peuvent être raisonnablement perçus 
comme étant perpétrés dans le but : 
i) d’intimider une population ou de faire pression sur elle ; 
ii) d’intimider ou de contraindre des pouvoirs publics ou une organisation internationale, 
ou de faire pression sur ceux-ci, pour qu’ils agissent ou s’abstiennent d’agir ; ou 
iii) de gravement déstabiliser ou détruire les structures fondamentales politiques, 
constitutionnelles, économiques ou sociales d’un pays ou d’une organisation 
internationale ; 
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La décision instituant Eurojust, même après sa révision de 2008  29, ne fait qu’une 
mention du terrorisme : celle de l’article 12 b) qui oblige les Etats membres à nommer 
un correspondant national pour Eurojust dans ce domaine, ce qui constitue bien un 
mécanisme, si ce n’est dérogatoire, au moins spécial au terrorisme. En revanche, pour 
ce qui concerne la compétence rationae materiae d’Eurojust, la décision renvoie aux 
compétences d’Europol, dont l’article 4, point a) ne fait pas référence aux décisions-
cadres de 2002 et de 2008, alors même que la décision créant l’agence Europol (en 
reformatant la convention du 26 juillet 1995) a été adoptée en 2009  30. 
On peut donc constater que la référence à la définition européenne du terrorisme 
est pour le moins erratique dans les différents instruments qui, d’une manière ou 
d’une autre, constituent des réponses à la menace du terrorisme. Il n’est pas toujours 
facile d’en comprendre la raison. Deux explications peuvent être envisagées ; elles 
sont liées. D’une part, au niveau de la coopération policière, cette définition n’est pas 
toujours d’un grand secours. En effet, la définition choisie par le Conseil en 2002, 
puis en 2008, contient, ce qui est logique, un élément intentionnel qui est nécessaire 
au niveau des incriminations pénales, mais qui est moins utile très en amont d’une 
infraction, au stade des recherches policières. D’autre part, et précisément pour les 
raisons mentionnées dans la première partie, cette définition pourrait parfois constituer 
un handicap, en ce qu’elle ne recouvre pas exactement la même notion dans tous 
les Etats membres. Pour autant, on peut penser que le fait de disposer au niveau de 
l’Union européenne d’une décision-cadre définissant les infractions de terrorisme 
constitue un indéniable facilitateur pour adopter des instruments dérogatoires du droit 
commun, et permettre d’assumer qu’ils répondent à la proportionnalité nécessaire à 
des telles dérogations. 
4.	 Conclusion
La méthode de rapprochement des législations actuellement suivie par l’Union 
européenne, en tant qu’elle ne permet pas de créer un code pénal européen, ne 
peut jouer totalement le même rôle que celui qu’elle assume dans le droit des Etats 
membres. Elle se révèle par ailleurs imparfaite pour véritablement faire disparaître 
d’éventuels problèmes liés à l’absence de double incrimination. 
Pour autant, on ne peut que se réjouir que l’Union européenne dispose, à travers 
les décisions-cadres de 2002 et de 2008, d’instruments définissant, fût-ce de manière 
imparfaite, les infractions terroristes. En effet, en l’absence de telles définitions, 
b) une personne ou une entité qui facilite ou favorise les actes visés au point a), ou y contribue 
financièrement, matériellement ou techniquement, ou par des services financiers ou autres 
en leur faveur ; 
c) une personne ou une entité fournissant ou collectant des fonds, par quelque moyen que 
ce soit, directement ou indirectement, en vue de les utiliser ou en sachant qu’ils seront 
utilisés, en partie ou dans leur intégralité, pour commettre tout acte décrit aux points a) ou 
b) ; ou 
d) une personne ou une entité qui aide à commettre les actes visés au point a), b), ou c), qui 
s’en rend complice ou qui tente de les commettre ». 
29 JO, n° L 63, 6 mars 2002. 
30 JO, n° L 121/37, 15 mai 2009. 
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il est facile de mesurer les difficultés bien supérieures qui se poseraient à l’Union 
européenne dans l’élaboration d’une politique antiterroriste commune, qu’elle soit 
interne ou externe.
Part iv
The shift towards prevention  
in the fight against terrorism

Are we heading towards a European form  
of ‘enemy criminal law’?
On the compatibility of Jakobs’s conception of ‘an enemy 
criminal law’ and European criminal law
Stefan braum
1.	 Introduction
Günther Jakobs’s theory of an ‘enemy criminal law’ seems to be primarily a debate 
among German criminal law scholars although its paradigms, reasons and substance 
continue to be discussed throughout Europe and above all in South America  1. 
Throughout this contribution, we would like to discuss this theory and analyse its 
basis whilst putting the German context to one side. 
To what extent does the concept of enemy criminal law apply at the European level? 
Is it a typically German phenomenon that cannot be translated into the structures of an 
evolving European criminal justice system? Does it include both a proper empirical 
and normative analysis of Europe’s legislative framework? Might someone argue that, 
with the ongoing transformation from nation state sovereignty to sovereignty based 
on a union of states, (or, perhaps, as some have suggested, a network of organs and 
institutions), this also dissolves the paradigms of theories deriving their sources from 
a focus on national criminal justice systems? 
It cannot be denied that a theory based on the functions and legitimisation 
of criminal law cannot just be built on a national context, particularly if it claims 
universal validity. Thus, theory building has to be transversal. It must take into account 
a contingent process of constitutionalising at the transnational level  2, with the 
1 Referring to the European and international context of the debate on Jakobs’s conception 
see L. Greco, Feindstrafrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2010, p. 7.
2 See R. Forst and K. Gunther, “Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen – Zur Idee 
eines interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms”, in R. Forst and K. Günther (eds.), Die 
Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen, Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, Frankfurt am Main, 
Normative Orders, 2011, p. 11 and f., p. 22 and f.
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European Union as the most prominent example  3. The main problem connected with 
Jakobs’s theory on ‘enemy criminal law’ is whether or not it still covers the empirical 
and normative situation of the current deficiencies in criminal justice systems, which 
go beyond national borders. One might make the following provocative statement: it 
would be good, if Jakobs was right. But unfortunately, things are even worse. 
2.	 Counter-terrorist	legislation	and	the	‘shift’	of	criminal	law
Ten years ago, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon 
dealt a shattering blow to the world order. A widely used phrase has become a cliché: 
“After September 11, nothing will be the same as before”. This is superficially true 
with regard to the development of, in particular, criminal law and, in general, of 
social control throughout Europe. There have undoubtedly been significant changes. 
However, there are existing structures of social control using criminal law with some 
political flexibility. These would appear to be sufficient to allow criminal law to be 
adapted to the political challenges of today’s terrorism. 
If one considers criminal policy patterns of the European Union, there has always 
been a range of risks and threats that demand more criminalisation and the extension 
of criminal law. First of all, legislative measures aimed at protecting financial interests 
against possible offenders and organised crime were launched, making criminal law 
related to economic and financial affairs more punitive. Secondly, a war has been 
declared on organised crime to improve police and judicial cooperation in Europe. 
At this stage, the phenomena of organised crime and terrorism were both used to 
provide arguments of substance backing up the tendency for fundamental rights to 
be watered down for security reasons. Even two years before September 11th, the 
Council recommendation of 9 December 1999  4 included some essential measures 
aimed at thwarting the financing of terrorist groups. Intensifying cooperation, sharing 
intelligence and exchanging information on the risks of terrorism were regarded as 
crucial for the future. Last but not least, the idea of a European Arrest Warrant was 
waiting to be pulled out of the European institutions’ filing cabinets.
The events of 21 September 2001 opened those filing cabinets. At an extraordinary 
meeting of the European Council, EU Member States agreed to a plan of action 
containing a whole catalogue of anti-terrorist measures  5. Political decisions have 
been made to step up police and judicial cooperation by introducing the European 
Arrest Warrant and by adopting a common definition of terrorism. Focus has been laid 
on police cooperation so that the role and function of Europol could be strengthened. 
The flow of information between Europol and the Member States has therefore been 
expanded and a special anti-terrorist team has been set up at Europol. Moreover, it 
has not just been the flow of information that has been targeted but also the flow of 
3 See J. Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity”, in J. Habermas, Between Facts 
and Norms, Boston, MIT Press, 1998, p. 491 and f.
4 Council Recommendation of 9 December 1999 on cooperation in combating the financing 
of terrorist groups, OJ, no. C 373, 25 December 1999, p. 1.
5 Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 
21 September 2001. 
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financial assets. As a result, both the Framework Decision on money laundering  6 
and the Regulation on the freezing of funds  7 were more extensively applied within 
the scope of counter terrorist measures. A series of legislative initiatives were initiated 
on this political basis. This had a major impact on the legislation of EU Member States 
in criminal law matters. 
The following sectoral and specific instruments have been adopted to combat 
terrorism: 
−	 Council Regulation of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures against 
certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism  8;
−	 Council common position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific 
measures to combat terrorism  9;
−	 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating 
terrorism  10;
−	 Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism  11.
This legislation made use of different legal terms, which opened up a broad scope 
of application of anti-terrorist measures. It defined both the term terrorist act and 
terrorist group and established that certain offences of a minor nature at first sight can 
also be connected to a future terrorist threat. 
The definition of a terrorist act includes a political phenomenon. Its description is 
global by nature. What defines terrorism as terrorism? The 2002 Council Framework 
Decision focuses on the macrostructures of States and political, economic and social 
systems. Terrorism is globally perceived as the permanent attempt to destabilise 
these macrosystems. Thus, the Council Framework decision of 13 June 2002, which 
implements the Council’s common position, stipulates specified aims of deviant 
behaviour that may be considered as terror. Terrorism is characterised as a serious 
intimidation of the population, as unduly compelling a government or international 
organisation to do something and finally as the destabilisation and destruction of 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or 
international organisation. 
Traditionally, criminal law has been based on principles of individual responsibility, 
which are expressed in clear rules of proof. Harm has to be precisely described, 
the causality must be well proven and established and mens rea has to be proven. 
These are requirements of the rule of law. By contrast, the elements of the definitions 
promulgated by the Council favour a global risk approach. They necessarily avoid 
these requirements because macrostructures cannot be translated into the established 
individual patterns of criminal law. 
6 Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA, OJ, no. L 182, 5 July 2001, p. 1
7 See Regulation (EC) 2062/2001 of 19 October 2001 and Regulation 2199/2001 of 
12 November 2001, both amending Regulation (EC) 467/2001, OJ, no. L 277, 2001, p. 25. 
8 OJ, no. L 344, 28 December 2001.
9 Ibid., p. 93.
10 OJ, no. L 164, 22 June 2002, p. 3.
11 OJ, no. L 330, 9 December 2008, p. 21.
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Counter-terrorist measures therefore make references to potential collective 
perpetrators. They do not focus on individuals as individual wrongdoing in relation 
to terrorist offences is very difficult to prove. Thus, the 2002 Council Framework 
Decision implemented the term terrorist group. Article 2 of this Framework Decision 
defines a terrorist group as a “structured group of two persons or more, established over 
a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences”. This definition 
raises more questions than answers. One open question relates to the element of a 
“structured group”. Article 2(1) provides further elements of an accessory definition. 
A structured group is “not randomly formed for an immediate commission of an 
offence” nor does it need “to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity 
of its membership or a developed structure”. As criminal law instruments are meant to 
apply to new terrorist threats, the legal nature of these instruments must also change. 
The definition of a “structured group” contains the elements of an offence that seeks 
to include the typical network scheme of terrorist organisations. This inclusion poses 
a problem. It dissolves the elements of legality, which implicate the clarity of norms 
and the foreseeability of their application. 
The transformation of criminal law into a counter-terrorist measure does not stop at 
offences considered as minor by nature. The demand for an overall reaction to terrorist 
risks also refers to offences such as theft or the falsification of documents. These 
offences are regarded as aggravated if they are committed with a view to committing 
terrorist acts. This criminalisation, required by Article 3 of the Council Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA, is mainly characterised by the malevolent intention of the 
offender, but above all, opens the door for an anti-terrorist investigation to be opened 
even if it relates to obviously minor offences. 
The Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA sets down the last cornerstone of an 
extended form of social control built on the foundations of global terrorist threats. The 
new Article 3 now requires national legislatures to criminalise preparatory acts. Both 
public provocation to commit a terrorist offence and recruitment for terrorism should 
be regarded as terrorist offences. The criminalisation of “training for terrorism” is an 
addition to the catalogue of acts considered worthy of criminal sanctions. 
This type of preparatory act goes far beyond the categories of attempt or 
instigation. These acts come under a scope of application which is not restricted 
to counter-terrorist risks but which is extended to the criminalisation of risks that 
have the potential to create terrorist threats. Thus, one should not just speak of 
preparatory acts in a traditional sense but of advanced preparatory acts. The objective 
of the criminalisation is not only prevention. Prevention requires the formulation of a 
clearly defined goal and needs the description of an instrument, which is suitable and 
necessary to achieve this goal. 
The 2008 Framework Decision leaves this orientation behind, although it still 
affirms acting within the traditional prevention model  12. Basically, it underlines the 
political need for a risk approach taking into account the change in “the modus operandi 
of terrorist activists” and for a risk approach reacting to the fact that terrorist activity is 
12 See Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA, Grounds 6 and 7. 
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about the interlinking of international networks  13. This describes a political strategy 
of permanent control on structures regarded as risky. The criminalisation of these 
acts is not based purely on the need for more prevention. It seems to be politically 
justified as it entitles public authorities to launch investigations into possible terrorist 
threats even if there are cases where there is neither a danger of a terrorist act being 
committed nor serious grounds to believe that terrorist offences will be committed. 
This type of criminalisation opens the door to an overall social control strategy. 
This strategy has led to essential changes within the criminal justice systems and their 
normative legitimisation. In substantial criminal law, one is faced with a permanent 
legislative drum beat of regulation blurring elements of an offence, replacing harm 
with danger and replacing danger with risks that may create a danger. In criminal 
procedure, the tendency goes from reasonable grounds that justify the launch of an 
investigation to preventive actions like undercover investigations and telephone tapping 
and ends up with overall control measures without any reference to empirically-based 
categories such as suspicion or concrete danger. 
This criminal procedure is characterised by the dominance of executive powers. 
They have the right to conduct secret investigations. They decide on disclosure of 
information or evidence. They collect information and data, which are registered in 
computer systems, facilitating the exchange of information across borders. The core 
of these new executive powers is the merging of security activities with domestic 
police or prosecutorial investigations. Due to terrorist counter-measures, a set of rules 
has been established that can put the traditional norms of criminal justice systems on 
hold if a terrorist threat arises. 
But it is also true that this is not a completely new development. Enhancing 
executive powers in criminal investigations belongs to the inherent logic of prevention 
strategies  14. But now the quantity, range and variety of security legislation since 
September 11 have reached an unprecedented level  15. On the one hand this entails 
the risk that security orientations will overwhelm the principles of a democratic state-
like rule of law and fundamental and political rights  16. On the other hand this entails 
a change of both the theoretical and practical understanding of criminal justice systems 
as such: there is a shift from legally bounded investigation to the general and flexible 
surveillance of potential risks. There is a shift from modern prevention to postmodern 
social control, which is meant to be overall social control  17. 
13 Ibid., Ground 3. 
14 See for example P. Andreas and E. Nadelmann, Policing the Globe – Criminalization 
and Crime Control in international relations, Oxford, OUP US, 2006, p. 217 and f. 
15 Critical on this global development for example J. HocKing and C. Lewis, “Counter-
terrorism and the rise of security policing”, in J. HocKing and C. Lewis (eds.), Counter-Terrorism 
and the Post-Democratic State, London, Edward Eldgar, 2007, p. 138 and f. 
16 Referring to the situation in the UK GS GOODWIN-GILL, “Everyone and the citizen: 
the devaluation of principles and protection”, in J. HocKing and C. Lewis (eds.), Counter-
Terrorism, p. 101 and f. (p. 106 and f.). Referring to the German context P.-A. Albrecht, 
Kriminologie, 3. Auflage, München, Beck, p. 69 and f. 
17 Ibid.
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Even if one does not agree on the extent of this ‘shift’, the fact that it exists 
cannot be denied. It is also difficult to ignore the increasing orientation of criminal law 
instruments towards risky structures instead of individual acts or persons. And it needs 
to be pointed out that the reason for this shift lies in the activities and legal initiatives 
of transnational institutions that go beyond national criminal justice systems. 
Does an interpretation of the function of criminal justice systems using the 
patterns of ‘enemy criminal law’ correspond to both the pertinent empirical situation 
of Europeanised criminal justice systems and the normative erosions caused by 
postmodern social control? 
We will consider the various paradigms of Jakobs’s conception in order to 
give an answer to the question as to how adequately it analyses the process of the 
Europeanisation of criminal justice systems.
3.	 The	Conception	of	enemy	criminal	law	in	the	German	scholar’s	debate
A.	 Between	facts	and	norms
Jakobs develops this conception in the context of a theory of punishment based 
on a concept of law. The concept of law that Jakobs describes cannot be reduced to 
pure normative theory declaring law as something purely epistemological, valid at 
any time at any place, ignoring the fact of whether it is respected in reality or not. 
His references are facts nourishing this reality of law. Jakobs insists on the fact that 
the real world has limits to the officially declared concept of law, considered to be 
“politically correct”  18. There is the rule of law but there are also conditions for 
implementing the rule of law. 
Regarding the dualism between norms and facts, Jakobs prefers a theoretical 
approach based on facts. They decide which norms can effectively guarantee an 
orientation within a concrete existing social system  19. On the other hand, facts can 
contradict norms without depriving them of their legitimacy if social systems insist on 
their factual validity. Thus, if a person violates a norm, by, for instance, committing 
an offence, it does not correspond to society’s expectations for their norms to be 
respected and maintained. Society decides on their validity and not the offender  20. 
A pronounced sanction related to an offence leads to a countermeasure to restore 
confidence in the further existence of the norm. It stabilises the norm by underlining 
that the expectations of its validity are still justified. If the offence is considered to be 
an offence and if the offender is treated like an offender by punishment, society proves 
the real factual validity of the norm  21. 
Referring to Niklas Luhmann’s theory of systems, Jakobs gives criminal law a 
systemic sense. Thus, by countermeasures (sentence and punishment) to maintain 
the norm, it can fulfil its goal of stabilising social expectations that given norms are 
still respected and continue to be respected. The role of punishment is therefore to 
18 See G. JaKobs, “Feindstrafrecht ? – Eine Untersuchung zu den Bedingungen von 
Rechtlichkeit”, HRRS, 2006, p. 289-297, at p. 289.
19 Ibid., p. 290.
20 Ibid., p. 291.
21 Ibid.
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safeguard the stability of social systems as such. Criminal justice systems serve as a 
tool to maintain the smooth functioning of a society and its subsystems. 
B.	 Jakobs’	concept	of	a	moral	person
1. Moral persons and enemies
Jakobs’s understanding of the relationship between facts and norms, expressed by 
his theory on punishment, includes a specific concept of a moral person perceived as 
a concrete part of concrete social systems. 
Rejecting a purely normative theory, Jakobs’s concept does not accept a moral 
person as an epistemological category  22 demanding respect for its integrity 
regardless of whether and how the person integrates itself in a framework of realised 
mutual recognition. A moral person is defined by a set of rights and obligations  23. 
Jakobs demands the moral person to perform and to be sufficiently willing to fulfil his 
obligations. In Jakobs’s view a concrete moral person has to contribute to the social 
systems and to guarantee a minimum level of reliability to submit to social norms  24. 
Only by presenting this minimum level of personal reliability can the expectations of 
other members of the social systems have a common basis. Otherwise, if this required 
minimum does not appear to be guaranteed, the person concerned loses his right to be 
treated like a full moral person. As a result, he will be deprived of his rights  25. Thus, 
the person will not be treated within the framework of the law: he shall see himself as 
being excluded, as an enemy  26.
2. ‘Enemy criminal law’ – the starting point and end of normative disintegration
Thus, Jakobs’s theory on punishment refers, after all, only to those citizens who 
are capable and willing of living within a framework of mutually shared expectations. 
The distinction made by Jakobs seems to be clear: Criminal law for citizens applies 
if both imputation of the offence to an individual perpetrator is possible and if the 
offence leaves a minimum of expectation of future behaviour that is compatible with 
social norms. The minimum level of reliability might be shattered but the validity of 
the negated norm can be maintained by some kind of sanction  27. However, without 
a minimum level of loyalty to social norms, the role of punishment in stabilising 
social expectations cannot work. As a result, the enemy must be subjected to security 
measures in order to bring him physically under control  28. 
Jakobs challenges the general legitimacy of his own theory of punishment, 
admitting that it is made for those situations that a social system still considers to be 
normal. Confronted with an extreme situation, Jakobs denies the paradigms of ordinary 
theories of criminal law. If countermeasures do not work and if security measures 
are needed, the social system, which has been undermined, consequently admits to 
22 Ibid., p. 289.
23 Ibid., p. 293.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 294.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 293.
28 Ibid., p. 296.
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having lost its capacity for normative integration. If a distinction is made between the 
punishment of an offender and a security measure with regard to an enemy, a dialectic 
process between both poles will have been launched. Social systems are then showing 
a lack of confidence in the proper functioning of their norms. They demonstrate that 
these norms are not made for situations defined as being exceptional or extreme. 
Thus, not only are the offenders without minimum loyalty in the spotlight, but 
the norms themselves are being challenged. If punishment does not guarantee that 
confidence lost in the factual validity of social norms in extreme cases is restored, 
how can one still argue that it works in a normal situation? In the light of Jakobs’s 
own theory, the tension between citizens and enemies, resolved by the exclusion of 
the latter, will lead to the normative disintegration of a society. Thus, the idea of an 
‘enemy criminal law’ is equivalent to the idea of an authoritarian administration of a 
disintegrated social system. 
Even Jakobs would not disagree with this point as the existing disintegration of 
social systems partly belongs to the real facts that have made him reflect on a specific 
criminal law related to enemies. Disintegration is the state of play. That is how Jakobs 
perceives the real existence of criminal justice systems  29. 
The criticism of insisting on the authoritarian nature of Jakobs’s conception will 
not make him change his paradigms either. On the contrary, Jakobs insists that the State 
has an obligation to protect its citizens’ right to security, assuming that the rule of law 
is interpreted as something real and not considered as an abstract notion disproved by 
reality  30. The issue is about finding the right balance between a criminal law applied 
to citizens and a law of security measures related to the enemy. The latter is necessary 
in order to prevent it from infiltrating the domain of criminal law, which is bound by 
the rule of law  31. The dualism between both categories will not lead to a synthesis. 
If expectations about the loyalty of individuals are reviewed, the review includes the 
tendency to replace security measures on an individual with security measures applied 
on structures. Thus, ‘enemy criminal law’ is not at the end but at the beginning of the 
further normative disintegration of systems.
3. Defining the ‘enemy’: individualisation of structural risks in the context  
of the German criminal justice system
With regard to the concrete circumstances of criminal justice systems, the first 
essential question about Jakobs’s theory is: who exactly is the enemy? He admits that 
these categories remain unclear: the part of a person considered to be hostile against 
norms can be merged with parts of a moral person that is well integrated within a 
social system. By referring to real facts, Jakobs tries to distil the model of an enemy 
out of existing legislative acts  32. This distillation, however, derives primarily from 
the background of the history of German criminal law and makes reference to the 
29 Ibid., p. 293.
30 Ibid., p. 297.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 295.
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recent and still ongoing German debate about the legitimacy of certain anti-terrorist 
measures. 
a) Political connotations
One of the characteristic elements of the modern history of German criminal 
law consists of the individualisation of structural problems. Authorities have always 
used the political strategy of labelling individuals in order to demonstrate their 
capacity to resolve social problems. In the 19th century, Bismarck’s social legislation 
was accompanied by an “act prohibiting activities of social democrats dangerous to 
public safety”. The Nazi regime enforced an act on “dangerous habitual criminals”, 
providing a legal basis for the deportation of opponents of the regime and both ethnic 
and religious minorities. One crucial element of this legislation was detention for the 
purposes of security. Individuals were excluded from society for political reasons. 
German political society in the 1960s and 1970s defined and labelled individual 
opponents to create justifications to extend criminal law. Opponents were painted as 
an abstract hypothetical threat to German society as a whole. The typology of these 
abstract threats changed from communists to terrorists and included members of the 
Baader-Meinhof-Group and the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) as well as organised 
criminals and fundamentalist Muslims  33. 
Jakobs’s definition of the enemy refers to this tendency to personalise structural 
risks. He derives his concept of an enemy inductively from legal texts both of 
substantial and procedural criminal law. In German criminal law, the offence of 
building a terrorist association sets out the range of sanctions from five years to ten 
years up to fifteen years of prison sentence  34. The latter just applies to ringleaders 
and persons behind. 
Jakobs argues that this cannot be justified by the pure infringement of the legal 
interest of public security but has come about because of political will and the need 
to submit those persons to security measures  35. In terms of criminal proceedings, 
Jakobs considers pre-trial detention to be an example of enemy criminal law as 
persons suspected of intending to escape or suspected of being at risk of colluding 
with others cannot be recognised as moral persons but as excluded enemies  36. 
In Jakobs’s view, secret investigation methods deprive citizens of their rights to 
information. This indicates that they are treated as enemies and not as moral persons 
integrated into society  37. The same indication is regarded as being pertinent in cases 
where defence lawyers’ access to their clients is restricted in cases of counter-terrorist 
investigations  38. 
33 See a short wrap-up of this development in the dissertation of M. Riechmann, Organisierte 
Kriminalität und Terrorismus – Zur Funktionalisierung von Bedrohungsszenarien beim Abbau 
eines rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts, 2008, p. 41 and f. 
34 Paras. 129a, 129b of the German Criminal Law Code – ‘Strafgesetzbuch’.
35 G. JaKobs, “Feindstrafrecht ?”, p. 295.
36 Ibid., p. 296.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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Jakobs’s definition of the enemy based on the wording of legal provisions rather 
insinuates the category of the enemy. However, it lacks a convincing, immediate 
conclusion from the analysed legal provision to the category in a logical sense. Even 
if a legal provision might incorporate a label relating to an individual considered as 
being a risk to society, this does not necessarily mean that this individual is regarded 
as being excluded from society as an enemy  39. 
Thus, the conclusion drawn by Jakobs is only comprehensible if you put it in 
the abovementioned historical context. Apart from a lack of coherence in the chosen 
terminology, these historical aspects show two further problems with Jakobs’s idea: 
first its political connotation and second the lack of an analysis of the empirical 
circumstances of criminal justice systems. 
Jakobs insists that his conception includes a scientific balance between existing 
criminal law, which perceives itself as a weapon, fighting against individuals presenting 
a risk or a danger to an existing social system. He argues that he has not invented this 
concept but describes it correctly  40. 
However, Jakobs cannot actually continue to affirm that his theory only describes 
the facts of a criminal justice system  41, underlining that the model of an ideal State 
bounded by the rule of law remains a political utopia  42. Describing facts cannot 
ignore the fact that politics and its strategies are part of the concrete reality  43. The 
expectations of a social system are necessarily politically defined. The stabilisation 
of the system is ultimately a stabilisation of expectations formulated by a political 
majority within a specific time and a specific situation. The label of the enemy is, in 
this context, not a scientific but a political label and is, last but not least, the final result 
of misleading societal communication. Thus, Jakobs cannot pretend to be politically 
impartial. On a theoretical level he seems to make an allusion to Hegel, affirming that 
reality and ratio are identical  44. Thus, Jakobs’s conception can also be interpreted 
as a scientific and theoretical conception, justifying the actual political state of play. 
This conception does not contain an argument on how to overcome the diagnosed 
normative disintegration of a society. 
b) Normative erosions 
The political nature of Jakobs’s conception is underlined by the German debate 
both on torture and on the German air security act, authorising military forces to shoot 
down a passenger aircraft suspected of being used as a weapon against the lives of 
human beings  45. 
39 See also F. Saliger, “Feindstrafrecht: Kritisches oder totalitäres Strafrechtskonzept”, 
JZ, 2006, p. 756 and f. (p. 760).
40 G. JaKobs, “Feindstrafrecht ?”, p. 293.
41 Ibid., p. 290.
42 Ibid., p. 297.
43 See J. Bung, “Zurechnen-Können, Erwarten-Dürfen und Vorsorgen-Müssen – Eine 
Erwiderung auf Günther Jakobs”, HRRS, 2006, p. 317 and f., at p. 319.
44 See F. Saliger , “Feindstrafrecht”, p. 757.
45 Former para. 14(3) Luftsicherheitsgesetz.
are we heading towards a euroPean form of ‘enemy criminal law’?     247
It follows from Jakobs’s conception – without his own scientific responsibility 
– that the exclusion of the enemy justifies a partial withdrawal of the general and 
indivisible protection of human dignity. The loss of the status of a moral person opens 
a Pandora’s box, unleashing the traditions of the authoritarian State that were thought 
to have been overcome and that are now disguised as up to date instruments to face 
the challenges of current problems relating to terrorism  46. 
Referring to Luhmann’s scenario of a ticking bomb  47, both politicians and 
academics argue that the human dignity of a suspected person knowing where the 
bomb is hidden can be relativised and entitles authorities to use any physical coercion 
necessary against the suspect  48. According to this view, even the human dignity 
of innocent citizens can be sacrificed in order to save the lives of a larger number of 
people exposed to a concrete danger  49. 
Both are logical consequences of Jakobs’s conception. The loss of the status of a 
moral person and that person’s shift to a status of an enemy is the characteristic element 
of war. This allows criminal law to be transposed as an instrument of combat  50. 
Thus, citizens can be demanded to perform. Expectations formulated in this type of a 
situation with society at war can, from this perspective, include obligations for self-
sacrifice. 
Consequently, once labelled as an enemy, the person is at the entire disposal of 
the powerful State. Terrorists are regarded as being the enemy incarnate. This is the 
justification given for declaring a permanent situation of emergency, incorporated in 
the politically enhanced ‘war on terror’, for suspending the principles of criminal 
law, for destroying individual freedom and, to be clear, for betraying the heritage of 
freedom derived from the age of enlightenment. 
The European Court of Human Rights in the Gäfgen case  51 and the decision of the 
Federal Constitutional Court on the air security act  52 show that – in Jakobs’s words 
– there are norms that remain valid although there might be permanent counterfactual 
experiences. These norms are universal. They are valid apart from societal reality as 
they are the original source of any social integration. The message derived from these 
judgments consists of the indivisibility of human dignity. Normatively, there are no 
enemies. There are only citizens regardless of whether they do daily nine to five jobs 
or are suspected of terrorist acts. 
46 See as a representative example M. PawliK, Der Terrorist und sein Recht, München, 
Beck, 2008.
47 See N. Luhmann, “Gibt es in unserer Gesellschaft noch unverzichtbare Normen ?”, in 
Heidelberger Universitätsreden, Band 4, 1993, p. 27.
48 M. PawliK, Der Terrorist, p. 46.
49 Ibid., p. 48.
50 Ibid., p. 25 and f.
51 Eur. Court HR, 1 June 2010, Gäfgen v. Germany (Application n° 22978/05). 
52 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1 BvR 357/05, Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 15. Februar 
2006.




As mentioned at the beginning when describing EU counter-terrorism measures, 
it now becomes clearer that Jakobs’s conception of the enemy, which is essentially 
based on an individual typology, is not tailored to the process of the Europeanisation 
of criminal justice systems. It is a conception focusing on the Nation State regarded 
as the political sovereign in matters of criminal law. Confronted with the European 
framework, it ignores systems under construction that go beyond nationally oriented 
criminal law. These systems are based on the European principle of mutual recognition. 
They are composed of different, new actors and they are the basis for other transnational 
regimes of cooperation in criminal matters. Their goal is not to exclude but to be 
informed. This goal renders Jakobs’s enemy criminal law an outdated conception.
In the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice, the principle of mutual 
recognition provided by Article 82 §1 TFEU is the cornerstone of European legislation. 
The European Arrest Warrant, administrative and penal sanctions as well as possible 
rules on obtaining and using evidence are guided by this principle. This has replaced 
the traditional structures of bilateral cooperation in criminal law matters and has 
implemented a unique framework of European judicial decisions  53. 
It is a way to connect criminal justice systems and to establish independent rules 
outside the Nation State. These rules can be formal, reviewed by the European Court 
of Justice, but also informal. This informality changes the structure of European 
criminal proceedings. They do not focus on the typology of individual offenders but 
on systemic problems, e.g. how to cope with overloaded criminal justice systems  54. 
The main issue is about finding a rational method to live with the lacunae in the 
framework of mutual recognition and to lighten the case load of European prosecutors 
and judges. 
The actors in the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice are increasingly 
intra- and interconnected. Europol’s data files are regularly and systematically 
transferred to national police authorities. They are at the same time the heart of any 
information exchange at the European level. Eurojust is the coordinator for cross-
border investigations. Within the framework of Eurojust, joint investigation teams 
are put together to create task forces composed of police, prosecutorial and judicial 
authorities  55. Their objective is to enhance mutual cooperation. The European anti-
fraud office OLAF interacts with national prosecutors to enforce European control 
53 See the transversal and comparative study from L. Surano, G. Vernimmen and 
A. Weyembergh (eds.), The future of mutual recognition of criminal matters in the European 
Union, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009.
54 See M. Wade, “The Power to Decide – Prosecutorial Control, Diversion and Punishment 
in European Criminal Justice Systems Today”, in J.-M. Jehle and M. Wade, Coping with 
Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems, Heidelberg, Springer, 2006.
55 See A. Herz, “The role of Europol and Eurojust in Joint Investigation Teams”, in 
C. RiJKen and G. Vermeulen, Joint Investigation Teams in the European Union, London, 
Springer, 2006, p. 159 and f.
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on the abuse of European subsidies and grants  56. The operations of all these actors 
are oriented towards the exchange of information about structures that are considered 
to be at risk. For preventive reasons their goals lie beyond individual offences but 
include keeping a check on risky environments that may lead to deviant behaviour.
Finally, looking at cooperation with third countries, above all the US, the exchange 
of information focuses on discovering both patterns of financial activities  57 and 
patterns of travelling  58 which might establish a risk for transnational security. 
This pro-active approach goes far beyond concrete or abstract danger. It enforces a 
permanent social control on societal activities that may provide an environment for 
terrorism. In cooperation with third countries, widespread and broad competences to 
process, store and exchange personal data have become the overall political goal  59. 
This objective is now underlined by a new principle pronounced by the European 
Union. Personal data should be available for a better targeting of risky societal 
patterns  60. The Data Retention Directive  61 illustrates the dramatic shift: neither 
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed nor a concrete or 
abstract danger of such an offence is needed to store the data. There are extensive new 
prevention strategies. If it has to be perfectly effective, all of us have to contribute to 
save security interests. 
	 Two aspects follow from this short overview
First of all, criminal law has definitively outgrown the shoes of national criminal 
justice systems. A new structure has been established in the meantime. Some describe 
it as the structure of transnational cooperation. But looking at the new actors and 
institutions of the EU itself and taking into account new institutionalised transnational 
interactions between the EU and third countries, we should rather talk of a network 
structure overlapping the traditional criminal justice systems  62. Within this network 
structure, the individual, be it as a citizen or as an enemy, does not even appear 
anymore. Systemic interests of social control absorb the orientation on individuals. 
56 See C. Stefanou, S. White and H. XanthaKi, OLAF at the crossroads – Action against 
EU Fraud, Oxford, Hart, 2011, p. 77 and f.
57 See Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on 
the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the 
United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (so-called “SWIFT-
Convention”), OJ, no. L 195/5, 27 July 2010.
58 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of 
Passenger Name Record Data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime, COM (2011) 32 final.
59 See Mitsilegas’ analysis in EU Criminal Law, Oxford, Hart, 2009, p. 235 and f. 
60 See G. Vermeulen, T. vander beKen and S. van malderen, Availability of law 
enforcement information in the European Union, Antwerp, Maklu, 2005; see also M. Böse, Der 
Grundsatz der Verfügbarkeit von Informationen in der strafrechtlichen Zusammenarbeit der 
Europäischen Union, Bonn, Bonn University Press, 2007.
61 Directive 2006/24/EC, OJ, no. L 105, 13 April 2006, p. 54.
62 See for example I. augsberg, T. GostomzyK and L. Viellechner, Denken in Netzwerken, 
Tubingen, Siebeck, 2009.
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The categories of guilt and responsibility are disconnected from the individual and are 
replaced by an orientation towards collective risks  63. 
Secondly, the availability of data and the exchange of information throughout the 
world illustrates that we are all, in Jakobs’s words, both citizens and enemies  64. This 
is not the direct consequence of a particular criminal policy towards enemies but the 
immediate and long term consequence of the idea of prevention as such  65.
B.	 Moral	persons	–	conception	in	a	transnational	context	
Criminal law has shifted into a transnational context and demands for legitimation 
models that are different from those referring to the political sovereignty of the Nation 
State. Moral persons acting under the regime of mutual recognition and submitted to 
transnational law enforcement strategies find themselves in an ambivalent situation. 
They are still regarded as subjects of a constitutional order but are at the same 
time submitted to transnational regimes full of unresolved conflicts of law. Thus, 
moral persons in a transnational context are falling between different stools. On a 
transnational level, societal expectations cannot be homogenously defined. In terms 
of a person’s societal performance that they are expected to maintain, this can have 
a very different content in very different cultural environments. In Europeanised 
and globalised criminal law, we are all regarded as strangers who are interconnected 
within an unusual context. As this context does not have clear and precisely defined 
expectations, we have to presuppose the individual autonomy of a person as part of a 
reciprocal relationship for allowing reasonable crossborder interaction. 
Therefore, in a transnational context, the moral person is a stranger with indivisible 
fundamental rights at whose core are the principles of freedom and human dignity. 
Strangers, travellers, asylum seekers and defendants enjoy the label of freedom as 
world citizens. This label lies beyond any concrete system reality. Violations of another 
person’s rights can, of course, justify a sanction. The answer to infringements of the 
rule of law is the law and nothing else. Exclusion, however, will not be a feasible 
concept as there is no coherent system that you can be excluded from. 
The European Court of Justice pronounced, in the Kadi and Al Barakaat cases  66, 
that the European protection of fundamental rights must be regarded as universal. 
Kadi had his funds frozen as he was considered to be a possible member of a terrorist 
organisation. This measure was unlawful. An already ‘excluded enemy’ regained his 
status as a moral person. These European judgments would not have been possible if 
Jakobs had been a member of the Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. European criminal law and Jakobs’s conception of ‘enemy criminal law’ are 
not compatible either in an empirical or in a normative sense. 
63 See P.-A. Albrecht, Kriminologie, p. 111 and f. 
64 See also L. K. Sander, Grenzen instrumenteller Vernunft im Strafrecht, Frankfurt am 
Main, Peter Lang, 2007, p. 270 and f.
65 See W. NaucKe, Review of José Luis González Cussac, “Feindstrafrecht. Die 
Wiedergeburt des autoritären Denkens im Schoβe des Rechtsstaats”, Journal der Juristischen 
Zeitgeschichte, 2008, p. 32 and f., at p. 34.
66 Kadi I: CFI, 21 September 2005, Judgement T-315/01 and ECJ, 2 December 2008, 
Judgement C-402/05; Kadi II: CFI, 26 October 2010, T-85/09. 
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Terrorism gives rise to complex new threats in the modern risk society. Perpetrators 
make use of their enemies’ legally existing infrastructures to carry out attacks. Fuel, 
fertilizer, chemical raw materials, airplanes, computer networks, and other everyday 
objects are turned into effective weapons in an asymmetric conflict. As a result, the 
logistics of terrorism are often simple and easily overlooked. The period of time 
between identifiable preparation and the actual commission of an attack is, in many 
cases, short. Thus, the time-frame within which security agencies must act in order to 
prevent terrorist attacks from taking place is frequently narrow. The scope of possible 
future threat-scenarios extends all the way to the deployment of biological or nuclear 
materials of mass destruction. Potential perpetrators act in organized groups as well 
as in loosely structured cells that are only tangentially influenced by information 
disseminated on the Web and by foreign training camps. Religiously-motivated suicide 
bombers are not effectively deterred by secular penalties. These new developments 
and threats account for the interest of security agencies, if they believe an attack is 
imminent, in intervening in the run-up to the consummation of the act and, when 
warranted in individual cases, in imposing liberty-depriving measures  1.
* This paper is based on the advisory opinion of the author delivered at the hearing of 
the German Bundestag’s Committee on Legal Affairs on the “Statute for the Prosecution of 
the Preparation of Serious Violent Offenses Against the State” on 22 April 2009. The original 
opinion was published in German in Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ), 2009, p. 353-364. 
Special thanks to Emily Silverman for translation and invaluable editing assistance.
1 On this point, see U. sieber, “Grenzen des Strafrechts – Grundlagen und Herausforderungen 
des neuen strafrechtlichen Forschungsprogramms am Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches 
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At the same time, the changed perception of risks on the subjective level as well 
as a fear of crime that does not accord with the actual (objective) security situation 
lead to an increase in the need for security on the part of citizens in the modern risk 
society  2, a development that creates a climate conducive to the creation of new 
criminal provisions and places security interests over liberty interests. Individuals and 
institutions tend to have irrational reactions to rarely occurring “dread risks”. For 
example, studies show that in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
large numbers of Americans chose to travel by car rather than by air because they 
thought they would be safer that way. More cars on the roads means more accidents, 
however, and the number of ensuing traffic fatalities far exceeded the number of 
fatalities in the airplanes hijacked on September 11  3. This example clearly shows 
that irrational human reactions to serious risks can lead to significant indirect damage 
(i.e., damage brought about by the reactions of victims). The dismantling of civil 
liberties and constitutional guarantees – a result of the security policy pursued in the 
United States – is another example of indirect harm.
Given this background of new risks on the objective level, increased security 
needs on the subjective level, and the temptation to attract voters by pandering to 
security-related expectations, law-makers developing the security law of the future 
must avoid making mistakes that, despite the best of intentions, bring about more 
damage to the rule of law than benefits to security. Thus, intrusive measures designed 
to contribute to the prevention of terrorism must be subject to an impact assessment 
that includes the careful balancing of security and liberty interests.
B.	 The	German	“Statute	for	the	Prosecution	of	the	Preparation	of	Serious	Acts	
of	Violence	Endangering	the	State”	of	2009
The German “Statute for the Prosecution of the Preparation of Serious Acts 
of Violence Endangering the State” enacted in 2009 (hereinafter the “Statute”)  4 
responds to terrorist threats and the security needs of society primarily by creating 
new criminal offenses. These offenses include the criminalization of the preparation 
of serious violent offenses endangering the State, the establisment of contacts for 
the purpose of committing serious acts of violence endangering the State, and the 
und internationales Strafrecht”, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW), 
119, 2007, p. 22 and f., 37 and f., 45 and f. with additional references. 
2 H. Kury, M. brandenstein and T. yoshida, “Kriminalpräventive Wirksamkeit härterer 
Sanktionen – Zur neuen Punitivität im Ausland (USA, Finnland und Japan)”, ZStW, 121, 2009, 
p. 192, 214 and f.; H. schöch, “Kriminalpolitik in Zeiten komplexer Bedrohungsformen”, in 
F. lösel, D. bender and J.-M. Jehle (eds.), Kriminologie und wissensbasierte Kriminalpolitik, 
Mönchengladbach, Forum Verlag Godesberg, 2007, p. 45 and f.
3 G. gigerenzer, “Out of the frying pan into the fire: Behavioral reactions to terrorist 
attacks”, Risk Analysis, 26, 2006, 350.
4 Gesetz zur Verfolgung der Vorbereitung von schweren staatsgefährdenden Gewalttaten 
(GVVG of 30 July 2009), published in Bundesgesetzblatt I 2437. See also Government draft, 
Bundestags-Drucksache (BT-Drs.) 16/12428 of 25 March 2009, identical with draft CDU/
CSU and SPD, BT-Drs. 16/11735 of 27 January 2009. See also Bundesrat draft, Bundesrats-
Drucksache (BR-Drs.) 16/7958 of 30 January 2008.
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dissemination of relevant instructions. Excerpts from the three main offense definitions 
read as follows  5:
§ 89a StGB
Preparation of a serious violent offense endangering the State
“(1) Whosoever prepares a serious offense endangering the State shall be liable to imprisonment 
from six months to ten years. A serious violent offense endangering the State shall mean an 
offense against life under Sections 211 or 212 or against personal freedom under Sections 239a 
or 239b, which under the circumstances is intended to impair and capable of impairing the 
existence or security of a State or of an international organization, or to abolish, rob of legal 
effect, or undermine constitutional principles of the Federal Republic of Germany.
(2) Subsection (1) above shall only be applicable if the offender prepares a serious violent 
offense endangering the State by
1. instructing another person or receiving instruction in the production or the use of firearms, 
explosives, explosive or incendiary devices, nuclear fuel or other radioactive substances, 
substances that contain or can generate poison, other substances detrimental to health, 
special facilities necessary for the commission of the offense or other skills that can be of 
use for the commission of an offense under Subsection (1) above,
2. producing, obtaining for himself or another, storing, or supplying to another weapons, 
substances, or devices, and facilities mentioned under no. 1 above,
3. obtaining or storing objects or substances essential for the production of weapons, 
substances, or devices and facilities mentioned under no. (1) above, or
4. collecting, accepting, or providing not unsubstantial assets for the purpose of its 
commission.
…
(7) The court in its discretion may mitigate the sentence (Section 49(2)) or order a discharge 
for the offense under this provision, if the offender voluntarily gives up the further preparation 
of the serious violent offense endangering the State, or averts or substantially reduces a danger 
caused and recognized by him that others will further prepare or commit the offense, or if he 
voluntarily prevents the completion of the offense. If the danger is averted or substantially 
reduced regardless of the contribution of the offender or the completion of the serious violent 
offense endangering the State prevented, his voluntary and earnest efforts to achieve that object 
shall suffice”.
§ 89b StGB
Establishing contacts for the purpose of committing a serious violent offense endangering  
the State
“(1) Whosoever, with the intention of receiving instruction for the purpose of the commission 
of a serious violent offense endangering the State under Section 89a(2) no. 1, establishes or 
maintains contacts to an organization within the meaning of Section 129a, also in conjunction 
with Section 129b, shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.
(2) Subsection (1) above shall not apply if the act exclusively serves the fulfilment of lawful 
professional or official duties.
...
5 Neither the reference to § 89a StGB (Strafgesetzbuch, Criminal Code) in § 138 para. 2 
StGB nor the other amendments in the Statute (primarily procedural in nature) will be discussed. 
The English translation of the Statute as codified within the StGB – used here in slightly modified 
form – is by M. bohlander; it is available on the Web site of the German Ministry of Justice. 
See http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/index.html (last visited March 2012).
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(5) If the degree of guilt is of a minor nature, the court may order a discharge for the offense 
under this provision”.
§ 91 StGB
Encouraging the commission of a serious violent offense endangering the State
“(1) Whosoever 
1. displays or supplies to another written material (Section 11(3)) which by its content is 
capable of serving as an instruction to the commission of a serious violent offense 
endangering the State (Section 89a(1)), if the circumstances of its dissemination are 
conducive to awakening or encouraging the willingness of others to commit a serious 
violent offense endangering the State,
2. obtains written material within the meaning of No. 1 above for the purpose of committing 
a serious violent offense endangering the State
shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.
(2) Subsection (1) no. 1 above shall not apply if
1. the act serves the purpose of citizenship education, the defense against anti-constitutional 
movements, arts and sciences, research or teaching, reporting about current or historical 
events, or similar purposes or
2. if the act exclusively serves the fulfilment of lawful professional or official duties.
(3) If the degree of guilt is of a minor nature, the court may order a discharge for the offense 
under this provision”.
These offenses are designed to enable investigation authorities to intervene 
already during the preparation of terrorist attacks, even if only individual perpetrators 
can be identified and even if the requirements of § 30 StGB (attempted complicity) 
and § 129a StGB (forming a terrorist organization) are not fulfilled. Thus, the goal of 
the “prosecution” is not only the investigation of conduct carried out in preparation 
of terrorist acts, which could be undertaken by means of police and intelligence 
law; rather, a vital element of the security advantage aspired to by the Statute lies 
in arresting, trying, and convicting offenders and, ultimately, in sentencing them to 
prison.
As a result, the term “prosecution” as it appears in the title of the Statute aims less 
at atonement and retribution than at prevention, which the Statute seeks to attain by 
means of the additional ground for arrest based on the likelihood of repeated offending 
and by means of statutory punishment ranges that allow for the imposition of lengthy 
prison terms  6. The aim of detaining potentially dangerous terrorist offenders by 
means of custodial sentences imposed for the criminally punishable act of preparation 
– detention that is, however, of preventive nature with regard to the consummation of 
the act and to additional attacks – is expressed as follows in the Statute’s explanatory 
memorandum: “The grave threats posed in particular by Islamic terrorism necessitate 
the earliest possible intervention also of the criminal law. It would be difficult to 
explain why law enforcement authorities would initially have to refrain from 
arresting a person who had already engaged in concrete preparations for an attack 
(for example, obtained explosive materials in large quantities), simply because the 
stage of a punishable attempt had possibly not yet been reached, thus rendering a 
6 § 112a para. 1 no. 2 StPO (Strafprozessordnung, Code of Criminal Procedure), § 89a 
StGB. 
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conviction, should authorities choose to intervene, uncertain”  7. The instruments of 
preventive detention foreseen by the Statute have also become a central issue in the 
efforts of other countries to prevent future attacks – for example, control orders in 
the UK  8 and the internment camp at Guantanamo – and have caused serious legal 
controversies.
Along with its goal of providing security benefits, preventive criminal law 
– which includes the authority to detain persons considered dangerous – poses a 
categorical challenge to the classical concept of criminal law, namely, criminal law 
as the protector of civil liberties: punishment for past wrongdoing is increasingly 
being replaced by prevention of future harm (traditionally a function of preventive 
police law). Thus, the preventive paradigm is leading criminal law away from its 
traditional goals and limits and turning it into a sub-discipline of a broader security 
law within which the distinctions between criminal law and police law threaten to 
blur  9. Under the Statute, neutral, everyday activities may serve as objective nexuses 
for criminal law intervention when they are accompanied by certain intentions; under 
these circumstances, the activities become offenses punishable by up to ten years’ 
imprisonment. The volatility of this development is apparent in the fact that preventive 
thinking combined with the unrestrained use of criminal law in the run-up to criminal 
acts beyond what is contained in the Statute could lead to an even further-reaching 
criminalization of offense-planning, up to and including even the punishment of mere 
thoughts. Thus, the Statute raises central questions regarding the limits of the criminal 
law and, with its new approach, has consequences far beyond the concrete legislation 
at issue.
C.	 The	central	questions
An assessment of the Statute requires the analysis of important and fundamental 
questions. A conception of the legitimacy and limits of the new preventive criminal 
law in the run-up to threatened harm is necessary. Thus, the first step taken here will be 
to address the three questions central to the Statute, questions that must be answered 
before the Statute can be evaluated.
− In light of the divergent approaches adopted abroad, the first question examines 
the options for alternative legal solutions: can the goals of preventive – even 
liberty-depriving – measures be better (or also) achieved by means of legal 
measures outside the criminal law than by means of criminal law?
− The second question addresses the aspired-to preventive “security criminal law”: 
are the aforementioned, criminal law-based preventive measures in the run-up to 
criminal activity compatible with the aims and concepts of criminal law?
− The third question pertains to the legitimacy and limits of criminal law protection 
in the run-up to criminal activity: on what grounds and how early in the events 
7 Bt-Drs. 16/12428 of 25 March 2009, p. 9.
8 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 of 11 March 2005; on this point, see C. walKer, 
“Keeping control of terrorists without losing control of constitutionalism”, Stanford Law 
Review, 59, 2007, p. 1395 and f.
9 W. hassemer, “Sicherheit durch Strafrecht”, Strafverteidiger (StV), 2006, 326; U. sieber, 
ZStW, 119, 2007, p. 34 and f.
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prior to a violation of a protected legal interest or other actual harm can criminal 
law protection attach before a falsely-labeled police law for the prevention of 
danger ensues or a covert preventive security detention is created?
The results of the discussion (Part 2) of these three fundamental questions 
pertaining to “the criminal law of the risk society” make possible an evaluation of the 
Statute (Part 3). Part 3 also contains concrete suggestions as to how the legitimate goals 
of the Statute can be made more compatible with fundamental principles of criminal 
law and thus capable of withstanding challenges based on constitutional law. 
2.	 Basic	principles	and	their	consequences
A.	 Alternative	approaches
The challenges of terrorism briefly outlined above raise the question of whether 
the aim of the Statute to establish measures of preventive detention in the run-up to 
criminal activity could also be achieved – perhaps even more successfully – by means 
of regulations outside the criminal law rather than by means of the criminal law itself. 
The answer to this question falls squarely within the tenor of the Statute: given the 
current situation in Germany, the goal of establishing a means of preventive detention 
for the purpose of averting terror attacks can only be realized in a manner compatible 
with the rule of law if the instruments – and the restrictions – of the criminal law are 
utilized.
As a legal consequence of an international armed conflict, the law of war as used 
in the United States to combat terrorism enables the detention of enemy combatants 
and, in certain cases, the internment of civilians for security reasons. The treatment 
of persons who have been deprived of liberty is also regulated in the law of non-
international armed conflict. This kind of armed conflict – at first international and 
then national – exists in the sense of international humanitarian law on the battlefield 
in Afghanistan. The Geneva Conventions do not, however, permit this conflict to be 
expanded into a “war”, unlimited in time and space, against worldwide terrorism and 
all terrorists. The interpretation of the United States of international humanitarian 
law, according to which the newly defined “illegal combatant” is not entitled to the 
protections of this law, should also be rejected  10.
To be sure, police law – like intelligence law – can play a significant role in 
the surveillance and investigation of potential perpetrators. Preventive police law is 
not, however, suited for – sometimes long-term – detention in cases of danger, be 
it abstract or concrete: police custody under the police law of the German Länder 
requires a concrete and imminent danger and is limited in the various Länder to a 
maximum duration of two weeks  11. An expansion of police custody or other form 
10 M. sassòli, “Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law”, 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Occasional Paper Series (Harvard University), 
Winter 2006, no. 6; C. Kress, “Völkerstrafrecht der dritten Generation gegen transnationale 
Gewalt Privater?”, in G. hanKel (ed.), Die Macht und das Recht, Hamburg, Hamburger Edition, 
2008, p. 323 and f.
11 E.g., § 21 sen. 2 SOG (Law on Security and Order) (Lower Saxony); § 17 para. 2 sen. 2 
POG (Law of police and regulatory authorities) (Rhineland-Palatinate); § 28 para. 3 sen. 5 PolG 
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of police law-based curtailment of liberty along the lines of English legislation would, 
without an announcement of derogation, violate Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR)  12.
Measures available under the laws concerning foreign nationals are also not 
generally applicable for the objective stated above: Section 58a of the German 
Aufenthaltsgesetz (Residence Law) allows an order of deportation “against a 
foreigner on the basis of a prognosis supported by facts to avert a special danger to 
the security of the Federal Republic of Germany or a terrorist threat without previous 
notice of expulsion”  13. If this order cannot be executed immediately, to enforce the 
deportation, the foreigner, in accordance with § 62 para. 2 no. 1a Aufenthaltsgesetz, 
may be taken into custody on the basis of a judicial order. This requires, however, that 
the deportation order be executed within three months. Attempts to extend the use of 
such provisions run up against human rights limits  14. In addition, given the fact that 
they apply only to foreigners, they offer no viable alternative to criminal law – even 
in the States where denaturalization is a possibility. For example, under amendments 
made by the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act of 2006, British nationals can 
be deprived of their citizenship if the Secretary of State is satisfied that “deprivation 
is conducive to the public good”. This represented a toughening up of previous 
provisions that permitted British nationals to be deprived of their citizenship only for 
acts “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom or an Overseas 
Territory”  15. Even the preventive, police law-like provisions of the German law of 
measures (Maßregelrecht), located in the criminal code, cannot realize the goals of 
the Statute. Preventive detention under §§ 66 and f. StGB requires not only at least 
one pertinent triggering offense but also – as shown by numerous decisions of the 
Federal Constitutional Court – rigorous procedures to establish the prognosis of the 
offender  16. Furthermore, a law of measures against dangerous terrorist offenders 
that is independent of the commission of a serious offense would be incompatible 
with the European Convention on Human Rights  17. 
(Police Law) (Baden-Württemberg).
12 House of Lords, Secretary of State v. JJ and others (2007) UKHL 45, 31 October 2007; 
ECtHR, A. and others v. United Kingdom (Appl. no. 3455/05), 19 February 2009.
13 On this point, see A. erbslöh, “Bestenfalls überflüssig – Überlegungen zur 
Abschiebungsanordnung (§ 58a AufenthG)”, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ), 
2007, 159.
14 See Article 5 para. 1 lit. f ECHR as well as ECtHR, A. and others v. United Kingdom 
(Appl. No. 3455/05), 19 February 2009; Saadi v. Italy (Appl. no. 37201/06), 28 February 
2008.
15 L. zedner, “Security, the State, and the Citizen: The Changing Architecture of Crime 
Control”, 13 New Criminal Law Review 379, 382, n. 10, 2010.
16 E.g., Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidung (BVerfGE) 109, 190 and f.; BVerfGE 
109, 133 and f.; Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW), 
2006, p. 3483 and f.
17 ECtHR, Guzzardi v. Italy (Appl. no. 7367/76), 6 November 1980, paras. 102f.; Jéĉius v. 
Lithuania (Appl. no. 34578/97), 31 July 2000, para. 50.
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Similar constraints apply to newly defined legal regimes, such as “enemy criminal 
law” or “law of war”, that are developing in various – equally vague – forms  18; 
clearly, however, these regimes must all be rejected. In the course of an analysis of the 
criminal law system as a whole and its human rights protections, no benefit is to be 
had from establishing broad swaths of “private areas” that are not subject to criminal 
regulation and at the same time creating vague clauses to make way for an “enemy 
criminal law” or a “law of war-like preventive law”  19.
Thus, the following can be stated: except for armed conflict (which is narrowly 
defined by international humanitarian law), short-term preventive police measures 
(also narrowly defined), and measures of improvement and security located in the 
StGB, preventive liberty-depriving measures in the area of terrorism can, at this time, 
only be realized by means of the criminal law. The German legislature is thus acting 
correctly in not pursuing alternative liberty-depriving measures outside the criminal 
law.
B.	 Legitimacy	of	a	“prevention-oriented	criminal	law”
The rejection of alternative, extra-criminal approaches to measures of preventive 
detention does not, taken alone, justify the criminal law model put forward by the new 
German statute. Instead, as shown in the introductory remarks, an evaluation must be 
undertaken of whether and to what extent prevention-oriented, criminal law-based 
deprivation of liberty in the run-up to criminal offenses is legitimate.
The answer to this second fundamental question is also positive and supports the 
approach taken by the Statute, with the proviso that the constitutive requirements and 
elementary guarantees of the criminal law be upheld in all criminal law interventions. 
In other words, the prevention of future crimes as aspired to by the Statute is only 
appropriate when undertaken in response to past wrongdoings that are attributable to 
blameworthy offenders. It is, however, not appropriate if undertaken as an exercise of 
purely preventive police law that has simply been labeled “criminal law”. 
The primary reason for the focus on this – narrow – preventive goal is as follows: 
The absolute goals of punishment (such as retribution and atonement) and the principle 
of culpability place an upper limit on the various criminal law-based modes of 
restraining liberty but do not provide them with a general constitutional legitimation. 
Constitutional legitimacy is provided by the relative goals of punishment, such as the 
prevention of future crimes  20.
These preventive goals include – as illustrated by § 2 sen. 2 Strafvollzugsgesetz 
(Law on the execution of criminal penalties) – not only the stabilization of the general 
18 For a discussion of “law of war-oriented preventive law”, see M. PawliK, Der Terrorist 
und sein Recht, Munich, Verlag C.H. Beck, 2008, p. 38 and f., who characterizes war as a 
preventive tactic raised to the level of “existential monumentality” (p. 25).
19 See G. JaKobs, “Kriminalisierung im Vorfeld einer Rechtsgutsverletzung”, ZStW, 97, 
1985, p. 750 and f.; M. PawliK (n. 18, supra), p. 26 and f., 38 and f.
20 See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (BGHSt), 24, 40 
(42); W. hassemer, “Strafrecht, Prävention, Vergeltung”, Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Strafrechtsdogmatik (ZIS), 2006, p. 268 and f.; C. roxin, Strafrecht AT, vol. 1, 4th ed., Munich, 
Verlag C.H. Beck, 2006, § 3 margin no. 14.
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awareness of norms (positive general prevention), a goal that dominates punishment 
theory, but also public deterrence (negative general prevention) as well as the impact 
on the individual criminal offender (special prevention). Special prevention, in turn, 
encompasses both the resocialization of the offender (positive special prevention) 
as well as the protection of the general public achieved by means of the offender’s 
detention (negative special prevention). This is in accordance with the fact that the 
Federal Constitutional Court has recognized the use of custodial punishments as a 
means of preventing harm to the public  21.
While it is thus permissible to take security into consideration, doing so in the 
context of a purely preventive criminal law harbors the danger of a lack of limits. 
Preventive aspects could, for example, justify the imposition of security measures to 
prevent mere “thought crimes”. Thus, the categorical limitation of the criminal law 
lies in the restriction of its application to culpably committed wrongdoing: prerequisite 
to the intervention of the criminal law is a past wrongdoing that is attributable to an 
offender who acted culpably. Taken together, the wrongfulness of the offense and the 
culpability attributable to the offender establish the – constitutionally supported and 
in § 46 para. 1 StGB anchored – upper limit of punishment  22.
As the preparation of offenses in the early planning stages bears a smaller degree 
of wrongfulness than an attempt (defined as the taking of steps that will immediately 
lead to the consummation of the offense) or the consummation of an offense, the 
legislature should not entertain exaggerated expectations of the effect on security of 
long-term custodial sentences imposed for preventive purposes on the occasion of a 
preparatory act. Insights from the field of criminology also show that negative special 
prevention has its limits if one does not wish – as is permissible in various foreign 
jurisdictions – to punish minor wrongdoing (e.g., conspiracy) with long custodial 
sentences that are unjustifiable and incompatible with § 46 I StGB  23.
Punishment cannot be justified solely on the basis of the claim that the actor 
appears to be dangerous – even if the actor has engaged in readily apparent external 
conduct; rather, only a culpably committed, wrongful criminal offense attributed to 
the offender can be a triggering act for an assessment of dangerousness. The criminal 
law should not check the actor’s thoughts but rather only the actor’s externally 
perceivable actions. Thus, it is only legitimate as act-based criminal law and not as 
actor- or attitude-based criminal law – as illustrated by the nexus to an act expressed 
in Article 103 para. 2 GG (Grundgesetz, German Basic Law)  24. 
It is in this limitation of the criminal law to culpably committed, criminally 
wrongful acts that the essential ground is found for the singular role described above 
21 BVerfGE 45, 256; 64, 271.
22 BVerfGE 45, 227; BGHSt 30, 116 f.; Hassemer (n. 20, supra), ZIS, 2006, p. 268 and f.
23 On the limited degree of wrongfulness and blameworthiness associated with anticipatory 
offenses, see M. PawliK (n. 18, supra), p. 28 and f., for information concerning empirical 
findings, see H. Kury, m. brandenstein and t. yoshida (n. 2, supra), ZStW, 121, 2009, p. 195 
and f., 229. 
24 P. racKow, Neutrale Handlungen als Problem des Strafrechts, Frankfurt am Main, 
Verlag Peter Lang, 2007, p. 114 and f.; C. roxin (n. 20, supra), § 6 margin no. 1-2. For additional 
references, see n. 49, infra.
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of the criminal law in the context of liberty-depriving measures characterized by socio-
ethical condemnation. In addition, this unique role is also justified by the broader 
protections and guarantees that distinguish the criminal law from all other measures 
of State intervention. These guarantees include not only the limitation of criminal 
law to culpably committed wrongdoing but also the principle of act-based criminal 
law, the principle of clarity or void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied to criminal 
offense definitions, the prohibition of the ex post legislation of criminal offenses, 
the presumption of innocence, the principle “in dubio pro reo”, the leadership by 
a neutral prosecuting authority of the criminal investigation, the strict requirements 
regarding judicial authorization, as well as numerous other constitutional and criminal 
procedural guarantees. In this context, for example, the relevance to the criminal law 
of activities carried out in the run-up to crime makes compulsory the leadership role 
of the office of the prosecutor over the police. These categorical requirements and 
protections are also a decisive substantive reason for why the preventive, liberty-
depriving measures contained in the Statute must be located in the criminal law.
The “unique role” of the criminal law in the context of liberty-depriving measures 
that can be imposed on terrorist offenders determines not only the formal locus of 
these measures in the criminal law but also the content of the regulations, since the 
choice of a legal regime determines both the prerequisites for application of that regime 
as well as the guarantees it provides. For example, activities that justify preventive 
actions permitted by police law do not automatically justify the imposition of liberty-
depriving measures that are available to the criminal law. Such measures can only be 
imposed if, among other things, the culpability requirements of the criminal law have 
been met. Thus, laws that permit intervention for preventive purposes cannot serve 
as the basis for repressive criminal law reponses – even if they have been labelled as 
criminal law  25. 
Even if the constitutional dimension of substantive criminal law has not yet 
been sufficiently developed by the courts  26, criminal law categories correspond 
at least to some extent to the constitutional criteria. For example, the criminal law 
principle of culpability is constitutionally recognized, and the constitutional principle 
of proportionality limits all criminal law-based interventions  27. Thus, it is unlikely 
that the European Court of Human Rights and the German Federal Constitutional 
Court would accept the circumvention of their jurisprudence concerning Article 5 
ECHR or the constitutional prerequisites for preventive detention simply because the 
25 On the commitment to categorical prerequisites of criminal law, see C. mylonoPoulos, 
“Internationalisierung des Strafrechts und Strafrechtsdogmatik – Legitimationsdefizit und 
Anarchie als Hauptcharakteristika der Strafrechtsnormen mit internationalem Einschlag”, ZStW, 
vol. 121, 2009, p. 69 and f., 92; M. PawliK (n. 18, supra), p. 39 and f.; U. sieber, “Blurring the 
Categories of Criminal Law and the Law of War – Efforts and Effects in the Pursuit of Internal 
and External Security”, in S. manacorda and A. nieto martín (eds.), Criminal Law Between 
War and Peace, Cuenca, Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2009, p. 35-79.
26 For a recent decision on point, see BVerfGE 120, 241.
27 For an overview of the constitutional basis of criminal law, see I. aPPel, Verfassung und 
Strafrecht, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1998; O. lagodny, Strafrecht vor den Schranken der 
Grundrechte, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 1996. 
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corresponding offenses triggering intervention are labeled as criminal law and placed 
in the criminal code. As the Federal Constitutional Court has held that a computer-
aided “dragnet” investigation (Rasterfahndung) – a comparatively small intrusion 
into an individual’s right to informational self-determination – is impermissible in 
cases involving merely abstract dangers  28, it would seem likely that, in situations 
displaying similar dangers, the court would find against criminal provisions providing 
for up to ten years’ incarceration if they are not based on criminal wrongdoing. 
Thus, the question becomes more important of whether the criminal offense 
definitions contained in the Statute embody criminal wrongdoing or whether they 
are simply an expression of security-based law. This leads to the third fundamental 
question mentioned above, namely, the question as to the legitimacy of and limits 
on criminal offenses in the run-up to harm: specifically, to what extent and, most 
importantly, on what basis and in what case-scenarios can criminal law-based 
protection be “preponed” to the run-up to harm or – in the terminology of the criminal 
law – activated prior to the causation of harm to a protected legal interest  29.
C.	 The	legitimacy	of	anticipatory	offenses
1. Basic principles 
According to the dominant view in criminal law, criminal wrongdoing is 
characterized primarily by the harm to or endangerment of protected legal interests, 
that is, of especially important and vulnerable goods or “functional units” of the 
individual or the community (Rechtsgüter)  30. In order for wrongdoing to be 
criminally punishable, another additional criterion must be fulfilled. There must be 
a special relationship or offense structure (Deliktsstruktur) between the punishable 
conduct of the offender and the protected legal interest: the punishable conduct must 
create a condemned and forbidden risk to the protected legal interest that is attributable 
to the offender  31. 
28 BVerfGE 115, 363and f.
29 “Prepone” is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as: “To bring forward to an 
earlier time or date. Opposed to postpone”.
30 On the concept of the “Rechtsgut”, see W. hassemer and U. neumann, in U. Kindhäuser, 
U. neumann and H.-U. Paeffgen (eds.), Nomos Kommentar, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 3rd. 
ed. 2010 – prior to § 1 margin no. 108 and f.; C. roxin (n. 20, supra), § 2 margin no. 1-122. 
For different approaches, see, e.g., G. JaKobs, StrafR AT, 2d ed., Berlin, New York, de Gruyter, 
1993, Section 2 margin no. 1-6; M. Köhler, Strafrecht AT, Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer, 1997, 
p. 22 and f.
31 For a discussion of the “Rechtsgut”, see c. roxin, “Das strafrechtliche Unrecht im 
Spannungsfeld von Rechtsgüterschutz und individueller Freiheit”, ZStW, 116, 2004, 931. 
See also W. frisch, “Faszinierendes, Berechtigtes und Problematisches der Lehre von der 
objektiven Zurechnung des Erfolgs”, in B. schünemann, H. achenbach, W. bottKe, B. haffKe 
and H.-J. rudolPhi (eds.), Festschrift für Claus Roxin (hereafter: Roxin-FS), Berlin, New 
York, de Gruyter, 2001, p. 232 and f. For discussions of Deliktsstruktur, see the papers in R. 
hefendehl, A. von hirsch and W. wohlers (eds.), Die Rechtsgutstheorie, Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003, in particular A. von hirsch and W. wohlers, “Rechtsgutstheorie 
und Deliktsstruktur – zu den Kriterien fairer Zurechnung”, p. 198 and f., and W. frisch, p. 227 
and f. See also the following footnotes.
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Consequently, an “anticipatory” criminal law-based protection that goes beyond 
the injury to protected legal interests of the individual can be justified on the basis of 
two lines of argument  32: First, criminal wrongdoing can be recognized as occurring 
already when legal interests are endangered by risky conduct and not only later 
when injury actually occurs. In the case of these so-called “endangerment offenses”, 
the criminally punishable, harmful act is repositioned and the act itself rather than 
the result is emphasized. Second, collective legal interests can be recognized that 
only indirectly protect individual interests (also referred to as supraindividual legal 
interests, social legal interests, and intermediate legal interests). These collective legal 
interests lead to an anticipatory protection by shifting the legal interest in the direction 
of the injurious conduct; in this context, the protection of the individual legal interest 
is only the motivation of the legislature for the independent protection of collective 
legal interests (primarily on the basis of individualistic, monistic theories of legal 
interests). The two justifications of punishing the creation of risks to individual legal 
interests and of punishing the creation of harm to social legal interests are to some 
extent functionally equivalent and can be combined.
The following remarks, which pay special attention to the criminal offenses 
contained in the Statute, first examine the “preponing” of criminal liability as achieved 
by means of endangerment offenses. Subsequently, anticipatory protection by means 
of supraindividual legal interests will be addressed.
2. “Preponing” criminal liability by means of endangerment offenses
a) Legitimation and systematization 
The requirement that all punishable conduct represent a condemned and forbidden 
risk to a protected legal interest that is attributable to the offender is a consequence 
of the aforementioned definition of criminal wrongdoing  33. This linkage of criminal 
“preponement” to fundamental categories of criminal law provides the grounds for 
establishing the legitimacy of all endangerment offenses on the basis of generally 
applicable criteria, namely, criteria that can be tailored to the special requirements of 
each individual type of endangerment offense. In the course of evaluating conduct 
prohibited by endangerment offenses, the criterion of prohibited risk – central to 
such offenses – makes it possible to engage in a balancing test involving the value 
of the protected legal interest and the threat to it, on the one side, and the competing 
liberty interests restricted by the prohibited act, on the other. Thus, when evaluating 
the anticipatory offenses contained in the Statute, both the restriction of the new 
criminal offenses to the most serious crimes as well as the limited degree of danger to 
these legal interests posed by preparatory conduct in the planning stages are relevant 
from the perspective of security. On the other side, namely, from the perspective of 
restrictions on liberty interests, it is necessary to differentiate: the “liberty interest” in 
the collection of assets as addressed in § 89a para. 2 no. 4 StGB is doubtless of greater 
32 See n. 30, 31, supra, and n. 64, infra.
33 See n. 31, supra. For one approach to the requirement of a disapproved, prohibited 
danger, see C. roxin, ZStW, 116, 2004, 931; for another approach, see W. frisch, Roxin-FS 
(n. 31 supra), p. 232 and f.
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import than the interest in the collection of radioactive materials encompassed by § 
89a para. 2 no. 2 StGB.
Causing a prohibited risk to a legal interest is not sufficient, however, to establish 
criminal wrongdoing. In the case of mere endangerment of legal interests, an additional 
criterion of legitimation is necessary to establish punishable wrongdoing – one 
whose basic principles have not yet been clarified in the criminal law literature  34. 
Something more than just the attribution of the danger to the offender’s sphere of 
responsibility is required. Since punishment is distinguishable from other sanctions 
primarily in the ethical disapproval associated with it, another justification – as a 
functional equivalent to harm causation in the context of result crimes – is necessary 
as to why the offender’s conduct is condemned and punishable despite the lack of 
harm to the object of the offense or to a legal interest. The attribution of criminal 
responsibility and the legitimacy of criminal law are based on different principles than 
public nuisance liability (police law) or civil anti-trust law.
The additional criteria necessary to establish the legitimacy of endangerment 
offenses are categorized and understood by different authors in different ways  35. 
The approach presented here is based on the grouping of offenses according to their 
attributes of wrongfulness. Thus, the following discussion will distinguish between 
three major types of endangerment offenses, each with its own criteria of legitimacy: In 
the first group, the “objective danger-creating offenses”, the danger is based primarily 
on the objectively dangerous situation that the offender creates – intentionally or 
negligently – but no longer controls (below b). The second group deals with “planning 
offenses”. Here, in contrast, the danger stems from the offender’s intention – which is 
documented by an external manifestation – to commit an offense (below c). The third 
group involves “cooperation offenses” and is characterized by a combination of the 
two foregoing attributes, namely, the decision to commit an offense and the objective 
manifestation of the decision, with the – danger-increasing – participation of more 
than one offender (below d).
b) Endangerment through the creation of uncontrolled, objectively dangerous 
situations 
Existing academic discussion of endangerment offenses has concentrated 
primarily on offenses involving dangerous situations that are caused by the offender, 
that are objectively identifiable, and that require intention or negligence – as defined 
by general principles of criminal law – on the part of the offender. Individual scholars 
categorize endangerment offenses according to their own precepts, with no consensus 
as to systematization or conceptualization  36: 
34 See W. frisch (n. 31, supra), in hefendehl et al. (eds.), p. 222 and f.
35 See W. frisch, Tatbestandsmäßiges Verhalten und Zurechnung des Erfolgs, Heidelberg, 
Verlag C.F. Müller, 1988, p. 230 and f.; r. hefendehl, Kollektive Rechtsgüter im Strafrecht, Köln, 
Heymanns Verlag, 2002, p. 147 and f.; W. wohlers, Deliktstypen des Präventionsstrafrechts, 
Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 2000, p. 281 and f.; F. zieschang, Die Gefährdungsdelikte, 
Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 1998, p. 52 and f.
36 See references at n. 35, supra.
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(1) The so-called concrete endangerment offenses require a concrete danger to a 
specific protected object (e.g., danger to “life or limb of another person or property 
of significant value belonging to another” in the context of “endangering road 
traffic” under § 315c StGB). In contrast, the “abstract endangerment offenses”, the 
“abstract-concrete endangerment offenses”, and/or the so-called capability offenses 
(Eignungsdelikte), i.e., offenses that criminalize conduct capable of causing a particular 
harm, involve the general dangerousness of the act and the likelihood that harm will 
be caused (e.g., drunk driving under § 316 StGB). For these offenses, legitimacy 
and grounds for criminalization are based primarily on the fact that the offender has 
created a dangerous situation, has “released it into the world” in an uncontrolled state, 
and has left up to chance whether the endangered object or legal interest will in fact 
be harmed: it does not, for example, exonerate the offender in a case of § 315c StGB 
that his or her dangerous driving causes no damage, thanks to the successful defensive 
maneuver of an oncoming vehicle. The fortuitous outcome changes nothing with 
regard to the condemnation of the offender’s conduct  37.
(2) Special problems arise when the danger and the potential harm to a legal interest 
are not a result of the offender’s conduct alone but rather arise due to a combination 
of the offender’s conduct and the independent criminal acts of a third person or 
persons. This type of situation can arise, on the one hand, in so-called cumulation 
cases in which, for example, an offender releases certain substances into a waterway, 
an action that, taken alone, would not pose a danger to the protected legal interest, 
but, in combination with similar actions undertaken by others leads to substantial 
pollution of the waterway. In the context of “cumulative offenses”, the claimed 
criminal wrongfulness of the minimally harmful conduct may be justified under 
certain circumstances on the basis of the fact that the protected legal interest would be 
harmed if the same conduct were to be undertaken by numerous persons. The offender 
should not escape liability as a “free rider” for actions that must be prohibited for the 
rest of society in order to prevent the harm that – due to the cumulative effects of the 
activity – would otherwise result  38. 
(3) A third subgroup of endangerment offenses, offenses characterized by the 
creation of objective danger, confronts the difficult problems associated with 
independent, illegal acts committed by third-parties. These so-called affiliated offenses 
(Anschließungsdelikte)  39 involve an actor providing a third person with potentially 
dangerous objects (such as weapons) or information (e.g., how to use weapons), which 
are then used by this third person to commit an offense. The principle of personal 
37 W. wohlers (n. 35, supra), p. 286.
38 See l. Kuhlen, “Umweltstrafrecht: Auf der Suche nach einer neuen Dogmatik”, ZStW, 
105, 1993, 716; W. wohlers (n. 35, supra), p. 318 and f.; critical W. frisch (n. 31, supra), in 
hefendehl et al. (eds.), p. 235 and f.
39 The term used here emphasizes the necessary affiliated nature of the conduct of another 
person and should not be confused with the so-called connected or “adhering” offenses 
(Anschlussdelikte) of §§ 257-261 StGB. W. wohlers (n. 35, supra), p. 328, refers to these 
offenses as “preparatory offenses” (Vorbereitungsdelikte), a term that should, however, be 
reserved for the offense group dealt with at point c), infra. 
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responsibility vis-à-vis the third-party “affiliated” offender  40 and the principle of 
reliance (Vertrauensgrundsatz)  41 argue against the attribution of the illegal affiliated 
offense to the original actor. In many cases, the exploitation by an affiliated offender 
for criminal purposes of the original actor’s conduct cannot be foreseen, especially if 
the original actor’s conduct is neutral, that is, noncriminal (e.g., selling a bread knife 
in a department store). In the case of conduct with a clear relationship to criminal 
activity, however, special grounds for attribution and legitimacy are possible  42. 
These play a role when the actor violates a duty of care designed to prevent illegal 
affiliated conduct (e.g., in the context of weapons law), as when the object provided 
or the information delivered can only be used (or is used almost exclusively) for 
illegal purposes or is especially dangerous. The attribution of the wrongful third-
party conduct to the original actor is also unproblematic if the original actor and 
the affiliated offender collude with one another, if the conduct of the original actor 
displayed specific characteristics of incitement – as in the case of public incitement 
to crime under §§ 111, 130a StGB – or when the original actor knows for certain that 
his or her conduct supports an illegal affiliated offense  43. The methods of making 
available written material that can serve as incitement to a serious act of violence 
endangering the State listed in § 91 StGB belong to this category  44.
c) Endangerment caused by the planning of illegal activity
The general literature tends to neglect a second group of “endangerment offenses” 
that are referred to in Anglo-American criminal law as inchoate offenses and that 
are an important part of the new Statute. The endangerment of the legal interest in 
the context of these “planning offenses” (Planungsdelikte) – also known as “attempt 
and preparatory offenses” or “endangerment offenses with the actor’s supplementary 
internal processes”  45 – has less to do with an externally perceivable, objective 
danger caused by the offender and more to do with endangerment due to the subjective 
intentions, plans, or other notions of the offender. These plans must, however, be 
manifested objectively in a criminal act (whose connection to wrongfulness will be 
40 On this point, see h. schumann, Strafrechtliches Handlungsunrecht und das Prinzip der 
Selbstverantwortung der Anderen, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 1986.
41 See, generally, g. duttge, Zur Bestimmtheit des Handlungsunwerts von 
Fahrlässigkeitsdelikten, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 2001, p. 468 and f. with additional 
references.
42 BGH NStZ 2000, 34; BGHSt 46, 107; BGH NJW 2001, 2409; h. Kudlich, Die 
Unterstützung fremder Straftaten durch berufsbedingtes Verhalten, Berlin, Duncker und 
Humblot, 2004, p. 439 and f.
43 See g. duttge, “Vorbereitung eines Computerbetruges: Auf dem Weg zu einem 
‘grenzenlosen’ Strafrecht”, in b. heinrich, e. hilgendorf, w. mitsch and d. sternberg-lieben 
(eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich Weber (hereafter: Weber-FS), Bielefeld, Gieseking Verlag, 2004, 
p. 285 (294 and f.); A. von hirsch and W. wohlers (n. 31, supra), in hefendehl et al. (eds.), 
p. 204 and f.
44 For more on this point, see 3.C, infra.
45 Crimes with an “actor’s supplementary internal processes” refer to offenses that not 
only require the perpetrator’s mens rea with respect to the objective elements of crime but 
demand an additional element of intent (especially with respect to certain aims of the crime).
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discussed in detail below) in order to prevent criminalizing mere “evil thoughts” within 
the forum internum of the offender. Unlike the first group mentioned above, namely, 
the group of endangerment offenses defined (primarily) in terms of objectivity, the 
offender’s intent in these cases goes beyond his or her objectively realized conduct.
(1) Attempt is correctly considered part of this group of offenses  46. With regard to 
the subjective requirements of the offense, a criminal attempt requires the decision 
to commit a – particular, concrete! – crime. As far as the objective requirements of 
the offense are concerned, to be guilty of criminal attempt, the offender must be on 
the verge of taking steps to realize the crime on the basis of the offender’s offense 
plan, thereby manifesting his or her determination to carry out the offense and his or 
her dangerousness (in the case of “possible” attempts, this typically means causing a 
concrete threat to the object protected by the offense or to the protected legal interest). 
The objective requirement of criminal attempt as defined in § 22 StGB, namely, 
the imminent taking of steps toward realization of an offense, not only prevents the 
criminalization of purely subjective offense planning and evil thoughts; rather, at 
the same time it illustrates the non-punishability of mere offense preparation. Thus, 
preparatory activities such as scoping out the crime location, procuring the weapon, 
traveling to the crime location, and lying in wait for the victim usually do not suffice 
for attempt liability. As a rule, offense planning is not criminalized because in the 
planning stage the offender must still overcome the last of his or her inhibitions toward 
the offense (if he or she has them), and a relevant threat to the object protected by the 
offense or to the protected legal interest ensues only when the offender is on the verge 
of taking steps to realize the offense.
(2) For some offenses, however, criminal law protection is “preponed” to preparatory 
activity. In such cases, punishability – in contrast to instances of attempt liability 
– attaches early, long before the offender reaches the stage of being on the verge of 
taking steps leading to the realization of the offense.
For the offenses created by the new Statute, this “preponement” of punishability 
by dint of preparatory offenses is of central importance. Like attempt, these 
offenses require the intention to realize the offense, but – unlike attempt – a step 
toward commission taken in the early planning stage will suffice, as will, in some 
circumstances, an offender’s not entirely concrete vision of the offense.
The legislature frequently uses the (objective) concept of “preparation” 
(Vorbereiten) to express the subjective side of these offenses, as, for example, in the 
preparation of a war of aggression (§ 80 StGB), an undertaking of high treason (§ 83 
StGB), the counterfeiting of money or postage stamps (§ 149 StGB), data espionage 
(§ 202c StGB), human trafficking (§ 234a StGB), computer fraud (§ 263a StGB), 
falsification of identity documents (§ 275 StGB), and data tampering and computer 
46 Another view considers attempt punishable not because of the danger it poses but rather 
(also) because of the impression and bad example caused by the offender. For a discussion of 
the justification of the criminal punishment of endangerment, see h. J. hirsch, “Vorbereitung 
eines Computerbetruges: Auf dem Weg zu einem “grenzenlosen” Strafrecht”, in C. roxin-FS 
(n. 31, supra), p. 716 and f.; see also C. roxin, Strafrecht AT, vol. 2, 2003, § 29 margin no. 
10-24.
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sabotage (§§ 303a and 303b StGB). Any form of intent (including dolus eventualis) will 
satisfy the “preparation” requirement of these offenses  47. This group of preparatory 
offenses also includes the preparation of a serious violent offense endangering the 
State under the new § 89a StGB, for which, on account of the wording of the provision 
and an analysis of the structurally similar preparatory offenses, dolus eventualis with 
respect to the preparation of an attack could also be considered sufficient  48.
Tougher requirements with regard to the level of mental fault apply (but the 
demands with regard to the manifestation of preparation might be less stringent) 
when the legislature makes use of the subjective concept of “preparation” (in order to 
prepare) – “zur Vorbereitung” the main offense, as in the cases of the preparation of 
explosion or radiation offenses (§ 310 StGB) or of an attack on air or maritime traffic 
(§ 316c StGB). The same is true when the law describes conduct (especially dangerous 
conduct) that the offender must commit “in order to” (“um... zu”) achieve the illegal 
goals established in the offense definition. This is the case, for example, in the offense 
prohibiting the acquisition of a State secret “in order to” betray it (§ 96 StGB) and the 
offense prohibiting certain actions involving an insured object “in order to” commit 
insurance fraud (§ 265 StGB). This is also true when the offense definition requires 
an “intention” (“Absicht”) to commit a certain offense. This approach to offense 
definitions was taken in the new § 89b StGB: “Entering into relationships in order to 
commit a serious act of violence endangering the State”. This provision encompasses 
the establishing of contact with a terrorist organization as defined in § 129a StGB 
“with the intention of obtaining instruction in the commission of a serious act of 
violence endangering the State under § 89a para. 2 no. 1”.
Since these offenses “prepone” punishability to early phases of the planning stage 
and replace objective offense elements with subjective attitudes, their legitimacy is 
open to two – interrelated – criticisms: that of attitude-based criminal law and that of 
the lack of an attributional connex: The first point of criticism is that the recognition 
in subjective plans of a threat to a protected legal interest is impermissible because 
mere plans are at issue here. These offenses, so the claim, are nothing other than 
the punishment of mere thoughts and the criminalization of the individual’s private 
space, an impermissible actor- and attitude-based criminal law. The second point of 
criticism is that any threat or danger posed by objectively defined, act-related conduct 
“preponed” to early phases of the planning stage would be, at most, minimal. As 
criminalization is “preponed” to ever earlier stages, the actor, so goes the argument, 
may have inhibitions regarding the criminal act that have yet to be overcome, and the 
possibility still exists that the actor will change his or her mind about committing the 
offense. The argument continues: since the actor must still make additional decisions 
47 On the subject of dolus eventualis, see a. schönKe, h. schröder (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, 
Kommentar, 28th ed., München, Beck Verlag, 2010, § 80 margin no. 8; § 83 margin no. 9; § 149 
margin no. 8 (Sternberg-Lieben); § 234a margin no. 14 (Eser/Eisele); § 275 margin no. 5a 
(Cramer/Heine); § 303a margin no. 9 and § 303b margin no. 14 (Stree/Hecker).
48 Dolus eventualis need not necessarily be eliminated as an option simply because the 
violent conduct required by para. 1 must be “intended to and capable of” endangering the State. 
See BGHSt 46, 252. For a discussion of the intent requirements of § 89a StGB, however, see 
directly following remarks.
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regarding the commission of the target offense and/or since the consummation of the 
attack is still dependent upon the activities of third persons, the planned violent act 
cannot be attributed to the original actor as punishable wrongdoing  49. 
Criticisms of the criminalization of mere thoughts as well as related criticisms of 
actor- and attitude-based criminal law are correct since a justification of punishment 
on purely subjective grounds would be impermissible and in the case of the 
criminalization of the human forum internum would also be unconstitutional as an 
intervention in the core area of private conduct. These criticisms do not apply, however, 
when the offense definitions at issue – for example, various older preparatory offenses 
in the StGB as well as those stemming from the new statute – in addition to their 
subjective requirements also require objective, offense-related conduct with which 
the offender emerges from his or her forum internum or private internal area, enters 
the external world, and causes a danger there  50. The combination of an objectively 
manifested act and a more far-reaching subjective plan can thus suffice to legitimate 
criminalization. 
The legislature can respond to the issue raised in the second point of criticism, 
namely, the reversal of the decision to commit an offense, as an “abandonment” of a 
plan to commit an attack by including – as it did in the new § 89a(7) StGB – an “active 
remorse” provision. The possibility that an offender will give up an illegal plan to 
commit an offense does not reduce the original threat to the point where a relevant 
and attributable risk no longer exists. In any event, a significant level of danger exists, 
as a rule, when the offender acts intentionally or knowingly with regard to the attack, 
and the goal of his or her planning is to inflict serious damage. The same is true when 
the offender does not seek to realize a crime of his or her own but rather deliberately 
or knowingly supports the crime of another. These kinds of planning can be proven 
by means of covert investigation measures employed in the area of terrorism. The 
condemnation of the creation of risk can be supported by these aggravated intent 
requirements in combination with an objectively manifested preparatory act even if, at 
a later point in time, the offender cannot carry out the violent act and as a result there 
is no injury to the protected legal interest.
Thus, the lack of “proximity to the attack” in the planning stage, the intermediate 
steps that are still necessary, and the possibility of the renunciation of the plan to 
commit the crime can be compensated for to some degree – as shown in the balancing 
process outlined above – by aggravated intent and risk requirements  51. The 
49 See K. gierhaKe, “Zur geplanten Einführung neuer Straftatbestände wegen der 
Vorbereitung terroristischer Straftaten”, ZIS, 2008, 402; m. PawliK (n. 18, supra), p. 35 and f.; 
t. walter, “Der Rechtsstaat verliert die Nerven. Zum Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Verfolgung der Vorbereitung von schweren Gewalttaten (RefE)”, Kritische Justiz (KJ), 2008, 
446 as well as the references at n. 24, supra.
50 The expansion of the forum internum and of the punishment-free private sphere is taken 
too far in g. JaKobs, ZStW, 97, 1985, p. 753 and f., and m. PawliK (n. 18, supra), p. 27 and f. 
On this point, see also n. 19, supra.
51 On the effects of the interactions of objective and subjective act-elements on the 
condemnation of conduct, see h. Kudlich, “Objektives und subjektives Handlungsunrecht 
beim Vorsatzdelikt – zugleich Überlegungen zum Verhältnis zwischen Vorsatz- und 
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prerequisites and results of such a “compensatory model” with minimum subjective 
and objective requirements can be illustrated on the basis of the corresponding offense 
definitions in the Statute:
As far as some of the aforementioned preparatory offenses are concerned, 
the prohibited acts – or their more precise interpretation in the case law – pose a 
significant threat to valuable protected legal interests. This degree of – objectively 
clear – wrongfulness is present in many of the prohibited acts introduced in § 89a 
StGB that are associated with firearms, explosives, and radioactive substances. Thus, 
many of the prohibited acts clearly fulfill the abovementioned general requirements 
of criminal risk creation for important protected legal interests and – even without the 
requirement of preparatory intent – are already punishable. 
In contrast, from the perspective of punishable risk creation and also from the 
perspective of proof, those offense alternatives of the Statute are problematic in which 
a “preponement” to the offender’s early offense planning stages is combined with a 
neutral everyday activity that exhibits no objective link to a prohibited activity and no 
objectively measurable threat level  52. The subjective offense element does not limit 
nor does it concretize wrongfulness in these cases, rather it creates it. This cannot be 
justified especially when a neutral act constituting the offense is only an opportunity 
to treat a subjective idea as a criminal act. While this kind of combination does not 
go far enough to be labeled thought crime, it comes uncomfortably close to doing 
so  53.
Offense definition alternatives should be viewed especially critically if, on account 
of their vagueness, the extent to which they apply to everyday activities is unclear. For 
example, it is not sufficiently clear whether the collecting of assets as described in the 
new § 89 a para. 2 no. 4 StGB applies only to the collecting of donations or whether 
it applies to the accumulation of savings as well. The English-language version of the 
Fahrlässigkeitsunrecht”, in l. Kotsalis, n. choraKis, c. mylonoPoulos and i. giannidis (eds.), 
Theorie und Praxis, Festschrift für Anna Benakis, Athen, Sakkulas, 2008, p. 265 and f.; P. 
racKow (n. 24, supra), p. 121 and f.
52 For another critical voice, see h. radtKe, m. steinsieK, “Bekämpfung des internationalen 
Terrorismus durch Kriminalisierung von Vorbereitungshandlungen? – Zum Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Verfolgung der Vorbereitung von schweren Gewalttaten (Referentenentwurf des 
BMJ vom 21.4.2008)”, ZIS, 2008, 388. The German criminal law does, however, recognize as 
punishable acts whose only specific, objective relationship to the offense lies in the subjective 
view of the offender (e.g., certain constellations of attempt or neutral acts of aiding and abetting). 
See H. Kudlich (n. 42, supra), p. 458 and f.; P. racKow (n. 24, supra), p. 94 and f.; w. wohlers, 
“Gehilfenschaft durch “neutrale” Handlungen – Ausschluss strafrechtlicher Verantwortlichkeit 
bei alltäglichem bzw. berufstypischem Verhalten?”, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 
(SchwZStr), 117, 1999, p. 433 and f. 
53 For criticism of the Statute on this point, see o. bacKes, “Der Kampf des Strafrechts 
gegen nicht-organisierte Terroristen”, StV, 2008, 658; r. decKers and J. heusel, “Strafbarkeit 
terroristischer Vorbereitungshandlungen – rechtsstaatlich nicht tragbar”, Zeitschrift für 
Rechtspolitik (ZRP), 2008, 171; K. gierhaKe (n. 49), ZIS, 2008, p. 400 and f.; h. radtKe, 
m. steinsieK (n. 52, supra), ZIS, 2008, 387, 392 and f.; b. weisser, “Über den Umgang des 
Strafrechts mit terroristischen Bedrohungslagen”, ZStW, 121, 2009, 154. See also n. 24, supra.
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United Nations Security Council resolution upon which the provision is based  54 can 
be understood as referring to the collecting of donations. The English Terrorism Act of 
2000 shows, however, that a broader regulation, one that also covers the accumulation 
of assets (savings), is possible  55. Under this interpretation – which should be rejected 
– a youth who decided to begin saving money and to use the accumulated savings to 
become a terrorist after a few years would be punishable.
These thoughts serve as the basis of a more precise definition of the criteria that 
legitimate the “preponement” of attempt liability to include the so-called “preparatory 
offenses”  56. The preparatory offenses found in the StGB, including those introduced 
by the Statute, indicate that for these offenses the legislature sees grounds for 
“preponement” in the extreme dangerousness of the target offense and in the necessity 
of early intervention in order to prevent such acts  57. This risk assessment does not, 
however, suffice to justify wrongfulness (discussed above), as wrongfulness for these 
preparatory offenses requires additional functional equivalents to the “imminent 
taking of steps” found in the traditional definition of criminal attempt. These functional 
equivalents include a clear, objective manifestation of the preparation of the act, a 
special creation of danger, and special mental fault elements.
– Due to the need to justify the designation of an act as wrongful, the need to keep 
a critical distance from “thought crime”, and the need to have clear evidence of 
the preparatory offense, the “preponement” of attempt liability must establish 
the following requirements on the objective level of the prohibited act: First, 
there must be a clear relationship between the prohibited act and the offense, 
a requirement that cannot be fulfilled by harmless, everyday activities. A clear, 
objective manifestation of the decision to prepare, one that confirms the decision 
in an objectively recognizable way, is necessary – such as, for example, the 
manifestation of the appropriation in the offense of misappropriation  58. This 
kind of relationship to an offense can be seen, for example, if an actor acquires 
certain raw materials in an amount that – absent a plan to carry out an attack 
– makes no sense for his or her private or professional life  59. 
– In addition, a significant danger must be created, a danger that can be assessed 
objectively on the basis of the offense plan (just like the “imminent taking of steps” 
in the attempt context). The restriction on liberty associated with “preponement” 
54 See n. 74, infra.
55 Sections 15-18 Terrorism Act 2000 of 20 July 2000.
56 On this point, see i. anastasoPoulou, Deliktstypen zum Schutz kollektiver Rechtsgüter, 
München, C.H. Beck Verlag, 2005, p. 252 and f.; g. JaKobs, ZStW, 97, 1985, p. 753 and f.; 
g. stratenwerth and l. Kuhlen, Strafrecht AT, 5th ed., Munich, Vahlen Verlag, 2004, p. 231 
and f.
57 See also s. Kauder, “Strafbarkeit terroristischer Vorbereitungshandlungen”, ZRP, 2009, 
21; g. stratenwerth and l. Kuhlen,, Strafrecht AT, 5th ed., 2004, p. 231 and f.
58 For a discussion of misappropriation, see a. schönKe, h. schröder (n. 47, supra), § 246 
margin no. 10 (Eser/Bosch).
59 On the “adaptation” (Anpassung) of the conduct to the criminal planning and on the lack 
of a non-criminal explanation, see h. Kudlich (n. 42, supra), p. 184 and f. See also g. JaKobs, 
ZStW, 97, 1985, p. 762 and f.
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is only appropriate when experience shows that this danger can no longer be 
countered at a later point in time  60.
– Since the realization of this threat depends on additional acts of the offender 
or of other persons, the offender must have taken an unconditional decision to 
commit the criminal offense, both as far as the special risk is concerned as well 
as with regard to the attribution and condemnation of his or her act. In many 
cases, the lack of “proximity to the act” (common in the context of preparatory 
offenses) and the corresponding smaller degree of concretization of the planned 
act can only serve as the basis for a sufficient amount of subjective wrongfulness 
if an aggravated form of mental fault, such as purposefulness or knowledge with 
respect to the future crime, is also present  61.
d) Endangerment by means of cooperation
A third and special category that justifies endangerment offenses is characterized 
by a combination of offense planning with an objective threat based on the common 
planning of several persons. In this context, it is necessary to distinguish between 
conspiracy offenses – prominent in Anglo-American criminal law – and offenses of 
association – dominant in continental European law.
The objective dangerousness associated with these cooperation offenses is seen 
– in the so-called conspiracy offenses – in the mutual bonding of the offenders as 
well as – in the so-called offenses of association – in the danger associated with 
specialization based on the division of labor among offenders, the momentum, and 
the neutralizing effects of group processes, etc. The former offenses include the 
conspiracy offenses of the Anglo-American criminal law, counterparts of Germany’s 
– controversial – conspiracy offense (§ 30 StGB)  62. The latter group consists of the 
offenses of association found in §§ 129, 129a StGB. These offenses are also seen as 
offenses for the protection of social (supraindividual) legal interests in the area of 
public security  63. These cooperation offenses will not be discussed here in more 
detail because the justification for their existence is not relevant to the Statute (not 
even with regard to the offense of establishing contact with terrorist organizations).
3. “Preponement” of criminalization by means of supraindividual legal interests
The legitimacy of “preponed” criminal law protection on the basis of public, 
supraindividual (“social”) legal interests will not be addressed here in detail  64. The 
protection of (collective) social processes (not directly based on individual interests) 
60 w. frisch, in c. roxin-FS (n. 31, supra), p. 223 and f.
61 See discussion of proposed amendments to the Statute at 3.A., infra.
62 On German law, see u. fieber, Die Verbrechensverabredung, Frankfurt am Main et al., 
Verlag Peter Lang, 2001, p. 105 and f.
63 See, e.g., h. w. laufhütte, r. rissing-van saan and K. tiedemann (eds.), Leipziger 
Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, § 129 margin no. 1, vol. 5 (Krauss), 12th ed., Berlin, de 
Gruyter, 2009; m. hofmann, “Urteilsanmerkung zu OLG Düsseldorf vom 15.09.1997, VI 
2/97”, NStZ, 1998, 250.
64 In addition to the references at n. 31, 32, 36, supra, see m. Krüger, Die 
Entmaterialisierungstendenz beim Rechtsgutsbegriff, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2000, p. 
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that are essential for the functioning of the community can be justified on the basis of 
these supraindividual legal interests. Vague legal interests such as the protection of the 
public order or of the social climate are rightly rejected in this context  65.
This is also true of the legal interest in public security when this interest is not focused 
and concretized on the basis of a specific protected object  66. Such a concretization 
would have to analyze the security-related expectations of the population, which can 
be disturbed by unmanageable risks or by risks whose results cannot be controlled. 
The identification of intolerable risks could lead to results similar to those reached 
in the risk analysis within the framework of the endangerment offenses studied here 
but, in light of the subjective security expectation of the public, would be less clear. 
Since the problematic issues raised by the Statute have to do with the “preponement” 
of the prohibited act, it is – incidentally – also not determinative for the justification 
of criminalization whether the threat is associated with the individual interests 
mentioned in the criminal offense definition or whether the threat relates to interests 
in State security – interests that are also mentioned in the criminal offense definition 
and that (given the location of the norm in the portion of the Criminal Code entitled 
“Endangering the Democratic Rule of Law (Rechtsstaat)”) are the primary targets of 
protection. Thus, a legitimation of the proposed offenses derived specifically from the 
perspective of the protection of public security would not lead to more convincing 
results than the general comments presented here on the impermissible creation of 
risk.
3.	 Evaluation	and	reform	of	the	new	offenses
The above analysis of fundamental questions and criteria of legitimacy not only 
provides objective criteria for the evaluation of preventive criminal law and the newly 
created offenses, it also identifies the changes necessary for their legitimation. The 
above analysis has already highlighted those aspects of the Statute that are in need of 
amendment. The consequences are clear and will be summarized and illustrated in the 
following on the basis of the three most important aspects of the Statute. 
A.	 Preparatory	activity	under	§	89a	StGB
The offenses introduced in § 89a paras. 1 and 2 StGB fall within the category of 
preparatory offenses, analyzed above, which “prepone” criminalization to a point far 
before the attachment of attempt liability – as do numerous other criminal offenses 
in the StGB. On the subjective side, the offenses are limited to the preparation of the 
most serious criminal acts for which, given the need to prevent potential threats, early 
intervention is necessary. Many of the acts described in § 89a para. 2 nos. 1-3 StGB 
119 and f.; b.J.a. müssig, Schutz abstrakter Rechtsgüter und abstrakter Rechtsgüterschutz, 
Frankfurt am Main et al., Verlag Peter Lang, 1994, p. 149 and f.
65 For comments critical of the vague legal interest in public security, see g. duttge, in 
weber-FS (see n. 43, supra) p. 289 (295); c. roxin (n. 20, supra), § 2 margin no. 75-79. On 
the necessary concretization, see u. sieber, Computerkriminalität und Strafrecht, 2d ed., Köln, 
Heymanns Verlag, 1980, p. 251 and f.
66 For discussion of the legal interest of public security, see r. hefendehl (n. 35), p. 288 
and f. (controversial). In this context, see also K. gierhaKe (n. 49), ZIS, 2008, 402.
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are covered by other criminal provisions, such as the laws on firearms or explosives. 
Due to the statutorily required intention to commit an attack, the offenses in § 89a 
StGB represent aggravated forms of these traditional offenses. To the extent that 
the acts are traditionally criminalized even in the absence of an intention to commit 
an attack because the prohibited activity exhibits a clear, objective relationship to 
wrongfulness as well as a significant potential threat, criminalization according to the 
principles developed above is legitimate. Criminalization is also legitimate, as the acts 
prohibited in these cases do not involve any fundamental liberty interests worthy of 
protection. Since these offenses also apply to cases that pose a significant threat (e.g., 
collected explosives), to cases shortly before the attachment of attempt liability, as 
well as to recidivists, serious punishment can be justified  67.
Some offenses introduced in § 89a paras. 1 and 2 StGB, however, also pose a 
significantly smaller threat, especially when they address an early, indistinct planning 
stage (that is not limited by the offense definition) or apply when notions of the offense 
are still vague. They exhibit a blurred boundary area especially when they apply to 
acts that, taken objectively, are socially acceptable, when they apply to neutral, non-
punishable conduct, or when they apply in the context of acts that do not pose a 
(significant) threat. This is true specifically for the vaguely described “unnamed” cases 
and general clauses of § 89a para. 2 nos. 1 to 3 StGB (e.g., “other skills”, “special 
facilities”). The activities of collecting, accepting, and providing not unsubstantial 
assets as described in § 89a no. 4 StGB often represent socially acceptable conduct. 
On this basis, these instances still do not represent “thought crime” but can be seen as 
functioning within a critical distance thereof  68. 
In order to establish a sufficiently objective nucleus of wrongfulness, § 89a 
para. 2 StGB should be amended to include the requirement that the listed acts pose 
a certain danger or threat. This threat can also be determined in connection with the 
offender’s plan – comparable to the “imminent taking of steps” when attempt liability 
attaches. In this process, an attempt should be made to determine how to define the 
degree or extent of danger more precisely. Examples of this kind of limitation can 
already be seen in the interpretation of various preparatory offenses when case law 
and literature have refused to recognize as criminal the acts of limited importance 
or the acts that are far away from the harm to the protected interest  69. As far as the 
Statute is concerned, the requirement of this kind of threat or threat level can either 
67 Whether the ten-year maximum punishment for all offense alternatives is appropriate 
given other punishments foreseen by the system is, however, debatable. For a critical view on 
this point, see H. radtKe and m. steinsieK (n. 52, supra), ZIS, 2008, p. 391 and f.; H. radtKe 
and m. steinsieK, “Terrorismusbekämpfung durch Vorfeldkriminalisierung? – Das Gesetz zur 
Verfolgung der Vorbereitung schwerer staatsgefährdender Gewalttaten”, Juristische Rundschau 
(JR), 2010, p. 107 and f.
68 For criticism of the Statute, see decKers and heusel, ZRP, 2008, 171; K. gierhaKe 
(n. 49), ZIS, 2008, p. 400 and f.; h. radtKe, ZIS, 2008, 387. On this point, see also s. Kauder 
(n. 57), 21.
69 a. schönKe, h. schröder (n. 47, supra), § 80 margin no. 6 and § 83 margin no. 8 
(Sternberg-Lieben); W. JoecKs and K. miebach, Münchner Kommentar, Strafgesetzbuch, 
München, C.H. Beck Verlag, 2006, vol. 4, § 330d margin no. 19 (Schmitz).
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be added for the individual prohibited acts or introduced in general form by means of 
the legislative technique employed in § 80 StGB, which requires the (admittedly quite 
indeterminate) “danger of a war”.
Another issue that must be studied is how best – by means of an amendment to 
the Statute or a note in the explanatory memorandum – to insure that neutral conduct 
with no inherent, objectively recognizable relationship to an offense is placed outside 
the reach of the offense definition. As in the case of misappropriation, where the 
“manifestation of the appropriation” requires that the actuation of the intention to 
appropriate be “objectively recognizable”  70, a manifestation of the decision to 
prepare must also be included in the context of § 89a StGB (and other preparatory 
offenses)  71.
Finally, as far as the indefinite mental fault requirement of “preparation” is 
concerned  72, the law must be clarified: the offender must act willfully or (especially 
with regard to the financing of terrorism under § 89a para. 2 no. 4 StGB) knowingly 
with regard to the serious violent offense endangering the State  73. With respect to 
the financing of terrorism, the international requirements of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1373 would still be fulfilled  74.
70 a. schönKe, h. schröder (n. 47, supra) § 246 margin no. 10 (Eser/Bosch).
71 The initial sentence of § 89a para. 2 StGB could, for example, require, that the offender 
“manifest (in objectively recognizable fashion) the preparation of a serious violent offense 
endangering the State” by undertaking the subsequently listed activities.
72 On this point, see n. 47-48, supra. The policy solution suggested here could be effectuated 
with the help of both discussions concerning the need for punishment as well as explanations 
from legislative bodies during deliberations of the draft statute or in the travaux préparatoires. 
On the corresponding interpretation oriented to the “structure of the offense”, see n. 82, infra.
73 On this point, see text accompanying n. 55, supra. The initial sentence of § 89a para. 
1 StGB could, for example, cover those who “intentionally or knowingly prepare a serious 
violent offense endangering the State”. In contrast, changing the description of the prohibited 
act to include the phrase “in order to prepare” (a serious violent offense endangering the State) 
(as in §§ 310, 316c StGB) cannot be recommended since this would thwart the call for an 
objective manifestation of the preparatory act. For an interpretation limited to knowing conduct 
based on considerations of the need for punishment, see U. sieber, NStZ, 2009, 353, 362, n. 69 
(deliktsstrukturorientierte Auslegung); see also n. gazeas, t. grosse-wilde and A. Kiessling, 
“Die neuen Tatbestände im Staatsschutzstrafrecht – Versuch einer ersten Auslegung der §§ 89a, 
89b and 91 StGB”, NStZ, 2009, 593, 602.
74 No. 1(b) UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1373 of 28 September 2001 and 
Article 2, para. 1 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (UN Treaty 
Series no. 38349) cover practically word-for-word the same conduct: “the wilful provision or 
collection… of funds… with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge 
that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts”. As can be seen from a comparison 
with the equally authoritative French and Spanish versions, the parallelism of intention and 
knowledge indicates that subjective dolus directus in the first or second degree should be a 
requirement of criminal liability for terrorism financing; correspondingly, dolus eventualis does 
not suffice. An analysis of Article 2, para. 2 lit. b) Council Framework Decision on combating 
terrorism leads to the same conclusion. 
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B.	 Establishing	contacts	under	§	89b	StGB
Section 89b StGB also falls within the category “preparatory offenses”. It 
criminalizes the establishing or maintaining of contacts with a criminal or terrorist 
organization with the intention of receiving instruction for the purpose of committing 
a serious violence offense endangering the State pursuant to § 89a para. 2 no. 1 StGB. 
With the reference to §§ 129a and 129b StGB, the provision has an objective connection 
to wrongfulness, but one that transplants the structural problems encountered when 
trying to identify a criminal organization into the new regulation. The “preparation of 
a preparatory act” required on the subjective side of this provision, however, moves 
criminal liability to an extremely early point in the run-up to the offense: between the 
attachment of criminal liability and before the attack is consummated, the offender 
and/or other persons must take numerous intermediate steps  75. The Statute should 
thus at least be brought into conformity with the general principles that govern the 
limits of “preponement”, in that the prohibited act of establishing contacts should be 
combined not only with the intention of receiving instruction (i.e., the commission of 
the preparatory act) but also with the intention of committing an attack as required 
by § 89a StGB. It is clear from the remarks of practitioners who testified before the 
German Bundestag’s Legal Affairs Committee that proving this intention to commit an 
attack should not cause any problems  76. In addition, the goal of timely intervention 
by investigation agents should also be attainable when – as in the draft of the Bundesrat 
– the provision is linked to the completion of training and not to the establishing of 
contact. This kind of act requirement would do a great deal more justice to the criteria 
of a legitimate “preponement”. It would still go far beyond the requirements of the EU 
and the Council of Europe. With the reference to “training for terrorism”, the latter do 
not cover the (passive) experiencing of training but rather only the (active) providing 
of instruction to others in certain skills with the goal of committing a terrorist offense 
“knowing that the skills provided are intended to be used for this purpose”  77.
75 In contrast, the draft of the Bundesrat, BT-Drs. 16/7958 of 30 January 2008 for a new 
§ 129a para. 5 StGB would also criminalize the taking advantage of training programs offered 
by terrorist organizations. For criticism of the extreme “preponement” proposed by the draft, 
see K. gierhaKe (n. 49), ZIS, 2008, 403 f.; for criticism of the Statute, see w. JoecKs and 
K. miebach, Münchner Kommentar, Strafgesetzbuch, München, C.H. Beck Verlag, 2012, vol. 3 
§ 89b margin no. 3 (Schäfer); m. a. zöller, Terrorismusstrafrecht, Heidelberg, C.F. Müller 
Verlag, 2009, p. 581 and f.; for a different opinion, see S. Kauder (n. 57), 21.
76 See also D. wasser and A. PiaszeK, “Staatsschutzstrafrecht in Bewegung?”, Deutsche 
Richterzeitung (DRiZ), 2008, 319; for a different opinion, see W. JoecKs and K. miebach (n. 75, 
supra), § 89b margin no. 4 (Schäfer).
77 Article 3, para. 1(c) Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism in the 
version of 28 November 2008 (Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA, OJ, no. L 330/21, 
9 December 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ, 
no. L 164/3, 22 June 2002); Article 7 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism of 16 May 2005 (Council of Europe Treaty Series no. 196). See also Explanatory 
Report to the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism, margin no. 116 
to Article 7: “This provision does not criminalise the fact of receiving such know-how or the 
trainee”.
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C.	 Instruction	in	the	commission	of	a	serious	act	of	violence	endangering		
the	State	as	defined	by	§	91	StGB
Section 91 para. 1 no. 1 StGB – unlike the preparatory alternative in § 91 para. 1 
no. 2 – introduces an endangerment offense defined in terms of objective elements. 
The provision’s object of protection is defined – broadly – as written material “which 
by its content is capable of serving as an instruction to the commission of a serious 
violent offense endangering the State (§ 89a para. 1)”. This definition encompasses 
numerous offense-neutral passages (e.g., excerpts from a chemistry textbook). The 
offense prohibits activities including the promotion and the making available of such 
written material with a minimally substantiated risk description, namely, “when the 
circumstances of its dissemination are conducive to awakening or encouraging the 
willingness of others to commit a serious violent offense endangering the State”.
Since the commission of a serious violent offense endangering the State in the 
case of § 91 para. 1 no. 1 StGB depends upon the autonomous decision of an affiliated 
offender, the risk of an attack foreseen by the criminal offense definition can only be 
attributed to the original actor (who, for example, disseminated the information in 
the Internet) in accordance with the principles of legitimacy described above if there 
is a nexus between the protected object or the prohibited act and the offense. Such 
a linkage to the offense is extremely remote and, especially in the case of “making 
available”, insufficient, since both the prohibited act and the protected object rely on a 
suitability of the material for purposes of instruction or encouragement and not (also) 
on whether it was meant for these purposes. 
As a result of this suitability clause, the entire preparatory offense alternative is not 
only very broad but also extremely vague. The vagueness of the norm’s applicability is 
also due to the fact that the required suitability to encourage the third-party commission 
of a crime must derive from the “circumstance(s) of its dissemination”. The relevant 
consideration of the context of the dissemination of the written material is correct, to 
be sure, with regard to the legitimacy of anticipatory criminalization. But since the 
connections between data in the Internet (e.g., through links and the indices of search 
machines – including those that are added subsequently) are complex, this leads to 
significant uncertainties. For example, the text of the offense leaves open the question 
of whether already the very general dissemination in the Internet is sufficient or 
whether rather only the dissemination in a particular area (which one?) of the Internet. 
The posting of written material in the Internet advertisement of a terrorist organization 
is covered according to the Statute’s explanatory memorandum  78. Whether the 
posting in a critical discussion forum on questions of terrorism also suffices is, in 
contrast, still an open question. Similar hard-to-solve boundary problems arise, for 
example, when an international mail-order bookstore markets the chemistry textbook 
mentioned above in countries of the Middle East. While the inclusion of the broad 
social acceptability clause in para. 2 is essential in order to limit the norm, the clause 
does not mitigate the vagueness of the provision but rather aggravates it.
78 See the explanation in the government draft BT-Drs. 16/12428 of 25 March 2009, 
p. 10.
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As § 91 StGB encompasses not only instructions for the commission of serious 
crimes but even applies to written materials that are suitable for that purpose, interest 
in the exchange of information involving “dual-use products” cannot simply be 
deemed unjustified, even when the social acceptance clause of § 91 para. 2 StGB 
makes allowances for the most important interests in information. The vagueness 
of the norm is thus a serious problem from the perspective of constitutionality also 
because it can lead to a chilling effect on the free expression of opinion and, potentially, 
to pressure not to publish certain information. Due to its vagueness, the provision 
limits not only the free communication of Internet users but also leads to difficult 
assessments on the part of Internet providers as to the breadth of their “professional 
responsibilities”. Thus, the norm must be limited and made more precise. Possibilities 
include a stronger connex between the object protected by the provision and the offense 
(e.g., with a requirement that the written materials be “intended by their content” 
to achieve a specific purpose, as in § 130a StGB), a limitation of the prohibited act 
(e.g., with the requirement of a specified conduct of encouragement), an objective 
danger or endangerment requirement (as in § 80 StGB)  79, or a specification as to the 
mental fault requirement (such as the knowing or willful encouragement of violent 
acts). This also applies to the offense alternative “obtaining for oneself” (§ 91 para. 
1 no. 2 StGB). The need to make the norm more precise is all the more pressing 
because it not only intervenes in areas of liberty but also because (due to its serious 
control and implementation problems) it would have only a very limited effect in the 
global Internet  80. In its current form, the provision also goes much further than the 
corresponding international requirements and recommendations  81. The combination 
in the Statute of a high degree of vagueness, an unjustifiable additional “preponement” 
of criminalization, the limited effectiveness of the norm, and the aforementioned 
chilling effect on freedom of opinion provides fuel for the argument that the norm is 
unconstitutional.
79 This suggestion was made by Sieber already at the hearing of the German Bundestag’s 
Committee on Legal Affairs. See U. sieber, NStZ, 2009, 353, 363. On the unconstitutionality 
of § 91 para. 1 no. 2 StGB due to the failure of the legislature to include additional, objective 
elements in the criminal offense definition, see W. fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 
59th ed., München, C.H. Beck, 2012, § 91 margin no. 19; n. gazeas, t. grosse-wilde and 
A. Kiessling, (n. 73, supra), 593, 602.
80 For a discussion of this point in the context of child pornography, see U. sieber and 
M. nolde, Sperrverfügungen im Internet, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2008.
81 Article 3 para. 1(a) Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism in the version 
of 28 November 2008 as well as Article 5 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention 
of Terrorism of 2005 (both international instruments cited in n. 77, supra) encompass as 
“public provocation to commit a terrorist offence” only “the distribution, or otherwise making 
available of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist 
offence, where such conduct… causes a danger” that a terrorist offense “may be committed”. 
See F. Zimmermann, “Tendenzen der Strafrechtsangleichung in der EU – dargestellt anhand der 
Bestrebungen zur Bekämpfung von Terrorismus, Rassismus und illegaler Beschäftigung”, ZIS, 
2009, 1 and f., who also considers these proposals too far-reaching.
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4.	 Summary
These findings can be summarized as follows. The potential danger of terrorist 
attacks justifies the criminalization of preparatory activities as long as they are 
linked to already committed wrongdoing and not only to the dangerousness of 
persons. Within these limits, criminal law enables the deprivation of liberty – limited 
by the already committed wrongdoing and the culpability of the offender – that is 
imposed repressively as the consequence of the punishable preparation of an offense 
and that, with a view toward the consummation of the planned violent offense and 
additional attacks, has a preventive effect. Furthermore, the criminal law is the only 
instrument in the current legal landscape that (within the limits of wrongfulness and 
culpability) can justify a – not only short-term – deprivation of liberty for potentially 
dangerous terrorist offenders. Thus, the Statute’s prevention-oriented, criminal law-
based approach is, in principle, correct and is preferable to all alternative approaches, 
including “a preventive law oriented on the law of war”, a longer-term deprivation of 
liberty based on police law, and an expanded (civil) preventive detention of potential 
terrorists.
Also positive is the reliance on special endangerment offenses, which the Statute 
chooses as justification for criminal wrongfulness. Thus, the core area of the preparatory 
offenses in § 89a StGB is justified, both from the perspective of security and from that 
of liberty. The Statute expands criminalization with these types of offenses – which 
are not a novum – however, too far back in time in the run-up to the injury to legal 
interests. It covers not only punishable wrongdoing but also to some extent dangerous 
or suspicious conduct that only justifies intelligence or police surveillance or 
investigation. In addition, individual provisions are vague. Furthermore, the negative 
effect on freedom of information due to § 91 StGB is serious. In all areas, the Statute 
goes far beyond existing international requirements concerning the criminalization of 
preparatory terrorist activity.
Thus, the legislature must undertake amendments to the Statute in order to include 
the necessary limits and to make the Statute more precise. Should the legislature fail 
to take this step, case law and academia should undertake the suggested limitations, 
derived to some extent from general principles of criminal law. They should utilize 
the justification for criminalization of abstract endangerment offenses (especially 
planning offenses) described here for an “offense structure-oriented” interpretation 
(similar to the interpretation oriented to protected legal interests)  82. In addition, the 
Federal Constitutional Court should evaluate the constitutionality of § 91 StGB in 
light of its “vague” endangerment of freedom of opinion  83. It could also address the 
question of whether some aspects of the new offenses no longer implicate criminal 
wrongdoing but rather function as liberty-depriving measures of police law or as a 
kind of preventive detention mislabeled as criminal law  84.
82 This is especially true for the limitation of § 89a StGB to intentional or knowing conduct 
characterized by a significant degree of danger as well as an objectively recognizable nexus 
between the offender’s prohibited act and the offense.
83 See 3.C, supra.
84 See 2.A and B, especially text accompanying n. 27 and 28, supra.
Impact des nouvelles infractions terroristes 
quant à la qualification de participation  
à un groupe terroriste et à l’usage d’une preuve 




La présente contribution  1 s’articule autour de deux questions fréquemment 
rencontrées dans la pratique. 
Primo, il s’agit de l’impact de la nouvelle législation anti-terroriste belge, et 
plus particulièrement de deux éléments constitutifs de l’infraction terroriste. Il me 
semble que la nouvelle loi belge présente le risque d’amoindrir la rigueur de la loi 
pénale en ce qui concerne tant la preuve de l’élément matériel que celle de l’élément 
moral de l’infraction. D’une part, la notion de participation à un groupe terroriste 
reste particulièrement floue et pose des interrogations relativement aux conditions 
nécessaires pour la mise en œuvre de la répression. D’autre part, j’évoquerai 
l’élément intentionnel spécifique des nouvelles infractions, et plus particulièrement 
la problématique du moment à partir duquel l’intention délictueuse est présente. En 
effet, peut-on considérer que l’intention de « peut-être commettre un jour » un crime 
est suffisante pour une condamnation ? Ces problématiques sont évoquées à travers 
les deux premières affaires qui ont donné lieu en Belgique à la mise en œuvre de la 
nouvelle législation : les affaires dites du GICM (Groupe islamique des combattants 
marocains) et du DHKPC (un mouvement révolutionnaire turc).
Secundo, la présente contribution s’attache à montrer les problèmes que l’usage 
d’une preuve secrète peut révéler. Je tenterai de définir succinctement ce qu’est une 
preuve secrète, notamment en rapport avec les techniques particulières d’enquête. A 
travers un exemple concret de coopération entre la Belgique, l’Italie et l’Espagne, je 
1 La présente contribution n’a pas d’ambition scientifique mais se veut le reflet d’une 
expérience de praticien.  
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dénoncerai les risques que comporte l’usage d’une telle preuve quant au respect du 
procès équitable, mais également les moyens d’y remédier. 
2.	 L’impact	des	nouvelles	infractions
Le problème de base des nouvelles législations anti-terroristes réside dans la 
question du respect du principe de légalité de la loi pénale. Le principe de légalité exige 
que chacun d’entre nous soit capable de savoir quel comportement est pénalement 
répréhensible et dans quelle mesure  2.
Les nouvelles législations à propos de la lutte contre le terrorisme ont adopté une 
méthode particulière en vue d’incriminer au mieux ce phénomène complexe.
a) Certaines infractions du droit pénal général sont identifiées comme par exemple 
le meurtre, la possession d’armes, l’usage d’explosifs.
b) Ces infractions doivent avoir été réalisées avec une intention particulière, c’est ce 
que nous pouvons appeler « l’intention terroriste en temps de paix ».
c) Cette législation définit le groupe terroriste, c’est-à-dire cette organisation 
criminelle particulière qui agit pour réaliser les actes mentionnés ci-dessus avec 
une intention terroriste.
A.	 La	définition	des	actes	terroristes
Le Code pénal belge  3 a utilisé l’approche en trois temps, bien connue, de la 
décision-cadre européenne de 2002  4.
a) Une définition des actes qui sont considérés comme des actes terroristes (meurtre, 
etc.).
b) Les actes sont terroristes s’ils sont commis avec une intention terroriste.
c) L’incrimination du groupe criminel terroriste, c’est-à-dire les personnes qui sont 
organisées et qui commettent les actes terroristes.
B.	 La	critique	de	l’«	intention	terroriste	»
Le caractère vague de la définition de l’intention terroriste donnée par la décision-
cadre de l’Union européenne de 2002 a été fortement critiquée. Après la convention 
des Nations unies de 1997  5 sur les explosifs et celle de 1999  6 sur le financement 
du terrorisme, la décision-cadre a inventé une troisième intention terroriste très 
« politique ». En effet, à côté des deux intentions « classiques » que l’on retrouve dans 
les traités onusiens, à savoir l’intention d’« intimider gravement une population » 
ou de « contraindre indûment un gouvernement ou une organisation internationale 
2 A ce sujet, voir réseau de l’union euroPéenne d’exPerts indéPendants sur les droits 
fondamentaux, L’équilibre entre liberté et sécurité dans les réponses de l’Union européenne et 
de ses Etats membres à la menace terroriste, 31 mars 2003, p. 11 et s.
3  Voy. annexe. 
4  Décision-cadre du Conseil du 13 juin 2002 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme, JO, 
n° L 164-3, 22 juin 2002.
5 Convention internationale pour la répression des attentats terroristes à l’explosif, adoptée 
par l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies le 15 décembre 1997.
6 Convention internationale concernant la suppression du financement du terrorisme, 
9 décembre 1999.
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à accomplir un acte », l’infraction visée à l’article 137 du Code pénal belge vise 
également à « gravement déstabiliser ou détruire les structures fondamentales 
politiques, constitutionnelles, économiques ou sociales d’un pays ». Cette troisième 
intention est très vague et englobe, par exemple, l’objectif de transformer un Etat 
libéral en un Etat socialiste ou de démanteler un Etat national par des sécessions. 
C.	 Critique	à	propos	de	la	participation	à	une	organisation	terroriste	
Pour illustrer ce sujet, je souhaiterais mentionner des décisions judiciaires 
récemment rendues en Belgique relativement au GICM, le Groupe islamiste des 
combattants marocains  7. Les personnes poursuivies ont été condamnées à des 
peines d’emprisonnement allant jusqu’à huit ans.
Il est intéressant de se pencher sur les concepts de l’« intention terroriste », 
d’ « organisation terroriste » et de « membre du groupe terroriste » tels qu’ils ont été 
définis par la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles.
En effet, une des personnes poursuivies, Lahoussine El Haski, a été condamné 
et privé de sa liberté sur le fondement des dispositions pénales belges réprimant 
l’appartenance à un groupe terroriste – le « GICM » – qui aurait eu pour objectif de 
renverser le régime marocain au moyen d’actions violentes.
Ce groupe, tel que défini par la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, est un groupement 
d’opposition à un régime tyrannique d’Afrique du Nord, qui envisage un jour de 
renverser celui-ci, le cas échéant en usant de violence. On le voit, ce groupe serait 
avant tout une sorte de mouvement d’opposition politique et éventuellement armée 
au gouvernement marocain. La répression d’un tel mouvement politique emporte des 
restrictions importantes aux principes de liberté d’expression et d’association. On sait 
que ces libertés sont protégées par la convention européenne des droits de l’homme, 
mais peuvent néanmoins faire l’objet de restrictions, si celles-ci sont prévues par la 
loi, poursuivent un but légitime et sont nécessaires dans une société démocratique, 
selon le triple contrôle classique prévu par cette convention.
Or, si on peut considérer que cette condamnation pénale est « prévue par la 
loi »  8 et peut être considérée comme « poursuivant un but légitime » (protection des 
droits d’autrui et préservation de la sécurité), elle ne saurait passer pour « nécessaire 
dans une société démocratique » et cela pour plusieurs raisons.
En premier lieu, il faut constater que Monsieur El Haski n’a jamais été accusé 
d’avoir été impliqué dans un quelconque acte terroriste, ni même dans la préparation 
voire l’incitation à commettre de tels actes.
Lahoussine El Haski a certes effectué de courts séjours en Afghanistan où il ne nie 
pas avoir suivi une instruction militaire, mais c’est insuffisant pour l’impliquer dans 
quelque action terroriste commise.
Les juridictions belges ne sont d’ailleurs pas parvenues à apporter la preuve 
matérielle de tels agissements et se sont contentées de condamner Monsieur El Haski 
pour « appartenance à un groupe terroriste ».
7 Tribunal correctionnel de Bruxelles, 54e Chambre bis, 16 février 2006, inédit ; Cour 
d’appel de Bruxelles, 12e Chambre, 21 décembre 2006, inédit.
8 Articles 137 et 139 du Code pénal belge. 
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En deuxième lieu, et dans le même ordre d’idées, il faut relever la confusion 
opérée par les juridictions belges entre le délit d’appartenance et les attaques dont on 
n’a eu aucune preuve mais qui ont été imputées au GICM.
Alors qu’aucune preuve de la participation de Monsieur El Haski, dans un 
quelconque attentat, n’est apportée, ni n’apparaît des charges retenues par le ministère 
public, l’arrêt d’appel – confirmé en cassation – s’appuie sur des « meurtres et 
destructions préparés » – afin de renverser le régime marocain. Cela revient à imputer 
à un groupe d’opposition des actions matérielles violentes et contraires aux idéaux de 
l’Union européenne alors qu’elles n’ont jamais fait l’objet de discussion au cours de 
procédures pénales internes.
Mon opinion est que la création d’une telle qualification, avec une définition aussi 
vague, revient à tendre vers un pouvoir arbitraire. En effet, la constatation que les 
personnes condamnées en Belgique n’avaient participé directement ou indirectement 
à aucune action violente imputée au GICM, mais tout au plus, avaient montré une 
sympathie avec l’objectif politique de ce groupe (renverser le régime marocain) 
est interpellante. A partir du moment où ce mouvement d’opposition politique est 
étiqueté « terroriste », celui-ci ne peut plus légalement exercer son action de réflexion, 
d’association et d’expression de ses idées politiques – peu importe si on y adhère ou 
pas. L’existence même d’une opposition politique de tendance islamiste est devenue 
impossible. La simple sympathie (réelle ou supposée) à l’égard d’un tel groupement 
politique rend celui qui l’exerce coupable d’être un membre d’un groupe terroriste. 
Il existe d’autres infractions pénales qui permettent de punir, au moment où des 
infractions pénales sont réellement mises en œuvre ou projetées, ces actes déviants.
Le brouillard qui entoure la définition du groupe terroriste empêche naturellement 
une défense adéquate du suspect. Dans le cadre du GICM, « le terrorisme était le 
grand absent du procès ». Néanmoins, les défendeurs ont été condamnés pour des faits 
liés au terrorisme et ont reçu un stigmate difficile à surmonter, et ce particulièrement 
au moment de leur réinsertion après avoir purgé leur peine, tant en ce qui concerne la 
mise en œuvre de la libération conditionnelle ou la question de leur séjour administratif 
sur le territoire de la Belgique.
On pourrait conclure rapidement, avec Maria-Luisa Cesoni, que la définition 
vague « est basée sur l’orientation d’actions illicites à travers des fins décrites d’une 
telle manière que cela autorise des interprétations nombreuses et extensives et dont la 
preuve matérielle ne peut pas être donnée, dans la mesure où il s’agit de l’intention à 
propos d’un projet criminel futur, en d’autres mots à propos d’un élément subjectif, 
indépendant de son résultat »  9.
Une autre affaire intéressante en Belgique est celle relative au DHKPC, qui a fait 
l’objet de quatre décisions différentes au fond :
− Tribunal correctionnel de Bruges ;
− Cour d’appel de Gand, dont l’arrêt fut cassé ;
− Cour d’appel d’Anvers, dont l’arrêt fut à nouveau cassé ;
9  M.-L. Cesoni, texte tiré de la communication « La décision-cadre sur le terrorisme et la 
loi belge du 19 décembre 2003 » au colloque « législation antiterroriste et droits de l’homme » 
qui s’est tenu à Bruxelles le 27 février 2004 (texte non publié).
imPact des nouvelles infractions terroristes     283
− Cour d’appel de Bruxelles.
La jurisprudence a manifestement connu certains errements quant à divers 
sujets, et principalement relativement à la question de la participation à un groupe 
terroriste.
Ainsi, l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, du 23 décembre 2009  10, 
considère que :
« Les prévenus Asoglu et Kimyongur ne peuvent pas être reconnus coupables 
de participation à une activité d’un groupe terroriste au sens de l’article 140, § 1 du 
Code pénal.
La preuve n’est pas apportée que les actes matériels réalisés par les prévenus Asoglu 
et Kimyongur pendant la période incriminée, ont contribué à la réalisation du crime ou 
du délit par le groupe terroriste ni que les prévenus en avaient connaissance.
La diffusion de l’information mentionnée ci-dessus, le 28 juin 2004, ne peut pas 
avoir contribué à la réalisation d’un attentat qui avait eu lieu quatre jours auparavant. 
Il n’y a pas non plus d’indication concrète que la diffusion, le 28 juin 2004, de 
l’information à propos de l’attentat (raté) du 24 juin 2004 a contribué à la réalisation, 
par la suite, d’un nouvel attentat concret ou d’un autre délit ou crime « éventuellement 
après la période incriminée ».
Selon le ministère public, la communication réalisée à la suite d’un attentat 
terroriste à la lumière des buts politiques ou sociaux poursuivis, est au moins aussi 
importante aux yeux de ceux qui l’ont commis que l’attentat lui-même, de sorte qu’un 
attentat n’est commis que si les auteurs sont certains que, par la suite, il y aura de 
la publicité à ce sujet. Dans la mesure où – outre l’information générale à propos 
10 Traduction libre. Le texte original en néerlandais est le suivant : « Beklaagden ASOGLU 
en KIMYONGUR kunnen evenmin schuldig worden bevonden aan de deelname aan enige 
activiteit van een terroristische groep in de zin van artikel 140, § 1 Sw. Het bewijs wordt niet 
geleverd dat de handelingen die door beklaagden ASOGLU en KIMYONGUR waren gesteld 
tijdens de geïncrimineerde periode hebben bijgedragen tot het plegen van een misdaad 
of wanbedrijf door de terrostische groep en dat beklaagden daarvan kennis hadden. Het 
verspreiden van hoger vernoemde informatie op 28 juni 2004 kan niet hebben bijgedragen 
tot het plegen van een bomaanslag die reeds vier dagen eerder had plaatsgevonden. Evenmin 
zijn er concrete aanwijzingen dat de verspreiding, op 28 juni 2004 van de informatie over de 
(mislukte) aanslag van 24 juni 2004 ertoe heeft bijgedragen dat achteraf (eventueel na de 
geïncriminerende periode) een nieuw concrete aanwijsbare aanslag of enig andere misdaad of 
wanbedrijf werd gepleegd. De stelling van het openbaar ministerie dat de achteraf gevoerde 
communicatie over een terroristische aanslag in het licht van de beoogde politieke en 
maatschappelijke doelstellingen in de ogen van de pledgers ervan minstens even belangrijk is 
dan de aanslag zelf zodat een aanslag slechts wordt gepleegd indien de daders zeker zijn dat 
er nadien voldoende ruchtbaarheid aan zal worden gegeven, kan te dezen niet worden getoetst 
nu de tijdens de geïncrimineerde periode verspreide informatie – naast algemene informatie 
over de (al dan niet vermeende) politieke wantoestanden in Turkije)- enkel betrekking heeft 
op een mislukte aanslag (waarbij excuses werden aangeboden aan de door de daders niet 
geviseerde slachtoffers). Het strafdossier bevat geen lijst met aanslagen die zouden gepleegd 
zijn tijdens de geïncrimineerde periode (of tiidens een relevante periode die eraan voorafgaat 
of erop volgt) en waarover door beklaagden of minstens door het informatiebureau zou zijn 
gecommuniceerd », p. 31 et 32 de l’arrêt rendu le 23 décembre 2009 par la 13e chambre de la 
Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, inédit.
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de la situation politique intolérable (confirmée ou pas) en Turquie – l’information 
diffusée pour la période incriminée concerne simplement un attentat raté (à l’occasion 
duquel des excuses ont été présentées aux victimes qui n’avaient pas été visées par 
les auteurs), la position précitée du ministère public ne peut être vérifiée dans la 
présente cause. Le dossier pénal ne contient pas de liste des attentats réalisés pendant 
la période incriminée – ou pendant une période pertinente qui la précède ou la suit 
– et à propos desquels les prévenus, ou à tout le moins leur bureau d’informations, 
auraient communiqué ».
Les prévenus ont donc été acquittés de la prévention de membre d’un groupe 
terroriste.
Ceci signifie que même si les prévenus adhéraient à l’intention terroriste d’un 
groupe – c’est-à-dire changer la structure politique de l’Etat turc – ils n’ont pas 
participé à la réalisation d’un acte terroriste précis, même en diffusant des informations 
à propos de ces actions – (une certaine forme de complicité selon le Parquet fédéral) – 
et dès lors les prévenus n’ont pas pu être considérés comme membres d’un groupe 
terroriste.
Cette interprétation est conforme à la convention des Nations unies de 1999 
relativement au financement du terrorisme. La notion de participation aux activités 
d’un groupe terroriste apparaît déjà dans la convention des Nations unies de 1997 
pour la répression des attentats terroristes à l’explosif. 
En effet, l’article 2.3 de cette convention établit :
« Commet également une infraction quiconque :
a) Se rend complice d’une infraction au sens des paragraphes 1 et 2 du présent 
article ;
b) Organise la commission d’une infraction au sens des paragraphes 1 et 2 du 
présent article ou donne l’ordre à d’autres personnes de la commettre ; ou
c) Contribue de toute autre manière à la commission de l’une ou plusieurs des 
infractions visées aux paragraphes 1 ou 2 du présent article par un groupe de 
personnes agissant de concert ; sa contribution doit être délibérée et faite soit 
pour faciliter l’activité criminelle générale du groupe ou en servir les buts, soit 
en pleine connaissance de l’intention du groupe de commettre l’infraction ou les 
infractions visées ».
L’article 2.5.c de la convention de 1999 utilise le même langage et commande aux 
parties signataires de considérer comme pénalement répréhensibles des faits commis 
par une personne qui d’une quelconque manière « contribue à la commission de l’une 
ou plusieurs des infractions visées au paragraphe 1 ou 4 du présent article par un 
groupe de personnes agissant de concert (…) ».
L’article est clair. La personne doit avoir simplement participé à l’activité d’un 
groupe qui a commis une infraction terroriste. Cette contribution doit être réalisée 
« dans le but de perpétuer l’activité criminelle générale ou l’intention du groupe » ou 
« avec la connaissance de l’intention du groupe de commettre une infraction ».
Il faut souligner que cette infraction implique l’intention particulière du criminel 
de participer délibérément à l’objectif du groupe de commettre les actes terroristes 
mentionnés ci-dessus, avec une intention terroriste particulière.
Cet arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles de 2009 n’a pas été cassé. Ceci entraîne 
une grande discussion en droit belge, dans la mesure où il y a une différence de 
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jurisprudence entre les Chambres francophones et néerlandophones de la Cour d’appel 
de Bruxelles.
D.	 Que	va-t-il	se	passer	prochainement	?
Nous imaginons que cette situation devrait être présentée à la Cour de justice de 
l’Union européenne afin d’obtenir une interprétation conforme de la décision-cadre 
au principe de légalité.
Certains dossiers sont actuellement en cours et devraient apporter une réponse à 
cette question. Peut-être le dossier « Secours rouge », qui concerne des personnes qui 
auraient adhéré à un groupement terroriste italien, en Belgique… ou éventuellement à 
l’occasion de la réouverture du procès GICM, en mars 2012 suite à la condamnation, 
par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, dans l’affaire Hakimi  11 et la décision 
de la Cour de cassation belge de rouvrir le cas.
2.	 L’usage	de	preuves	secrètes
A.	 Qu’est-ce	qu’une	preuve	secrète	?
Il y a de nombreux exemples de ce qu’est une preuve secrète. Par exemple, un 
rapport des services secrets qui contiendrait l’information suivante : « Nous savons 
que Monsieur X est un salafiste et qu’il a des liens avec Ben Laden. Son numéro de 
téléphone mobile est le 67788 ».
Ce type de preuve secrète peut également émaner des services de police. Ainsi les 
services de police d’un Etat pourraient faire des rapports sur la base de preuves secrètes 
recueillies à partir d’écoutes directes par exemple, et en tirer certaines conclusions. 
Ces conclusions seraient à leur tour envoyées dans d’autres Etats et serviraient de 
preuves à charge contre des personnes poursuivies.
On peut trouver un exemple de ceci dans l’affaire du 11M, c’est-à-dire les attentats 
de Madrid.
Ainsi, l’accusé principal, « El Egipcio », était poursuivi en Espagne en étant 
considéré comme le cerveau des attentats. Cette accusation reposait principalement 
sur le résultat d’écoutes directes réalisées en Italie. En effet, cette personne faisait 
également l’objet d’une investigation en Italie, lieu où elle se trouvait avant son 
extradition vers l’Espagne. A l’occasion de ces écoutes directes, « El Egipcio » 
s’exprimait en arabe, et ses propos ont été par la suite traduits vers l’italien. 
A la demande de la défense, menée par Endika Zulueta, l’Audience nationale a 
demandé une expertise des bandes enregistrées en Italie et exigé la présence de celles-
ci à l’audience. Les experts nommés par l’Audience nationale ont été très critiques à 
l’égard des traductions et des transcriptions italiennes  12.
En effet, ceux-ci ont considéré que ces transcriptions et traductions italiennes 
ont créé un contexte et même des affirmations qui n’étaient pas présents dans les 
11 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, HAKIMI c. Belgique, 29 juin 2010.
12 Rapport à propos des transcriptions et traductions des enregistrements concernant Rabei 
Osman Al Sayed, affaire : enregistrement 1339-12 – l’ensemble des documents se trouvent 
sur le site http://www.elmundo.es/documentos/2004/03/espana/atentados11m/ (15 décembre 
2011).
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enregistrements. Bien sûr, il y a des problèmes techniques auxquels doivent faire face 
les services de police. Mais plutôt que de considérer qu’il y a un doute à propos de la 
valeur incriminatoire des mots – ce qui aurait été une bonne réaction – les services de 
police ont réalisé une traduction « à charge ».
Cette situation des « transcriptions espagnoles-italiennes » représente un double 
problème méthodologique :
− d’un côté, le travail italien avait été marqué par un manque de rigueur qui avait 
débouché sur une traduction orientée et incriminatoire, et
− d’autre part, la police espagnole, en utilisant « simplement » la traduction italienne 
a commis une erreur en présentant le dossier d’une manière partiale.
Ceci a trait à la question de la preuve contextuelle : il fallait absolument démontrer 
l’implication de l’accusé dans le « djihad international ».
Par exemple, à l’occasion du même rapport, les experts espagnols ont noté :
« … de la transcription italienne, il ressort qu’une personne déclare que l’on 
peut faire un djihad n’importe où sur la terre, mais ce qu’on entend réellement sur la 
cassette est restreint à certains endroits : Irak, Palestine, Afghanistan, etc. ».
De la même manière, la preuve directe et donc pas simplement contextuelle, 
semble avoir été surestimée. Rabei Osman « El Egipcio » était poursuivi pour avoir 
pensé les attentats de Madrid. Il était supposé être le cerveau derrière les attaques et 
avoir tout préparé et ceci sur la base de ces enregistrements.
Les experts espagnols ont évalué cette preuve de la manière suivante :
« Commentaire : « entendu dans aucune partie de l’enregistrement que l’opération 
de Madrid était son idée ou était son projet ». Ou encore : « entendu dans aucune 
partie des enregistrements : l’idée de l’opération était la mienne ».
L’utilisation des techniques particulières de recherches a permis aux équipes 
d’enquête de reporter, de manière imprécise, des conversations et de créer un accusé 
en imaginant un contexte factuel et des déclarations qui n’existaient pas : Rabei 
Osman n’avait jamais dit que les attentats de Madrid étaient son idée ou qu’il les avait 
préparés.
Rabei Osman a été acquitté des préventions par l’Audience nationale et ceci fut 
confirmé par le Tribunal suprême. Le procureur public espagnol souhaitait qu’il soit 
condamné à 38 962 ans de prison pour avoir participé et organisé un groupe terroriste 
pour conspirer sur la commission de 191 meurtres et la tentative de commette 1 891 
meurtres. 
Cet exemple illustre le risque qui gît dans l’usage des techniques spéciales 
d’enquête. Le haut degré de technicité donne l’apparence d’une preuve scientifique. 
L’affaire du 11M illustre également que le contrôle judiciaire sur les techniques 
spéciales d’enquête doit être efficace.
Ainsi que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme l’avait déjà déclaré en 1978 
dans l’affaire Klass : « alors que la possibilité d’une action inappropriée par un officiel 
malhonnête, négligeant ou trop zélé, ne peut pas être complètement évitée quel que 
soit le système, ce qui est de la plus grande importance pour la Cour dans la présente 
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affaire est la possibilité qu’une telle action se produise, mais également les gardes-
fous qui sont prévus afin de pouvoir s’en protéger »  13.
Je ne peux, dans ce cadre, m’empêcher de m’interroger sur ce qui se serait passé 
si le juge espagnol avait seulement reçu un rapport des autorités italiennes rapportant 
que Rabei Osman « El Egipcio » avait dit qu’il était le cerveau des attentats de Madrid, 
sans qu’une expertise ait été réalisée par le tribunal.
Ceci signifie qu’en cas d’usage de techniques particulières d’enquête, il est 
nécessaire qu’existe une contradiction efficace sur le matériel probatoire lui-même, et 
pas seulement sur des rapports réalisés à propos de ce matériel probatoire.
C’est la même question en matière de preuve secrète. Un contrôle judiciaire 
effectif ne peut être réalisé que si la défense peut réellement exercer son rôle. On doit 
malheureusement constater qu’à l’occasion de l’usage de ces techniques particulières 
d’enquête ou de la preuve secrète, nous sommes souvent confrontés au résultat de ces 
enquêtes avec une faible possibilité de contradiction à l’égard du contenu même de 
l’enquête réalisée.
Pour revenir à l’exemple du 11M à Madrid et à la situation de l’accusé Rabei 
Osman, les conclusions des experts sont tout à fait édifiantes.
Le premier problème concerne la qualité des enregistrements : les experts 
considèrent qu’il est très difficile de comprendre ce qu’il y a dans l’enregistrement 
pour des raisons techniques (localisation des microphones, personnes présentes 
pendant les conversations ; problème technique pur de la tonalité de la voix).
Plus loin, ils expliquent que la police espagnole avait initialement traduit de l’italien 
vers la langue espagnole, sans considérer la langue originale des enregistrements.
Les experts espagnols concluent en disant :
« Dans la transcription sous contrôle, nous avons enregistré, à diverses occasions, 
les défauts suivants : omissions, additions, contradictions, interprétations et distorsions 
de ce qui est dit dans l’enregistrement.
L’omission des mots ou de phrases complètes peut être due à un manque de clarté 
de la voix dû au bruit environnant, etc. Mais d’autres défauts, qui impliquent l’ajout 
de nuances et même d’informations qui n’étaient pas présentes dans l’enregistrement, 
peuvent résulter, selon nous, dans un manque de compréhension par le transcripteur, 
qui manquait d’unité syntaxique et sémantique, qui à son tour a conduit à une mauvaise 
compréhension ou à une faible compréhension de tout ou partie de conversations.
Globalement, nous considérons qu’il y a eu une reconstruction d’un contexte 
artificiel qui a donné une certaine cohérence thématique, mais qui ne reflète pas le 
contexte original que nous trouvons dans l’enregistrement ».
3.	 Conclusion	
Primo, la définition restrictive des infractions, qui devrait prédominer en droit 
pénal, doit nous conduire, logiquement, à considérer qu’un groupe terroriste est un 
groupe de personnes qui ont commis ou essayé de commettre des infractions terroristes 
bien définies.
13 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Klass et autres c. Allemagne, 6 septembre 
1978, § 58.
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De son côté, le Comité des droits de l’homme des Nations unies a publié des 
observations pendant sa 81e session concernant le rapport des parties, conformément 
à l’article 40 du pacte des droits civils et politiques  14 :
« 24. Le Comité est inquiet que la loi du 19 décembre 2003, sur les infractions 
terroristes, donne une définition du terrorisme qui, en référence au degré de sévérité 
des infractions et de l’intention exprimée des criminels, ne satisfait pas entièrement 
au principe que les infractions et les peines doivent être établies par la loi (article 15). 
L’Etat partie devrait donner une définition plus précise des infractions terroristes ».
Cette critique du Comité des droits de l’homme des Nations unies devrait être 
prise en compte afin de revoir ou à tout le moins d’évaluer la définition des infractions 
terroristes telles que prévues par le droit belge.
Secundo, lorsque la défense est confrontée à des rapports secrets, réalisés par les 
services secrets, ou par des services de police nationaux ou étrangers, nous ne savons 
pas si ce qui a été réalisé l’a été de manière légale. Par exemple si des écoutes directes 
réalisées dans tel pays l’ont été conformément au droit de ce pays, mais également au 
droit européen des droits de l’homme. 
En matière de rapports secrets, cette question est particulièrement importante 
lorsque l’on en arrive à la question de preuves qui peuvent venir d’un Etat où la 
torture est pratiquée. Il n’y a pas de contradiction possible par la défense (comment 
réaliser un contre-interrogatoire d’une personne incarcérée au Maroc ?) et cela 
signifie habituellement que les tribunaux considèrent que ces preuves doivent être 
admises comme des preuves circonstancielles, c’est-à-dire simplement confirmatives 
d’informations qui ont été obtenues d’une autre manière.
On en arrive alors à une situation où nos Etats « blanchissent » des informations 
obtenues de manière odieuse dans des Etats tiers au système européen de protection 
des droits de l’homme.
14 Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, adopté et ouvert à la signature, 
à la ratification et à l’adhésion par l’Assemblée générale dans sa résolution 2200 A (XXI) du 
16 décembre 1966, entré en vigueur le 23 mars 1976.
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Annexe	–	La	définition	belge	du	terrorisme
Art.	137 (inséré par L 2003-12-19/34, art. 3, 046 ; en vigueur : 8 janvier 2004)
§ 1er. Constitue une infraction terroriste, l’infraction prévue aux §§ 2 et 3 qui, de par 
sa nature ou son contexte, peut porter gravement atteinte à un pays ou à une organisation 
internationale et est commise intentionnellement dans le but d’intimider gravement une 
population ou de contraindre indûment des pouvoirs publics ou une organisation internationale 
à accomplir ou à s’abstenir d’accomplir un acte, ou de gravement déstabiliser ou détruire les 
structures fondamentales politiques, constitutionnelles, économiques ou sociales d’un pays ou 
d’une organisation internationale. 
§ 2. Constitue, aux conditions prévues au § 1er, une infraction terroriste :
1° l’homicide volontaire ou les coups et blessures volontaires visés aux articles 393 
à 404, 405bis, 405ter dans la mesure où il renvoie aux articles précités, 409, § 1er, 
alinéa 1er, et §§ 2 à 5, 410 dans la mesure où il renvoie aux articles précités, 417ter et 
417quater ;
2° la prise d’otage visée à l’article 347bis ;
3° l’enlèvement visé aux articles 428 à 430, et 434 à 437 ;
4° la destruction ou la dégradation massives visées aux articles 521, alinéas 1er et 3, 522, 
523, 525, 526, 550bis, § 3, 3°, à l’article 15 de la loi du 5 juin 1928 portant révision du 
Code disciplinaire et pénal pour la marine marchande et la pêche maritime, ainsi qu’à 
l’article 114, § 4, de la loi du 21 mars 1991 portant réforme de certaines entreprises 
publiques économiques, ayant pour effet de mettre en danger des vies humaines ou de 
produire des pertes économiques considérables ;
5° la capture d’aéronef visée à l’article 30, § 1er, 2°, de la loi du 27 juin 1937 portant 
révision de la loi du 16 novembre 1919 relative à la réglementation de la navigation 
aérienne ;
6° le fait de s’emparer par fraude, violence ou menaces envers le capitaine d’un navire, 
visé à l’article 33 de la loi du 5 juin 1928 portant révision du Code disciplinaire et 
pénal pour la marine marchande et la pêche maritime [1 ainsi que les actes de piraterie 
visés à l’article 3 de la loi du 30 décembre 2009 relative à la lutte contre la piraterie 
maritime]1 ;
7° les infractions visées par l’arrêté royal du 23 septembre 1958 portant règlement général 
sur la fabrication, l’emmagasinage, la détention, le débit, le transport et l’emploi des 
produits explosifs, modifié par l’arrêté royal du 1er février 2000, et punies par les 
articles 5 à 7 de la loi du 28 mai 1956 relative aux substances et mélanges explosibles 
ou susceptibles de déflagrer et aux engins qui en sont chargés ;
8° les infractions visées aux articles 510 à 513, 516 à 518, 520, 547 à 549, ainsi qu’à 
l’article 14 de la loi du 5 juin 1928 portant révision du Code disciplinaire et pénal pour 
la marine marchande et la pêche maritime, ayant pour effet de mettre en danger des 
vies humaines ;
9° les infractions visées par la loi du 3 janvier 1933 relative à la fabrication, au commerce 
et au port des armes et au commerce des munitions ;
10° les infractions visées à l’article 2, alinéa premier, 2°, de la loi du 10 juillet 1978 
portant approbation de la convention sur l’interdiction de la mise au point, de la 
fabrication et du stockage des armes bactériologiques (biologiques) ou à toxines et 
sur leur destruction, faite à Londres, Moscou et Washington le 10 avril 1972.
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§ 3. Constitue également, aux conditions prévues au § 1er, une infraction terroriste :
1° la destruction ou la dégradation massives, ou la provocation d’une inondation 
d’une infrastructure, d’un système de transport, d’une propriété publique ou privée, 
ayant pour effet de mettre en danger des vies humaines ou de produire des pertes 
économiques considérables, autres que celles visées au § 2 ;
2° la capture d’autres moyens de transport que ceux visés aux 5° et 6° du § 2 ;
3° la fabrication, la possession, l’acquisition, le transport ou la fourniture d’armes 
nucléaires ou chimiques, l’utilisation d’armes nucléaires, biologiques ou chimiques, 
ainsi que la recherche et le développement d’armes chimiques ;
4° la libération de substances dangereuses ayant pour effet de mettre en danger des vies 
humaines ;
5° la perturbation ou l’interruption de l’approvisionnement en eau, en électricité ou en 
toute autre ressource naturelle fondamentale ayant pour effet de mettre en danger des 
vies humaines ;
6° la menace de réaliser l’une des infractions énumérées au § 2 ou au présent 
paragraphe.
Inchoate offences
The sanctioning of an act prior to and irrespective  
of the commission of any harm
Katja šugman Stubbs and Francesca Galli  1
1.	 Introduction
Traditionally, the line of criminal responsibility in the phases of the preparation of 
a criminal offence was drawn at the stage of an attempt; preparatory acts were rarely 
incriminated. Even the phase of the attempt was usually only criminalised when it 
comes to the most serious offences. 
The fight against terrorism and organised crime has brought a fundamental policy 
change in western criminal justice systems such that reactive criminal law has been 
increasingly used for preventive aims. The emphasis is no longer put on responding to 
offences that have been committed but on averting their commission. In this respect 
the line of criminalization is drawn lower down to fully encompass the attempt; the 
preparatory acts and inchoate offences are being frequently used as a tool to incriminate 
those earlier stages in the development of the criminal offence. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how the emergence of antiterrorist legislation 
has dramatically changed the traditional fundamental concepts of criminal law, moved 
the criminal law interventions from ex post to ex ante interventions, extended criminal 
liability further back to preparatory acts and then changed the demarcation between 
the stage of preparation and attempt. All this also changed the definition of inchoate 
1 Francesca Galli would like to express her gratitude to the Fonds de la Recherche 
Scientifique (FNRS) for its generous financial support, over the years, of her post-doctoral 
research at the Institut d’Etudes Européennes (ULB), focusing on “L’Union européenne et la 
prévention du terrorisme : impact sur le droit pénal et redéfinition de la relation entre le droit 
pénal européen et les droits pénaux nationaux”.
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offences and enabled inchoate offences to become one of the major tools in fight 
against terrorism  2.
2.	 What	are	inchoate	offences?	
It is common for the continental legal criminal law theory to differentiate 
between few steps in the process of commission of a criminal offence. Those steps 
are: (1) a mental plan, (2) preparation acts, (3) an attempt, (4) a full completion of an 
offence  3. 
The traditional criminal law doctrine is based on a belief that criminal law should 
be used as a last resort for most serious violations that cannot be adequately suppressed 
in any milder way (ultima ratio)  4. This school of thought suggests that, in the name 
of freedom of expression, the mere intention to commit a crime should not constitute 
an offence and opinions should remain free  5. The State should be able to punish 
only outwardly expressed action or a failure to perform one.
The doctrine regarding preparatory acts (the second phase) is more complex. 
Academics have traditionally considered it inappropriate to criminalise acts which 
are merely preparatory to a criminal offence  6. In defining the scope of criminal law 
through the harm principle  7, the dominant concern of legal writers has traditionally 
been to hinder the increasing expansion of criminal liability. In this respect for most 
2 C.M. Pelser, “Preparations to commit a crime. The Dutch approach to inchoate offences”, 
Utrecht Law Review, 4(3), 2004, p. 57-80; L. Picotti, “Expanding forms of preparation and 
participation”, General Report, Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, 78(3), 2007, p. 405-452; 
F. Galli, British, French and Italian anti-terrorism legislation: a comparative study, Doctoral 
Thesis, University of Cambridge (yet unpublished). 
3 H.H. JeschecK and T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 
1996, p. 509.
4 N. Jareborg, “Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)”, Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law, 2, 2004, p. 521-534.
5 “[P]unishing individuals for their thoughts alone [constitutes] a sensitive taboo in criminal 
justice. Everyone seems to agree that it would be a perversion of the institution to punish in 
the absence of action-for thoughts alone” (G. P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 49). “The maxim that civilized societies should not 
criminally punish individuals for their ‘thoughts alone’ has existed for three centuries. Generally, 
the criminal law recognizes that we cannot identify an individual’s thoughts or predict whether 
antisocial behaviour will result from them” (D. W. Denno, “Crime and Consciousness: Science 
and Involuntary Acts”, Minnesota Law Review, 87, 2002, p. 282-283). 
6 On the criminalization of remote harms see A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 
5th edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 49-50; A. von hirsh, “Extending the Harm 
Principle”, in A. Simester and A.T.H. Smith (eds.), Harm and culpability, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996.
7 Liberal philosophers have argued that a positive reason in favour of the State’s 
intervention to create a criminal offence is the prevention of a conduct which can cause harm 
to others. According to Feinberg: “It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation 
that it would be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the 
actor (the one prohibited from acting) and there is no other means that is equally effective at 
no greater cost to other values” (J. Feinberg, The moral limits of the criminal law, New York 
Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 26).
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legal systems the preparatory acts have not been (or have rarely been) criminalized 
until they reach the stage of attempt, since it is a generally accepted doctrine that 
criminal liability arises only after the harm has been caused  8. Consequently, the 
line of criminal responsibility is usually drawn at the attempt stage and even that 
is frequently limited to more serious offences  9. Hence the demarcation between 
preparatory acts and an attempt has always been particularly relevant, although 
complex, since there are numerous theories and doctrines on which the distinction 
of different phases is based  10. It is impossible to make a final conclusion regarding 
the distinction of those two phases because of at least two reasons: the first one 
being that the definition of a certain criminal offence (especially the complex ones 
e.g. terrorism) differs so much from system to system that this affects the distinction 
between the different phases of committing a criminal offence, and the second one 
being the difference among different legal cultures in defining the criteria. Numerous 
tests and doctrines have developed in order to distinguish between them  11. 
Inchoate offences are actions and agreements that are carried out as preparation 
for a substantive offence. “Inchoate” means “not yet completed or fully developed”. 
Although they do not constitute a complete offence, they are nonetheless criminalised 
because they are steps towards it being committed  12. As a result, inchoate offences 
are also offences in their own right with their own criminal liability attached. They 
always relate to a substantive offence but are completed and can be prosecuted before 
the commission of any full offence  13.
8 J. Child and A. Hunt, “Risk, Pre-emption, and the Limits of the Criminal Law”, in 
K. doolin, J. child, J. raine, a. beech (eds.), Whose Criminal Justice? State of Community, 
Sherfield Gales, Waterside Press, 2011, p. 51-68.
9 “Thus in a current English law on attempts, for instance, criminal liability attaches only 
to acts which are more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence. Therefore, 
although an attempt in English law is clearly a departure from the paradigm since it clearly 
allows for intervention before any harm has resulted, nonetheless there is some relationship 
between the conduct and the clear resulting harm in the sense that clearly the risk that the 
harm may result is greater the further along the path of criminal preparation the offender has 
progressed” (J. Child and A. Hunt, op. cit., p. 53-54).
10 It is also difficult to establish different kinds of criminal liability which stems from 
those phases. As Lacey underlines: “... the lines between no liability, inchoate liability and 
full liability are notoriously hard to draw” (N. Lacey, Reconstructing Criminal Law: Text and 
materials, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 68). 
11 See for example comparison of the distinctions between preparatory acts and an attempt 
in Croatian, German and French system in P. Novoselec, “Razgraničenje pripremnih radnji i 
pokušaja”, Zbornik PF Rijeka, 1991, 29(2), p. 721-759. 
12 They contain a set of different criminal offences which include preparatory acts and also 
contain the stage of the attempt. 
13 For example, participation in a criminal organisation is an inchoate offence. It is 
sufficient to be involved in the organisation and an actual contribution to the commission of the 
offence that the organisation intends to commit is not necessary. It is not even required that the 
organisation has already committed offences. The commission of offences may not be the only 
purpose of the organisation. 
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Legal theory distinguishes between two sorts of inchoate criminal offences: (1) 
the ‘general part’ ones that can be superimposed onto other indictable offences and 
(2) a ‘special part ones’. The first category traditionally includes inchoate criminal 
offences such as: attempt (any act that is more than merely preparatory to the intended 
commission of an offence), conspiracy (an agreement between two or more people 
to behave in a manner that will automatically constitute an offence by at least one of 
them) and incitement (persuading someone else to commit an offence, regardless of 
whether or not the offence is eventually committed). Within this general categorisation, 
they are understood and defined differently in different countries depending on their 
legal traditions. Attempt, conspiracy and incitement are very often only criminalised 
when it comes to the most serious offences  14. This means that inchoate offences 
traditionally constitute an exception. 
This is even more true for the special part inchoate criminal offences; traditionally 
there are only very limited exceptions for the existence of special part preparatory 
offences (possession offences – e.g. possession of means to forge money). We can 
therefore safely argue that in general, incriminating preparatory acts in a form of 
inchoate offences used to be an exception. 
3.	 Inchoate	offences	and	anti-terrorist	law
However, some strong arguments exist for setting the line lower down on the 
scale of evolution of a criminal offence. From a government’s point of view, the 
criminalisation of inchoate offences serves two social purposes. Firstly, an individual 
who commits an inchoate offence is hardly to be considered less dangerous, thus 
he/she must be put under investigation and prosecuted. Secondly, state authorities 
must be able to intervene at an earlier stage than the full completion of the offence. 
The argument is that preventing the completion of the offence is more beneficial to 
society than merely punishing the offender. There seem to be therefore sound reasons 
of policy and principle to punish these types of wrongdoing, a key one being that the 
defendant has demonstrated, by his actions, his willingness for a substantive offence 
be committed  15. 
One of the factors contributing to setting the line to the more preventive criminal 
law practice in the last decade was definitely the fight against terrorism and organized 
crime. The specific characteristics of terrorist offences literally allure the thinking 
that the traditional criminal law concepts have to be changed. Terrorist attacks are not 
spontaneous, but require long, elaborate preparations, which by themselves do usually 
not constitute criminal acts (e.g. learning to fly planes, donating money to certain 
14 E.g. in the Netherlands an attempt is punishable only if it relates to the criminal offence 
punishable by a prison sentence of 8 years or more and in Slovenia only up from 3 years (Article 
34 CC). Slovenia has generally very lenient crime legislation and the offences punishable by a 
prison sentence of more than 3 years are already serious criminal offences. See C.M. Pelsner, 
op. cit., p. 63.
15 See the elaboration of the Law Commission on the rational of the conspiracy offence 
in Conspiracy and Attempts: A Consultation Paper, Law Commission Consultation, no. 183, 
2007, Part 2. What is interesting is the effort with which they are arguing for an existence of 
inchoate offences. 
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organizations). The transition from an attempt to the full completion of the specific 
offence is fast – it is an execution of an iter criminis which has been planned in detail 
in the previous stages of preparation. The simple straightforward logic that stems from 
those facts is that if we want to prevent terrorism, we have to extinguish it ‘at the root’, 
meaning at the preparation phase or even earlier. According to this philosophy, the 
exceptions to the general criminal law principles are acceptable, based on a utilitarian 
argument – the devastating consequences of the terrorist attacks  16.
The emergence of those two forms of crime has definitely brought fundamental 
policy changes in Western criminal justice systems, the first one being the extension 
of criminal liability further back to preparatory acts and the second one being the fact 
that that reactive criminal law has been increasingly used for preventive aims  17. 
Criminal law is moving further and further away from ex post reactions to ex ante 
intervention. 
As a consequence, the fight against organised crime and terrorism dramatically 
affects the definition of inchoate offences in modern criminal law, its fundamental 
principles and concepts  18 and the demarcation of preparation and attempt. For 
instance, the problem with some offences, such as “association for terrorist purposes” 
or “participation in a terrorist organisation”, is that they encompass all three stages in 
the commission of an offence: the preparation, the attempt and the completed offence. 
A clear demarcation between preparatory acts and attempt is thus not always possible. 
Inchoate offences are thus used as a major instrument of criminal law in the legal fight 
against terrorism. This cannot but be a source of concern. 
Although they definitely existed prior to September 11, the counter-terrorism 
legislation enacted since then has certainly expanded all previous trends towards 
anticipating risks. The aim of current counter-terrorism measures is mostly that of 
a preventive identification, isolation and control of individuals and groups who are 
regarded as dangerous and allegedly represent a threat to society. The risk in terms 
of mass casualties resulting from a terrorist attack is thought to be so high that the 
traditional due process safeguards are deemed unreasonable or unaffordable and 
prevention becomes a political imperative. In the words of the UK anti-terrorism 
branch: 
“The threat from international terrorism is so completely different that it has been 
necessary to adopt new ways of working (...). The advent of terrorist attacks designed 
16 See e.g. Hallevy’s concluding remark: “The fight against terrorism effects the definition 
of inchoate offences, and inchoate offences are used as a major instrument of criminal law in 
the legal fight against terrorism” (G. Hallevy, “Counter-Terrorism and Inchoate Offences”, 
Paper presented at the 2nd Annual Conference on the Legal Fight Against Terrorism, Columbia 
University and Ono Academic College, at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1406042).
17 See e.g. J.T. Parry, “Terrorism and the new criminal process”, William & Marry Bill of 
Rights Journal, 15(3), 2007, p. 765-835.
18 K. šugman and M. Jager, “Post 9/11 developments of the EU criminal law-related 
initiatives and their implications on some basic criminal law principles”, in P.C. Duyne (ed.), 
Crime business and crime money in Europe : the dirty linen of illicit enterprise, Nijmegen, Wolf 
Legal Publishers, 2007, p. 247-267.
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to cause mass casualties, with no warning, sometimes involving the use of suicide, 
and with the threat of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons means 
that we can no longer wait until the point of attack before intervening. The threat to 
the public is simply too great to run that risk (...) the result of this is that there are 
occasions when suspected terrorists are arrested at an earlier stage in their planning 
and preparation than would have been the case in the past”  19.
Most of the preparatory steps which are at the basis of terrorist attacks were 
allegedly not punishable under the old concept of inchoate offences hence, law 
enforcement agents could not have intervened at the preparation stage. Intervention at 
the attempt stage ran the risk of being ineffective as the transition from the attempt to 
the full completion of an offence is often fast in terrorist cases. 
The legislator has thus enacted specific offences to seize preparatory acts of 
terrorism: terrorism financing; membership in an association for terrorist purposes; 
glorification of terrorism; production of means, chemical substances, biological 
substances; training potential perpetrators; and the detailed planning of terror 
operations, etc.  20.
As has been underlined in the course of this publication, inchoate offences have 
been expanded in most countries not only because of national developments, but also 
to comply with international and European requirements. The 2002 EU Framework 
Decision, for example, requires the punishment of offences such as the “direction 
of a terrorist group” and “participation in a terrorist group”, including “providing 
information or material means via any kind of financing of these activities with 
knowledge that this participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the 
group”  21. Both the Council of Europe Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(2005) and the EU Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA require States to criminalise 
public provocation to commit a terrorist offence and recruitment and training for 
terrorist purposes when committed intentionally. Such offences must be punishable 
by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties  22.
19 London Anti-Terrorism Branch (SO13), “Submission in support of three month pre-
charge detention” (2005), appendix of Home Affairs Committee, “Terrorism Detention Powers”, 
HC, 2005-06, no. 910-I, p. 54 as quoted by J. McCullogh and S. PicKering, “Pre-crime and 
counter-terrorism”, British Journal of Criminology, 49(5), 2009, p. 628, at p. 632.
20 With regards to the UK, see for example S. 56 Terrorism Act 2000 (directing a terrorist 
organisation) and S. 1 Terrorism Act 2006 (encouragement of terrorism). As for France see 
the “association de malfaiteurs for terrorism purposes” (Article 421(2)(1) CP) and its Italian 
homologue encompassed in Article 270 bis CP.
21 Article 2 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating 
terrorism, OJ, no. L 164, 22 June 2002, p. 3-7.
22 Article 3, Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ, no. L 330/51, 9 December 
2008, p. 21-23. 
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4.	 A	concrete	example	of	a	terrorist	inchoate	offence:	the	“possession		
of	an	article	for	terrorist	purposes”
The United Kingdom’s anti-terrorist legislation, by contrast, is a particularly 
controversial example of a current trend in English criminal law, which is to create 
new offences in inchoate mode over and above the traditional categories of conspiracy, 
incitement and attempt.
A particularly significant example of a terrorist inchoate offence is the “possession 
of an article for terrorist purposes” (S. 57, UK Terrorism Act 2000), punishable 
with a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment (increased to fifteen years 
by the Terrorism Act 2006). This offence goes as far as to criminalise suspicious 
circumstances where an individual becomes liable unless he has a “reasonable 
excuse” to explain “the circumstances”. Section 57 only requires the existence of 
circumstances creating a suspicion that the possession of the article in question is 
connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism  23. 
The problem is: when does the possession of an article (possibly harmless as such) 
become criminally relevant  24?
As underlined in the contribution on the UK counter-terrorism legislation, a 
key question in relation to this offence is the reversal of burden of proof and what 
the defendant has to do, if anything, to avoid conviction where the circumstances 
mentioned in the section exist. 
The offence existed in the earlier Northern Ireland legislation  25. When reform 
of anti-terrorism legislation was discussed in the late 1990s, the need for such an 
offence was questioned. However, retaining this offence in legislation was considered 
necessary precisely in order to allow police intervention at an early stage against the 
commission of terrorist acts. This provision is allegedly needed in order to allow action 
to be taken against a person who is found in possession of an article (e.g. during a 
search of premises) which, although perhaps commonplace in normal circumstances, 
is well known to be used in the manufacture of bombs. If no other evidence exists, 
it might be difficult to charge the terrorist suspect with an offence of conspiracy, for 
instance, to cause explosions  26. 
23 Controversies have recently arisen as for the interpretation of this section. See C. WalKer, 
“Case comment. Terrorism: precedent”, Criminal Law Review, 1, 2008, p. 80; C. WalKer, “Case 
Comment. Terrorism: possessing an article”, Criminal Law Review, 1, 2008, p. 71; C. WalKer, 
“Case Comment. Terrorism: Terrorism Act 2000 s 57”, Criminal Law Review, 1, 2008, p. 72.
24 The concept of possession has already given rise to great difficulties in drug cases. 
However, not even the leading House of Lords decision in Warner v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner identified a clear set of principles on the matter. [1969] 2 AC 256.
25 S. 16A Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, S. 30 Northern Ireland Emergency Provision 
Act 1991 and S. 32 Northern Ireland Emergency Provision Act 1996. Widely used since its 
introduction, S. 30 resulted from the recommendations of the Colville Report (1990), though 
its application was there confined to possession in public places. Then, S. 63 Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 amended the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 so as to extend the 
possession offence to the United Kingdom.
26 Lord lloyd of berwicK and P. WilKinson, “Inquiry into legislation against terrorism”, 
Cm 3420, 1996, para 14.5.
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France and Italy have been more circumspect in this area. For instance, the two 
jurisdictions have not criminalised alleged terrorist speeches (or the mere public 
expression of opinions) to the same extent, nor have they criminalised the possession 
of articles for terrorist purposes. Their legislation has instead gradually expanded the 
notion of conspiracy (“association for terrorist purposes”) and relevant provisions on 
aiding and abetting.
5.	 Critical	aspects	in	the	use	of	inchoate	offences	
In the last decade, parliaments have been active in enacting new offences in the 
“inchoate mode” and criminalising preparatory activities even where these stand 
several steps away from the actual perpetration of the harm. This trend is particularly 
visible in the legislation related to terrorism, where it is sometimes coupled with an 
extensive use of administrative measures for preventive purposes. 
For instance, the British legislator has gone a long way in designing offences in 
the inchoate mode and even imposing a shift in the evidential burden of proof on to 
the defendant  27. The current tendency to legislate with a view to eliminating risk, 
though recently accentuated, dates back much earlier  28. And the shift in criminal 
liability is also manifest with regard to recent examples, such as the Sexual Offences 
Act 2003, the Fraud Act 2006 and the Serious Crime Act 2007.
The criminalisation of inchoate offences raises particular difficulties. The tendency 
to devise offences around a minimal actus reus has meant that the boundaries of criminal 
liability have become vague, elastic and porous, often emphasising the importance of 
mens rea over the actus reus  29. Inchoate and preparatory offences broaden the scope 
of criminal responsibility not only because their boundaries are vague and uncertain 
but also because they move criminal liability very far from the actual commission 
of an act. The actus reus of terrorist inchoate offences is often currently extended to 
embrace a wide range of behaviours, sometimes apparently innocuous. Although they 
always relate to a substantive offence, these preparatory offences are completed and 
can be prosecuted before the commission of any full offence.
The reach of these offences is further extended by the fact that they operate with 
reference to a definition of terrorism that is extremely broad, therefore possibly in 
breach of the lex certa principle. The new offences are, moreover, often superfluous, 
27 Inchoate Liability for encouraging and committing crime, London, 2006, Cm 6878. See 
for a comment G.R. Sullivan, “Inchoate liability for assisting and encouraging crime – the Law 
Commission Report”, Criminal Law Review, 12, 2006, p. 1047-1057. 
28 For example, in 1883 the Explosive Substances Act (which is still in force) encompassed 
in its S. 3(b) an early example of an extremely extensive possession offence with a minimum 
actus reus.
29 In the words of Justice Jackson: “The modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it 
almost defies definition. (...). It is always ‘predominantly mental in composition’ because it 
consists primarily of a meeting of minds and an intent”. Krulewitch v. US (1949), 336 U.S. 
440. 
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the behaviour they proscribe being already sufficiently addressed under existing 
legislation  30.
Not only do inchoate offences expand criminal liability, but they also regrettably 
allow the use of enhanced preventive powers and police interventions before the 
commission of an offence  31. These unsatisfactory criminal law developments are 
even more problematic as they trigger the application of special procedural rules 
for the investigation and trial of terrorist offences to a larger group of individuals, 
often with reduced judicial oversight. Their introduction and use is dictated by law 
enforcement arguments – the need to intervene at an early stage and prevent the 
commission of an offence – rather than reasons of criminal liability. They thus allow 
an early intervention, but where are its limits? Hence, recent provisions have gone 
beyond the limits of what criminal law normally penalises  32. 
New inchoate offences also include descriptions like: the “encouragement” of, 
“glorification” of and/or “apology” for terrorism (albeit in an undefined future and 
at undefined places) as well as the dissemination and the publication of relevant 
material  33. The impact of international instruments aimed at terrorism is noticeable 
in this context. 
These offences are likely to affect the right to freedom of expression (Article 10 
ECHR). This right may be legitimately restricted under limited conditions identified 
in Article 10(2), i.e. only when interferences: are prescribed by law  34, pursue 
a legitimate aim  35, and are “necessary in a democratic society”  36. These three 
requirements imply that criminal offences in this area should be narrowly defined. 
30 See for example the conviction of the imams Abu Hamza and El-Faisal for incitement 
to murder before the introduction of the offence of “encouragement to terrorism” in British 
legislation in 2006. 
31 The UK Law Commission even encourages this when they compare the two different 
types of policing: (1) the more traditional (they call it simplistic) ‘fire-brigade’ one, responding 
to the report that the crime has been committed and (2) ‘intelligence-led’ policing or ‘problem-
oriented’ policing, which is reacting to the information that the crime will be committed. They 
obviously favour and encourage the second approach. Conspiracy and Attempts: A Consultation 
Paper, Law Commission Consultation, no. 183, 2007, p. 26-27.
32 Child and Hunt concisely point out the lack of justification for the existence of the 
special part inchoate offences. See J. Child and A. Hunt, op. cit., p. 55-67.
33 See for example S. 1 (“encouragement of terrorism”) and S. 2 (“dissemination of 
terrorism publications”) UK Terrorism Act 2006.
34 The restriction must be based in law and meet certain standards of clarity and 
accessibility, enabling citizens to foresee the circumstances which a given conduct might entail. 
Laws granting public authorities a broad discretion to limit the freedom of expression fail such 
a requirement. See Eur. Court HR, 25 November 1996, Wingrove v. United Kingdom, App. 
no. 17419/90. 
35 See Article 18 ECHR on permitted restrictions. 
36 The third requirement entails a pressing social need for the limitation, justified by 
relevant and sufficient reasons, proportionate to the aims pursued and brought about by the least 
restrictive means available. See e.g. Eur. Court HR, 7 December 1976, Handyside v. United 
Kingdom, App. no. 5493/72; Eur. Court HR, 8 July 1986, Lingens v. Austria, App. no. 9815/82; 
Eur. Court HR, 18 July 2000, Sener v. Turkey, App. no. 26680/95); Eur. Court HR, 9 June 1998, 
Incal v. Turkey, App. no. 22678/93. 
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Otherwise, their vagueness and breadth would increase the impact of an already 
unclear definition of terrorism and their interpretation is likely to be highly subjective. 
According to the European Court of Human Rights, freedom of expression is meant 
to protect precisely the most controversial views and dissenting opinions  37. Thus to 
avoid the criminalisation of legitimate statements, extreme speech provisions should 
only prohibit the direct incitement of terrorist acts resulting in imminent violence and 
a risk of harm to security  38.
Similar concerns arise in relation to the new offences of recruiting or training for 
terrorist purposes. These offences run the risk of curtailing freedom of association 
and assembly (Article 11 ECHR), which may only be restrained under the previously 
mentioned conditions of legality, necessity and proportionality. The increasing impact 
of anti-terrorism legislation on the legitimate exercise both of freedom of expression 
and freedom of association cannot but be a source of concern.
The interpretation of inchoate offences may create difficulties both at the 
investigation and trial stage. As underlined with regards to the “association for 
terrorist purposes” offence in Italian criminal law, case law may be incoherent and 
merely require evidence to prove the association of a person with a terrorist group 
rather than evidence of the commission of terrorist acts. In some cases, ideological 
adherence to criminal purposes has been considered enough for a charge; in other 
cases, criminal liability was thought to require concrete steps towards the commission 
of an offence  39.
6.	 Shift	towards	prevention,	anticipation	of	risk	and	normalization		
of	the	exception
There are numerous dangers inherent in an approach which tries to use criminal 
law as a preventive tool. As Ulrich Beck pointed out, nowadays, risk and damage 
control are at the centre of the means and legitimisation of State intervention  40. 
There is, however, a difficulty in translating the policy concept of “risk” into a criminal 
law language which is supposed to be based on a principle of legality, especially its 
lex certa aspect. 
The development of inchoate offences is one feature of a paradigm shift towards 
preventive action, which poses critical challenges for the protection of individual 
rights. First, the boundaries of what is a dangerous type of behaviour are highly 
contentious and problems arise with the assessment of future harm. Secondly, 
“suspicion” has replaced an objective “reasonable belief” in most cases in order to 
justify police intervention at an early stage in terrorism cases without the need to 
37 See e.g. Eur. Court HR, 23 April 1992, Castells v. Spain, App. no. 11798/85; Eur. Court 
HR, 8 July 1999, Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey, App. nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94. 
38 See Eur. Court HR, 8 July 1999, Karatas v. Turkey, App. No. 23168/94. 
39 See F. Galli, “Italian counter-terrorism legislation: the development of a parallel track 
(‘doppio binario’)” in this same publication. 
40 On the development of a “risk society” and a “culture of control” see U. BecK, Risk 
Society: Towards a New Modernity, London, Sage, 1992, p. 21; M.M. Feeley and J. Simon, 
“The new penology”, Criminology, 30(4), 1992, p. 449; D. Garland, The culture of control, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001.
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envisage evidence-gathering with a view to a prosecution. The risk of potential harm is 
often assessed on the basis of secret evidence and justified by political considerations, 
possibly prior to the establishment of any trial. Thirdly, there is greater reliance 
on preventive administrative measures as a means of general use instead of seeing 
them as exceptional and temporary, and necessarily linked to a genuine emergency. 
They are created for the purpose of early interventions in order to avoid terrorist acts 
taking place rather than merely to respond after the event (e.g. detention, expulsion 
and deportation of immigrants, administrative detention, control orders and listing). 
Governments can thus act on the lower standard of possibility of future harm rather 
than the higher standard of proof of past criminal activities. This allows a shift towards 
greater government discretion on national security grounds at the expense of judicial 
scrutiny.
This drift towards prevention raises the question of whether one should see 
terrorists as criminals, who are both bound and protected, as all citizens are, by 
criminal law and rights of due process. And, if not, to what rights should they be 
entitled? The question has been explored by the German author, Gunther Jakobs, 
who has developed the notion of “Feindstrafrecht”  41. Since 2000, the author has 
described the development of an “enemy criminal law” as inevitable and called for 
exceptional treatment for non law-abiding citizens who have become “enemies”. A 
significant shift in inchoate liability implying that individuals are not always punished 
after wrongdoing (retrospectively), but before any actual harm occurs, in order to 
prevent it (prospectively)  42 is one of the three distinctive features of enemy criminal 
law  43.
The introduction of terrorist inchoate offences and the criminalisation of preparatory 
acts with a terrorist purpose has been regarded as exceptional and legitimised by the 
fact that such measures are temporary and target only terrorism-related activities and 
specific groups of people. The description of anti-terrorism powers as temporary 
emergency measures facilitates their acceptance. The notion of “normalisation” 
describes a process through which emergency measures prompted by extraordinary 
events become institutionalised over time as part of the ordinary criminal justice 
system, long after the circumstances that initiated them have disappeared  44. The 
theory of “normalisation” does not claim that the adoption of extraordinary powers is 
41 See S. Braum, “Are we heading towards a European form of ‘enemy criminal law’? 
On the compatibility of Jakob’s’ conception of ‘an enemy criminal law’ and European criminal 
law” in this same publication; G. JaKobs, “Terroristen als Personen im Recht?”, Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 117, 2006, p. 839; A. Gamberini and R. Orlandi, Delitto 
Politico e diritto penale del nemico, Bologna, Monduzzi, 2007; M. Donini and M. PaPa, Diritto 
Penale del nemico, Milano, Giuffrè, 2007; C. G. Jara diez, “Enemy combatants versus enemy 
criminal law”, New Criminal Law Review, 11, 2008, p. 529.
42 This would represent an upheaval of the traditional function of the investigation and the 
trial meant to ascertain the commission of an offence and not to prevent it. 
43 The other features being the limitation or exclusion of procedural rights and the 
application of disproportionate sanctions if compared to similar provisions. 
44 See more on a process of normalization in D. BrocK, R. Raby, M.P. Thomas, Power and 
Everyday Practices, Toronto, Nelson Education, 2012, p. 2-33.
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necessarily inappropriate in response to exceptional events. The problem is that the 
powers introduced are unlikely to remain limited to the context of the fight against 
terrorism, or that they have a tendency to be applied beyond their original scope and 
thus become part of, and impact upon, the ordinary criminal justice system and law 
enforcement policies at large  45. The normalisation of extraordinary powers is also 
perilous because the new provisions become the standard of reference for the design 
of future policies  46.
7.	 Conclusion	
Governments continue to believe that a broader definition of terrorism and new 
preparatory and inchoate offences are proportionate responses to the phenomenon of a 
contemporary terrorism. In addition, the introduction of new offences is often justified 
by the need to implement international and European instruments. 
It must be accepted, of course, that the creation of inchoate offences is not a 
negative trend as such. As the borders open, technology and social risks evolve 
the criminal justice system has to follow. It is naive to expect that the traditional 
understanding by which only completed acts can be penalised would be able to deal 
with contemporary crime, such as organized crime and terrorist threats, by judicial 
means. It would have to rely on preventive administrative measures. The problem 
arises as for the necessity and proportionality of each measure.
However, such offences are, as shown above, problematic from different reasons 
which must not be disregarded despite the need for change. 
Firstly, they are an exception from the generally accepted criminal law standards 
and are being drafted in special circumstances, without being based on a coherent 
theoretical justification, but rather on the State of need and emergency. Despite the 
fact that the newly created anti-terrorist offences substantially digress from the well-
established criminal law standards, there is yet no coherent theoretical base on how 
such offences should be drafted and how they should be interpreted. Criminal law 
ought normally be restricted to offences which are likely to cause harm. Or it should 
target intentional acts only, other than an offence of recklessness. The legislator 
should go beyond the criminalisation of offences which are likely to cause harm only 
in serious cases within the reasonable limits constrained by requirements of a strict 
mental element. Attempts should be made in the drafting of new offences to keep the 
criminalisation of preparatory acts restricted to those which are close to the stage of 
execution of the intended offence. This would prevent an immoderate extension of 
criminal liability and be in compliance with the principle of legality. 
Secondly, the criminalisation of intentions that have not yet materialised would be 
against a fundamental criminal law principle that offences must address concrete acts 
45 O. Gross, “Chaos and rules”, Yale Law Journal, 112, 2003, p. 1011, at p. 1090; 
D. Dyzenhaus, “The permanence of the temporary”, in R. J. Daniels et al. (eds), The security 
of freedom, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2001.
46 See the examples of an use of an anti-terrorist legislation on people/groups who were 
obviously not terrorist: e.g. Maya Evans convicted under anti-terrorist law after refusing a 
police instruction to stop reading out loud the list of dead soldiers at the Cenotaph in Whitehall. 
B. Gibson, The New Home Office, Winchester, Waterside Press, 2007, p. 75. 
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or behaviours, and not mere ideas. In order to ensure compliance with the principle 
of legality (nulla poena sine lege, nulla poena sine culpa) and the principle of 
proportionality, there must be damage to the protected interest or harm for punishment 
to occur. This does not mean that inchoate offences can be regarded as George Orwell’s 
“thought crime”. There remains a requirement that the defendant’s blameworthy State 
of mind manifests itself by some words or conduct. However, since, in the case of 
terrorism, the actus reus is so broad, sometimes seemingly innocuous, it is important 
that inchoate offences are kept within reasonable limits by requirements of strict 
mens rea. Under new legislation, it is too frequently the case that sanctions are more 
severe than in ordinary cases  47. With regard to sentencing practice, offenders must 
in any case receive a lesser punishment than they would have received in the case of 
a completed offence.
Thirdly, there is a danger that such measures will be used for circumstances other 
than the one intended for and that the weak standards on which they are based will 
be used as a standard for future law drafting. This is a worst-case scenario in which 
all the above mentioned flaws would actually ‘flood’ the legal systems and change its 
nature. Such a State is surely not to be desired. 
In the end, it is difficult to object to the new developments, but the new solutions 
should be carefully considered, well-founded, concise, proportionate and reasonable. 
Only respecting those standards the new legislation trends will not endanger the 
democratic foundations of our societies. 
47 Particularly severe is the punishment of inchoate offences no matter what the actual 
or potential harm caused is. The mere participation in a terrorist organization is liable to a 
maximum charge of ten years of imprisonment (Article 270 bis Italian Codice Penale). This is 
even more significant given the fact that according to a strict interpretation of the general rule 
ex Article 115 Codice Penale preparatory acts cannot be punished unless the main offence is 
actually committed. In the United Kingdom the offences of “directing a terrorist organization” 
and engaging in “any preparatory act” is liable to imprisonment for life; the possession of an 




Tzu-lu said, ‘If the Lord of Wei left the administration of his State to you, what 
would you put first?’
Confucius said, ‘If something has to be put first, it is, perhaps, the correction of 
naming [zheng ming]’.
Tzu-lu said, ‘Is that so? What a roundabout way you take! (…)’. Confucius said, 
‘(…) When names are not correct, what is said will not sound reasonable’.
Confucius, Analects, 13.3 (transl. D. C. Lau, with an adaptation by Chong-
Ming Lim [italicised]).
The texts compiled in this volume provide a thorough analysis of the impact of 
European counter-terrorism legislation on the penal law systems of the Member States 
of the European Union (EU). The following considerations are intended as a brief 
reflection on some of the general trends and problematic issues identified therein.
1. It has been argued that the common definition of terrorism introduced by European 
law was essential for police, security and judicial cooperation between Member 
States in that it helped to build a common language and thus ensured mutual trust for 
cooperation  1. In fact, the most relevant effect of the Framework Decision 2002  2 
was to impose the duty to incriminate terrorist offences as such  3, since some of the 
Member States (perhaps even the majority) did not provide for any specific punishment 
for acts of terrorism  4.
1 See Roland Genson’s and Gilles de Kerchove’s contributions within this same 
publication. This argument was equally supported by Michele Coninsx in her oral contribution 
at the ECLAN conference.
2 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, 
OJ, no. L 164/3, 22 June 2002 (FD 2002).
3 But see the contribution of Martin Böse within this same publication, and the reference 
to the prevailing opinion in German legal literature, according to which the FD does not impose 
a specific consideration (and labelling) of terrorist offences as a separate set of crimes.
4 According to whittaker, only France, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom “had a 
specified legal definition” of terrorism in 2001. See d. J. whittaKer, The Terrorism Reader, 
London and New York, Routledge, 3rd ed., 2007, p. 288. The disparity between the laws of the 
different Member States reflected the different degree in which terrorism was perceived as an 
issue in the several cultural and historical contexts: see Gilles de Kerchove’s, Robert Kert’s, 
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However, after going through the presentations of the national rapporteurs, one 
might wonder whether the FDs of 2002 and 2008  5 actually led, or indeed could lead 
at all, to the implementation of a true common definition of terrorist offences: 
1.1 In the first place, the Member States did not all fully and accurately transpose 
the FDs. Belgian and Austrian legislation, for instance, might not punish the crime of 
provocation to carry out an act of terrorism where it is punishable by other laws. The 
former has not transposed the FD 2008 into domestic law yet  6 and the latter has not 
implemented that particular norm  7.
The same conclusion applies to the (non) transposition of the incrimination of 
‘terrorist groups’ into German law, since the Bundesgerichtshof [Germany’s Supreme 
Court] refused to widen the scope of the expression ‘criminal organisation’ through 
interpretation, so as to encompass plain membership in a terrorist group and thus 
comply with the definition provided in the FD 2002   8.
1.2 So far, it might be argued that the problem lies in the lack of full and accurate 
transposition of the FDs and that straightforward compliance with European legislation 
would put in place a common definition. However, the law of some Member States 
entails definitions of terrorism which are broader than the European ones, either 
because they already existed long before 2002  9 or because national legislators have 
‘over-implemented’ the FDs  10. Although ‘over-implementation’ (which is, in itself, 
a rather intriguing concept) can occur in other contexts  11, ‘over-implementation’ of 
European legislation on substantive criminal law is also a direct consequence of the 
Henri Labayle’s, John Spencer’s, Anne Weyembergh and Laurent Kennes’ contributions within 
this same publication. 
5 Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ, no. L 330, 9 December 2008, p. 21 (FD 
2008).
6 See Anne Weyembergh and Laurent Kennes’ contribution within this same publication. 
7 See Robert Kert’s contribution within this same publication. Austrian law has also 
restricted the scope of some offences (e.g., bodily harm and threats) in relation to the definitions 
of the FD 2002 (ibid.).
8 BGH Urteil vom 3. 12. 2009 − 3 StR 277/ 09, para. 43 and f.: see the contribution of 
Martin Böse within this same publication. 
9 See Henri Labayle’s, Manuel Cancio Meliá’s and John Spencer’s contributions within 
this same publication.
10 See Robert Kert’s, Katalin Ligeti’s and Jorn Vestergaard’s contributions within this 
same publication.
11 A good example of ‘over-implementation’ is the way in which Portuguese law draws 
the offence of financing of terrorism: where Article 2(1) of the UN International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) requires intent or actual knowledge 
that the funds provided are to be used to carry out terrorist offences, Article 5º-A of Portuguese 
Lei no. 52/2003, of 22 August (transposing FD 2002), as amended by Lei no. 25/2008, of 5 
June (implementing the UN Convention), deems it sufficient that one knows that the funds 
can be used for that purpose. Obviously, the norm must be construed restrictively, or it would 
otherwise lead to obnoxious consequences: since every individual that makes a bank deposit 
is aware that financial institutions can engage, albeit unknowingly, in murky business with 
terrorist groups (that is indeed the reason underlying accounts freezing orders), and as it is not 
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so-called ‘minimum rules’ scheme that continues to limit the legislative competence 
of the Union, even under the new Treaties. The EU can set the definition of minimum 
punishable conduct but cannot prevent Member States from adopting broader 
incriminations or harsher penalties  12. 
Therefore, the ‘minimum rules’ competence also accounts for the lack of a true 
common definition of terrorism and, ultimately, makes it virtually impossible.
1.3 Hence, Member States share now, at most, a common core notion of terrorist 
offences and the FDs have significantly contributed to building that up. It is a positive 
development that cooperation has reportedly improved on the basis of that core 
notion.
2. Alongside this core notion of terrorist offences, European antiterrorism legislation 
has had other impacts:
2.1 The FDs have imposed on Member States the duty to expand the ambit of 
protection provided by their penal law systems in order to encompass the Union itself 
(its institutions, bodies and agencies) as well as the other Member States together with 
their nationals and residents. Such expansion is a paradigmatic concretisation of the 
idea of a common area of freedom, security and justice. 
Indeed, this is a most legitimate claim of the EU and it filled in gaps that were 
plainly unacceptable. In the past, a terrorist offence committed in the territory of 
one Member State against the EU or against another Member State might not fall 
under the former’s law because most States traditionally perceive terrorism to be 
an offence against their own inner security or public peace. Therefore, in the past, 
those offences would be prosecuted and tried, in the forum loci delicti – if at all –, 
as common murders, taking of hostages, etc., which would probably prevent other 
Member States from exerting their jurisdiction and applying their antiterrorist laws, 
given the interpretation of non bis in idem by the European Court of Justice in Van 
Esbroeck (same material acts)  13. Consequently, those terrorist acts, as such, might 
remain unpunished.
2.2  The protection of third States intended by the FDs is quite broad. On the one 
hand, it is a positive achievement that the FD 2002 took a formal approach and did not 
require that those States be democratic or abide by the rule of law  14. The protected 
required that the funds are actually used to carry out terrorist offences, virtually everybody 
would be perpetrating the offence of financing of terrorism by simply owning a bank account.
12 P. caeiro, Fundamento, Conteúdo e Limites da Jurisdição Penal do Estado. 
O Caso Português, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2010, p. 438 and f., and p. 566 and f.; see 
also Emmanuel Barbe’s  contribution within this same publication. Upholding the opposite 
opinion, see H. G. Nilsson, “How to combine minimum rules with maximum legal certainty?”, 
Europarättslig Tidskrift, 2011, p. 665, especially at p. 673.
13 ECJ, 9 March 2006, Judgment C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, ECR, p. I-2333 § 25 f.
14 See Sabine Gless’s contribution within this same publication. But see, in a different 
direction, Jorn Vestergaard’s contribution, and the negative definition of terrorism brought into 
Austrian law so as to exclude from the ambit of terrorist offences the acts that “aim to establish 
or re-establish democratic or constitutional order or to exercise or protect human rights”, 
which is intended to refer, in particular, to “acts (e.g. by political opposition groups) which 
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legal interest is not the State as such – which would possibly call for a restriction of 
the protection to ‘worthy’ States – but rather, ultimately, the peace that the populations 
should enjoy. On the other hand, if we admit that terrorism is not an international 
crime under customary law (save for terrorism as a war crime or as a crime against 
humanity)  15, the extension of Member State jurisdiction to terrorist offences 
committed by third country nationals against third States outside the European territory 
is difficult to justify, even if the perpetrators have their residence in Europe. Extending 
Member State jurisdiction as above might also violate international law (illegitimate 
intervention)  16 since the lex loci might not punish the concrete act at stake, especially 
when we bear in mind some of the acts that European law criminalises and how close 
they can be to the exercise of certain rights and freedoms. 
3. It is clear that the EU was entitled to approximate Member State laws on the 
definition and punishment of terrorism and, in doing so, it certainly fulfilled its duties. 
However, the EU seems to have followed Member States’ traditions in this field by 
legislating immediately after terrorist attacks, as States usually do, and in a hasty 
manner that raises just criticism. Why does the legislation on terrorism vary so easily 
in time and space?
The answer is, of course, that terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon that takes on 
ever-changing and multifarious forms  17. That is also the reason why, as distinct from 
international core crimes, no universally agreed definition of terrorism has ever been 
reached. And yet, in no other field is there such a strong push to label prohibited acts 
with a precise official name. Is it not interesting that Article 1(1) FD 2002 explicitly 
imposes on MS the specific duty to deem the designated acts as ‘terrorist offences’  18? 
What is the reason for this obsession with a name? Obviously, the special moral blame 
(terrorist offences are graver than the underlying acts of murder, violence, etc.) and 
the simplification of references in other legislative acts: ‘terrorist offences’ becomes 
a single, homogenous category, dealt with through a uniform set of rules  19. The 
author of a cartoon that is interpreted as glorifying the attack on the twin towers can be 
subject to the same investigative techniques  20 and prosecuted, tried and convicted 
are committed in non-democratic societies outside the European Union and which must be 
adjudicated in Austria”, with all the consequences this has on the principle of legality / lex certa 
(Robert Kert’s contribution).
15 See, e.g., g. werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., The Hague, 
TMC, 2009, p. 30, marginal number 85; but see, opposing, a. Cassese, International Criminal 
Law, Oxford, OUP, 2nd ed., 2008, p. 162 and f.
16 See K. ambos, Internationales Strafrecht, Muenchen, Beck, 3rd ed., 2011, p. 23, p. 41, 
mn. 40.
17 The new feature introduced by what could be grossly designated as “al-Qaeda linked 
terrorism” seems to be its “intangibility”: “one never knows who one’s enemy is” (J. habermas, 
in G. Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror. Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 29).
18 “Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts 
referred to below in points (a) to (i), (...) shall be deemed to be terrorist offences”.
19 See Emmanuel Barbe’s and Gilles de Kerchove’s contributions within this same 
publication. 
20 See Robert Kert’s contribution within this same publication. 
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under the same procedural rules, restrictions of rights, etc. that would apply to the 
perpetrators of the attack themselves. This is all by virtue of the magic word that 
serves as an ‘anchorage point’  21: the label ‘terrorist offence’. Given that the degree 
of harm caused by each of the offences mentioned is not comparable, we cannot avoid 
asking the question: How did we get here? 
The magnitude of recent terrorist offences and the prevailing “culture of fear” are 
the main reasons. They paved the way for the irrational and otherwise inconceivable 
legal levelling of the cartoonist and the mastermind of a devastating large-scale 
bombing. Nevertheless, due to the very different nature of their acts, the legitimacy 
of such homogenisation requires a stronger basis, which has been found, ultimately, 
in a sort of new Tätertyp [type of perpetrator] doctrine  22. The legal treatment of 
terrorists does not relate primarily to the offences committed or the harm caused, 
but rather to what offenders are, or are assumed to be  23, and the threat they pose 
to society. Let us look with more detail into this combination of perpetrator-centred 
approach and risk prevention.
3.1 Arguably, laws are no longer meant to work to prevent terrorist acts as criminal 
offences. Rather, they are intended to control terrorists, conceived as an absolute them, 
as opposed to us. Indeed, when a given society criminalises any type of conduct, there 
is always an implicit them underlying the circle of addressees of the penal norm since 
the prohibition relies, precisely, on a general commitment not to engage in illegal 
behaviour. 
However, it is likely that one of us will someday be in breach of a prohibition and 
will perpetrate an act of fraud, a sex crime, manslaughter or even murder. 
In that case, we want to be treated decently and therefore our representatives pass 
laws to make sure that no State intervention occurs before our behaviour jeopardises 
society’s or third party interests. In addition, penal norms must be clear-cut and precise 
in their meaning; our right to be informed of the charges must be respected and the 
evidence against us must be examined by an impartial court.
These requirements do not have to apply when we are legislating on terrorists  24. 
Whereas a physical barrier between them and us simply cannot be built in Europe, it 
seems that a symbolic, spiritual fence, made of legislation, is being erected to target 
specific groups. That does not necessarily mean that a Feindstrafrecht  25 approach 
to terrorism is being followed. More simply, the aim of legislating on terrorists is 
not to create mechanisms that enable society to respond to their offences (e.g., by 
claiming, through punishment, that the violated norm is in force in spite of the offence 
21 See Jorn Vestergaard’s contribution within this same publication.
22 g. dahm, Der Tätertyp im Strafrecht, Leipzig, 1940.
23 m. cancio meliá, in G. JaKobs and M. cancio meliá, Derecho Penal del Enemigo, 
Madrid, Thomson, 2003, p. 94 f.
24 See Christophe Marchand’s contribution on the use of secret evidence within this same 
publication.
25 As it is well known, this controversial concept has been developed by Günther Jakobs 
since 1985: see g. JaKobs, “Kriminalisierung im Vorfeld einer Rechtsgutverletzung”, ZStW,	97, 
1985, p. 753 and f., and the discussion in G. JaKobs and M. Cancio meliá, Derecho Penal del 
Enemigo. See also Stephan Braum’s contribution within this same publication.
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committed) but rather to identify them as such before they can violate those norms. As 
distinct from common criminal law, prevention (meaning deterrence)  26 is no longer 
used to signify the goal of punishment  27. Instead, prevention describes police activity 
stricto sensu, i.e., the development of strategies to prevent risk from materialising into 
damage (prevention as in Präventionsstaat  28 [Prevention State]).
3.2 Given the magnitude of the threat posed by terrorists as a general category of 
people (not necessarily by every terrorist offence), it is not surprising that formal 
agencies of crime control enjoy exceptional powers of surveillance, investigation 
and use of secret evidence. Such powers are coupled with the exceptional levels of 
incrimination of preparatory acts, assistance (a form of participation possibly more 
tenuous than complicity)  29, provocation, training, recruitment, glorification of 
terrorist acts and their perpetrators and even certain constructions of the crime of 
terrorist association where simple ideological adherence suffices to materialise the 
crime  30 so that investigation and surveillance can start as early and extend as far as 
possible.
Incriminating preparatory and accessory acts  31 is useful because it grants the 
police the necessary powers to identify and stop terrorists beforehand. It also provides 
the legal basis for keeping them under control. If police activity is fruitful and terrorists 
are actually prevented from causing damage and spreading terror, they cannot just 
be set free. Thus, those incriminations allow for the application of penalties that do 
not really correspond to the rather modest harm caused by the offence. They are, 
in substance, pre-criminal security measures that serve the purposes of rendering 
the terrorist innocuous and available for the authorities as a source of information 
for a period of time  32, circumventing, by the same token, objections that might be 
raised against administrative preventive detention  33. Indeed, the purpose of keeping 
26 See a. ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 5th 
ed., 2006, p. 16: “(...) one fundamental reason for having a criminal law backed by sanctions is 
deterrent or preventive: (...)”.
27 As argued by Michele Coninsx during her oral presentation at the ECLAN conference. 
28 See, e.g., s. huster and K. rudolPh, “Einleitung”, in S. huster and K. RudolPh 
(eds.), Vom Rechtsstaat zum Präventionsstaat, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2008, p. 12 and f.; 
P.-a. albrecht, Die vergessene Freiheit, 2nd ed., BWV, 2006, p. 45 and f.; and a. hofmann 
and b. zängerling, “Innere Sicherheit und Präventionsstaat. Herausforderungen durch den 
internationalen Terrorismus”, available at <http://fzk.rewi.hu-berlin.de/inneresicherheit.
pdf> (last visited 11 March 2012). On the pervasive obsession with risk prevention, see also 
c. shearing and P. stenning, “From the Panopticon to Disney World: the development of 
discipline”, in A. N. Doob and E. L. GreensPan (eds.), Perspectives in Criminal Law: Essays in 
Honour of John Ll. J. Edwards, Aurora, Canadian Law Book Inc., 1985, p. 335 and f.
29 See Francesca Galli’s contribution within this same publication. 
30 See Katalin Ligeti’s contribution within this same publication. 
31 See Katja šugman and Francesca Galli’s and Ulrich Sieber’s contributions within this 
same publication. 
32 The different nature of these sanctions was clearly perceived by Michele Coninsx, when 
she wondered during her oral presentation at the ECLAN conference, albeit in a more general 
context, what purpose the imprisonment of terrorists should serve.
33 See John Spencer’s contribution within this same publication. 
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terrorism control within the judicial system (as opposed to the administrative or 
military system) should be endorsed (both for the sake of fundamental rights and for 
the confirmation of the State’s exclusive authority to define a given act as criminal)  34, 
but the obvious question is: At what price? How far can the principles and categories 
of criminal law be stretched to accommodate the so-called “fight against terrorism”?
3.3 In a way, it could be said that some elements of antiterrorism legislation 
already substantiate a Feindstrafrecht approach but it seems that the current general 
mechanism created for terrorists owes more to the lineaments of the so-called “new 
penology” paradigm theorised by Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon  35. In fact, 
both theories, being quite different in many aspects, share nonetheless a common 
element – the depersonalisation of the individual. However, as far as terrorists are 
concerned, the idea is not only to neutralise dangerous ‘un-personal’ individuals (in 
the framework of Jakobs’s conception, the enemy keeps his individuality, which is 
indeed the basis that allows for his classification as such: de-personalisation is still a 
consequence of an undesired individual attitude, of his disposition, of his decision of 
self-exclusion from the legal polity)  36, but rather to assess the dangerousness of a 
targeted group and manage the risk posed by that group regardless of the particular 
acts or features of each individual  37. 
4. The early stage of State intervention leads to an overly broad scope of the relevant 
norms, which is exacerbated by the vague way in which European and domestic law 
phrase prohibited conduct. The rapporteurs brought some awkward instances of 
actual prosecution for terrorist offences  38. Indeed, the concern is even stronger when 
the extension of criminal liability puts in jeopardy a significant part of a country’s 
population, for particular reasons  39. Moreover, the dangers of criminalising acts of 
everyday life as discrete offences are self-evident. Laws that have been made for them 
could actually be applied to us. And there lies the ultimate paradox of antiterrorist 
34 See m. cancio meliá, in G. JaKobs and M. cancio melià, p. 97 and f., and Gilles de 
Kerchove’s contribution within this same publication. 
35 Compare m. feeley and J. simon, “The New Penology: notes on the emerging strategy 
of corrections and its implications”, Criminology, 30/4, 1992, p. 449 and f.; see also Gilles 
de Kerchove’s contribution and Katja šugman and Francesca Galli’s contribution on inchoate 
offences within this same publication. 
36 See g. JaKobs, in G. JaKobs and M. cancio meliá, p. 36 and f. But see, proposing 
a possibly different interpretation, m. cancio meliá, Los Delitos de Terrorismo: Estructura 
Típica e Injusto, Madrid, ed. Reus, 2010, p. 36 and f.
37 See m. feeley and J. simon, p. 455. The purposes and methods of the new penology 
are conceived to deal with (manageable) “common offenders” rather than terrorists, but both 
the risk-assessment approach and the prevalence of (group) profiles over (individual) faces 
adapt easily to anti-terrorist policies: see m. aJzenstadt and b. ariel, “Terrorism and risk 
management: The Israeli case”, Punishment & Society, 10/4, 2008, p. 355 and f. ; and Ulrich 
Sieber’s contribution within this same publication
38 E.g., the almost picturesque cases of the divorced fathers’ association and the flaming of 
two dustbins reported by Robert Kert in his contribution and the taking of hostages by inmates 
in a prison, to be traded against a pizza, reported by Katalin Ligeti’s in her contribution within 
this same publication. 
39 See Manuel Cancio Meliá’s contribution within this same publication.
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legislation: the most worrying of all criminal offences walks hand in hand with some 
of the most cherished freedoms in western culture (association, expression, etc.), and 
not even the State can always tell them apart in the face of its own law  40. It is quite 
odd that the European legislator, while fighting such a heinous kind of criminality, 
feels the unusual need to assert that the instruments at stake respect fundamental 
rights and cannot be interpreted as being intended to restrict them  41.
In a nutshell, it seems clear that the main criticism raised and shared by all national 
rapporteurs relates to the fact that antiterrorist legislation throughout Europe is largely 
overly broad. Maybe the responsibility for that is to be shared between Member States 
and the European Union. 
It is not likely that the FDs will be reshaped in a way that proves more consistent 
with general principles of criminal law, especially the principles of harm and 
proportionality. It is probable that the EU does not even have the competence, under the 
current version of the Treaty, to reduce the scope of its own provisions on substantive 
criminal law – and that would be, in any case, most undesired at a political level. 
Therefore, in the near future, citizens’ rights and freedoms in the realm of 
antiterrorism can expect little from the European legislator (except, perhaps, as 
regards procedural rights). The defence against their possible violation seems to lie 
now with the courts (including the European Court of Justice). Maybe the courts can, 
in their decisions, hold that Article 1(2) of the FD 2002 and Article 2 of the FD 2008 
contain actual, binding norms and not just pious intentions or useless reminders of the 
States’ obligations in this field.
40 See Christophe Marchand’s and Anne Weyembergh and Laurent Kennes’ contributions 
within this same publication.
41 “This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they emerge 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States as principles of Community 
law. The Union observes the principles recognised by Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European 
Union and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably 
Chapter VI thereof. Nothing in this Framework Decision may be interpreted as being intended 
to reduce or restrict fundamental rights or freedoms such as the right to strike, freedom of 
assembly, of association or of expression, including the right of everyone to form and to 
join trade unions with others for the protection of his or her interests and the related right 
to demonstrate” (10th recital of the Preamble of FD 2002); “This Framework Decision shall 
not have the effect of altering the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental 
legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union” (Article 1(2) of 
FD 2002); “This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of requiring Member States to 
take measures in contradiction of fundamental principles relating to freedom of expression, 
in particular freedom of the press and the freedom of expression in other media as they result 
from constitutional traditions or rules governing the rights and responsibilities of, and the 
procedural guarantees for, the press or other media where these rules relate to the determination 
or limitation of liability” (Article 2 of FD 2008). On the ‘unease’ caused by the felt need to 
insert such clauses in the European legislation, see a. miranda rodrigues, O Direito Penal 
Europeu Emergente, Coimbra Editora, 2008, p. 219.
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